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ABSTRACT 
This thesis traces indigenous social and economic developments 
among the Akan and the incorporation of the territory known as the Gold 
Coast into the international world economy up to 1930. The focus for the 
thesis is threefold: developments and conflicts within the Akan social. -, 
formation itself, pressures and demands by social classes in Europe calling 
for greater and new forms of contact with the Gold Coast and also, perhaps 
more importantly, processes which were the outcome of struggles and con- 
flicts between the European colonisers and the indigenous residents on 
the Gold Coast. 
To assess the full nature of the political, social and economic 
pressures linked to the incorporation of the Gold Coast into the economies 
of Europe, we begin the thesis by sketching in an, account of the early 
contact indigenous Akan social formations. We then trace and try to 
characterise the differentstages of colonisation and the different demands 
by Europe for gold, slaves and indigenous cash crop production, and how the 
outcome of these European demands were largely determined by the nature of 
indigenous class struggles, and not simply by the wishes of actors in the 
so-called 'centre'. The extent and nature of indigenous slavery is 
explored with specific focus both upon Akan state formation, and how the 
Atlantic slave trade represented a change in the demands of Europe from 
gold to labour to work in the Caribbean, and that at that stage of history 
to acquire sufficient labourers the Europeans were dependent upon indigenous 
forms of capture and reproduction of slave labour. We examine why, at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, Europe returned to demand gold and cash 
crop production from the Akan and how this led to the formation of formal 
colonialism, which in its early stages was dependent upon indigenous 
relations of production and reproduction. We then trace the development 
I 11 
of a colonial capitalist political economy on the Gold Coast; the 
'policy' of indirect rule and the two processes of commercialisation 
and commoditisatiOn of Akan land and labour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why yet another thesis on the Gold Coast might be the question 
raised by anyone at all familiar with African history? At the outset 
the point must be made that this work is not in fact a history. This 
is a contribution to understanding the political economy of colonialism 
and its effects upon an occupied territory. Within this broad framework 
our specific focus is upon an examination of the processes, particularly 
the political and social, underpinning the early impact of European 
capital; on the Gold Coast and in Asante, having first looked briefly 
at the nature of pre-colonial African society on this part of the 
West African littoral. 
Throughout this thesis we draw heavily upon much written and 
published materials. We also use new oral data collected in 1980 
together with archival materials on formal British colonialism in the 
colony after 1874. 
The central concern of this thesis is to draw out the themes 
and issues which for so long have either been neglected or left implicit 
in much of the written history of Ghana. We do this in two ways. 
First, by adopting the approach of 'longue dureel (1) and second, by 
situating our work within a materialist problematic. The longue duree 
in our study in fact covers six centuries. In doing so our intention 
is to place the minutiae of detailed political events backstage so that 
we may develop an understanding of the slow, long term changes that 
occurred on the Gold Coast. We try to uncover what one writer sees 
as underpinning the "shifts and changes of political events". We try 
in fact to: 
(1) See Fernand Braudel ' Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, Translated by Marian Kochan, (London: Weidenfield and Nic n, 1973). 
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reveal the stable, almost undestructible system 
of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, 
the constant readjustments the underlying tendencies 
that gather force, and are then suddenly reversed 
after centuries of continuity, the movements of 
accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent 
motionless-bases that traditional history has covered 
with a thick layer of events (1). 
The particular processes considered here are to do with the increased 
incorporation of the territories of the Gold Coast into an increasingly 
more dominant international capitalist economy. In tracing these 
processes we do not view indigenous Africans as passive objects of 
inevitable historical laws created by the Europeans. Instead, we look 
at the actions of indigenous groups in determining their own future. 
We also recognise, however, that as our main concern is with assessing 
the processes associated with the Gold Coast's increased contact with 
Europeans, the development of merchant capital and the later transition 
to 'legitimate' trade, there is an inbuilt bias to the thesis which 
links, and may. even subordinate our understanding of indigenous social 
to say that the early processes to colonial. contact. This is not 1. 
informal colonisers or even later occupiers-of the Gold Coast came 
with a grand design for a new Gold Coast society. It will soon become 
clear that no such blue-print for the territory ever existed. Instead, 
the tale of British colonial 'policy' on the Gold Coast was one of 
constant muddle and confusion resulting from a series of conflicts in 
Britain, and on the Coast, which largely reflected different class 
interests among the colonisers and the colonised. But this is to run 
ahead of the 'story'. Suffice to say here that the activities of the 
European merchants and colonisers on the Gold Coast reshaped what 
existed in the territory but this transformation owed as much to the 
(1) Michel Foucalt, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (London- Tavistock 
Publications, 1974, p. 3). 
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internal dynamic, actions, and reactions of the indigenous inhabitants 
as it did to European initiatives. We recognise, therefore, the need 
to assess the nature and composition of the indigenous social 
formation in acquiring a sufficiently clear idea of the impact of 
colonialism on the Gold Coast. 
Thus we see the crucial need to combat any implicit Eurocentrism 
and focus on transformations within the Akan social formation. We do 
this historically by teasing out from the material in particular the 
processes of commoditisation of labour and land that occur and class 
formati on. We seek a bal ance in the treatment of thi s materi al , between 
the processes at work underpinning merchant capital in Europe and its 
presence on the coast, with the indigenous African developments including 
the role of merchant capital in Asante. We begin the thesis witha tentative 
analysis of early state formation in Asante and a brief account of the 
possible way production was organised prior to and during the early contact 
with Europeans. This precedes an account of different views of the development 
of merchant capital in Europe and the earliest forms of the incorporation 
of the Gold Coast into a European dominated international economy. 
The second way in which we examine the themes and issues in 
Akan political economy differently from previous Gold Coast historial 
writings is by working within an historical materialist problematic. 
We trace briefly what this, means in a moment. African historiography 
has for a long time been concerned with elevating the 'events' of 
African society to the level of European history. This is to say 
the preoccupation of many writers has been to show that African 
societies have a past,, and that it was as intricately complex and 
sophisticated as early European civilisations. The basis of this 
4 
position is empiricism-and the method of 'counterfactual isation' (1 
Thus writing about Asante history has persistantly stressed the 
modernity of nineteenth century Kumase life and its similarity to 
life in Europe (2). This view of developments in Asante contrastsý 
with the writings of nineteenth century colonial officials, who 
although they often recognised the intricacies of Asante life, never- 
theless saw it as primitive, and in no way resembling the civilised 
worlds of London and Paris (3). How could it be that views of different 
writers, albeit writing in different ages, have two very dissimilar 
ideas on life in nineteenth century Asante? The answer lies with the 
method of the historian and to a lesser extent in the material she/he 
uses. 
Scanty evidence on the Akan social formation has been supple- 
mented in recent years, with the help of new forms of data col 1 ecti on, and anal 
These have included-the use of oral tradition, archaeology and 
anthropology (4). Despite the increased collection and assimilation 
(1) This extends also to what mightbe called Ghanaian nationalist history. 
See for example, Francis Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy 
in the Gold Coast, 1868-1900: A st in the forms and-force of protest 
(London: Longman, 1971) and also the more recent work by Ivor Wilks, 
especially the immense volume , Asante in the Ni-neteenth Centuýx, the 
structure and evolution of poli order, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 19/b). On'counterfa-c-tuat-Tisation' see, H. Bernstein 
and J. Depelchin, 'The Object of African History: A Materialist 
Perspective', Part One, History in Africa, 5,1978. On different 
conceptualisations of Af'rican historiography see inter alia, Thomas 
Hodgkin, 'Some Problems of African Historiography', -'R'isfo-ry WorkshiR, L 
13,1979, and Tore Linne Erikson, 'ýiodern African History: Some 
Historiographical Observations', Scandinavian Journal of 4, 
1979. 
(2) 1. Wilks o 
(3) For exam; le, 
*J. Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee, (London: 
Cass, 1824). 
(4) See, for example, a selection of the large output of research and 
documentation on the Akan by staff and students at The Institute of 
African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, in the last twenty 
years. 
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of 'raw data' on the Akan, which has reduced the difficulties with 
working from a shortage of historical evidence, problems with 
recent writing on the Akan social formation still persist. The 
difficulty with much 'nationalist' writings and writers (1) has 
been the continued assumption that the material (albeit newly discovered) 
speaks for itself. In other wordsthere is an implicit assumption in 
recent historiography of the Akan that 'the historical evidence',, and 
the working of it, is objective and unbiased. All an historian of 
Ghana has to do to write the history of colonialism in Ghana is to 
provide sufficient data to show that an event occurred or did not occur. 
In contrast to this position, our position is that the writing 
of history and of political economy,, is not a question of simply 
uncovering the historical facts which exist in the 'real' world 
divorced from, amongst other things, the ideological concerns of the 
author. In other words the historian or political economist brings 
to bear on the information which he/she gathers a set of ideas which 
. 
have already shaped and determined the information and data she/he 
decides to collect, and those facts which are thought to be 'significant' 
Previous writing on Asante and the Gold Coast (2) has been 
largely within a certain empiricist problematic. This is in contra- 
distinction to the present work which locates its analysis within an 
(1 A selection of these writers might include: F. Agbodeka, op. cit., 
J. K. Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbours, 1700-1807, (London: 
Longman, 1971), E. Reynolds, Trade a-n--cT-Economic Change on the 
Gold Coast, 1807-1874, (London: Longman, 1974). 
(2) The excep is the work done by E. Terray, which in fact relates 
to a neighbouring kingdom. For example, see, 'Classes and Class 
Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman', translated by 
Anne Bailey, in M. Bloch, (editor), Marxist Analysis and Social, 
Anthropology, (London: Malaby Press, 1975). 
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historical and materialist framework. The term problematic (1) refers 
to the method of study: 
Its components include both a set of concepts and 
a set of rules or procedures which govern both the 
construction of concepts and their employment in 
analysis (2). 
The problematic of any social scientist determines the very 
questions which are posed, and thus the answers to them, which are 
not given solely by the 'facts' themselves or by the feelings of the 
researcher. In other words a problematic indicates the object of 
knowledge and also the concepts used in the study of it. 
What bearing do these observations have on this piece of work? 
The importance of the term problematic lies with our comment that 
previous writings onAhe Gold Coast have as their object of study the 
reification of facts, which speak for themselves. A second character- 
istic of much writing on the Gold Coast is the concern with surface 
political phenomena, like institutions of government, rather than 
with the social production of life (3). In contrast, our analysis 
attempts to locate the workings of the Asante social formation, 
together with the development in European contact on the coast, within 
the production of material and human life together with an analysis 
of the consequent relationships between people: both areas of concern 
L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading CaRital, translated by 
Ben Brewster (London: New Left-Teview Editions, 19/0), and, 
H. Bernstein and J. Depelchin, op. cit., and Part II, History in 
Africa, 6,1979. - (2) H-79'ernstein and J. Depelchin, op. cit., Part One, p. 9. 
(3) This criticism of an emphasis upon political events and 
institutions may be extended to more recent nationalist - 
histori- 
ography of the Gold Coast. In addition to the examples cited at 
footnote 1 page 4 above, see David Kimble, A Political History 
of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism., (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963). 
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are embodied in the Marxist concepts of mode of production and social 
formation. The concept mode of production is used at a level of 
abstraction that does not relate to any specific empirically observable 
phenomena but, "has a theoretical function and validity independent 
of any given set of concrete circumstances" (1). The premi se of our 
position is that any analysis of society must begin with production 
in general because this is itself the premise of human existence. 
Our project is to apply the concept of mode of production to the 
period under study through the application of materialist categories 
of analysis which relate to the constitutive parts of the concept mode 
of production. Thus we speak of relations of production, productive 
forces and political and ideological relations between classes. These 
concepts are applicable to the concrete, historical entities of the 
Gold Coast and Asante social formations. The latter term denotes: 
... the concrete compl ex whol e compri si ng e conomi c 
practice political practice and ideological practice 
at a certain place and stage of development. 
Historical materialism is the science of social 
formations (2). 
Our criticism of much previous work on the Gold Coast and Asante 
is that its object of study has been superf i ci al . The concern of 
historians of the Gold Coast has been largely to trace historical 
events divorced from any theoretical understanding of the social 
(1 This point is made to differentiate the Marxist position from empiricis, 
See Bernstein and Depelchin op-cit-, part 1, p. 5. This follows from the 
method which Karl Marx employýd in Capital volumes 1-3 where a theory 0 
capitalist mode of production is pro-O'de-T-which can be applied to 
pe and North America but which is not derived capitalism in Eur,, or 
empirically from any one cas(ý study. Where empirical material is 
included in Marx's work it provides support for theoretical proposition! 
of the work. 
(2) L. Althusser, Glossary. For Marx, (London: Allen Lane The Penguin 
Press, 1969). The usefu'T-ness of the concept social formation i's 
discussed further in Chapter One below. 
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processes linked to the dominant political economy of the period. 
Concern with telling the story of colonialism with more recently 
uncovered evidence has been the error also of so-called 'nationalist' 
historians. These writers have often reacted against colonial 
histories of their countries, and the tradition of European anthropological 
investigation, by resorting to the discovery of new historical facts of 
the period under study. Our point is that although it is clear on the 
one hand that much of the Gold Coast's past remains unwritten, it is 
equally true thatin. order to fill in the gaps, the author requires a 
method of analysis not simply rooted in counterfactualisation)but in 
the development of a theoretical framework which is grounded in the 
production and reproduction of the specific society being studied. This 
does not mean that all we have to do is reinterpret old data. On the 
contrary. Because much of the Gold Coast's history has been written 
from a non-materialist problematic much of the data will have been 
fetishized. Where information has been gleaned from anthropological 
material, for example, and relations between people are described 
the description more often than not refers to reified juridical or 
legal relationship rather than recognising that relationships are 
determined by the production of material life (1). 
We will trace in a moment the other difficulties with the 
empirical material. For the moment though let us recap. This work 
of poli. tical economy distinguishes itself from previous histories of 
the Gold Coast and Asante because of its method of analysis and the 
extensive time period that it studies. The advantage of this combination 
(1) See, Jacques Depelchin, 'Toward a Reconstruction of Pre-Colonial 
Central African History' , Ufahamu, Journal of the African Activist Association, 9,1,1979. 
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comes to the fore in the opening chapters with an assessment of the 
acceleration of African Slavery and the development of the inter- 
national slave trade on indigenous social formations. The slave 
trade has of course been the subject of numerous studies, but seldom 
has the transport'in people across the Atlantic been combined with 
an analysis of the effects on specific indigenous social formations: 
of the undermining and strengthening of different indigenous relations 
of production, and the processes set in train like the eventual 
commoditisation of land and labour, which culminates in the development 
of colonial capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century (1). 
Slavery in Africa, moreover, is seldom discussed in relation to 
indigenous change and development not related. to a global international 
dimension. 
Although much of the documentary evidence available for this 
thesis is of the fetishezed kind, that is, a product of anthropological 
and historical writings, the conclusions of which have been ideologically 
prescribed, it would be wrong to discount the usefulness of all previous 
history and historiography of the Gold Coast. As two observers have 
recently commented: 
while there is a radical break between the 
materialist problematic and those of bourgeois 
social thought, and while this break must be 
constantly reproduced from a materialist viewpoint, 
the relation to bourgeois thought cannot be one of 
comprehensive or uniform dismissal (2). 
In other words bourgeois historiography and anthropology, does have 
something to contribute to our understanding of the Gold Coast's 
political economy. After all, bourgeois historiography is the product 
(1) On this see Chapters 5 and 6. 
(2) Bernstein and Depelchin, op. cit., Part 2, p. 31. 
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of numerous pressures and advances within social science apart from 
%merely' the ideological elements of its problematic which we havemen- 
tioned above( 1). By this we mean that we can use much information that 
has been documented as long as this is used within the questions 
posed by a materialist framework. In addition, we recognise throughout 
this thesis the ideas central to bourgeois work but these are 
reformulated and adopted within the concepts derived from a Marxist 
problematic (2). One of the difficulties in doing this is to be aware 
of the problems implicit in using the materials of bourgeois social 
science. In using the documentary evidence of early anthropology, for 
example, we have to be alert to several ideological and methodological 
issues which could affect our judgement of the nature of European 
impact on the Akan and of Akan indigenous developments. 
AnthroDoloav and Colonialism 
Throughout the early part of the thesis we refer to the data 
collected by anthropologists. There are two major difficulties which 
have to be recognised in using this kind of material. The first is 
its link with colonial officials and thus the tendency to reflect the 
prevailing balance of power and views of colonial authorities, in 
particular to support local chiefly structures; the second refers to 
the difficulties in which African institutions and way of life were 
understood and conceptualised by the investigators of European origin. 
The latterprocess in which one cultural substance is transformed into 
another, that is African culture as seen by Africans is documented and 
(1) Ibid, p. 32. 
(2) TFiTsis very different from accepting a notion of synthesis 
between materialist and bourgeois writings. See, M. Castells and 
E. de Ipola 'Epistemological Practice and the Social Sciences', 
Economy and Society, 5,1976 especially pp. 140-41. 
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viewed by Europeans has been called 'transubstantiation' (1). 
The relationship between early anthropology and the colonial 
authorities is well known and the point will not be laboured here. 
Briefly, the turn of the nineteenth century witnessed the increased 
desire by colonial authorities to perfect the institutions of indirect 
rule. It was recognised increasingly that the only way to do this was 
to have a better understanding of the 'natives'. This phase in the 
development of anthropology was marked in the Gold Coast with the 
appointment of R. Rattray as head of the Anthropology Department in 
Ashanti in 1921, and by the establishment of the Ministry of Native 
Affairs in 1928. Earlier, two phases existed in the history of the 
development of anthropology where 'primitive' societies verging on 
extinction had been studied, in unison with, for example, anti slavery 
groups. A second phase was initiated where colonial authorities 
gradually recognised the importance of understanding local customs 
and mores. As Rattray was to comment having worked as government 
anthropologist in the Gold Coast for more than ten years: 
Sometimes with little real knowledge of Africa's past, 
history, tradition, legal code, constitutions, 
religion we have attempted to build up working plans 
of government for various regions, which are ostensibly 
based on native institutions but in reality are sometimes 
only our own western ideas of constitutional government 
under a thin disguise (2). 
The need to understand African society so as to be able to rule them 
more effectively, and better still to get them to. rule themselves in 
line with colonial structures, was recognised in London as early as 
(1) On this see, Theodore H. von Laue, 'Transubstantiation in the Study Of 
African Reality', African Affairs, 74,297,1975, and on the relation- 
ship between anthropology and colonial authorities see von Laue, 
'Anthropology and Power: R. S. Rattray among the Ashanti', African Affairý 
75,298,1976, and A. F. Robertson 'Anthropology and GoverrC5e_ntin_G_H_an_a7_ 
African Affairs 74,294,1975. 
(2) von Laue (1975),. op. cit., p. 42 quoting, The Leopard Priestess, (1935), p. 2 
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1894. In this year the President of the Rov. il African Institute 
urged the organisation to become what one writer has called a 
"clearing house for information about foreign peoples and (to) make 
this knowledge available for imperial purposes of commerce and 
rule" (1). 
As we have already mentioned, the use of anthropology in 
assisting government service in the Gold Coast became regularised with 
the appointment of R. S. Rattray to government service. It was from 
1921, and in the host of published work which followed especi-ally 
between 1923 and 1929, that the colonial 'presence in the Gold Coast 
was linked most strongly to the academic discipline of anthropology, 
a link which had its basis in the European notion that sufficient 
knowledge of their African subjects was needed to ensure the "workable 
articulaýion between traditional authorities and British administra- 
tion" (2). It is to an awareness of the methodology of anthropology, 
however, that we have to turn to recognise the major changes and 
difficulties which exist in using anthropological sources in this study. 
Rattray's major works are referred to throughout this thesis and 
they prove an invaluable source for early information on the ideology 
(1) 
(2) 
A. Mafeje, 'The Witchcraft of British Anthropology in Africa', 
Mimeo, n. d. p. 5. The evidence to support the ideological and 
5-ractical links between anthropology and the colonial authorities 
can be duplicated. For example, in 1903 a Professor Haddon of 
Cambridge and President of the IAS recognised that " ... a full knowledge of the local conditions and a sympathetic treatment of 
native prejudices would materially lighten the burden of government 
by preventing many misunderstandings and by securing greater 
efficiency would make for economy", quoted. in Mafeje, ibid., p. 5. 
It might also be noted that the School of Oriental StOdl-es, opened 
in London in 1917, changed its scope in 1938 to include African 
studies which increased links between academic anthropology and 
colonial administrators, on'this point, see von Laue, (1976), 22-cit., 
p. 35. 
von Laue, (1976), op. cit., p. 36. 
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of Asante Iife (1 ). We say i deol ogy because Rattray was open to many 
criticisms applicable to what has subsequently become known as the 
British school of social anthropology. These criticisms lay basically 
in the timelessness, the ahistorical treatment of societies by anthro- 
pologists and the reification, of early African institutions. Rattray's 
observations on African life in Asante did not go fu, ýther than a 
recognition of the dominant and prevalent ideas within Asante,, which 
sustained and ensured the reproduction of a dominant class of chiefs 
and elders. Rattray's appreciation for Asante life, and his desire 
to comprehend the complexity of the institutions of the Akan, led to 
a glorification of a society which was in fact based upon conflictual 
relations between people in their struggle to sustain themselves (2). 
This reification of the idyllic life of the Asantes, the 
supposed lack of private property and the communal bliss which this 
engendered, was based on the notion of the 'deity' in which the Asantes 
were seen to have so much fai. th. The reverence for the dead and for 
those as yet unborn was seen to consolidate the seeming lack of 
Asante concern for individual wealth. 
As we will see in the opening chapters of this worký the Asante 
situation vias quite different from how Rattray described it. Rather 
than an idealised communal bliss, Asante society was shot through with 
(1) See in particular, R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923)j 
Religion and Art in Ashanti, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), Thd 
Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19T2) 
Tshanti Law and Constituion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929). 
(2) Rattray therefore clearly did not reflect simply a colonial mentality. 
Indeed, his reification of different Asante institutions is very 
similar to that of later day 'nationalist' historians. See, for 
example, K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political 
System of Ashanti., (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1958), J. E. Casely 
Hayford, The Truth About the West African Land Question, (London: 
Frank Cass Company, 1971). , 
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conflicts between groups (classes) of chiefs and elders, who sought 
to sustain their positions of dominance which were located in their 
greater ability to accumulate wealth vis-a-vis commoners and women. 
Rattray gave support to the lie of harmonious family groups which 
was then transposed to greater social harmony at the level of the 
state (1). This is especially apparent in Rattray's work on Ashanti 
law and constitution (2) which could be utilised by the British in 
enhancing the latter's 'overlordship'. Rattray in fact concluded 
from this study, that the Asante had much to show the European about 
democratic relations between individual families and the state (3). 
What he did not do is thoroughly examine the relationships between 
people in Asante as relations between power holders. Society in 
Asante was perceived in terms of functional integration or what 
Durkheim called 'organic-solidarity' (4). For Rattray, integration 
or a notion of social equilibrium was the norm in Asante society, and 
any conflict or disintegrative phenomena that might raise its ugly 
head was abnormal. In short, Rattray's work translated into print 
the dominant ideological and often practical 'realities' from the point 
of view of the colonialists of African society. Rattray's work 
reflected the prevailing balance of power. This was for two, often 
contradictory reasons. First, because of his links with the colonial 
regime and second the method and procedure for understanding Akan 
society. 
(1) Von Laue, (1976), op. cit., p. 49. 
(2) Rattray, (1929), op. cit. 
(3) In doing so Rattray once more shows his ambivalent relationship between 
his role as a colonial official, and the need to impose colonial ideas of 
control, with his anthropological concern to recognise fully the nature 
of Asante society in its own terms. See ibid., p. 49. 
(4) See, for example, Emile Durkheim, The Div-i"s-ii-on of Labour in Society_, 
translated by G. Simpson, (London: Collier Macmillan, 1964). 
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The nature of Rattray's investigation into Asante life, largely 
through the use of informants, ensured the idealisation of Asante 
real i ty. Rattray's use of Twi did not wholly circumvent the use of 
translators and did not ensure that his informers would be free to 
comment about Asante society without restraint. Rattray, moreover, 
had a preoccupation with folklore (1) which resulted in a romantisation 
of the Asante, a role which did not merge too easily with his colonial 
job of finding ways of incorporating Asante institutions more closely 
into the British regime. 
Underpinning our criticisms of the writings of Rattray is the 
more fundamental difficulty that we recognise in understanding different 
cultures. This is that Rattray, like any outsider, inevitably failed to 
perceive the nuances of meaning present for the ASante in the areas 
which he documented, and what he did record was the ideological view 
presented by the dominant classes in Asante. Despite his use of the 
Twi language and his presence for many years in Asante, his position 
was always one of colonial official and this must inevitably have been 
perceived as such by the Asantes. Rattray's recorded observations were 
always those which he saw as important to record rather than those 
which the Asante themselves might have set special store in. This is 
not to say that Rattray's accounts of ceremonies and his- understanding 
of the significance of them is not important. His accounts provide 
useful information for us. The point is that this information has 
then to be set within a different problematic. In addition, we are 
often concerned with different information from that which became the 
focus for Rattray. Our preoccupation is with discovering the way in 
which the Asante produced the means of subsistance and exchange and 
(1) von Laue, (1976), op. cit., p. 40. 
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how this production was organised. We focus on this in our early 
chapters. Our search for different information and our reworking of 
Rattray's material, leads us to focus on the relations of production 
and reproduction in the Akan social formation. 
In levelling t4is criticism against Rattray we do not exempt 
ourselves from the problems involved in understanding non-European 
societies. The problems of transubstantiation are present in the work 
that follows. We hope, however, by premising our thesis with the 
observation that there has hitherto been little recorded African 
history, and much recording of 'events' in a westernised tradition, 
that some of the pitfalls of much of the published material can be 
avoided. By this we mean that no pretence is. made here to tell the 
'story' of Asante developments from the fourteenth century to the 
1930's. Although at different times we try to pull the 'narrative' 
together, our major concern is with developing theoretically a frame- 
work within which to situate the process of the Gold Coast's relations 
with Britain. The result is that we move between a social historical 
account of the so-called major events of the Gold Coast's colonial 
past, and the development of a different theoretical position for under- 
standing state and class formation in the Akan areas. An account of 
the interrelationship between the historical events and our theoretical 
understanding and situation of them is central to this thesis (1). 
This is not to say, however, that the theorisation of different 
periods of the Gold Coast's history is unproblematic. There are a number 
For a similar recent attempt at reducind the boundaries between 
history and the development of a Marxist theory of underdevelopment 
see, G. Kitchen, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making o 
an African Petite-Nou-r-ge'oisie 1905-1970,, (London: Yale University 
P re ss, TDIZT. - 
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of debates within the tradition of historical materialism which are 
concerned, among other things, with providing the tools of analysis 
for understanding non-capitalist societies, the conceptual isation of 
slavery and the transition ýto capitalism in Europe and elsewhere. 
We examine many of these debates in this thesis, and indicate the 
contentious nature of the different positions within the Marxist 
traditions of scholarship. In Chapter One, we situate the need to 
understand early contact Akan relations of production within the debates 
about modes of production and 'social formation', as useful concepts for 
clarifying and uncovering the social 'realities' of non-capitalist 
societies. In Chapter Two, we examine in detail the controversy 
surrounding the emergence, periodisation and character of an inter- 
national world economy. The third chapter raises once more the debate 
about slavery. This is examined not simply from the position of the 
Atlantic slave trade, and the question as to how many Africans were 
transported to the Caribbean, but rather from the position which slavery 
had within the indigenous Akan social formation and whether it is indeed 
useful to talk about a general category of slavery, or whether there were 
different forms of 'unfree' labour in Asante. In tracing the development 
of formal colonialism on the Gold Coast we show the inter-relation 
between legitimate trade and indigenous social movements within Asante. 
This discussion prepares the way for the final two chapters which discuss 
the commoditisation of land and labour in the Akan areas between ca. 1874 
and 1930 and contributes to the debate about the role of colonialism 
in undermining, in a very uneven way, indigenous relations of production. 
In other words, this thesis seeks to extract some of the central 
themes of Asante and Akan development in the five centuries between ca. 
1450 and 1930. We locate them within a specific problematic. This 
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problematic provides the tools for an historical and materialist 
analysis of the increasing incorporation of sections of the West 
African littoral within the orbit of the British dominated international 
political economy. The processes specifically examined are class 
formation and erosion, and the changing relations of production within 
Asante with specific reference to gold mining and cash crop production. 
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CHAPTER0NEI 
EARLY CONTACT AKAN-ASANTE SOCIAL FORMATIONS, 
I. IN'TRIODUCTION 
f 
I 
This opening chapter attempts to discuss further some of the 
issues raised in the Introduction as well as examine tentatively what 
might have been some of the factors associated with the emergence of 
state formation on the Gold Coast among the Akan. 
The issues extended from the Introduction relate essentially 
to the methodology employed iý this work and a discussionof some of 
the categories of analysis which are used throughout the thesis. 
Before we begin with this discussion however, we need first to try 
and define what we actually mean by the 'Gold Coast' throughout the 
long period up to 1930. 
I,. THE GOLD COAST SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
The Gold Coast in this study refers to the geographical 
area which became known as the Gold Coast Colony on the West African 
littoral bordered by the river Bandama to the West, the river Volta 
to the East and what became the forest kingdom of Asante in the North. 
Within this geographical area our focus of study are the people 
comprising the Akan. The Akan constitute what we have called above 
(1) a social formation, that is, "a historically concrete society 
whose structure, organisation, and_historical development were 
conditioned by specific systems (modes) of material production" (2). 
(1) Page 1. 
(2) -Ray A. Kea, Settlements, Trade, and Polities in the Seventeenth- 
Century Gold Coast, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1982), p. 1. 
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Although the Gold Coast was marked by a degree of spatial 
"I linguistic groupings (1) and a number heterogeneity - four princip'U 
of political units - it also contained a degree of spatial homogeneity 
with regard to social structure, forms of production and technology. 
It is because of this degree of similarity in relations of production,, 
extensive trade networks, the presence of markets, together with 
other factors of regional political economy that we view the Akan 
within the geographical area of the Gold Coast as a specific social 
formation. In addition we talk about an Asante social formation - 
which is also peopled by the Akan, see t1ap Two. We distinguish 
this socio-historic entity from the more general notion of the Akan 
because of the increasingly separate, but not unconnected, presence 
of the Asante forest kingdom in relations with the Gold Coast from 
circa 1700 (2). Despite the fact that the Asante social formation 
also shared common characteristics with the coastal Akan (Fante) the 
presence of the Asante state assumed such social, economic and 
military importance on the Gol'd Coast, both prior to and following 
formal British control, that we must and can only recognise its 
specificity by distinguishing it from the other Akan groups. 
Ih later chapters we also discuss briefly the Northern 
Territories and the interplay of groups in this geographical area 
with the Asante - (see Map One). We look, for example, at the 
encroaching colonial forces especially following the development of 
formal colonial authority in the Gold Coast Colony in 1874 and the 
British occupation of Asante (Ashanti) in 1900. 
(1) Volta Komoý, Gur, Central Togo (Ewe), Ga-Danme, see ibid_, p. 2. 
(2) The period around 1700 is widely seen to be important as reflecting 
the climax of the formation of the Asante state. See, for instance 
J. K. Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbours 1700-1807, (London: Longman, 1671). 
I. Wilks, Asante i the nineteenth century; the structure and evolution 
of a political order. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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111.01, ' [ION-CAPITALIST SOCIAL FORHATIOINS 
There are a number of different, but nevertheless related 
marxist perspectives on how to understand the historical, political 
and economic composition of pre-colonial and non-capital ist 
societies (1). The debate on African 'modes of production' has largely 
developed from a critique of the pioneering work of British and North 
American anthropologists who saw the need to establish a specific 
field of economic anthropologyjwhich did not simply use analytic 
concepts derived from neo-classical economic theory to study 'non- 
riodern' society. Tnstead, Bohannan and Dalton (2ý argued that 
notions of supply and demand and profit maximisation were inappropriate 
categories to understand African economies. Despite this, Bohannan 
and Dalton did recognise that one of the best ways in which we could 
conceptualise the developnent of 'non-modern societies' was by 
recognising the spread of the market and market exchanges throughout 
Africa. 
In critically appraising this position a number of French 
authors attempted to move the debate away from a concern with under- 
standing specific societies through the exchange of marketable 
products and distributive mechanisms generally. Instead, for a 
number of writers entrenched in what has been called the 'new 
economic anthropology' (3) the analysis of non-capitalist society has 
(1) For an introduction to some of the debates see, Robin Law, 'In search of 
.a marxist perspective on 
Pre -Co I on ial Tropical Africa' JAH 19,3,1978. (2) See their jointly edited volume, Harkets in Africa, ýC, ý-ic`aqo: North 
t4estern University Press, 1962). 
(3) See inter alia, J Clammer, The New Economic Anthropology, (London: 'elacmillan 
Press, 1978 , 
r'. -Terray, Long Distance Exchange and the Fo'rmation of the 
State: The Case of the Abron Kingdomof Gyamad, Economy and Society, 3,3,1974 
and ýOn Exploitation: Elements of an Autocritique', Critiq-u-e o)-T-T-nnthro olo L'2pý 
13-14,1979. In the same volume see the pieces by Oleillassouxli - istorlccI+a 
Modalities of the Exploitation andQverexploitation of Labour' and P-P-Rey, 
'Class Contradiction in Lineage Societies, also by Meillassoux Maidens, Meal 
and Money. Capitalism and the Domestic Community, (Cambridge: Uni-v-e-r-sity -ressl 
TgMTS-e-e aI so A. Fos ter-Cart-e-r-'76--Fodes of Production Controversy' , NLR 
107,1978. 
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been rooted in the concept of a mode' of production - even though the 
concern has often been to understand the significance of exchange 
within this structural concept. 
The concept of 'mode of production' has already been briefly 
discussed (1 ) and we are *not going here simply to reinvoke the 
debates within marxism of the early 1970's about the abstract theoretical 
validity of t he concept. These debates are alluded to at different 
times in this thesis and discussed In numerous review articles (2). 
Instead, what we want to do here is to indicate that there are a 
number of inadequacies k.., ith the explanatory value of the concept mode 
of production as it was classically conceived by Karl Marx (3). We 
will then introduce one aspect of the debate about the relevance of 
using a concept of modes of production in understanding non-capitalist 
societies and this will be with reference to the way in which pre- 
colonial and early-contact social formations ensured their reproduction. 
In other words we try to introduce here the notion that mode of 
production, conceived in simple economic terms, is an inadequate 
concept in itself if it does not incorporate also the social - as 
well as economic - reproduction of specific social formations. We 
then go on to look specifically at some of the debates within Akan 
studies as to how we can understand or conceptualise the relations 
between people in the early contact period of the Gold Coast between 
(1) See page 7 above. 
(2) For some of the more esoteric theQretical positions see, inter alia, 
B. Hindess & P. Hirst, Pre Capitalist Modes of Productio-n-, TLonU-on: 
Routledge Kegan Paul , 0'ý, and J. G. Taylor, From Moderni'sation 
to 
Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of v: § ýoment 
and Underdevelopment, (London: Macmillan, 19/9) , see also ninew, 'The Material of Reproduction: Anthropological Views on Historical 
Materialism and Kinship' , Economy and Society, 8,1 , -1979. (3) See for example, Karl Marx, Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, (London: 'Lawrence an-d-W-ishart, 1971) , p'ip. 
23 
circa 1600-1750. 
(a) Mode of Production 
The abstract concept which indicates a particular interaction 
between the development of the forces of production and reproduction 
on the one hand, with the social relations and the means of production 
on the other, is known in most marxist discourse as a mode of production. 
1his concept was perhaps the most central organising principle of the T 
work of Karl Marx. Indeed historical materialism became in large part 
the study of specific modes of production as they were translated in 
specific social formations. The premiss of most of Marx's analysis of 
historical societies, which were usually capitalist, was that the 
nature of the relationship between producers in the material production 
of life largely determined the character of a specific mode of 
production. Of particular importance for Marx was whether there was 
ownership or non-ownership of the means of production and by whom or 
what class was the surplus at any given historical moment appropriated 
and how? 
Harx recognised the possible transition of a number of different 
modes of production from primitive, ancient, slave, feudal capitalist 
and socialist but this possible development of stages should not be 
seen as teleological or necessary in a deterministic sense. Most 
of Marx's analyses of concrete social formations were concerned with 
the capitalist mode or the transition to it from feudalism. The chief 
characteristic of a feudal mode of production for Marx was the access 
ýy the labourer to the means of production - th't is land - which was 
possessed by a feudal lord, and the coercion of the labourer by the 
noble (lord) which facilitated the transfer of surplus by rent from 
a class of producers to a class of non-producers. In contrast, a 
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capitalist mode of production for Marx was most clearly defined in 
terms of the 'liberation' of the unfree labourer from access to the 
means of production. With capitalism, the labourer was usually 
separated from the land and he/she became a "free" wage labourer 
free to sell his/her labour power in the market place without 
political coercion from a dominant classýbut under the economic 
duress that if labour power was not sold he/she would starve. 
Political coercion was replaced by the coercion of the market. 
Although useful for understanding historical and social 
developments in Europe since the eighteenth century, Marx's concept 
of mode of production is fraught with difficulties if we want to 
apply it rigidly to non-capitalist pre-colonial Gold Coast societies. 
Indeed wte will see throughout this thesis that a concern only with 
the ownernship or non-ownership of the means of production is 
inadequate in locating the specific point of political power among 
the Akan. Instead, we will argue; inter alia that an understanding 
of relations between individuals in addition to the relations between 
individuals and the means of production is a more useful point of entry 
for examining the dynamics of political power in early contact Akan 
social formations. We will also suggest that relations of production 
I 
are an inadequate guide in themselves to understanding the nature of 
non-capitalist social formations. Instead, we need to examine a 
whole range of relations of social reproduction, the appropriation 
of agricultural and gold surpluses and the changing political 
positions of office within an emerging Asante state - but this is to 
rI un ahead of the story. 
The inadequacy of simply transposing Marx's discussion of the 
capitalist and feudal modes of production in understanding Africa's 
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past has been made by a number of French scholars, who in the 1960's 
began to re-examine Marx's own concept of the Asiatic mode (1). This 
was in fact renamed by S. Amin as resembling more a tributory mode 
(2). Briefly, these terms refer to societies where agricultural 
production was organised- individually or communally - Marx used India 
as the case - but where property rights in the means of production 
were vested in a ý; tate. There was no landowning class as such. In 
addition surplus generated from agricultural production was appropriated 
by tax either in kind or as forms of tribute and not as rent (3). 
Although there are similarities 41. -o be seen in the Akan social 
formation with this definition of the Asiatic or Tributary mode we 
will see shortly that there are also important differences. Indeed 
because of the differences largely relating to the specific relations 
of production on the Gold Coast, the specific site of production 
activities and the relations between a number of emerging states, 
and the direct producers, the Akan and Asante social formations can 
Probably be best Understood by talking about the articulation of a 
domestic mode of production with three servile modes (4).. We will 
argue, tentatively because the available material is limited and 
fragmentary, that there was a domestic mode of production which was 
(1) See, J. Suret-Canale, 'Les Societes traditionelles en Afrique tropicale 
et le concept de"mode production asiatique', La Pensee, 14 April 1964, 
Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, -t-ran-s-lated and edited 
by Eric Hobsbawm, (London: Lawrence and Wisha'rt, 1964) and Umberto 
Melotti, Marx and the Third World, (London: Macmillan, 1977), and 
Perry Anderson, Lineaýes of the Absolutist State, (London: NLB, 1974). 
(2) Samir Amin, Accu lation on a World Scale, (New 'York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1973). 
We can notp here that this line of argument has been pursued by 
C. Coquery-Vidrovitch and an alternative formulation postulated, namely 
an African moae of production where a bureaucracy appropriates surplus 
not through actively engaging in production but by engaging in long 
distance trade - see, 'Research on an African Mode of Production', in, 
G. W. Johnson and M. Klein (editors), Perspectives on an African Past, (Boston: Little Brown, 1972). 
(4) On articulation of modes of production see, A. Foster-Carter, op. cit., 
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inserted into a hierarchical social order where a class of chiefs 
(nobles) extracted surplus from commoners and slaves. Domestic 
mode contrasts with tributary or asiatic modes of production 
mentioned above which we will argue focus too much upon the realm 
of distribution and exchange, rather than in the processes and 
relations of production and reproduction. The term domestic is used 
here essentially as a heuristic device to see more clearly the nature 
of the articulated structure of a number of different sites of material 
production within early contact Akan-Asante society (1). 
The domestic mode of production was characterised as far as 
we can tell by agricultural and gold production performed by a class 
of commoners organised in 'household' and village units. Surplus 
labour was also appropriated at different times from these producers 
by a chiefly class in the form of cash - that is, gold - or products. 
T 1his appropriation, and the origins of the chiefly class, needs to be 
located in these relations of production as well as three further 
modes of production based upon servile relations but which could often 
be distinguished from each other by the different origins of the 
slaves. In one, slaves werecaptured from outside the Akan-Asante 
(1) This is not to be confused with 'domestic mode' as outlined by 
M. Sahlins in Stone Age Economics, (London: Tavistock Publications, 
1974) which is identified in socTeties where almost no surplus is 
produced and there is a non-hierarchical community of subsistence 
producing families. On the contrary, the Akan and Asante social 
formations seemed 
, 
to have been characterised by a hierarchical 
social order where a class of chiefs (nobles) extracted surplus 
from commoners and slaves. We chose the term domestic mode of 
production because from what we know of pre-colonial Akan societies 
it situates the precise location of the site of production and the 
relations between the actors involved. It also gives us the proper 
framework within which to assess the process of the appropriation of 
surplus labour. In contrast, the termtriýutarV mode-see Samir Amin, 
qp_ýJt., and R. A. Kea op. cit,, 'focusses too muc*h*on the realm of distri- bution rather than pro-d-uc-t-Ton. We do not use the 'lineage' mode - compare P-P. Rey, 'The Lineage [4ode of*Production', Critique of Anthropolog, 3,, 1975, because, inter alia., it "locates--the-marrjage ý-y-s-t76-Fl-a*srt e 
central means b-y-Q--T7cTFt7Te dominant class exercises its power over the dominated", see also, P-P. Rey, 'Class Contradictions in LinpAna 
Societies' , Op-(-ký. 
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social formation; in a second from within them through acts of 
banditry against neighbouring groups in the area, and in a third 
by commoners 'pawned' within the social formation itself. Servile 
labour which became known to Europeans in the nineteenth century 
as 'domestic slaves' were probably recruited from 'odonko's - those 
purchased on Asante's northern border but also from pawns. It seems 
that prisoners of war were usually reserved for work on plantations (1). 
Our use of slave modes of production here is rooted partly 
in the form of capture of the labourers who became 'unfree' workers 
in the Asante social formation, as well as in the nature of the 
specific servile relations of production which characterised slavery. 
We have now moved away from Karl Marx's original notion of a mode of 
production as based simply upon specific relations of production. 
By situating our analysis of slave modes of producticn 
in, inter 
alia, processes of capture which occurred between and within different 
communities, we are broadening our concern with modes of material 
production to include also structures which facilitate the 
reproduction of the forms of servile labour -a process which 
possibly established relations of exploitation between populations (2). 
In this thesis therefore, although it often remains implicit, 
mode of production is not conceived in simplistic economistic 
concerns of material production per se. Instead the concept 
includes discussion of the very reproduction of the social formations 
concerned. Indeed, this shift in the discussion leads us to recognise 
See Chapter Three below for greater discussion of the different 
categories of servile labour. 
(2) See, C. Meillassoux, (1979), op. cit., p. 10. 
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the notion that for the concept of mode of production to have any 
useful explanatory value in understanding non-capitalist social 
formations'- and indeed also for understanding capitalist social 
formations too - mode of production must include within its 
theoretical framework the notion of its reproduction. It is here, 
in trying to add greater clarity and theoretical rigour to the 
concept that the work of Meillassoux is particularly useful (1). 
As with his work on slavery in West Africa, Meillassoux is at pains 
to show that the concept of mode of production is of little 
explanatory use unless it includes an appraisal of the way in which 
the mode is reproduced. In this way Neillassoux arguably shifts 
formalistic discussion of theoretical modes of production to an 
analysis of specific actors involved in the production and 
reproduction of the material conditions of existence in non-capitalist 
societies. 
Meillassoux's work on the Gouro of West Africa has added a 
further dimension to marxist studies on non-capitalist society. 
In his study of the Gouro, Meillassoux explores the self-sustaining 
mechanism of the societY to reproduce itself. In particular he 
recognised that the exchange of prestige goods secured the further 
social reproduction of the lineage-based society because such goods, 
unlike subsistence goods, were used to seal a marriage bond and 
thereby the control of women and young men by the village elders who 
controlled the access to such goods. 
See especially, C. Meillassoux, (1981), op. cit., but also, 
E. Terray, Marxism and Primitive Societi-ý`s, -7ew York and London. 
Monthly Review Press 1972) Translated by 7. Klopper, p. 195. On 
upderstanding the conditions of the reproduction of modes of 
production see also the important Introduction to H. Wolpe (editor), 
op. cit. 
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Although his account might be ahistorical, and it is also 
unwarranted to simply transpose Meillassoux's observations of the 
Gouro to other non-capitalist societies, still his work does 
offer certain insights into how we might begin our analysis of 
the Akan in the Gold Coast and Asante. Instead of merely concerning 
ourselves with relations of production or juridical ownership or 
even control of the means of production - in our case land - or even 
modes of ýxtrýction of surplus labour, such as that by Akan chiefs 
Meillassoux suggests that we should perhaps consider as our premiss, 
the way in which the Akan social formation was reproduced- what 
were the mechanisms for social reproduction and what were the 
specific contributions to it from different groups (classes) in 
T 
society? Lt must be stressed here that social reproduction does 
n: refer solel, ' ocical reproduction of society. A view of ot Y _c 'DiolU 
social relations that was based solely on that dimension would oe 
determinist '1). For instance, in discussing the 
role of women in non-capitalistAkan society -a focus of study so 
much neglected ýy ! -: Kent writers - we do not simply explain the 
subordinationofwo, men to their role as producers and rearers of 
children or Qerformers of domestic chores. Indeed, it might be 
argued that in non-industrial societies women very often divided 
and shared whatever domestic chores were performed with their 
(1) This criticism is levelled at Heillassoux by Felicity Edholm, 
Olivia Harris, Kate Young, 'Conceptualising Women', Critique 
of Anthropoloýy, 9& 10,3,1977. Care has to be useF-1_n__tTe 
use of b1ologistic language associated with Meillassoux not 
least because it can draw us into a Darwinean or Spencerian 
problematic. For a critique of biologism and yet an attempt 
to situate women centre stage in the analysis of political 
economy see, Karen Sacks, Sisters and Wives: The Past and Future 
of Sexual EqualitY-, (London: Greenwood Press_, __M9Y__espeCially 
Chapter One. See also, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, 'Placing Women 
in History', N. L. R., 133,1982. 
menfolk (1). We will argue instead, albeit tentatively, because once again 
the data is sparse - that if women were exploited in Akan-Asante 
early contact social formations such exploitation was rooted in 
their role as material producers and reproducers of the Akan social 
formation: that is by producing gold along with their men but in 
some cases being denied access to the product of their labour. 
Social reproduction it) this context refers to "the 
specification of wýjat structures have to be reproduced in order 
that social reproduction as a whole can take place" (2). Our focus 
of analysis in understanding the possible reproduction of the Akan 
social formation is not with biological reproduction of the Akan 
but of the social reproduction of the labour force - of slaves for 
example - an analysis of the relations of production of what we 
call the domestic mode of production, its relationship with chiefly 
authority and the presence of unfree labour in the Akan social 
formation. 
Meillassoux's work has provided a useful intervention into 
the ongoing debate about how vie can best refine or adapt the marxist 
concept of mode of production to understanding non-capitalist social 
formations. We are concerned less with how much of Karl Marx's 
limited nineteenth century discussion of modes of production we can 
apply to pre-colonial or early contact Gold Coast. Instead, by 
examining the contribution of Meillassoux's work we are alerted to 
(1) Carmen Diana Deere, 'Rural Women's Subsistence Production in the 
Capitalist Periphery, in, R. Cohen, P. Gutkind, J. Brazier 
(editors) Peasants and Proletarians- the struggle of Third-11-arld 
Workers, (London: Hutchinson, 1979). 
(2) F. Edholm, et al., op. cit., p. 105, emphasis added. 
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a discussion of the Akan modes of production which is predicated upon 
both economic and social production and reproduction of the Akan (1). 
We assess below not only the relations among the Akan at the level 
of chiefs/elders and commoner men and slaves in the social hierarchy 
comprising the Akan sociýal formation but we also explore what could 
well have been the position of women in Akan relations of production 
and reproduction. Our focus of analysis in trying to uncover these 
relations is the production of gold. In addition we assess the 
importance of land and labour in Asante and the social controls over 
these 'factors' of production. 
Before we proceed any further and discuss the relations of 
power between these groups in the Akan social formation and in 
particular what possible position they played in the formation of 
early contact indigenous states on the Gold Coast there is a further 
theoretical term we need to clarify. Social relations of production 
in a mode of production are normally discussed as representing 
antagonistic relations between "classes". Now that we have broadened 
out our concept of mode of production to include a range of 
relations of production and reproduction we need to take stock of 
what this does to our notion of social class. 
(b) Class in Non-Capitalist Societies_ 
The category of social class is used at different times 
throughout this thesis and is seen as a useful concept in under- 
standing relations of power between the Akan. The concept of class 
For an interesting discussion of the need for a non-economistic 
conceptualisation of mode of production see also, I. Meszaros, 
Marx's Theory of Alientation , 
(London: Merlin, Press, 1970), and 
N. Mouzel is, Modern Greecý : 'Facets of Underdevel opment, (London 
Macmillan Press, 1978). 
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is used because of its significance within an approach which uses 
historical materialism as its organisational framework. As P-P. Rey 
has commented recently, if we use concepts like relations and modes 
of production we must at the same time, because they are located 
within the same problematic, talk of social classes and exploitation 
(1). The discussion of classes in non-capitalist society is however 
fraught with difficulties and disagreement (2). This disagreement 
is both because of a suggested lack of any conceptual basis for the 
term as well as the absence of sufficient historical data on which to 
base judgements about pre-colonial Akan (or indeed other African) 
social formations. 
Like the debate about modes of production, however, the 
French anthropologists have once again made useful and clarifying 
contributions to the issue of whether social class is a valid 
category for analysis of non-capitalist society. Beginning with a 
critique of Meillassoux's fcrrulation of modes of production among 
the Gouro, P-P. Rey has stuck firmly to the notion that social class 
essentially identifies different relations of production. Rey has 
maintained that the elders irf Meillassoux's study of the Gouro obtained 
the prestige goods, and thus the control of reproduction by appro- 
priating the surplus labour of young men. Rey argued that this 
(1) P-P. Rey, 'Class Contradictions in Lineage Societies', 
Critique of Anthr2poýEL, 13 and 14,4,1979, p. 42. 
(2) For some of the controversy see, inter alia, E. Terray, (1972), 
op. cit., P-P. Rey, (1979) - op. ci-t., a-nU, C. Meillassoux, 
7197TT-, op. cit. But see also tl`ý-einteresting discussion 
about the usefulness of the concept in-Joel Samoff, 'On Class, 
Paridigm , and African Politics' in Africa To - 
dýy, 29,2,1982 
and Robin Cohen, 'Class in Africa: nalytical Problems and 
Perspectives' in The Socialist Register, 1972 (edited) by 
, 
R. Miliband and J. 5avMI`e, 7London: Merlin., IM). 
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constituted exploitation and therefore elders and juniors constituted 
antagonistic social classes. In fact for Rey there are no classless 
societies (1). 
Emmanuel Terray has also recognised the possibility of 
exploitation in non-capitalist societies although for him the 
appropriation of surplus labour does not necessarily ensure the 
presence of social classes, because fundamental to this concept is 
class consciousness (2). Rejoining the debate, Meillassoux has 
argued that exploitation and class cannot be so easily used in 
discussing lineage societies (3). Meillassoux recognises that the 
surplus labour of the juniors among the Gouro, that is beyond their 
own subsistencegoes to meet the subsistence needs of their offspring 
and the old but that over the period of a lifetime a man can expect 
to become the recipient of what is seen only as an exchange of 
surplus labour between generations of the future, present and past 
producers. Meillassoux reserves the term exploitation for the 
lineage members who produce surplus but ca nnot look forward to the 
exchange of it benefitting either themselves or their offspring. The 
groups (classes) who are denied the right to their own offspring and 
whose reproduction is not met by the community are those who remain 
foreigners - the slaves (4). 
There are clearly a number of difficulties associated with 
trying to apply the term class to non-capitalist societies. We 
1) P-P. Rey, (1979), cit. 
K2) E. Terray, (1979), op. -cit. 
(3) Meillassoux is also ýFrit-ical of the term Iineaq6' - see 
C. Meillassoux, (1981), op. cit. 
(4) C. Meillassoux, (1979), op. Fi-t., and 'CorrespondeRce', 
Economy_and Society, 7, ý-, IM. 
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assess the particular position of slaves later. For the moment let 
us clarify what we will mean by class and exploitation in this thesis 
and let us briefly assess also much of the current debate in Akan 
studies about the most appropriate category for analysing power in 
early contact Gold Coast societies. 
Class and Rank Aniong the Asante 
By exploitation in this thesis we mean the appropriation (the 
nature of which may change over time) of surplus labour, produce or cash 
by a non-producing group (class) which uses the appropriated products 
to sustain itself. We talk of a chiefly class (1), or class of headmen 
who appropriated the products of the labour of a commoner class of men 
and women and also of unfree slave labourers. This is what we might 
call the 'objective' criteria for defining groups of producers as a 
class of chieýs or elders. As Marx suggested, however, and Terray more 
recently, (2) there are are also subjective factors in determining the 
development of classes. Marx asserted for example, that we could only 
suggest that a class existed 'for itself' if the members of that class 
developed a shared consciousness. 
Because available data for the period on the Gold Coast is 
fragmentary it is difficult to assess even the objective let alone 
the 'subjective' criteria for establishing class relations. However, 
we coul d argue , as- has been done recently by Kea 
(3) ,- that a degree 
(1) Our very use of the term class here situates our definition in relationE 
of production. 
(2) See, inter alia, The-German Ideology, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1970), The -C-ommunist Manifesto (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972). 
E. Terray (1979) op. cit. For a general discussion of class see, R. 
Miliband, Marxism and Politics, (Oxford Uriiversity Press, 1977), Ch. 2. 
(3) R. E. Kea, oP-cij., pp. 179-1 - 
I-Wilks also argues tha, t a degree of 
consciousness emerged for both the asikafQ and, Ahafo - the middle and 
lower classes respectively, see, Asý'nteiri the Nýineteenth CentEZ, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Preýss, 1915), P. 705, 
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of class consciousness had manifested itself on the Gold Coast by 
the early seventeenth century. This was arguably the result of the 
forced movement of peasants from the countryside to the towns. 
This migration hastened the development of a social movement of 
banditry which emerged in reaction to the pressures of increased 
political and economic subordination to chiefly power. One of Kea's 
concerns in what is a major contribution to Akan studies is to show 
that the seventeenth century Gold Coast social forniation was 
characterised by the presence of two modes of production: a tributary 
mode of production and a slave owning mode, where the principle 
relation between power holders and subordinates was the appropriation 
of surplus labour - or products - of food or gold - by nobles from 
commoners and slaves. Moreover, Kea recognises a si3f-, ificant 
economic and political differentiation not only between but also 
within both the powerholders and commoners (1). We return to an 
assessment of this work in a moment. 
One other author who has focussed attention on the usefulness 
of the category of class for clarifying (or obscuring) power relations 
between the Akan - both Asante and coastal Fante - is Kwame 
Arhin (2). Although Arhin's observations are specifically related 
to the Akan in the nineteenth century it is useful for two reasons 
to discuss his v, 'Ork here in relation to understanding earlier non- 
capitalist Akan society. First, it highlights once more the 
difficulties of applying any categories rigidly to the Akan and 
Asante social formations-and second., reference to it further situates 
ýhe rest of our thesis within some of the current debates on power 
(1) Kea, op. cit., inter alia, p. 5,20,46,96,98-99,106. 
(2) K. ArFlFn, Rank-TnFd-CT`ass Among the Asa. nte and Fante in the 
Nineteenth Century', Africa, 53,1,1983. We discuss the senior 
'Akanologist', I. WilTs--Fe7ow. 
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and authority in early Akan society. 
Using a similar theoretical framework to that used in his 
analysis of Asante state formation (1 ), Arhin elevates politics, 
culture and ideology above the organisation of production and 
appropriation of surpluses as determinants in understanding power 
relations between the Asanteand in so doing is reluctant to use the 
term class at all. However, in discussing the coastal Fante he 
does talk about "incipient classes" (2) initiated largely by a degree 
of "commercialism" which is seen more as the result of external , 
Eu"ropean and neighbouring Akan trade activities rather than because 
of the relations of production between the Fante themselves (3). 
For Arhin, the social class categories of bourgeoisie, petit bourg- 
eoisie and proletariat, likened by Wilks (4) to asikl+ . 
(wealthy 
men) youngman and ahiafo (the impoverished or underpri vi 1 edged 
within societY) are inappropriate for understanding the realities 
of'nineteenth century society. This is largely because the term 
bourgeoisie was honed in the formative period of western capitalism, 
with connotations of the ownership of capital, and does not 
adequately convey the complexity of Akan society. For Arhin, the 
state in Akan society was seen as the "custodian of the community". 
Instead of individual economic ownership of the means of production 
there was only "community ownership" and because of this Wilks' 
social differentiation based upon economic roles is seen to be 
inaccurate M., 
j 
(1) See-, pp. M-43below. 
(2) Arhin, op. cit., p. 2. 
(3) [bid., 
--. 
TS718. pp 
(4) VTITTS' op. cit., and K. Arhin, op. cit., p. 3. 
(5) Arhin, -iTid-., pp. 4-5. 
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Some of the issues which Arhin raises here are alluded to 
in the rest of the thesis. What was the role for instance of trade 
to state formation and what was the specific contribution of 
different social classes in this process? Particularly we are 
eager to assess how individuals within a specific lineage might have 
distinguished themselves and their descendents by becoming successful 
traders. In so doing it is argued that they "acquired prestige, 
respect and honour" and became eligible for "political and social 
mobility" (1). Such accounts imply that although individuals might 
initially distinguish themselves in Asante society in an economic 
sphere by showing themselves to be successful in the accumulation of 
wealth (2) it was often only in their elevation to a political 
position of power in the village or on the divisional council that 
It real" power and au-thority over commoners could be exercised and 
reproduced. For Arhin, in contrast to Wilks, it appears that it 
was an Asante's political position which also became an economic 
resource and not vice versa. "Men of enterprise acquired social 
distinction but did not form a separate rank unit. They were not 
numerous enough and in any case social ranking was an aspect of 
political ranking "(3). By rank Arhin refers specifically to "a 
position derived from status in a hierarchy of statuses" (4). 
This hierarchy existed both between different states - in order 
of the arrival of 'stools' to the area - as well as within each 
state and village where the village council members - the elders 
(. 1 ) ibtd, p. 5. 
(2) -5-eFe--T. McCaskie 'State an, d Society, Marriage and Adultery: 
some consideration towards a social history of precolonial 
Asante', JAH, 22,4,1981, and Chapter 4 below. 
(3) Arhin, oP. 71t., p. 5. 
(4) Ibid. 
LEE 
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and chiefs, were ranked in order of "real. or presumed arrival of 
their forebears in the settlement of the village" (1). The order 
of this ranking could, however, be modified by changes in the 
relations between different states following wars or changes in 
marital connections between stools (2). 
Although flawed - most importantly because Arhin reduces 
class almost solely to a political deterininism,, and he says little 
about the impact of the encroaching world economy upon the formation 
of ranks - this remains an important contribution to Akan studies. 
This is because of the recognition of certain political structures 
and processes in Asante in the nineteenth century. Arhin discusses 
for example, the significance of stool regalia andthedifferent 
life styles which officeholders exhibited in nineteenth century 
Asante. He argues too, for instance, that it was only certain 
authority holders and not commoners or slaves who could exhibit 
wealth and who often received commissions on stately collections 
of tribute because of their position within 'palace associations'. 
Our brief discussion here of whether class is a useful 
concept for understcriding ear ly-contact Akan society has highlighted 
two different positions. Kea (from a marxist perspective) argues 
that "Productive relations . .. had primacy over exchange relations" 
(3). He further asserts that a recognition of who appropriated 
surplus labour within seventeenth century Gold Coast society is 
the most useful c riterion for under standing who exercised both 
, -pol-itical and economic-power and thus social class is a useful 
(1) ibid, pp. 5-6. 
(2) 1-b-17 
(3) -Kea, op. cit., p. 173. 
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categoryfor analysing non-capitalist Gold Coast society. In 
contrast, Arhin, in seeking to understand who wields power among 
the Asante focusses upon political, cultural and ideological factors 
removed in the first instance from the production process. Like Kea, 
who holds that production- relations are the most important point of 
entry for analysis (1) we argue throughout this thesis for the need 
to base our analysis in the first instance on relations between 
producers and non-producers and on relations of reproduction among 
the Akan before we examine the changing nature of political processes 
among the Akan. Having said this however, we need to make the 
important point that neither class nor rank are mutually exclusive 
concepts, although one does take precedence as a heuristic device 
for clarifying our understanding of early Akan social formations. 
We say they are not mutually exclusive because in all societies, 
notions of personal esteem, self and culturally imposed worth are 
important guides to individual action, the exercise of political 
power and how people relate to each other. It will be the contention 
of this thesis that wealth, life styles and stately regalia and 
political paraphenalia contr_ibuted to the maintenance of the Asante 
state in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The impetus and 
underpinning structures of the state, however, and of the relations 
between chiefs, freemen and slave men and women, was the ability 
of a chiefly class through the state to extract surplus labour 
and therefore sustain itself as a dominant class. Relations of 
productiory determined the character of the state but were in turn 
subject to the machinations of a whole host of political and cultural 
(1) But there is some doubt that he actually succeeds in this 
endeavour - focussing instead upon exchange relations - see below. 
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restrictions. 
Ivor Wilks has documented many of the processes associated 
with the entrenchment of the Asante state (1). However, despite the 
use of terms like bourgeoisie, Wilks does not focus upon forms of 
surplus extraction in the consolidation of the state. Instead, a 
major focus are the institutional 'modernising' policies of different 
regions which lead to the development of a 'bureaucracy' in Asante (2). 
Like Arhin whose major concern is arguably with 'political' developments, 
Wilks builds an impressive picture of Asante's political structures 
in the nineteenth century. It is, however, only partial in its account 
of relations between power holders and commoners. We return to this 
in a moment. Suffice to say here, that we recognise the need for an 
analysis of political, ideological and cultural dynamics in early Akan 
societies. We stress however, that a starting point of analysis should 
be the reLlm of production and not with 'superstructural' political 
phenomenon alone. As Kea notes: 
Landed property and agriculture constituted thL. 
central category of, social production, dominating 
all other categories ... The social structure 
associated with landed property and agriculture 
had three principal elements: a class of overlords 
(the ahenfo and the abirempon), a rent paying 
peasaý-t-ry, and slave-s-a-n'd bonded freemen engaged 
in various farming activities (for example, land 
(1) Among-these_were the Odwira festivals and the use of symbols like 
the Golde'rý 's-tool to -reflect--- develop - unity among the Asante. 
See Wilks (1975), op. cit. 
(2) See especially, WTiTks-, ibid., Chapters 14 and 15 and 'Aspects 
of Bureaucratisation in -t-R-enineteenth century', JAH, 7,2. 
1966. 
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clearance and cultivation (1). 
(ii) Kinship 
In contrast to the use of the category of class to understand 
power relations among the early contact Akan two major traditions 
in Akan studies have failed to recognise adequately the intricate web 
of power relations between Akan citizens based upon the exploitation 
of servile labour. We can now assess these alternative formulations 
of relations between the Akan before examining the possible path 
which state formation took among the Akan. 
Relations between the Akan have been characterised as we saw 
in the Introduction within an 'anthropological' tradition which has 
been concerned with "kinship and synchronic social structure, with 
the jural domain, with religion and spirituality" (2). Another 
approach within Akan studies has been to reconstitute a finely 
textured Asante history with an eye to greater detail than previously 
Kea op. cit., p. 165. Fo'r Kea, a major shift occured in the late 
sevenfeent-F century and early eighteenth century where slaves and 
bonded freemen became principle producers of agricultural surplus 
instead of free commoners. This shift was linked to a change in 
the form of payment commoners made for the right to work land from 
the payment of gold to rent in kind (produce). In the seventeenth 
century peasants were under pressure of land revenue demands to 
sell part of this harvested produce in the town markets for gold - 
a portion of which went to revenue collectors as rent. Thus peasants 
were obliged to live in reasonable proximity to 'central townships". 
With the conversion of money rent to rent in kind there was not the 
same necessity for peasant villages to be closely located to the 
towns. Hence-a process of deurbanisation occurred. about which more 
information is needed. The important point here, however, is the 
transition to a greater reliance by chiefs upon slave labour and a 
possible demonetisati 
- 
on of relations between towns and villages. 
Moreover, peasant farming communites took on a greater economic and 
military role and were reorganised-to represent corporate administrative 
and juridical movements. See Kea, op. cit., pp. 166-168. 
(2) For discussion of this perspective sTeý7, -McCaskie, (1983) op. cit., p. 24. 
This anthropological tradition is cha. racterised by the wo-ri, --o-fýR. S. Rattr2 
see for example his, Ashanti, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923) and M. 
Fortes, Kinship and Social Urder. (London: Routeledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969). See the Introductio-n-aFove for further criticism of this 
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has been recorded. (1). A difficulty with this latter position has 
been that whereas historical detail about the Akan social formations 
is welcome it has seldom been cast in any explicit theoretical 
framework, and certainly not one that considers relations between 
the Akan to be based firml. y in the appropriation by one class of the 
surplus labour of another. Akan social formations therefore have 
seldom been described as being dominated by class relations. The 
three analysts considered above are a partial exception to this but 
even Ivor Wilks in his important study of Asante (2) does not 
adequately explain the nature of relations of production. Instead, 
Wilks, when he comes down to it seems to organise his work around 
concerns of lineage and kinship which takes the discussion back to the 
anthropological concepts developed within a problematic unconcerned 
with power relations and more concerned with issues of symbolism and 
ritual, although he does use them within a temporal rather than a 
timeless frame. We intentionally simplify these two schools of 
thought about the Akan. They could be used as ideal types which have 
tried to reconstruct Akan social formations without posing the 
questions which we see need to-be raised. The work of Kea, and 
earlier of Terray, has attempted to redress this imbalance and we 
try to pursue their varied approaches below. W-_do so 6y offering a 
critique of the way in which Akan social formations have hitherto 
been described in both anthropological and historical literature. 
Common to both 
'historical' literature 
(1) See, for instance, 
of Greater Ashanti 
(2) 1. Wilks (1975) op 
of the 'anthropological' and the more recent 
on the Akan social formations is the notion 
I. Wilks, (1975) op. cit., K. Arhin, 'The Structure 
1700-1824', JAH, 8,1,1967. 
. Cit. 
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that kinship was the organizing principle for religious, political 
and economic activities. This view sees the lineage as a corporate 
descent group where the concept of abusua denoted those of a common 
matrilineal ancestry (1). For example: 
In the most extensive topographical sense ... 
abus, Ao. denotes a dispersed economy made up of 
localised sections of which are believed to be 
connected by common matrilineal ancestry (2). 
We do not deny that an understanding of kinship is important for 
recognising the composition and form of Akan society. However, the 
way that it has previously been conceptualised, as on the one hand 
a description of relations of consanguinity and alliance, and yet on 
the other as the basic structural element in terms of which all else 
is analysed is inadequate. This is because such a view of kinship is, 
as -,. qe will show, superficial and empiricist but also, possibly 
structuralist and idealist. In contrast, we want to try and recognise 
a basis to kinship itself. Attempts have been made recently to 
analyse the notion of kinship more thoroughly although they have o-Iften 
remained only at an abstract and theoretical level (3). For example, 
instead of locating kinship and lineage relations in an idealist 
notion that they merely emerged because of blood ties per se Godelier 
(1) Abusa bako mogya bako - One Abusua, one blood. See the Glossary 
f-or a brief explanation of principle Asante Twi terms. 
(2) M. Fortes, op. cit., p. 162. For a similar view to this of 
kinship see, Ge6-rge Balandier, Political Anthropology, (London: 
Allen Lane 1969), Chapter 3. S-e-e also the critical review by 
J. Ennew, op. cit. 
(3) M. Godelier, 'Modes of Production Kinship and Demographic 
Structures', in, M. Bloch, (editor) (1976) op. cit., and 
M. Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist AnthrL-poT-o-g, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1977). 
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has suggested that the concept of kinship is one which informs our 
understanding of both the 'infrastructure' and 'superstructure' of a 
specific social formation. The previous focus of writers on the 
nature of corporate descent and the functions of family groups is 
relegated by him to having a dependency upon more fundamental 
relations of production. Godelier's position has certain theoretical 
difficulties. Not the least among these is that this formula for 
understanding kinship reflects a particular brand of economic 
reductionism. However, Godelier's concern with understanding kinship 
as being rooted in relations of production does have the merit of not 
simply focussing upon superstructural concerns alone. Moreover he 
does offer a way to explore the interaction of kinship ties and 
relation of production. 
Following Godelier's theoretical contribution, together with 
historical investigations into the pre-1700 Akan social formations 
by Kea and others (1) we argue that it was indeed relations of. 
production but also relations of reproduction too which determined 
the character of lineage relationships (2). In contrast to the work 
of Rattray who located the authority of Asante chiefs in their 
position as 'caretakers' of the whole Asante nation and people, Kea 
clai, ms to situate the development of inequalities and social 
differentiation with the Akan in different social relations of 
production. For Kea, "commerce was a precondition for the emergence 
of an aristocratic tradition based on the ownership of merchant 
(1) Godelier, op. cit., Kea, op. cit. 
(2) See also, r. M-e'iTlassoux -F19811-, op. cit., where he suggests 
that "relations of dependence lin-k-ed -d-pand realized in 
production must ... be recreated by filiation or adoption 
within a kinship framework", p. 47. 
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capital and the employment of unfree labourers in productive 
activities" (1). This position moreover, is predicated upon a 
theoretical framework which locates societal development in terms of 
a relationship between simple and expanded reproduction which is 
dependent upon internal changes in the Akan relations of production 
and external influences - essentially through trade. Kea's analysis, 
therefore, contrasts markedly with those descriptive accounts of Akan 
state formation which tells a story of the migration of people in 
search of food, trade or both without adequately grasping the nature 
of the internal dynamic that drove these early societies and the form 
of social organisation. We return to his actual findings on processes 
at work in the Gold Coast in the seventeenth century below. 
In. contrast to the recent work done by Kea, the anthropological 
tradition on the formation of Akan states and the emergence of trade 
sees those processes as compatible with the persistance of an 
essentially nonn! lictual and non-exploitative Akan social formation. 
The basis for saying this was seen to 1 ie in the way the Asantehene 
and sub-chiefs in Asante were supposed to have powers vested in them 
by the nation as a whole rather than in any way reflecting a hierarchical 
exploitative social system based on the extraction of surplus labour 
from commoners and slaves. Illustrative of this non-conflictual social 
formation was seen to be the way land was allocated. Notwithstanding 
our earlier comments on the problem of reducing the nature or relations 
of production to the simple dichotomy of ownership or non-ownership of 
the means of production it is still a useful first step to look at 
these relations in our assessment of which group(s) within the Akan 
(1) Kea, op. cit., p. 56. 
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and Asante social formations wielded political power. However, 
information relating to land for the early contact period with 
regard to how it was allocated and by whom, is not plentiful. Once 
again vie are forced to draw a picture of early contact society from 
oral data and the accounts of European travellers with all of the 
difficulties that this entails. 
(c) Land in Early Contact Akan-Asante Social Formations 
For Rattray rights to land in the early contact period of 
Asante were dependent upon membership of the common ancestry - the 
abusua of segmentary"kkan matrilineage which safeguarded reproduction 
by control over access to land and the ability to produce goods for 
consumption and trade (1). 
We are told also that earth in Asante was referred to as 
'Old Mother' and was revered for its importance to society enshrined 
in the idea that it represented fertility (2). Indeed the Asante 
said that "all power is in land" with the material basis for this 
reverence lying in the early productive activities of the Akan, 
presumably circa laOO-1600, which were based upon the collection of 
foodstuffs and production of gold in the forest and subforest region 
of the Gold Coast. Game was also abundant with monkeys, wild pig 
and the grass cutter rodent being hunted for food. Snails were 
collected, mostly by women and children and if not eaten immediately 
were dried and smoked for consumption later. 
'(1) 
See R. S. Rattray, (1923), op. cit., Chapter 3 for the classical 
exposition of matrilineal Uescent in the Akan. Strangers also 
had access to land, this is discussed below. 
(2) On the importance of land in Ashanti, see, R. S. Rattray, Ashanti 
Law and Constitution (Oxford; 1919) Chapter 33. See also)-77-. A-. Y. 
Kyerematen, lnter-'ý-tate Boundary Litigation in Ashanti; African 
Social Research Documents ol. 4. (Holland: Afrika Studicentrum Leiden, 
Holland and University of Cambridge 1971), and also R. S. Rattray 
(1923) op. cit., Chapter 21. 
kL- 
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Agriculture became increasingly productive for the Akan 
especially following the greater use of iron, produced locally but 
augmented by European imports in the sixteenth century, which 
accompanied the influx of new crops like maize, cassava, tomatoes, 
oranges and groundnuts. The use of firearms also made the hunting 
of game easier, but the major activity was agriculture which was 
'shiftingý where vegetation was cleared by the slash and burn method, 
and the plentiful nature of land compared with the numbers of people 
often meant cultivated land was not returned to for long periods of 
time (1). 
ý,, 'e may say that even in this agricultural phase, property 
relations to ý 10 with land did not become too entrenched-, land was in 
fact exploited in two ways in Akan society, circa 1400-1600, both as 
a sub4 jert of labour, that is directly with no human energy being 
previously invested in it, as in hunting and gathering and as an 
instrument of labour, where labour was invested in the land for a 
delayed return of an agricultural product. Food production in the 
Akar, social formation, even though it wasphiftinggas still based 
upon people's regular access to new land as well as on cooperation 
within the specific productive unit. As we will see shortly the 
productive unit was probably the domestic community where an 
individual ensured access to land to sustain himself and kinspeople 
through the production of food in the form of either crop preparation 
or the mining of gold (2). 
(1) M. D. McLeod, The Asante (London: British Museum Publications Ltd., 
1981 P. 15. See, also"George Benneh, 'Systems of Agriculture in 
Tropical Africa', reprinted from Economic Geography, 48,3, July 
1972, and Kea p. cit. 0 
(2) The search fo; go)-T-dtended not to clash with the cultivation of 
foodstuffs because the former was carried out mainly in the., dry seasons. 
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There is one oft-quoted statement that is usually brought out 
to prove that land was owned communally: 
... land belongs to a vast 
family of which many 
are dead, few are living and countless numbers are 
unborn (1). 
This could refer to an early period that may have existed pre-contact, 
when agriculture was relatively new, still shifting and land was 
virtually a free good. Or could refer to a later period when an 
individual shared the right to work different pjeýces of 'family' land 
without alienating it as property. The term 'alienation' in fact 
probably does not accurately describe the nature of land holdings in 
Akan society in the pre-contact period. Instead we should perhaps 
examine the nature of control over the allocation and use of land when 
discussing the period both immediately preceding and following contact. 
-ill tentatively ask who exercised the right of We might nevertheless st 
allocation of land and what were the relations that these 'controllers, 
had with those who did not exercise this allocative function? Even 
if ý, ie Cl'o not knoý-,, enourlh aoout the, cm-pirical circumstances at this time 
to nive a definitive pýcture it will become increasingly clear that 
an anthropological view of Asante society as representing some kind 
of communal bliss is false (2) and so too is a view that such relations 
were unchanging. 
(1) Nana Sir Ofori Atta, Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa, quoted in N. A. Ollenn , 
'Principles of Customary Law in Ghana', p. 4,, cited in G. Benneh, 'The 
Impact of Cocoa Cultivation on the Traditional Land Tenure System 
of the Akanýf Ghana', Ghana Journal of Sociology, 6,1,1970, p. 44. 
See also, R. S. Rattray, (1923) oF7E-it, p. Z16, and Kwame Y. Daaku, 
Trade and Politics on the Gold--Coast, 1000-1729, (Oxford University 
Press, 1970). 
(2) See, H. G. Jones, The Earth Goddess, quoted in S. Hymer, 'Economic 
Forms in Pre-colonial Ghana', Journal of Economic History, 30, , 
1970, see also A. N. Klein, 'The Cultural and Histor-Tic-al-1contexts 
of Inequality in Akan-Asante Society', Unpublished Manuscript, 
1979, p. 5. 
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Akan society seems to have become increasingly stratified 
with eventually a Paramount chief emerging at sollie stage as the head 
of an embryonic state. This process may well have owed something 
to a shift from gathering, previously, to shifting agriculture, which 
had to become increasingly structured as the abundance of land 
4-a 
became less, ýnd not justLýthe expansion of trade. We shall in fact 
argue that an emerging state structure was based upon two levels of 
surplus appropriation, even if we cannot date these processes 
precisely. The first was achieved nationally within Asante where 
the position of Asantehene and his immediate group of councillors 
and the -Otk-r-t in the villages came to occupy positions of dominance 
by the appropriation of surplus created by captured slavesworking 
on the chief's plantations or gold pits, and a whole list of 
obligations which fell upon the ordinary commoner. These obligations 
included aids to pay for expenses of a chief 's funeral , 
levies for 
the purpose of making purchases for the 'stool ' and its regalia (1) , 
war expenses (apeatoo) and 'communal 'I abour where all 'I esser 
-important persons' would work on the chief's farm for a few days a 
year (2). A second level of surplus appropriation which sustained 
chiefly power was derived 'internationally'. This refers her to that 
area outside the purely Asante area (3) where first, tribute was 
(1 ) The stool is the major symbol of a chief's authority and is seen as 
a symbol of a chiefdom's unity and cohesion. Stool land refers to 
land in the area and jurisdiction of a specific chief. For a- 
discussion of the hierarchy between chiefs see, A. A. Y. Kyerematen, 
op. cit., Chapter 2. 
(2) I: FaTt-tray, (1923) op. cit., p. 227. These mechanisms for sustaining 
. chiefly power wiTT-5-eexamined 
in greater detail in Chapter 4 below. 
(3) This area is defined as outside the initial Amantoo states that is 
the larger and older aman, polity, within Asýinte, in particular 
the term Amantoo refJ-sto 'the five aman of first rank' - Bekwae, Dwaben, Ko-Fo--fu, Mampon an, d Nsuta - se-e--r-. Wilks, (1975), op. cit., 
p. 729. 
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exacted from conquered subordinated states but also trade established 
internally was expanded to include exchanges, often state directed, 
with the coastal and northern areas. The ideological paraphenalia 
to sustain the chiefly authority arguably grew out of the state 
building actions of Osei Tutu and his high priest Komfo Anotche and 
to a lesser extent their predecessors Twum and Antwi, Oti Akentem and 
Obiri Yeboah in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century (1). 
It is towards an understanding of the formation of the Akan 
state that we will concentrate in the last part of this Chapter. 
As a foretaste to this we can here examine briefly some further 
possible mechanisms whereby a chiefly class exercised control over a 
class of commoners and slaves. Indeed we can begin to lay out more 
clearly - although still tentatively - what we mean by a chiefly class 
among the Akan between circa 1400-1600, that is in the period 
immediately prior to and in the first, indirect stages of contact 
with European merchants. 
Kea is particularly suggestive of the possible development 
of an Akan chiefly class in the seventeenth century. Talking about 
the Gold Coast social formation Kea locates the emergence of a class 
of 'nobles' which he calls great men - afahene - to the possession of 
wealth which "gave them the means of access to public office and allowed 
them to monopolise the means of administration" (2). In other words, 
(1) Tradition has placed much emphasis upon the actions of these 
individuals. - It is more likely that they represent a developing 
chiefly-class the interests of which were shared by many others 
leading increasingly entrenched mercantile positions. 
(2) Kea, op. cit., p. 292 
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in contrast to the anthropological tradition in 'Akan studies' which 
if it concerns itself with process at all implies that chiefly 
structures have to be understood, and presumably emerge from, within a 
genealogical framework as evidenced in folklore and tradition, Kea 
posits the reverse. Individual ability to accumulate wealth through 
differential access to the means of production generated dominant 
classes which in turn consolidated their positions politically and in 
blood ties (1). Central to this process of differentiation was the 
control over access to land and as Kea argues too the use of slave 
labour. 
Briefly, we are suggesting tentatively, because of the lack of 
available material for the pre-1700 period, that control over the 
allocation of land may have been crucial to the basis of the chiefly 
control of commoners and slaves - and that such processes were in 
train before 1700. In the case of Asante we have to work back from 
later, post 1700 observations and then try to reconstruct the 
process of state formation in the forest kingdom. For example, the 
later record suggests that on the national level among many of the 
chiefly powers there developedat the point when land became less of 
a free good, the ability to exact allegiance fees from 'strangers' 
wishing to farm on land to which they had no immediate rights of 
access. The stranger might then have become a migrant vassal who 
was expected to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Paramount chief on 
whose land he had settled. In doing this the migrant would also 
acknowledge his subordinate access to land compared with people in the 
(1) Kea distinguishes three groups within the Afahene class which he 
calls a 'brotherhood' of nobles: these wer-et-*F-epolitical-military 
group or ahenfo, the mercantile group or abirempon and the priestly 
group or asofo, see ibid., p. 292. 
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local land holding abusua (1). We do know a littlemore certainly 
that later subordinate vil lage headmen(a(!,, k,, -. t-, ) exercised the right 
of decision whether a person could lease pieces of land to stranger 
farmers. It became a chief's function as so-called guardians of the 
land to allocate portions to stranger farmers: 
If a stranger to this town wanted land to farm he 
first had to go and see the chief and inform him of 
his desire to cultivate ... At first after having 
made his intention known and also that he is a member of 
say the Nson, Agona or the Anona clan the chief would 
only introduce him to the head of that particular clan 
who would show him where he could farm (2). 
Oral evidence pictures settle"Ment of communities and the exces*s supply 
of land over the numbers working it possibly for the period circa 
1700-1800 in these terms: 
Those who were first to arrive could farm anywhere. 
What happened was that nobody was allowed to cut off 
his neighbour. Those who came had to present 
drinks to the chief before they could farm because 
there were certain places that is taboo to weed (3). 
Although it is said repeatedly that chief's people shared in every 
interest of the stool land with him (4) it is very difficult for this 
to be demonstrated from the available evidence. Rather, as was 
declared in a state's Native Customary Laws at the start of the 
twentieth century: 
(1) It should be noted that all persons were at one time 'strangers'. 
See Rattray (1923) op. cit., p. 220 and Kyerematen, op. cit., p. 17 and 
the discussion of l'and use and the rise of chiefdoms. 
(2) Interview: Village chief and elders Aboso, Western Region Ghana, 
17 Augusf, 1980. A copy of oral data collected in 1980 is deposited 
in The African Studies Unit, University of Leeds. 
(3) Interview: Village elders Asaase, Ashanti Region Ghana, 
26 June, '1980. 
(4) See, J. E. Casely Hayford, The Truth About the West African Land 
Question, (Second Edition, first published 1903, London: Frank 
Cas-S-To-. Ltd., 1971), p. 54. 
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The ownership of all lands throughout the division 
is vested in the stool, that is to say either the 
paramount stool or some subsidiary stool owing all 
allegiance thereto; the chief and Oman council of 
the stool in which the ownership i-ý -vested are 
regarded as caretakers or trustees of the land for 
the stool (1). 
Reference to caretaker here is very different from the usual 
connotation of simply looking after something for somebody else. 
Caretakerhere means someone with the right to seize the land of a 
family refusing among other things, to fulfil military service (2). 
It also refers to the village chiefs and elders and family heads 
who derived individual gainfron, their position as allocators 
(guardians) of the land. For exemple, Rattray noted in a study of 
Ashanti law, published in the 1920's, that there were a number of 
caveats central to the ceremony of disposing of stool land to Asante 
subjects. If the grantor of land, that is the chief, wanted the new 
land holder merely to be its possessor he would include in the 
ceremony the words: "I give this land to you, eat upon it" or "I 
give this land to you look after it for me". In payment for the use 
of the land the new occupier was subject to a number of prestations 
from the chief: labour rent and rent in kind. We discuss these in 
some detail below. Suffice to say here that the chief, as occupant 
of the stool imposed a number of obligations on those to whom he 
allocated land. An initial fee was imposed for the right to work the 
land but in addition there were a whole range of annual tributes and 
(1) GNA(K) ADM D Box 1907: Native Customary Law 15/3/1927-30/7/32. 
TTFs quote refers directly to the Mampon district of Asante. 
(2) See, Rattray, (1923) op. cit., p. 227. It must also be 
remembered that individuals did have the right to exclusive 
use of portions of the soil which became the prerogative of 
kindred groups. Kea, op. cit., p. 108, uses the term caretaker 
for the seventeenth entur to denote a group of state revenue 
collectorsor 'marinos' who acted as overseers for the upper classes. 
Characteristica'U-yperhaps,, Rattrayin noting the caretaker pattern 
offers little indication as to its origins. 
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royalties from any minerals dug in the area (1). On other occasions 
the allocator of land might say "I give this land to you as a 
present". In this last case the receiver Of the land would have to 
pay the chilef or elder an Aseda (offering) which reflected in some 
sense the value of the land (2). Hereditary possession of the land 
for the new occupant however was not guaranteed. Instead, the new 
producer remained simply the possessor of the land and never its 
owner - customary forms of rent were given to the owner - that is the 
allocator of the land. In other words a chief's 'caretaker' role in 
relation to land gave hini a powerful political and economic position 
within the developing Akan and Asante states. 
All land which was not farmed moreover, came under the political 
jurisdiction of a chief who demanded the allegiance of anyone tilling 
the land in the community. The Omanhene or Paramount chief was in an 
even stronger position in the sense that he had sovereign oversight 
of land although this again is not seen by commentators in the 
It has been suggested that the best way of conceptualising the nature 
of these relationships in pre-colonial Asante society is to call them 
feudal rather than communa*list - that is to say a feudalism stripped 
of its European medieval connotations. See, 'Social relations in land 
in pre-colonial Asante'. African Study Group, No. 7, n. d., p. 8. While 
recognising the important job of clarifying some of the issues involved 
in Asante's pre-colonial relations of production we do not see the 
simple characterisation of the Asante as a feudal mode of production as 
very useful. Indeed, it will soon become clear that the either/or 
characterisation of the pre-colonial Akan social formation serves only 
to mystify and obscure the complexity of the indigenous relations of 
production. Instead, we prefer an assessment of the Akan 6nd Asante 
social formation which recognises the presence of a whole range of 
relations _6f -production which can be attributed to a domestic and three 
servile (slave) modes of production. 
Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution (Oxford, 1929), p. 355. This payment 
to the chief by 'commoners' for use of the land is justified by many 
commentators of the Akan as simply to uphold the dignity of the stool. 
Compare, A. A. Y. Kyerematen op. cit., p. 24. We will show later in this 
Chapter, and in the thesis as a whole, that the ability of the chiefs 
in the Akan social formation to accrue wealth as non-producers helped 
to elevate their position as a dominant class of exploiters. 
twentieth century to have constituted private ownership (1). In 
contrast to these writers our position is that control of the 
allocation of stool land vested in the powers of chiefs and elders 
enhanced their dominance over commoners in the Akan and Asante 
social formation. Although on the surface it appears that chiefs 
and elders in the period circa 1600-1700 simply carried out the 
demands of the people for land within the jurisdiction of a stool, 
the transactions involved for commoners to get access to land 
necessitated them entering into an increased subordinate relationship 
with the chiefs. This relationship centred around the payment of 
tribute from the commoners to the allocators of the land. Tribute 
was in the form of labour services on the chiefs' land and with the 
-he chiefs of one third of the gold mined or crops appropriation by It. 
grown on the commoners land. 
Little contemporary evidence exists to clarify further the 
social processes which facilitated the emergence of chiefs and of 
their control over land, commoners and slaves or as to when this 
occurred beyond saying simply between 1500-1700. We are in the realm 
of what has recently been called 'conjectural history' (2). On one 
point however, recent debates on the emergence ofchiefly classes in 
Asante are reasonably clearalthough not in unanimous agreement (3). 
This is the increased differentiation within Akan society prompted by 
a process other than land allocation: uneven access to gold and trade 
goods as well as to slaves. We will see in a moment that the 
0) Hayford, op-cit., p. 55. Compare also, Rattray, (1929), op. cit., p'. 348. 
(2) McCaskie, -TM3), op. cit., quoting J. Peel, p. 26. 
(3) The possible signilfýicance of servile labour in state formation remains 
contentious. See, inter alia, E. Terray, (1983) op. cit., and R. Dumett. 
'Pre-colonial GoICIT-ininý' and the State in the Akan Region: With a 
Critique of the Terray Hypothesis', in, G. Dalton, (editor), Research 
in Economic Anthropology, Vol. 2, (London: JAI Press, 1979). 
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development of the gold trade among the Akan predates European 
demand for the product at the end of the fifteenth century. Indeed 
we would certainly agree that "gold (sika) ... is located conceptually 
and materially at the very core of the historical experience of their 
(Akan) society and culture" (1). The exchange of gold for slaves 
became a driving force in the development of Asante. Control over 
the mining and access to gold - particularly nuggets - was a universal 
mechanism for both developing and sustaining social differentiation in 
the period of Asante state formation. We may conjecture that it was 
the individual accumulation of surplus and the development of the 
'big men' which promoted the formation of the Asante state. It may 
have been the disproportionately greater access to wealth accumulation 
through the appropriation of gold and other tribute initially, and 
not simply through trade as is suggested in Kea's analysis, and later 
of slave labour which created territorial dominance by a number of 
powerful individuals - and maybe it was these who consolidated a wealthy 
position through ritual, symbolism and political structures under a 
title of chief. Some such complex and multidimensional process occurred 
over a period of two hundred years or more wherein powerful families 
created the dominance of family lineages and the creation of a unitary 
state over which the Asantehene came to preside. This process, 
moreover, did not occur in isolation. We may add that increased 
European contact on the coast and inland, and the increased demand 
for gold which accompanied the contact tended to initially enhance 
indigenous, local relations of production and chiefly dominance (2). 
(1 ) -'-IcCasH e, op. ci t-, see also Chapter 2 below. 
(2) iVe-ýos`sible initial reinforcement of indigenous relations of 
. production 
during the first period of European contact is raised 
in more detail in Chapter 2 below. 
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We trace what might be called a 'culturalist' interpretation 
of this process in Chapter Four below. Suffice to say here, for 
the moment, that this interpretation of state formation among the 
Akan is somewhat different from that describedby both anthropological 
and historical . 
J'Wilks) accounts of Akan studies. What we have 
tried to show here is that although the outcome of the formation of 
Asante niiqht well have been a system of chiefly authority vested in 
them supposedly by the state's citizens, this is more of an ideology 
than an 'explanation' as to how this structure of chiefship developed. 
In contrast, our understanding of Asante state formation is rooted 
firmly in a historical materialist tradition which examines individuals 
differential access to the means of production and to surplus labour/ 
product and the consolidation of this process through the development 
of ideological and political constraints to legitimate chiefly 
authority. 
We may now conclude this Chapter with a more detailed discussion 
of recent contributions to understanding the period of Akan state 
formation and atteMptL to specify some of the relations of production - 
many to do with gold - which existed in the history of the Asante 
state circa 1500-1700. 
IV STATE FORMATION AND GOLD PRODUCTION 
It is very difficult to assess with any certainty what 
happened with regard to state formation among the Akan in the period 
between circa 1500-1700. This is because little data exists for this 
time span. In order to make any judgements about the period we thus 
have to extrapolate backwards from later accounts of Asante which might 
give us a glimpse of what life in the pre and early contact social 
formation may have been like. This also means that although we can, 
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as above, indicate processes that must have occurred prior to 1700 
it is difficult to explain their causesand in particular to assign a 
weight to external as opposed to internal processes - another issue 
of contention as we shall see below. In assessing the possible nature 
of relations of production in the extraction of gold from auriferious 
rock and its panning from the river beds in western Gold Coast we 
thus depend upon many eighteenth and nineteenth century European 
traveller accounts. 
Of course, as we have seen in the Introduction, these 
European sources of information about the Gold Coast are plagued with 
difficulties of both a theoretical and empirical nature. We have 
shown, for example, the often timeless nature of anthropological 
accounts of the Akan and the preoccupation of more. recent historical 
writing which stresses the accumulation of factual information often 
without an explicit theoretical framework within which to explain the 
issues which it raises. In contrast to these two positions this thesis 
attempts to offer an alternative perspective to understanding the early 
contact Akan and Asante social formations. Our perspective is one 
which uses an explicitly materialist and historical framework - one 
situated in the need to assess the transformation of the social 
formations over time. In short we use the notion of longue duree. 
We nevertheless are still confronted with problems of sources and data 
for understanding the transformation of the Akan and Asante social 
formations. We have to make use of oral data - with all of its 
inadequacies - and the use of the very anthropological and historical 
accounts of the period of which we are so critical. We can only hope 
that the combination of our more rigorous theoretical framework and the 
use of only discrete and critically appraised early European writings 
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and oral data alerts the reader to the difficulties involved in our 
assessment of the Gold Coast up to 1930. Our summary of the account 
of state formation is only suggestive of what might have been the 
course of historical development. We discuss much of the secondary 
material on Akan social formations in Chapter Three below and with it 
we advance the notion that we can only understand the possible 
trajectory that states took between circa 1500-1700 with an associated 
discussion of servile labour. Indeed we conclude this Chapter with a 
tentative preliminary account of this. For the moment though we can 
assess what has been a very recent assembling of a host of European 
accounts of what life might have been like on the Gold Coast between 
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. 
(a) Akan State Formation: Some Preliminary Observations 
As we have already briefly mentione'd, the significance of Kea's 
contribution to understanding Akan state formation is that he has 
substantially shifted the debate in Akan studies away from the less 
fruitful concerns with 'The Origins of the Akan' per se to an attempt 
at trying to understand the process of state formation. This is in 
contrast to earlier work which for many years has concerned itself with 
an ethnographical debate about the migration of 'the Akan' without 
doing much more than simply describe or suggest the geographical paths 
involved in the movement of peoples (1). 
I 
(1) Kea, op. cit. On some of the ethnographical debate see Adu Boahen, 
'The -6-rigins of the Akan', Ghana Notes and Queries, 8,1966, and 
Ivor Wilks, 'The Mossi' and Akan States, 1500-1800', in M. Crowder 
and J. A. Ajayi, (editors), History of West Africa, Two Volumes, 
Volume One (London: Longman 1971). An exception to this ethnographical 
position is the work of E. Terray, already cited, for the neighbouring 
state of the Abron, moreover, other work has attempted to draw a link 
between trade and Akan migration, see J. K. Fynn, Asante and its 
Neighbours, 1700-1824, (London: Longman, 1971), K. B. Dickson, A 
Historical Geograp y of Ghana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 
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In addition to collecting in one place much of the European 
accounts of trade on the Gold Coast for the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, Kea has attempted to use a historical materialist framework 
for understanding state formation among the Akan: that is at least 
as far as the historical evidence allows him so to do. In fact, it 
is perhaps more accurate to say that because the available data for 
the seventeenth century is largely concerned with trade and commercial 
relations between European merchants and local traders on the Gold 
Coast the vast amount of Kea's project too focusses upon a discussion 
of trade, commerce and the exchange of products. He is careful never- 
theless to stress that discussion of the increasing volume of local 
trade and commerce - something he reviews in detail-must be rooted in, 
and indeed made subordinate to, "processes of social production based 
on slave, peasant, and artisanal labor" (1). 
11 
Kea has a threefold periodisation of the Gold Coast regional 
social formation. First, he mentions a period, date unspecified to 
the late fifteenth century which was characterised by what he sees as 
simple reproduction based upon mercantile-agrarian relations. The 
second period Kea talks about in more detail and dates from the 
fifteenth to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. 
Finally, Kea speaks about a third period from the late seventeenth to 
to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (2). 
(1) Kea, op. cit., p. 173. See also p. 172. 
(2) Like R-eawe say little about the first period - date unspecified 
to the late fifteenth century. This is because any observation 
on this period must be even more speculative and suggestive than 
our already tentative observations about the early contact period 
up to 1600-1700. More research clearly needs to be carried out 
on this area - we need to note though that the lack of information 
onýthis period makes it problematic for us to assess with any 
certainty the particular process of change between the two periods. 
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The second period which Kea discusses is characterised by 
expanded reproduction which i*c- wkwe . rates of 
lncal surplus 
appropriation and accumulation increased and had the effect of 
reinforcing social stratification. The latter was characterised by 
nobles who appropriated surplus produce - agricultural and gold - 
from commoners and slaves. Kea's description of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century on the Gold Coast is also marked by increased 
urIvanisation, "'bursts' of -reproduction on an extended scale" (1) 
and population growth. Kea continues: 
From the fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries 
the region comprised a mosaic of sovereign, independent 
polities. No single oman was militarily stronger than 
any other, hence terr7torial conquests by military means 
were uncommon ... The "unity" of the region was not 
realised at the level of a politically and militarily 
dominant oman and a spatially extensive network of 
administrTt-ive seats subordinate to a paramount 
administrative center. It was realised at the level of 
a dominant regional trading center and dispersed networks 
of lower-level commercial central places and at the level 
of the mercantile ''empire" of the Akani, which was based 
on trade towns (2). 
We cannot possibly do full justice to Kea's contribution to 
Akan studies in the span of this Chapter especially as his contribution 
only appeared as the final drafts of this thesis were being prepared. 
We have however introduced his study of settlements, trade and state 
formation among the coastal Akan in the seventeenth century because 
it is particularly suggestive of alternative conceptualisations of the 
themes and issues that we have raised in this Chapter. Like much of 
what follows in the rest of this Chapter which relates to the early 
contact period of Akan politics, economics and history it is impossible 
to say with any certainty what 'actually happened' on the Gold Coast 
and in the formation of Akan states. All that we can do is to try and 
(1) Kea, op. cit., p. 13. 
(2) Ibid ., p. 322. Emphasis in original - compare his Observation on the late seventeenth century - see footnote 1, p. 4-1 abQye. 
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make use of the fragmentary historical material and situate it within 
a framework which for us makes sense of the world - that is which begins 
an analysis of society from the relations of production and reproduction. 
Kea tries to do just this by linking trade relations in the seventeenth 
century to the likely production relations which may have existed at 
that time and in turn to emerging political formations. Although 
exchange relations for Kea therefore become a focus of concern they are 
understood only be recognising the probable productive relations which 
facilitated the development of trade. 
For example, Kea assembles, from fragmentary evidence for his 
'second period', a picture of the development of indigenous merchant 
capital from the demands made upon free peasant producers and slaves: 
Theemergence and growth of major trading towns during 
the period Y. V, as linked to the conversion of peasant 
agricultural surplus, realised as gold, to merchant 
capital. The process of urbanisation was partly rooted 
in the transfer of social wealth from the settlements of 
free cultivators to the towns (1). 
This mercantile-agrarian period in the process of Akan state 
formation where the governing classes were seen to rely on the surpluses 
of their own subjects, gave k,, la, v Kea suggests to an imperial-agrarian 
period of the eighteenth century which was marked by administrative/ 
military units most notably those of Asante (2). We focus in this 
thesis mostly on this later period where according to Kea, a process 
of deurbanisation was set in train following a change in the payment 
of land rent by peasants from cash to rent in kind. This led to a 
reduction in peasant production for the market and an increased 
I 
(1) Kea, op. cit., p. 20. 
(2) Ibid., pp. 324-5. 
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opportunity for peasant accumulation. These developments followed 
an increase in military organisation of an Asante state towards the 
end of the seventeenth century and the increased linking of merchant 
capital to landed property controlled by the political and military 
functionaries of the state in the eighteenth century. 
Kea attributes an important position in the class structure 
of seventeenth century Akan society to slaves and bonded freemen 
or 'retainer labour' (1). It was from the group of unfree labourers 
that the nobles - elements within the class of afahene (great men) (2) - 
appropriated the products of surplus labour across a whole range of 
productive activities (3). What is significant about this retainer 
class is that: 
Generally speaking (they) owned neither productive 
property nor the products of their own labour; they 
could not putthemeans of production into operation, 
and they were separated from their own means of 
subsistence. Their material welfare depended on those 
who owned them, the afahene (4). 
We can now assess the possible role which slaves took in the 
likely formation of the Asante state by focussing upon the role of 
servile labour and the role of commoner menandwomen in the production 
of gold in early contact Akan society. We have already seen briefly 
one mechanism in which this domination was sustained - through the 
allocation of land. The argument here will be that a group (class) 
maintained a position of dominance over unfree labourers (slaves), 
(1) "bid., pp. 56,165-66,290,296. 
(2) iýiZ, p. 292. 
(3) Tea sees the diversity of slave (retainer) tasks as indicative of 
increased specialisatiQn within the afahene's economy, see, ibid., 
p. 293. Retainers may have worked a-sTo-mestic servants, att-en-i-dants, 
gold miners and concubines etc. 
(4) Ibid., p. 295. 
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commoner men and women. 
Gold Production 
Gold production was probably a major preoccupation of 
different Akan groups for many years especially following contact 
with Mande and Wangara traders from the Western Sudan around the 
fourteenth century. In addition to highlighting central relations 
of production among the Asante in the early contact period, it is 
useful to examine gold production at this early stage of European 
incursions on the West African littoral, because it helps us to 
try and assess more clearly the nature of the impact or collision 
between these social groups in relation to gold production (1). 
There were two trade routes for gold at this time. A north 
west route through Bonna and Bobo-Diolasso or a directly northern 
passage along the Black Volta river through Bole, Wa and Wal&nbele. 
One destination of the gold was Jenne where it was exchanged for salt, 
textiles and other northern products. It is difficult to calculate 
the actual amounts of gold transported along the Northern route, and 
of that later exported to 'Europe. Reliable sources for such data are 
unavailable. However, recent comprehensive recalculation of much 
of the documented material together with consultation of a host 
of oral traditions suggest that the Northern Trade in gold fr6m the 
(1) For the most recent examination of the Akan gold trade see, 
Timothy F. Garrard, Akan Weights and the Gold Trade, (London: 
Legon History Series Longman, 1980) and-Chapter T below. 
Unfortunately, Garrard's book often stops with the recalculation 
of the quantities of *old produced and does not examine in 9 
sufficient detail the nature of the relationships between the 
people of the Akan that are the basis of this productive activity. 
For attempts to look at the latter concern, see, E. Terray, 
(1974) op. cit., and 'Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron 
Kingdom-of---G-yaman', Translated by Anne Bailey, in M. Bloch, 
(editor), op. cit. See also R. E. Dumett, (1979), op_. cit., and 
the response by E. Terray (1983) op. cit. 
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Akan between 1400 and 1700 was of the order of 3,200,000 ounces 
The interest shown by northern traders in the gold produced 
by the Akan precipitated an increase in the amount of gold being 
directed to the North, ratherthan towhat might have been its main 
indigenous function of providing regalia for chiefs in the gold 
producing areas. The deniand for gold was to have major repercussions 
for the way in which the Akan people lived and worked together. In 
particular, the development of the gold trade provided an added basis 
for the development of an increasingly hierarchical society presided 
over by chiefs and elders who began to control the extraction and 
tradipg of gold. As we will see in a moment, whereas gold was 
extracted and panned by independent domestic producers, it was liable 
increasingly to appropriation by non-producing chiefs. This process 
was reflected most notably in the development of state forms and their 
consolidation in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. We have already 
seen how chiefs and elders in the allocation of land benefitted from 
receiving obligations from commoners. These obligations included the 
chiefly acquisition of gold. Possibly by the end of the sixteenth 
century and beginning of the seventeenth in the Akan states of Bono- 
Manso (Bono) there was royal control over the extraction of alluvial 
gold from the banks of the Tain and Tano rivers. The people of Bono 
were expected to give one third of the gold that they collected to the 
king and one third for the village head with only the remainder being 
(1) Garrard, op. cit., p. 163. See also Chapters Two and Three below. 
It might Fe- -interesting to note the total of 3,200,000 ounces 
exported northwards from Asante for the whole period 1400-1700 
compares with recent South African gold production figures for 
1981 and 1982 respectively of 655,755 kg and 662,516 kg. South 
Africa's revenue from gold exports in 1982 was R8,780 million. 
South Afric-an Digest, week ended 25 March 1982. That is, approximately 
300 yea-rs of goTd-production on the Gold Coast was equivalent to about 
1j years of South African current gold production. 
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shared among the miners as long as they were not slaves (I). The 
monarch, assisted by the paraphernalia of chiefly power attracted 
greater numbers of traders from the western Sudan for the purchase 
of gold and kola nuts (2). Increased interest in gold production 
followed the recognition of the benefits that greater extraction 
brought. Benefits were especially felt by the heads of villages 
and their families and this led, in the period following the late 
fifteenth century, to the development in Bono-Manso of a royal 
treasury and perhaps the beginning of gold dust as currency and the 
introduction of metallic weights for the weighing of gold (3). 
Gold production was clearly one basis upon which non- 
capitalist Akan states rested. Indeed, it might be suggested that 
the desire to increase the stock of gold proved to be a central 
motivating factor in the developiment of the most powerful Akan 
state of all. In Asante, Opoku Ware's drive northward, (circa. 
1722-1723), might be seen as a concerted attempt to extend control 
(1) Garrard, op. cit., p. 46, the usual case was for the miners to keep 
the gold Just and the chiefs to appropriate the nuggets. This 
form of chiefly appr6priation also extended to foodstuffs collected 
by the commoners; "The chief of the village had a, portion of any 
animal killed", see Interview, Abontiakoon, op. cit. 
(2) See Chapter Two bel o-w--f or---t-Fe- exchange, of gol df or northern products 
and European wares, On the kola trade see, Paul E, Lovejoy, The 
Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900, (London and Zaria: Ahmadu Be-Ilo 
University Press-, -T980). 
(3) Dumett, op. cit., pp. 40-41. On the importance of gold weights see 
Garrard, -opcit., and M. D. McLeod, op. cit., Chapter 8. With the 
onset of gold dust as currency and for trade a system of locally 
produced brass weights was developed to measure out units of gold 
dust. These remained in use until the end of the nineteenth 
century. They were of two forms: representational weights 
showing scenes from local life and geometric weights. The latter 
were the most popular. 
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over the gold resources of Bono-Techinian (1). 
From at least the end of the sixteenth century (although 
probably before) the production of gold was important for the Akan 
states of the forest region and this importance mounted as a system 
of Asante beliefs about wealth and the need to satisfy the demands 
of royal display emerged. As one informant told us, "anytime the chief 
felt he needed cold for the stool regalia he asked the people to 
produce it" (2). But it is crucial to ask: how was this gold extracted 
both from the auriferous rock and from the miners whose labour procured 
it in the early contact Akan social formation? Moreover, to suggest 
that gold was a factor in state formation implies also that so were 
the relations of production involved in gold-production. 
The location of gold either in auriferous rock or on the beds 
of certain rivers determined the nature of the extractive labour 
process. Here is one of the many nineteenth century European accounts 
of Akan techniques for mining: 
The shafts are dug by means of a small hoe, shaped 
somewhat like an Indian bassoolah, the iron being 
about 2 inches broad and 4 or 6 inches long. The 
workman squats on his hams and scrapes the sandy 
earth into a small calabash which, when filled, is 
drawn up to the surface by his companions. The shaft 
is just large enough to allow the miner to turn round 
in, and means of ascent and descent are afforded by 
holes cut in the sides, into which the miner inserts 
his toes, after the fashion of the old chimney-sweepers' 
(1) Bono itself increased its wealth by defeating Banda, circa 
1630-1640, and incorporating the latters gold fields ýniý- 
the Bono production system. See Dumett, op. cit. As a prelude 
to the importance of gold in state formation see, Georpes 
Niangoran-Bouah, 'Ideologie de Vor chez les Akan de Cote-d 
Ivoire et du Ghana' " Journal Des Africanistes, 48,1,1978 (2). Interview, Abontiakoon 
, op Cit. We trace c Tefly control 
ýf 
gold production and trad-e-l-n7hapter Four below. 
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boys when ascending a chimney. Of course having 
no pumps and baling, except on a very small scale, 
being impossible, operations have to be suspended as 
soon as water is reached and indeed but little can be 
done at all during and shortly after the rainy 
season (1). 
And in 1732 the panning for gold was described when talking about the 
people of lower Ankobra: 
They plunge and dive under the most rapid streams 
with a brass basin or wooden bowl on their heads, 
into which they gather all they can reach to at the 
bottom; and when full return to the banks of the 
river, with the basin on their head again, where 
other men and women are ready to receive and wash 
it, holding their basins or bowls against the stream 
till all the drossand earth is washed away; the gold 
if there is any in the basin, by its own weight 
sinking to the bottom. When thus cleaned aný separated 
they turn it'into another vessel till quite clear of 
sand or earth. The gold comes up some in small grains, 
some in little lumps as big as peas or beans, or in 
very fi ne dust. This is a very tedious and toilsome way 
of gathering gold; for I have been -assured that the most 
dexterous diver cannot oet above the value of two ducats 
a day, one day with another (2). 
This description of the panning for gold suggests a sexual 
division of labour where members of the whole family were involved in 
the search for gold. Indeed: 
whatever the scale it could be found that organisation 
of mining labour was done within the frame of domestic 
organisation (3). 
The division of labour was sexual in the sense that the digging of the 
slanting pits was done by the menwith the use of the short and long hoe, 
(1) J. A. Skertchley, 'A visit to the gold fields of Wassaw, West Africa', 
Journal of Royal Geographical Society, 48,1878, p. 278. The 
techniques of gold production Were also explained to us in 
interviews with chiefs and elders of various villagers. See also, 
R. Addo-Fenning, 'The Gold Mining Industry in Akyem Abuakwa circa 
1850-1910', Sankofa, 2,1976. 
(2) J. Barbot, 'T-Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea, 
quoted in N. R. Junner, Gold in the Gold Coast, (Accra: Ghana 
Geological Survey Department Memoir, numbe-rT, reprinted 1973), p. 6. 
(3) Kwame Arhin, 'Goldmining and Trading among the Asante of Ghana', Journal 
des Africanistes, 48,1,1978, p. 93. See also E. Terray (1974), 2pý. cit-, 
p. 34. 
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families had "their piece of land on which they dug the gold" (1) 
with the women collecting the loosened earth in the respective wooden 
bowl which was then pulled to the surface assisted. by young girls. 
Although the evidence is fragmentary we can here try to concretise 
some of our more general theoretical points that we made at the 
beginning of the chapter about reproducing the conditions of existence 
of the Akan social formation and the role of women. Specifically we 
are concerned here with the possible role that women played in both 
producing but also in controlling the products of their labour in gold 
production and agriculture. 
Although a matrilineal society, in contrast to the view aired 
by Rattray, there is little evidence that women were less subordinated 
than men to the power of chiefly authority. For Rattray, the matri- 
lineal nature of Asante society, the fact that women alone were seen to 
"transmit blood to descendents" placed women in a raised status in 
society (2). Moreover, women were not seen to stand alone in their 
relations with others ; "for behind the women stands a united family 
bound by the tile of blood". This is supported by the concept of 'mother 
right' which "affords the women a protection and a status that is 
more than an adequate safeguard against the ill treatment by a male or 
group of males. Her children belong to her and her clan, not to that 
of her husband" (2). Despite the matrilineal nature of Akan-Asante 
society and the elevated status which Rattray attributed to the position 
of women, we can now demonstrate that women's relative control over 
their offspring was not translated into the control which they had over 
(1) Interview: elders Ayanful, Ashanti Region, 26 June 1980. 
(2) ITaittray, (1923), op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
(3) Ibid., p. 79. 
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the distribution and marketing of gold and other produce. Indeed 
it is debatable even whether the elevated status which Rattray 
attributed to women is consistent with his own account. See, for 
example, his later comments which explain in more detail the nature 
of the relationship between a husband and a wife, and in particular 
the way in which the husband can control his wife's activities (1). 
Although a sexual division of labour existed in the production 
of gold there does seem to be a question mark at least, and thus the 
potential for a debate, about the relative ability of women in Akan 
society circa 1500-1750 to control their access to the products of 
their labour. Evidence is again fragmentary and largely dependent 
upon oral data but one writer (2) recently has suggested that although 
women's labour was crucial to the production of gold it was not common 
for them to be similarly involved in its weighing and distribution 
through trade. Other evidence points to exceptions to this. A woman 
could at times through a position as market trader exchange kerite nut 
for gold (3). Women might also in exceptional circumstances inherit 
gold weights which couldfacilitate petty marýet trading. But it does 
seem to be the general rule, however, that women were denied access to 
the prestigious and financially rewarding occupation of a goldsmith (4). 
Garrard's view is borne out by oral evidence: - 
Weights were owned by every adult man who traded. 
Women did not have weights; they had neither'the 
(1) Rattray, (1929), op. cit., p. 22. 
(2) Garrard, op. cit. - 
(3) Dianý Rey-Hulman, Vor et les differenciations sociales dans, L'Anno, 
ou la creation de 1'espace politique de L'Anno', Journal Des 
Africanistes 38,1,1973, pp. 77-78 and Garrard op. cit., p. 177. 
(4) See Garrard, "Women could never become goldsmith-s a-n7were forbidden 
to touch a goldsmith's equipment" op. cit., p. 117. See also, p. 138. 
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ingenuity nor the power. They sent the gold to 
the house where the men could weigh it, putting 
it into a little cloth packet (1). 
Insofar as they were denied general access to gold weights, 
and thus the ability to trade in gold, women were denied control over 
the products of their labour. Garrard argues that this was so and 
sums up his view of the subordination of women in these terms: 
Throughout the Akan parts of Ghana I found old 
people who assured me that women had not been allowed 
to use weights or scales, and some went so far as to 
say that women could not own them ... At Nchiraa an elder said that if a man dies his widow did not kepp 
the weights but handed them to the successor. At ý'; jau 
I was told that men did all the weighing and that 
although the chiefs, elders a' nd family heads each had 
a bag of weights, women did not. In Debibi an old 
lady assured me that women did not have weights (2). 
I Ln addition to women's labour being used extensively in the 
mining of gold, women it seems also had to "help their husbands on 
the farms. After the men had cleared the land it was the women who 
did the planting of foodstuffs ... " 
(3). This was an activity necessary 
for the development of sufficient food items to sustain the community 
of which they were a part. "After all this they had to keep the home 
as expected of them" (4). Women's work in the domestic setting might 
be seen to be the third level of their possible exploitation in pre- 
colonial Asante. Like their husbands they worked for the production 
of gold and food and were subject to the exigencies of that activity 
as aLciated within the Akan social formation (5). At the same time 
(1) Information from Opanin Kojo Mensah of I; chiraa, Kwame Nsia of Njau, Akwia Addae of Debibi, Adwoa Asuama of Nsoko, 1973-75, quoted in Garrard op. cit., p. 177. Emphasis added. 
(2) Garrard op. cit., p. 177. 
(3) Interview, Aboso, op. cit. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) To--rexample, prestations from chiefs and elders. 
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however, they worked in the home in the preparation of foodstuffs to 
sustain their labour and family and consequently the reproduction of 
labourers who would ultimately continue to oppress them. 
Of course the suggestions that women were subordinated at the 
place of work because they lost control of their product and in the 
domestic community because they perhaps worked longer hours than 
their menfolk and that they might be the subject of negotiation through 
the transaction of bride price (1) are tentative. Data might well be 
summoned to show that women did indeed pocket the gold that they 
mined or panned and that it is Eurocentric to see the Akan women 
subjected to domestic chores in the domestic community (or that there 
was not differentiation within the position of women) - after all did 
not their menfolk have to clear the land and build their houses - was 
not this also work and therefore joint participation in domestic 
duties? 
This contentious debate cannot be solved here - or anywhere 
else for that matter until further research is conducted specifically 
into the sexual composition of work groups and the direction of surplus 
products in agriculture and gold. WemerelY suggest that this is a 
fruitful area for further work but that at the moment, perhaps on 
balance, Garrard's work on Akan gold production and our own oral data 
(1) On bride price - the exercise of Aseda, see Rattray, (1929) op. cit., 
p. 24, where it is acknowledged that the man purchases "sexuýl preroga- 
tive, coupled with the benefit of her services and later those of her 
children". See also Mader to Basel 21 April 1875, no. 182/Additional 
comments to Accompany Mohrs letter of 22 April 1875. From Correspondence 
Bound under the Title Africa, 1875 in Paul Jenkins, (editor). Abstracts 
from the Gold Coast correspondence of the Basel Mission (Ghana: Mimeo 
University of Ghana, Legon 1970) p. 54, where it is recognised that 
gold diggers organised their labour force for gold digging by augmenting 
their number of wives. For an illustration of the*procedure associated 
with bridepriceand an illustration of a chief's ability to use the 
transaction to increase his status see GNA(K) AMD D Box 1907, Native 
Customary Law, 15/3/27-30/7/32. 
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collection suggests the possible subordination of women by their 
denial of access to the gold which they helped to produce. 
In addition to the specific place that women took in the 
production of gold there was also arguably a significant contingent 
of slave labourers involved in the labour process to produce gold. 
One of the most suggestive debates in recent years about the possible 
driving force underpinning the formation of Akan states has been 
between Terray and Dumett. Briefly, because the issues are touched 
on again in Chapter Three below, Terray has argued, from research on 
the Brong (Abron) state of Gyaman, that profits from long distance 
trade were an important source of income to the state in the pre-colonial 
period and were predicated upon the exploitation of gold by a subjugated 
mass of unfree (slave) labourers (1). In other words, Terray challenges 
a view furthered by certain writers in the early 1970's that there was 
a direct and simple one to one correlation between long distance trade 
per se and the creation of states. This is to say, Terray was critical 
of thenotion, perhaps best articulated by Coquery-Vidrovitch (2) that 
the major function of pre-colonial states was to provide trade security 
in return for which the state would deduct profits from tradesman 
through taxation. Although on the one hand recognising the importance 
of long distance trade to state formationjerray on the other handtook 
his analysis one step backwards arguing that: "the sovereign, and the 
chiefs subordinate to them, (drew) the essential part of their wealth 
from the surplus labour supplied by their slaves and that the role of 
long distance trade is therefore above all to allow the realisation of 
the surplus thus extracted" (3). In addition, Terray's analysis of pre- 
(1) E. Terray, (1983), op. cit. - 
(2) C. Coquery Vidrovitch, in (1972), op. cit. 
(3) E. Terray, (1983), op. cit., p. 96. My emphasis. 
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colonial Akan societies has been concerned with placing centre stage 
not only the slaves role in production but also the reproduction of the 
relations of captivity - both defined in terms of slave relations of 
production - and to a less extent the processes involved with the 
capturing of slaves - in understanding state formation among the 
Akan (1). 
Terray's notion that it was the chiefly control of slaves 
which primarily determined the trajectory of state formation among 
the Abron, and that this 'model' might be extended to other cases, has 
been criticised by R. Dumett. Dumett is critical of Terray's sources 
of information for the formative period of state building among the 
Akan (2). In contrast to Terray, Dumett argues that gold production 
among the Akan in the period of state formation was not organised 
around the chiefly monopoly of slaves but rather around family work 
units - although he concedes that domestic slaves may have been 
involved (3). Moreover, rather than focus on the largely 'mythical' 
presence of unfree labourers, and their control by chiefs in the 
formation of states, the emergence of a ruling hierarchy among the 
Akan should instead focus on: 
(i) the traditional obligation. by family heads or 
farmer-occupiers to pay a portion of the usufruct to 
local stool authorities (amanhene); (ii) the direct 
power of states to tax, which derived from both the 
traditional territorial controls of the ruler as well 
as from the kinship obligation of the people to him (4). 
As we have stressed throughout this Chapter available data 
for the formative period of state development which Dumett and Terray 
I 
(1) See also E. Terray, (1974), op. cit., p. 334. 
(2) Although Dumett does not exo-nerate himself from the selection of 
texts most suitable for his own argument. See Terray, (1983), op. cit., p. 98. 
(3) Dumett, (1979), op. cit., p. 45. 
(4) Ibid., p. 49. 
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discuss is fragmentary. Largely because of this it will probably 
always be difficult to say with any certainty what the determining 
factors involved in the formation of the state among the Akan. actually 
were. What we can try and do here though - as with discussions 
earlier in this chapter - is to identify the theoretical framework 
which makes the limited data intelligible. In fact, having said this 
neither Terray or Dumett's contribution to understanding Akan state 
formation are mutually exclusive (1). Dumett's account of gold mining 
in Asante for example, illustrates an important political and economic 
dimension to the sources of state revenue in late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century Asante. Focussing mainly on state taxation and 
forms of obligation for labour service (2) Dumett reminds us of the 
indirect forms by which the established Asante state procured its 
sources of income. This is a crucial dimension to understanding the 
basis upon which the Asante state sustained itself. It does not 
however, attempt as Terray has done to locate the establishment of 
chiefly hierarchies upon direct extraction of surplus labour from 
increasing numbers of servile labourers and to a less extent the 
labour service of commoner men and women. In other words, Terray's 
account of one possible factor in the formation of Akan states is rooted 
in an account of the relations of production in the Gyaman (Abron) 
kingdom and is not fundamentally dissimilar to Kea's argument about the 
coastal Akan where it is recognised that: 
In the fifteenth century slavery emerged as the principal 
form of social labour in such labour intensive activities 
as gold mining and forest clearance (3). 
(1) For further discussion of this, see Chapter Three- 
(2) Dumett, (1979), op. cit., pp. 56-60. 
(3) Kea, op. c it. , p. 
-j-97-. 
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(C) Sl avery 
Whatever the 'real' nature of social relations in pre-colonial 
Akan-Asante social formations it should now be clearer that the, social 
organisation of life became an increasingly antagonistic and 
hierarchical affair. Commoner men and women for instance could at 
any time be called upon to work for no reward on the farms and mines 
of village chiefs and Paramount chiefs. 
Any time the chief felt he needed people's help 
he informed his elders who in turn informed the 
people stating when they were required to-work 
on the chief's farm (1). 
and 
In the olden days the people always helped the 
chief on his farm. They did almost everything 
for him. They cleared the land did the planting 
and the harvesting. Not only this, they also 
weeded the farm when it became necessary (2). 
Commioners were therefore summoned by the chief to work on the 
latter's farm lands. This communal labour acted to enhance a group 
of chiefs and elders who became increasingly detached from any notion 
of simply being the village or state representative. Nevertheless 
the acts of exploitation were justified continuously in terms of 
being necessary for the community. At the level of rhetoric chiefly 
power was meant to be used solely for developing the cohesiveness 
of an Akan and Asante social formation. The effect was to -enhance 
the position of a separate class of chiefs and their dominance over 
commoner men and women. 
However, we have seen that gold production was (probably) 
a matter of production by servile labour directly controlled by chiefs. 
(1) Interview, Abontiakoon, op. cit. 
(2) Interview, Aboso, op. cit. 
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Indeed, further development and enhancement of chiefly power came 
particularly after the emergence of the Asante Empire circa 1700 with 
the more positive involvement of chiefs and elders in the furthering 
of trade activities in gold and slaves. But chiefly power was already 
possibly by the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, being 
enhanced by the increasing monopolisation of slaves which were used 
to farm and mine chiefs' land. We need therefore, to look more 
thoroughly at what was involved in the relation between slaves and 
their owners - those who commanded their labour - and how this relation 
was created and reproduced. 
With the exception of other slaves, everyone could own a 
slave. There was, however, a structural limitation imposed upon the 
numbers owned by different groups in the community. The number of 
slaves in each domestic unit depended upon the resources which could 
be mobilised for the initial appropriation and the facility to 
incorporate them successfully within the domestic structure. As we 
have suggested slavery was perhaps already a significant form of social 
oppression in the fifteenth century in Akan society and trade in slaves 
was soon to displace the mining of gold as the dominant 'social ' 
acti*vity. As early as the fourteenth century in neighbouring parts too: 
The trade in slaves ... was one of the major activities and one of the principle resolurces 
of the political and military formations that 
started in the Sudanic zone (1). 
A full discussion of slavery and slave relations of production 
will be reserved for Chapter Three below. It suffices to offer herean 
outline of the mode of reproduction of slaves for in the process we will 
C. Meillassoux, 'The Roleof Slaveryin the Economic and Social History 
of the Sudanic Zones of West Africa', Paper presentedý to the Conference 
on the Economic History of the Savanna, Kano Nigeria, January 1976, 
Mimeo. Translated by R. J. Gavin. 
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realise that an analysis of the relations of reproduction will in fact 
involve an analysis of the links within the Akan social formation but 
also between it and othersocial formations (1). There were at least 
three sources of slaves. There were the slaves exchanged with traders 
to the north of Asante for gold and those that were seized from within 
Akan areas and from neighbouring territories. In addition there were 
also the'local slaves' who were 'pawns' or had been 'panyarred' (especially 
in a later period) for the non-payment of debt. 
Slaves who were captives were the result of an enslaving 
activity, the development of raiding parties into neighbouring Akan 
areas and beyond led to the increasing militarisation of the Akan state. 
This militarisation helped facilitate the increased recoverable value 
from the slaves activity through the seizure of greater numbers of 
slaves. The value of a slave has been seen not to lie only in the 
amount of labour activity that (s)he fulfills but in his/her ability 
to reproduce him/herself at a low cost of subsistence. It was this 
that the militarisation of the embryonic state facilitated. Meillassoux 
captures the essence of this when he says: 
... the slave is deprived of his own means of 
reproduction. The reproduction of slavery depends 
on the capacity of the society to acquire slaves, 
i. e. on an apparatus which is not directly linked 
to the capacities of demographic reproduction (fecundity) of the enslaving population. The rate 
of accumulation, depends on the number of slaves 
acquired, and not directl-y--o-n--t'Fe-ir-productivity (2). 
This did not mean that the enslaving people were not concerned 
with the cheap reproductioR of a group of unfree people. Indeed, we 
may assume that if captured women brought forth children they quickly 
(1) See Meillassoux (1981'), op. cit 
(2) Ibid, p. 11. Emphasis is original. 
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became the slaves of the chief alone (1). The chiefs in early contact 
ASante society appropriated most of the captives for work on their 
'own' land but domestic slaves were also to be found in commoner 
households especially towards the end of the eighteenth century when 
the opportunites for accumulating slaves became more widespread (2). 
The domestic slave might be incorporated within the family productive 
unit. As time and generations progressed the 'slave' would sometimes 
be allocated his own piece of land and usufruct with which to grow 
crops. When captives were not immediately appropriated into the 
retinue of chiefs and elders when they worked on their land and repro- 
duced more slave labour within that household, they worked within a 
domestic productive unit. Together with the commoner wife and children 
they augmented the labour force and assisted in the production of gold 
and food. Complete erosion of the slave title might not occur or be as 
easy to achieve however, and with part of the product from his land 
being directed to his/her 'former' master (s)he remained in an 
exploited and subordinated position. Only a partial picture was often 
conveyed latr then by European observers when they remarked , that the 
domestic slave was: 
little affeýcted by his state of bondage inasmuch 
as he continued as a member of the same community, 
and had access to the same limited sphere of enjoyments 
within the reach of all (3). 
ýfl Bterview, Ayanful, Rp. cit. 1 2 We discuss the greater access to slaves and financial renumeration for commoners below, especially Chapters Four to Six. 
(3) This comment is symptomatic of nineteenth century Eurocentrism 
see, Thomas J. Hutchinson, 'The Social and Domestic Slavery 
on Western Africa and its Evil Influence on Commercial 
Progress', Journal of Royal Society of Arts, 26. ii. 1875, 
p. 316. 
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In contrast to this nineteenth century writer on Asante we 
have stressed throughout this Chapter that an understanding of the 
class relations of people in Asante does not depend solely upon an 
analysis of the differences in life styles of the individuals but in 
an analysis first and foremost of their relations of production. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has served the purpose of trying to clarify 
the framework of analysis which we employ throughout this thesis in 
assessing processes of colonial transformation on the Gold Coast and 
in Asante. We have also raised issues linked to the formation of 
Akan states and appraised a number of different approaches to under- 
standing what was a multidimensional process. In particular we have 
tried to understand some of the trends in the first period of informal 
colonial change -a tentative formulat-lonoiventhe difficulty of 
securing a clear picture of the pre-contact social formations. 
Our major criticism has been levelled at an anthropological - 
perspective of analysis which has situated unquestionably the 
emergence of power structures among the Akan in blood ties and forms 
of 'royal' descent without trying to explain the dominance of these 
structures. We have also assessed briefly an historical school of 
Akan studies, marked notably - althoughýwith substantial differences 
separating them - by Arhin and Wilks. What these authors share is a 
dominant concern with political and cultural processes to the almost 
total exclusion of economic production concerns. It is to the latter 
that we have looked in this Chapter notably in the work of Kea and will 
do so throughout this thesis. We nevertheless also recognise the need to 
appraise the position of political and institutional apparatuses which 
served to maintain state power among the Asante for these relations of 
production. 
I 
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CHAPTERTW0 
COLONIAL EXPANSION AND EARLY TRANSFORMATION ON 
THr' -GOLD COZýý 
ca. 1400-1700 
Merchants capital, when it holds a position of 
dominance stands everywhere for a system of robbery, 
so that its development among the trading nations 
of old and modern times is always directly connected 
with plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and 
colonial conquest; as in Carthage, Rome and later 
among the Venetians, Portuguese, Dutch etc. 
Karl Marx, Capital, Volume Three 
I INTRODUCTION 
We can now begin to further assess the first stages 0-10 informal 
colonialism on the Gold Coast. Informal colonialism refers here to 
the period of colonial, that is European, incursion on the Gold Coast 
up to the formal legal establishment of the Gold Coast Colony in 1900. 
What impact did early European contact have upon the Akan? Were 
indigenous relations of production affected by European merchants 
demanding gold or were pre-contact forms of organisation able to cope 
with the increasing demand for this metal? 
For one recent writer of Asante history, the transformatory 
effects of the European presence were minimal until 1806. Contact 
before this date was "chiefly commercial and perfunctory in any 
political sense" (1). In part we agree with this assessment. While 
merchant capital was busy promoting the consolidation of the 
(1) T. C. McCaskie, 'Innovational Ecleticism: the Asante Empire and 
Europe in the nineteenth century', Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 14,1972. For a diffe-Fent view of the impact of 
colonialism on ýfrica and the nature of its transformation, see, 
P-P. Rey and G. Dupre, 'Reflections on the Pertinence of a Theory 
of the History of Exchange I, Eco'nomy and Society, 3,2,1974. 
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transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, chiefs and 
merchants in Asante enhanced their positions as office holders 
through increased trade to the coast, the hoarding of gold and the 
militarisation of the Asante state to conquer neighbouring territories. 
This does not mean -to say that the increased European presence on the 
coast andthe increased incursions inland did not have a dramatic 
affect upon the Akan. Rather, this European presence simply matched 
many of the disruptive incidents which were emanating at this time 
from Asantes' expansion (1). There were, however, a number of 
structural changes in store for the Akan as well as the less qualitative 
effects of increased European contact on the coast at this time. 
We will examine what these structural effects were later. 
Before we do this we are going to see in more detail the way in which 
the Akan organised their economies.. Data for this period, ca. 1471- 
1600, is limited. There is little documentation of this period and 
that which does existwas written mainly by Europeans. Ilhen we are discussing 
the early period of Akan developments up to ca. 1750 all that we can 
usefully do is hypothesise. We can raise the questions and issues 
that need to be posed in suggesting a historical and materialist 
account of Asante state formation. For example, we can extrapolate 
back in time from the written and-documented sources to try and 
reconstruct the internal dynamics of Asantes' political economy. 
Consequently many of the conclusions of this chapter are exploratory 
and tentative. Before we build upon our assessment of the way in 
which the European demand for gold in particular affected the Akan we 
must first turn to examine the nature of European expansion to West 
(1) See Chapter Three for an account of Asante state formation. 
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Africa. What was the impulse behind the voyaging of merchant adven- 
turers to the Guinea Coast? What lay behind the seemingly insatiable 
demand for gold that had begun in the early fifteenth century with 
the systematic exploitation by the Portuguese, of the West African 
Ii ttoral , and led to the buil ding of a fortress at Sao Jorge 
da Mina 
in 1481 specifically for the purpose of trading cloth and clothing 
for gold? 
Did European merchants venture to the Guinea Coast solely for 
profit from general trading or was there a specific desire to locate 
quantities of gold? If it was the latter, what special quality did 
gold possess which was to distinguish it from other trading commodities 
and what was the impact upon European economies of increased quantities 
of gold? In. order to answer these questions we will need to assess 
the character of the European economies from which traders to West 
Africa came. By making this assessment we will know more clearly the 
kind'of effect that the European presence on the West African littoral 
had upon indigenous social structures. The character of the European 
economies is important for two reasons. The first of these is that 
the form of colonial contact varied according to the nature of the 
colonisers economy. Although different in a number of ways, the 
Portuguese and English political economies in the fifteenth and 
seventeenth century were characterised by a crisis ridden feudalism 
and an increasingly more dominant capitalist mode of production. We 
will show, with special reference to England, that it was merchant 
capital rather than industrial capital which began the process of 
underdevelopment on th. eGold Coast. This view is in contradistinction 
to that proposed by many writers who view developments in sixteenth 
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century Europe as already reflecting a capitalist world economy (1). 
The second reason why we examine the nature of European 
economies in this period is to see the kind of commodities which were 
being demanded to support mercantile expansion. We see throughout 
this thesis, that at different historical moments colonialism seeks 
to acquire different kinds of product which are produced by the Akan. 
In. the-early period, ca. 1400-1700, the product largely sought after 
in Europe was gold. From ca. 1700-1807 the products were slaves to 
work European owned plantations in the West Indies. In the nineteenth 
century 'legitimate' products like palm oil and rubber were substituted 
for the export of Africans. 
By assessing the nature of the products demanded by Europe, 
together with the specific phases in the development of capital from 
Europe, we can see more clearly the effect that European contact had 
upon the Gold Coast. We can examine the change, for example, in the 
indigenous relations of production needed to produce the goods for 
Europe. More fundamentally we link the nature of European expansion 
to West Africa with the internal dynamic and organisation of Akan 
production. The Akan are no longer seen as merely victims of 
external colonial pressures but have an internal dynamic of their 
own which at different moments welcomes and opposes increased European 
contact on the coast. In particular, the internal processes, and form 
(1) See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: 
Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins oT-tFe-European World- 
Economy in the 7T-xteen--tT century, Studies in Social Discontinuity, 
(New York and London: AcaUe-mi-cTress International Edition, 1974). 
See alsotheseries published by Sage, series editor, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, at present up to five volumes, especially volume 2, 
W. Goldfrank (editor), The World System of Capitalism: Past and 
Present, (1979) and volume 5, E. Friedman (editor), Ascent and 
Declinj in the World System (London: Sage Publications, 1982). 
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of interaction with Europe, largely determined the possibility and 
nature of European contact with the Akan. In other words, the basis 
for our periodisation of this early period of contact and transformation 
is the nature of the extraction of different products and the pressures 
and responses to these that were set up. Our concern in this chapter is 
with the European demand for gold: the processes in Europe which created 
this demand, the Akan organisation of gold production whic4made the flow 
of gold to the coast possible and the nature of the dialectical relation- 
ship between these two dynamic processes. Our argument here will be that 
whereas no changes in Akan modes of production occurred in this early 
period of colonial incursion (ca. 1471-1700) the Gold Coast was 
incorporated into a developing global economy. We shall go on to 
argue that the processes linked to this incorporation, the 'structural 
presence' and impact of European merchant capital in the realm of circu- 
lation, in the increased purchasing of gold, and (later) slaves, acted as 
the essential prerequisite for the future subordination of the Akan 
social formation under different powers culminating in rule by the British 
In this Chapter we will look briefly at the needs of the European economies 
for gold and the significance this 'commodity' had for future European 
development and incursions on what was to become known as the Gold 
Coast, and whether the increased demand for gold exports necessitated 
a change in the relations between the Akan people who produced the 
mineral. Having assessed this aspect of European 'development' in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century we will look at developments within 
(1) For an expansion of the notion of 'structural presence' see, 
H. Alavi, 'The Structure of Peripheral Capitalism', in, Hamza 
Alavi and Teodor Shanin, (editors), Introduction to the Sociology 
of "Developing Societies", (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1982). 
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the Akan areas at this time. We close the chapter with an assessment 
of the structural and less qualitative affects on the Akan social 
formation which received the Portuguese, Dutch and English traders. 
ii BEGINNINGS OF COLONIALISM 
The development of embryonic commercial relationships in 
Europe can be dated from. the eleventh century where feudal relations 
were in a process of consolidation. Greater concern with the development 
of trade and commerce were only witnessed at the time of the Crusades 
against Islam from the twelth to the thirteenth century overseas and 
the early erosion of serfdom and the commutation of labour services 
at home. From the fourteenth century the Guinea Coast and the Sudan 
were seen as the 'Eldorado of Adventurers in the trading world, with 
Genoese traders-going to the Tuareg and the Portuguese establishing a 
foothold at what they called Mina, literally the Mine, on the Gold 
Coast to obtain greater quantities of gold (1). Indeed a feature in 
this long transition from a European economy based upon feudal 
relations of production to the embryonic development of a capitalist 
economy (2) was the requirement of-greater quantities of gold and 
silver to support the monetarisation of the economy (3). 
Marc Bloch, Land and Work in Medieval Europe, Selected Papers, 
Translated by J. E. Anderson, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1967), P. 241. 
(2) Feudal relations of production here refers to inter alia; unfree 
labour tied to the land and payment for pro duc-e-t-F-ro -ug-TF1 abour 
services, while capitalist economy refers to one predicated upon 
free wage labour and the commoditisation of relations between 
people. 
(3) Money, for example, is the expression of a general social relationship 
of exchange between private economic agents. More will be said on 
the role of money and gold in the next section. See, Suzanne De 
Brunhoff, Ma 
- 
rx on Money, (New York: Urizen Books, 1976), p. 21 where 
it is made aiFiu-nýantly clear that "The capitalist economy is 
necessarily a monetary economy" p. 21, Compare, Karl Marx, "the 
money economy is common to all commodity production", quoted in, 
ibid. 
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As one commentator has remarked, the Portuguese, Dutch and 
English political economies in the three hundred year period 1450-1750 
were characteristed by the: 
transition from a system of social relations 
where monetary arrangements are secondary and 
subordinate, to one in which money (in the 
broadest sense) play(ed) a major role (1). 
More will be said in the following section about the role of 
gold from the Guinea Coast in the formation of embryonic capitalist 
economies of Europe. It is worth remembering here though, by 1344, 
legal regulations were laid down in England that the principle of 
gold must be accepted, that it was legal tender between two merchants 
and could not be refused (2). This might possibly be the modern date 
from which we can see the character of money as a powerful possession 
and one which enhanced the already ascending position of a merchant 
class. Gold was to become more important for the economies of Europe 
and especially Portugal, Holland and England as these countries 
developed their trade networks and paid balances in gold and silver (3). 
If we can see the growing influence of monied merchant groups from the 
fourteenth century in England and the development of greater trading 
links from the long sixteenth century, ca. 1450-1640(4), what impact 
I did this 
have upon countries outside the immediate European geographical 
area? Before we proceed we should also probe a little more carefully 
the basis for asserting that the development of capitalism, or more 
specifically of a 'world' capitalist economy, can be dated from 1450. 
1 
(1) Pierre Vilar, A History of Gold and Money 1450-1920, Translated 
by Judith White-, (London: NLB, 1976), p. 25. 
(2) Bloch, op. cit., p. 241. 
(3) Vilar, s p. 74, for an example of sixteenth century distributiolis of payments in gold and silver. (4) See Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Rise and Future Demise of the World 
Capitalist System: Conce ts for Comýarative Aralysis', hereafter 
cited as RFD, in, I. WaUerstein, Te Capitalist World Economy, 
(Cambridg(T-Czmbridýe University P. ress, 1979), p. 25. 
89 
The World System 
Debates over the origin of a world (capitalist) economy 
distinguished by a hierarchy of countries into core, semi-periphery and 
periphery have captured the imagination of many social theorists (1). 
Indeed such an approach could at first glance have some explanatory valut 
for our subject matter. Both the expansion of European influence from the 
fifteenth century and the 'incorporation' of the Gold Coast could be 
approached in terms of world system. theory. We have no disagreement with 
the notion that a series of economies in the Americas, Africa and the 
Orient became increasingly tied to commercial and trading transactions in 
Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth century thereby establishing an 
international economy (2). Our point of departure from 'world system 
theorists' however is that we do not characterise the fifteenth or six- 
teenth century global economy as capitalist. This criticism is discussed 
in further detail below. In addition we argue that the characterisation of 
the European economies as capitalist in the sixteenth century fails to 
recognise the specific processes at work in Europe at the time. This is 
because such an analysis does not emphasise the crucial way in which 
production was organised in Europe; instead the focus is upon the expansion 
of the global market. Moreover, it is the development and the spread of 
market relations throughout the globe which is seen as the dynamic factor 
in 'explaining' the processes of change at work in different indigenous 
'peripheral. ' social formations. Incorporation into a world market is 
(1) In addition to references cited at fn. 1 p. 6T see A. G. Frank, World 
Accumulation 1492-1789, (London: Macmillan, 1978a) and A. G. Fr-anT 
Dependent Accumulation-and Underdevelopment, (London: Macmillan, 1978b). 
(2) A. G. Frank, f-o-rexample, sees the year 1492 as marking the continuity 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the political events 
which develop the conditions "that would revolutionise the world out of 
many and transform the many to create one". The specific factors symbol 
is ing sixteenth century expansion are seen to be the joining of the crowns 
of Casti 1e and Aragon in 1469 whi ch led to the development of the Spani sý 
Empire and Columbia's four voyages between 1492 and 1502. In addition 
there were the development of new'trade routes to the Orient and Spanish 
'contact' with American Indians, (1978a), op. cit., p. 40. 
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seen to account for structural transformations in colonised 
countries instead of the threefold series of class conflicts in the 
indigenous national social formation, the European national terrain 
and the interrelation of these struggles resolved at the international 
level. At a more general level world system theories'method of 
analysis, where the emphasis is placed upon the increased circulation 
of products in Europe, fails to fully recognise the role and position 
of areas like the Gold Coast in the later development of European 
capitalism. Before we look at these criticisms of worldsystem theory 
in greater detail, we can quickly look at the position of the most 
authoritative advocate of this position, this is the work of Immanuel 
Wallerstein. 
Wallerstein's position is premised upon the notion of a "social 
system" defined with reference to the circuit of commodities in it (I). 
Historically, two kinds of social system can be identified. The first 
was a closed self sufficient economic nodule. The second has been 
the world-system which has been of two types. The first of these is 
the "world empire", characterised by political centralisation and 
economic "flows from the periphery to the centre by force (tribute 
and taxation) and by monopolistic advantages in trade" (2). The 
downfall of the last such phase of the world system - The Holy Roman 
Empire - was due to the political centralisation and over-bureaucratisatio 
that it engendered. In contrast, the capitalist world economy which 
developed in the sixteenth century in Europeoffered an alternative 
and more lucrative source of surplus appropriation. In this phase 
of the world system the state became "less the central economic 
(1) 1. Wallerstein, quoted in H. Hblalp, 'Frank and Wallerstein 
Revisited: A Contribution to Brenner4s Critique' , Journal ConteTLOrary Asia, 11 , 1981 , p. 175. (2) T-. -Tallerstein, (1974), op. cit., p. 15. 
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enterprise than the means of assuring certain terms of trade in 
other economic transactions" (1). Moreover, it was the market which 
created the incentives to raise capitalist productivity. 
It is with locating capitalist development in the market, 
rather than in the relations of production between classes in Europe, 
that we disagree with Wallerstein's conceptualisation of the world 
system. Wallerstein's view is that: 
The essential feature of a capitalist world economy 
is production for sale in a market in which theobject is to 
realise the maximum profit. In such a system production is 
constantly expanded as long as further production is 
profitable and men constantly innovate new ways of producing 
things that will expand the profit margin (2). 
This characterisation of the capitalist world economy tells us very 
little about the dynamics of feudalism in Europe and of the transition 
to capitalism (3). Little is said, for example, about the processes 
linked with the development of the forces of production in Europe upon 
which this global expansion of the market in the sixteenth century 
depended (4). And indeed the 'spread' of the market is itself not 
explained. In contrast to Wallerstein, we do not see the expansion of 
the market as the essential feature of capitalism. Instead, we view the 
main dynamic of the development of embryonic capitalist relations of 
production from feudalism in Europe as class struggle. The major 
distinguishing feature of the development of capitalism in Europe was 
the development of 'free' wage labourers who were forced to sell their 
'labour power' as a commodity resulting from the separation from their 
means of production. As Laclau has recently commented: 
(1 ) Ibid., p. 16. 
(2) -T. Wallerstein, RFD, p. 15. 
(3) This criticism is7aken up pyrticulary by Robert Brenner, 'The Origins 
of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo Smithian Marxism', NLR, 
1040 1977. 
(4) Theda Skocpol, 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical 
and Historical Critique', American Journal of Sociology, 82,2,5, 
1977, p. 1078. 
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The fundamental economic relationship of capitalism 
(is) ... constituted by the free labourers sale of his (her) labour power, whose necessary precondition is the 
loss by the direct producer of ownership of the means 
of production (1). 
In this latter view of the transition to capitalism in Europe, free 
wage labour is seen to be the product of class struggle rather than 
a derivative of a world division of labour. This is not to say that 
world system theory does not recognise conflicts within feudal England, 
forýexample, between serfs and lords. It is to say rather that the 
significance of class struggle for Wallerstein is subordinated to a 
host of extraneous factors of a "cyclical secular and climatological 
order" (2). In short, world system theory as one observer has 
commented does not provide a: 
Dynamic of internal relations into which the variables 
may be placed ... (there is) no theory of social change 
as an outgrowth of the crisis of the social relations 
that structure a social system " (3). 
Wallerstein's version of the development of the world system 
therefore does not, in our view, adequately explain the development 
of capitalism in Europe. The emphasis. lies with the development of 
an international world market rather tharf the relationship of this 
aspect of Europe's sixteenth century expansion with indigenous class 
struggles. In short, the dissolution of feudalism cannot simply be 
reduced to an expansion of trade but instead must be: 
understandable only in terms of the conflictual 
processes, processes of class transformation 
and class struggle, which tend to emerge from the 
contradictory characterof the pre-capitalist 
(1) Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (London: 
NLB, 1977), p. 23. 
(2) See for exampl e, I .. Wal 1 erstein, RFD, pp. 18 and 25. (3) See Stanley Aronowitz, 'A Metatheoretical Critique of Immanuel 
Wallerstein's 'The Modern World System'', Theory and Society, 10,4, 
1981, p. 508. See also Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, 
'Towards a Structural Perspective on the World System', Politics 
and Society, 7,4,1977. 
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social relations themselves (1). 
This criticism of Wallerstein's characterisation of the transition 
to capitalism in Europe is important for two reasons. First, if we 
are to fully understand the nature of the early European contact with 
the Gold Coast we need to know the domin'ant social processes at work 
in the European economy which partly determine the European presence 
on the West African littoral. For Wallerstein this is simple: 
"capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world economy" (2). 
He is too eager to link the emergence of a world economy to what he 
sees as the establishment of capitalism in Europe based upon the 
expansion of the world division of labour and the development of 
productive forces. Missing from this view of the transition from 
feudalism to capital, ism is the recognition that the onset of 
capitalism there was predicated upon the qualitative expansion of 
labour productivity. This was linked to the appropriation by a class 
of owners and controllers of the means of producing relative rather 
than absolute surplus value (3). 
If the latter was the case then the form of the expansion of 
trade to the Gold Coast and the contact with indigenous people there, 
will have been based upon the extraction of relative surplus value 
rather than the unequal exchange of commodities. In our view, the 
European contact with the Gold Coast in the period up to the end of 
the eighteenth century was in fact dominated by the expansion of 
(1) This is the thrust of Brenner's critique, op. cit., p. 13. See also 
his comment that, "the development of unde--r-d-eveTopment was rooted 
in the class structure of production based on the extension of 
absolute surplus labour". 
(2) 1. Wallerstein, RFD, p. 19. 
(3) Karl Marx Capita-F, volume one, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970) 
part v, Týe *6d ion of Absolute and of Relative Surplus Value, 
Chapter 16, Absolute and Relative Surplus Value, especially pp. 477-481 
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merchant capital from Europe the principal of which was to exchange 
European made, or seized, products at a higher price than those which 
were purchased on the West African littoral. Our position is that 
rather than capitalism being established in Europe from the sixteenth 
century it is more accurate to see the period as one of transition 
to capitalism from feudalism. As Frank, someone with a similar perspective 
to that adopted by Wallerstein, has acknowledged, the sixteenth century can 
accurately be seen as reflecting the "development of capitalism in its 
mercantile stage and the first period of concentrated capital accumulation 
in Europe (1). By adopting this periodisation we can more fully under- 
stand the European merchants' demand for gold from the Gol'd Coast and 
the nature of the contact with the Akan social formation. As we show 
below, the demand for gold became the focus for Portuguese, Dutch and 
English traders to the Gold Coast and it becomes themerchandise which 
helped facilitate the primitive accumulation of capital for the 
development of capitalism in Europe. 
The second reason why Wallerstein's characterisation of the 
development of the world economy is not very helpful, for our purposes, 
is that he indentifies the expansion of the market in Europe as the sole 
causal and explanatory factor in understanding the nature of the 
relationship which is established between countries in Europe and 
countries in the periphery. Wallerstein once again, therefore, leaves 
out the dynamic of class struggle in his analysis of the development 
of a capitalist world system. He not only ignores the processes 
of class struggle involved in the development of capitalism but also, 
and more impb. rtantly for our purposes, he fails to recognise the 
(1) A. G. Frank, (1978a), op. cit., p. 52. 
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existence of class struggle on the periphery, and the role of this 
to the nature of colonial transformation and incorooration. Wallerstein 
also fails to see the dynamic between class struggles in Europe and 
the periphery and how these are resolved. Wallerstein's concern 
with the expansion of the_European market therefore is not the best 
point of departure for the analysis of social change in either Europe 
or West Africa. 
Our position is that the sixteenth century was the scene of a 
developing world economy and an understanding of this differential 
geographical spread of the market is important for understanding 
colonial transformation on the Gold Coast. However, the developing 
world economy was not yet a capitalist world system. Instead, the 
dynamics of the international economy in the sixteenth century as 
they affected the Gold Coast reflected the transitions in Holland, 
Portugal and England of the break up of feudalism and the development 
of merchant capital as the precursor to capitalism in Europe. It was 
only later, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, that the 
international economy could be seen to reflect the ascendency of 
capitalist relations of production in Europe. As one commentator has 
remarked, in England: 
The bourgeoisie resisted 
a serious apprenticeship 
compromise in the 1670's 
1690's, and added to its 
a new. mode of faster and 
of wealth (1). 
power in the 1640's, served 
in the 1650's, made a profitable 
and 1680's, came of age in the 
already extraordinary history 
greater accumulation and circulation 
Our additional argument has been that the incorporation of 
countries on the periphery of European capitalism can only be fully 
assessed by examining social processes in the incorporated social 
(1) Marvin Rosen, 'The Dictatorship of the Bourgedsie: England, 
1688-1721', Science and Society, XLV, i, 1981, p. 35. 
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formation itself, and how they interact with the external market 
forces, rather than simply through the prism of European expansion. By 
this we mean that a comprehensive account of the incorporation of the 
Gold Coast into the economies of Europe requires an assessment of the 
political economy of the Gold Coast. We need to know more fully the 
indigenous structure of the Akan areas when considering the impact 
of the Dutch and English merchants clamouring for gold. Without this 
analysis of indigenous social structures incorporation for the Gold 
Coast into the world economy becomes solely the product of European 
endeavour. The Akan become simply victims of European trade when as 
we will see they were for many years equal partners. 
We can now proceed to try and clarify our argument that the 
sixteenth century was a period of transition to a capitalist mode 
of production in Europe. Specifically, the English social formation 
at this time was characterised by the dominance of merchant capital, 
the circulation of capital which does not need, "the process of 
production itself to be organised upon a capitalist basis" (1). Our 
discussion will show that a notion of a world system of capitalism at 
this time does little to help us clarify the relationship between an 
increasingly dominant series of European economies over the societies 
of West Africa and certainly sheds little light on the former's 
transforming impact upon the latter. This brief excursion into the 
theoretical perspectives seen to underpin capitalist development and 
pre-capitalist underdevelopment will lead into a discussion of the 
reasons why gold was sought in Europe and the historical contact 
between Europe and the Gold Coast. This will especially highlight 
the fact that this period may well be seen to mark the early development 
(1) G. Kay , Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis, (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 93. 
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towards the establishment of a world economy but this was not, for 
reasons already stated, one, based upon capitalist production. Rather, 
certain European economies were developing from the hegemony of 
merchant capital's desire to secure greater quantities of gold and 
other precious metals for currency to finance mercantilist 
adventurers for the appropriation of greater amounts of alternative 
trade commodities. The sixteenth century witnessed the-enormous 
development of international trade and growth of colonial conquest but 
this was based upon merchant classes in Europe during the period of 
primitive accumulation of capital. 
III MERCHANT CAPITAL AND THE CIRCULATION OF CAPITAL 
space does not allow us to examine in any great detail the 
intricacies of the importance of money and the development of 
capitalism with an in depth account of the historical 'events' which 
took place in Europe from the fourteenth century. All that we can 
do here is explain a little more clearly the nature of the processes 
underpinning embryonic capitalist development in Europe. In particular 
we can briefly get an understanding of merchant capital and European 
economies need for gold and thus their greater interest in the Gold 
Coast. By doing this, we will see thatwhat world system theorists are 
talking about in the sixteenth century is really a period of transition 
to capitalism; a process they recognise, but one which they categorise 
as capitalist instead of seeing merchant capital as: "the historical 
form of capital long before capital established its own domination 
over production. It's existence and development to a certain level 
are in themselves historical premises for the development of capitalist 
production" (1 ). 
(1) Karl Marx, Capital, Volume Three, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1972), P. 327, Emphasis Added, see zlso, pp. 336-337. 
9.8 
Merchant Capital 
"Merchant capital is simply capital functioning in the sphere 
of circulation" (1 ), the first free state of existence of capital in 
general, it is i form of capital which only, "requires that part of 
the social product should regularly consist of commodities - i. e. goods 
for the express purpose of exchange and money" (2). These last two 
categories are essential for the survival of merchant capital because 
value here is expanded by unequal exchange - by buying commodities 
more cheaply than they are sold. Unlike later industrial capital, 
merchant capital has no direct control over the labour process and is 
dependant upon a social class which does. Mercharýt capital thus 
promotes the exchange of commodities, the merchant has a concentration 
of purchases and sales and seeks to sustain his profit from unequal 
exchange by maintaining a monopoly control of his market (3). 
The organisation of trading companies in their incursion of 
the Gold Coast by merchant capital is an illustration of the attempts 
at the monopolisation of trade. Very often the Charters which 
inaugurated these companies specified the need to dissuade competition 
between the companies of Europe as well as among the people they were 
encroaching upon. For example, the Dutch Director General of the 
Coast of Africa in Guinea was instructed that he: 
should try to convince the natives, with sweetness 
or with harshness, whatever may be required, that 
once they belong to our trading stations they should 
(1) Ibid, p. 279. 
(2) I<a--y, op. cit., p. 93. 
(3) See, -Kar-F-ga-rx, (1972) op. cit., 
and Kay, op. cit., p. 96. 
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not trade with foreign ships, and in that way hamper 
our trade (1). 
Monopoly was essential to the success of merchant capital 
and early colonial expansion from Europe. Briefly, monopoly power 
was used by trading companies to reduce the prices paid to the producers 
of exportable commodities and to increase the prices of imports into 
the Gold Coast. This monopoly was initiated and maintained with the 
help of the emerging absolutist state in feudal England. Merchants 
received support from their respective nation states while performing 
fiscal and diplomatic favours for the state (2). This is not to say 
that there were not difficulties and conflicts in trying to maintain 
the monopoly on trade. These difficulties emanated from rivalry on 
the Gold Coast and the ability of the Akan to play one set of European 
merchants off against the other. There was also rivalry between 
merchants in England. One such rivalry evolved around the ethic of 
only one company having a monopoly of trade. For example, arguing 
against the persistence of trading monopolies a famous English 
Protestant merchant protested: 
All free subjects are born inheritable as to their 
lands so also to the free exercise of their industry 
and those trades whereto they apply themselves and 
whereby they are to live (3). 
West Indian Company (hereafter cited as WIC) 831: Article 16 
Special Memorandum and Instruction for Heerman Abramsz, Director 
General of the Coast of Africa in Guinea, April 1675, in, A. Van 
Dantzig, compiler and translator, The Dutch and Guinea Coast 1674- 
1742: A Collection of Documents from the General State Archive at 
the Hague, Acc a: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1978), p-. 1-2- 
(2) See S-B-1). de Silva, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p-. --4TT and on the role of 
the state see below. 
(3) Edwin Sandys, quoted in William Appleman Williams, The Contours 
of American History. (New York: New Viewpoints, A 01-vi"sý-1on of 
F -rTa-n -0 -1-n- -9 RE -sI nFc-. , 1973), p. 48. 
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The important point to note is that the focus in England around 1645, 
concerning the persistence of monopoly, was not against mercantilism 
per se. Although tighter controls were sought on the exercise of monopoly 
these were only called for to secure the greater safety of English 
merchants: to ensure greater access for England while penalising 
those fellow countrymen who abused the system. 
In addition to monopoly control of markets, the other essential 
factor assisting the development of mercantilism was money. Moreover, 
this condition was also best guaranteed by the intervention of the 
state. Money became increasingly important in the development of the 
political economy of fifteenth to sixteenth century Europe. Briefly, 
money has three broad functions: as an intermediary of exchange and 
means of payment, an index of comparison between goods - that is as a 
means of value - and as a store of value (1 ). The merchant is concerned 
with all three of these characteristics as his wealth always existed, " in 
the form of money and his money served as capital" (2). The merchant 
ensured a circulation of capital by advancing money for a commodity 
and then sell ing this commodity at a higher price (M-C-Ml ) where money, 
the independent form of exchange value, is the point of departure and 
increasing the exchange value an end in itself (3). Money is a social 
relation of production (4). The trade in it emanated from international 
commerce and increased the need for merchants to exchange their local 
national coins for other local national coins or simply to exchange 
(1 ) See, Suzanne De Brunhoff, op. cit., and also P. Vilar, op. cit. (2) Karl Marx, (1972) op. cit., p. R6. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) 10-e-lTru n ho ff, op. cit., P. 19. The role of money is "determined by 
its functions Mthin the entire pattern of capitalist economic 
relations", under capitalism money becomes part of the capitalist 
system of relations of production, ibid. 
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different coins for uncoined pure silver or gold- acommodity Marx 
was later to call world money (1)., This exchange business was "one 
of the natural foundations of modern finance" (2) where increasingly: 
National money discards its local character in the 
capacity of universal money; one nationalcurrency is 
expressed in another and thus all of them are finally 
reduced to their content of gold or silver, while the 
latter, being the two commodities circulating as world 
money, are simultaneously reduced to their reciprocal 
value ratio, which changes continually (3). 
There was noa priori reason why gold played the role of money. Rather, 
it did so because of a combination of social historical reasons. This 
broader context will be referred to later but for one writer gold: 
is able to play the role of money in relation to 
other commodities because it has already played the 
role of commodity in relation to them -(4). 
This follows from a recognition that gold, at one time a commodity 
metal, became the money commodity. It took the role as general 
equivalent of commodities or money and in so doing excluded "all other 
commodities from the character of general equivalent" (5). It is the 
", first metal to be discovered as metal" (6) and to. be elevated to the 
position of exchange value. As a commodity gold became transformed 
into a general equivalent distinct from all commodities. This is an 
important point and indicates the time when "Money ... exists as the 
exchange value of all commodities alongside and outside them" (7) and 
(1 ) K. Marx, (1972), op. cit., p. 317. 
(2) Ibid, p. 317. 
(3) =i , p. 318. (4) Ue-Brunhoff, op. cit., p. 23. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) KaFTMarx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political 
Economy, (Rough Draft), Translated wiETF-a--fo-rward by Martin Nicolaus, 
TLon--don: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1977), 
p. 176. Emphasis in Original. 
(7) Ibid, p. 188. 
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when during the fourteenth to sixteenth century in Europe gold for 
a short while, but more generally metallic circulation, became the 
dominant money form. When gold ceased to be a commodity only between 
the West Coast of Africa and European countries it began to be 
circulated as a medium of exchange of commodities, an instrument of 
circulation. This is the significance of gold to merchant capital 
and the later development of capitalist relations of production in 
Europe. Gold became first, simply a commodity but then a commodity's 
commodity. Gold took the form of money and thereby became the means 
in which greater amounts of commodities could be appropriated by a 
developing merchant class. The contradiction of course was that as 
gold became minted into coins, and thus transformed into currency, it 
demonetised itself: it lost its weight of metal and became a shadow of 
its own metallic substance. 
The importance of gold to the economics of Europe can only be 
seen in the wider context of the link between the circulation of 
commodities and the circulation of money. Merchant capital in its 
desire to promote the exchange of commodities strived for greater 
monetary reward which, given the historical context of fourteenth to 
sixteenth century Europe and its relationship with other parts of the 
globe, became encapsulated within the demand for gold. What began as 
merchant forays to the West African littoral for exchange of commodities 
developed into the clamour for the commodity's commodity. Gold and 
later silver, became symbols of power between capitalists and 
societies in the mercantilist era and served as catalysts for state 
development and involvement in the expansion of Europe (1). As the 
(1) As indeed the accumulation of gold nuggets and dust were increasingly 
becoming the symbols of power within the Akan social formation. 
See below. 
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demand and use of gold in Europe increased it is relatively easy 
to see that merchant capital became increasingly a fore-runner to 
the development of capitalist production. In contradistinction to 
the view of world system theorists, the sixteenth century was 
characterised by merchant capital, the process of obtaining profit 
from unequal exchange, which dominated instead of capitalism on an 
international (world) scale where profitability depended upon the 
exploitation of wage labour. This is important because it must be 
seen that what world system theorists have really done is simply 
indicate a period of transition to capitalist economies in Europe 
rather than describe a period there of already established capitalism. 
This transition was marked by the detachment of merchant capital from 
the production process but where increasingly "industrial capital 
comes into its own when the extensive forms of growth which merchant 
capital fosters are superceded by investment in depth" (1). Merchant 
capital laid the basis for the concentration of money wealth predicated 
upon the importation of gold and silver from an increasing number of 
'informal colonies'. 
We will see br, iefly below the close links which developed 
between the merchant state and merchant classes in this period of 
transition to capitalism. We can cite here though an early illustration 
of this link, together with the recognition of the need for gold in 
Europe to fund European expansion, by mentioning an early call for 
government assistance on the Gold Coast by Dutch traders: 
De Silva, op. cit., p. 421. On the specifics of transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Europe, see The Transition from 
Feudalism to Capitalism, introduction by Rodney Hilton, (L . ondon: 
NLB, 1976), see also Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist 
State, (London: NLB, 1974). 
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in countries subsisting on traffic as these lands 
do (i. e. Holland) an abundance of gold is peculiarly 
necessary, as in many places goods must be sought 
for not with other goods but with money, as is evident 
from the whole Eastern Trade which-ca-nonly be driven 
from this side with money (1). 
The sixteenth to seventeenth century marks the enormous 
development of international trade which is consolidated by the 
increased presence of money and its central place in merchant 
economies. These two developments lead towards the satisfaction of 
individual wants rather than as before where the merchant bought 
commodities for many buyers. As Karl Marx observed the: 
development of merchants capital tends to give 
production more and more the character of production 
for exchange value and to turn products more and 
more into commodities (2). 
In this later phase of merchant capital, a phase known as mercantilism, 
where the state became more actively involved in merchant trade, 
merchant capital developed as an agent of productive capital rather 
than as an autonomous 'independent' form of capital in its own right. 
We can now look at the demand for gold in the period between 
ca. 1500 and 1700 in Europe. This examination will confirm the importance 
of gold in the period of merchant capital and will highlight the increasing 
help from the state to the formation of merchant capital expansion. 
(b) The Demand for Gold, 
The sixteenth century has correctly been characterised as a 
period of economic expansion in Europe; of a change and transformation 
in the relations of production and: 
FC NI 1610-16231, request for government help 4 August 1611, pp. 24-25, 
emphasis added, Balme Library, University of Ghana, Legon. 
(2) K. Marx, (1972), op. cit., p. 327. 
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the result of a long evolution in demography, 
agriculture technology and industry, of the 
exploitation of the commercial and financial 
techniques, and of the organisation of national 
economies by their rulers (1 ). 
But what was the relationship between these developments in Europe, 
which facilitated the processes of primitive accumulation, and the 
increased merchant activity in West Africa? What impact, for example, 
di d the i ncreased amount of gol d imports i nto Europe f rom the Gol d 
Coast have upon the development of mercantilism and later the 
development of capitalism in England? From Mina, the annual ore 
receipts were as follows: 
TABLE ONE (2) 
Annual Average Receipts from Mina 1504-1545 
Years Kgs 
1504-1507 433.366 
1511-1513 413.922 
1517-1519 443.676 
1519-1522 411.864 
1543-1545 371.578 
Although these quantities -of gold, as we will see, were 
crucial to the continued expansion of mercantilism in Portugal and 
later Holland and England they did not in themselves precipitate the 
development of capitalist modes of production in Europe. Rather, 
gold was brought back to Europe when there was a need for it, when 
there was a trade surplus add this became increasingly the case. 
(1) Vilar, op. cl t. 1 p. 69. (2) Ibid, p. 56. 
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As one commentator has remarked: 
If an influx of gold iq to have a profound economic 
meaning there must be a profound economic reason for 
it: it must correspond to an upsurge in exchange and 
in production, and cannot result simply from 
encirclement through war (1). 
Gold became an invaluable commodity especially in balancing 
directly or indirectly a deficit in trade between western Europe 
and the Orieftt which provided some of the goods (spices) to pay for 
east European imports. To recognise that the upturn in European 
economies predated the influx of gol'd does not deny that an increase 
in gold imports did have a profound effect upon west European 
economies. Amongst other things there was a 'price revolution'. 
This followed the influx of American and African gold into Europe 
which resulted in the devaluation of gold relative to other 
commodities and the rise in general prices (2). Gold was not 
altogether unimportant in actually stimulating a trade revival and 
the increase in prices which encouraged business. Our argument 
in fact will be that the inflow of gold to the European economies 
in the sixteenth century helped facilitate the primitive accumulation 
of capital which later served to extend the embryonic development 
of capitalism on the continent. 
(i) The Traders 
Portugal was the first European country to discover gold 
on the Gold Coast reaching Mina in 1471. By 1540 however it was no 
Ibid,, p. 35. Thus: "The minting of gold was ... a consequence of western economic development and not a cause 
p. 36. 
(2) Ibid., p. 76. 
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longer bringing gold into Europe (1). The Guinea trade was began 
by a Lisbon merchant Fernao Gomes and governed by the Mina company 
under strict instructions from the King of Portugal to enforce a 
monopoly of trade which received consolidation by Papal Bills issued 
by Eugene IV and Sixtus IV (2). The Portuguese were continually 
frustrated in their attempts to enforce such a monopoly. They were 
plagued by interlopers and restricted first to a floating trade, 
that is trade from boats which the crews did not leave_, and later to 
coastal trade which led to the building of forts as trading centres. 
In return for gold, Portuguese traders initially exchanged cloth, 
textiles, canvas and copper, coral, glassware and shells with the 
Akan people (3). In this the Portuguese met a demand for fashions 
which had been established previously by Wangara traders. Increasingly, 
however, slaves were exchanged by the Portuguese for gold. The slaves 
served a function of carrying much of the export commodity from the 
hinterland to the waiting Europeans. Slaves were bought at Benin in 
1479 by Eustache de la Fosse and by 1529 this was a well organised 
business (4). 
The King of Portugal is said to have disliked this aspect of 
the trade but his concern lay more with attempts at continuing a 
(1) Elmina Castle was built by the Portuguese in 1482 and Axim fort 
in western Gold Coast in 1503. A testimony to Portuguese contact 
with pre-state forms is given in J. K. Kumah, D, --nkyira 1600-1730 AD, 
MA Thesis, University of Ghana, Institute of African Studies, 1965, 
"It is Tikely that gold from Denkyira was coming down to the coast 
since the time of the Portuguese", p. 2. 
(2) See Vilar, o cit., p. 55 and T. Garrard, Akan Weights and the 
Gold Trade, on on: Legon History Series, Eongman, 1980), pp. 
72-73. 
(3) Vilar op. cit., p. 55 see also, D. Birmingham, 'The Regimento Da 
Mina': T. H. S. G., xi, 1970. 
(4) Birmingham, op. cit., p. 4. 
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monopoly of trade on the coast. The importance of gold for Portugal 
was already becoming apparent with the first minting of the 'escudos' 
in 1436 and 'cruzados' in 1457 as a medium of exchange and a new 
addition to Portuguese currency. The increased wealth which the gold 
content of the cruzado (3.54 grammes of fine gold) ensured, helped 
facilitate Portugal's ascendency over the previously hegemonic 
commercial powers of the Mediterranean. It also served to enhance 
the increasing volume of Portuguese trade with the Far East following 
Vasco da Gama's circumnavigation of Africa (1). The importance of the 
Mina gold trade was thus located in the significance that this 
commodity had for the Kingdom of Portugal and the Portuguese economy 
in Europe hence the need to enforce and maintain a monopoly on trade. 
All gold entering the country was taken first to the mint where it was 
returned to individual owners in the form of money which in turn was 
used to develop increasing commercialisation of the Portuguese economy. 
The importance of gold for European economies was stressed to the King 
of Spain by the Lords States General of United Netherlands as early as 
1609. Talking about the importance of the Guinea trade and the need 
to support the seafaring traders they stres'sed that: 
The return cargoes of the same trade, being pure 
gold, which is brought to this country, is minted 
and further distributed amongst the participants (2). 
On the Guinea Coast a Royal monopoly was ruthlessly enforced. 
No resident in the castle, for example, was allowed to own a set of 
scales which could be used to weigh'quantities of gold. But Portugal 
(I ) Vilar, op. cit., p. 56. 
(2) FCNI , 1-6=- 3, p. 12. Translation of unsigned letter relating to The development of trade between the King of Spain and Archdukes 
and honourable high and Mighty Lords States General of the United 
Netherlands. 
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faced mounting competition from neighbouring European countries. 
In 1553 three English merchants financed three ships to the Gold 
Coast from which they acquired one huddred and fifty pounds of gold. 
A similar expedition took place in 1554 and between 1555 and 1557 an 
English trader called Towerson made three voyages. In all cases the 
exchange of goods on the coast was between European cloth and Akan 
gold (1). Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Dutch also 
became more involved in Guinea trade, a trade which they were to 
maintain an interest in, in one form or another, until well into the 
nineteenth century. 
(ii) The Mercantilist State 
We will talk later about the impact that 'colonial' rivalry 
had on the coast. It is now important for us to project our concern 
with some of the processes linked to European expansion to the 
seventeenth century. We can do this by tracing the greater interest 
and encouragement shown in the development of commerce at this time 
by the mercantilist states in Europe. Mercantilist state here refers 
in particular to the institutions of the monarchies of England and 
Holland and their respective groups of advisers and entourage which 
in a later period were to form a rising bourgeoisie. A brief look at 
the role of the state here is important as it will focus our attention 
on what became the main vehicle for informal colonialism on the Gold 
Coast - the formation of chartered companies. In doing this we also 
develop an earlier assertion that this period of European expansion 
-was one based not on a capitalist wo. rld system but developing merchant 
capital bent on unequal exchange. 
(1) For an interesting description of the trade see, T. Garrard, 
and also J. W. Blake, (translator and editor) Europeans in West 
Africa, 1450-1560, Volume II, series II, Vol 
ýXXXVII, (London: 1he 
Hakluyt Society, -Issued for 1942). 
lie 
English and Dutch incursions on the Gold Coast occurred in 
a way not too dissimilar from those of the Portuguese before them. 
Merchant companies, syndicates or partnerships were formed to 
facilitate enough finance to make a trip to the Guinea Coast 
worthwhile (1). The usual process was for a group of merchants to 
finance a ship to bring back as much gold and treasure as possible. 
In 1562, for example, Sir William Garrard and other', London merchants 
sent out two ships which'returned with one hundred and fifty pounds 
of gold (2). The claim of the Portuguese to a legal monopoly of the 
coast meant that'such voyages had'to be furtive and secretive and if 
they were discovered, as was usually the case, the merchants were 
quick to demand help from their country of origin by way of protection. 
We will look at two areas of this protection and state 
involvement in the trade to the Guinea Coast and more generally in 
the development of a mercantilist system to enhance the greater 
profitability of its national merchants. These will be the petitioning 
and the encouragement given to the minting of coins of the realm with 
the gold brought back from the coast and the development of state 
institutions in the form of a banking system (3). 
(1) James A. Williamson, A Short History of British Expansion: I, The 
Old Colonial Em2ire, TL-o-n-ýon: Macmillan, 1930), p. 83. (2) 7e-eBlake (1942) op. cit., and Garrard, op. cit., p. 79. 
(3) This help like all help was of its nature contradictory and 
alienated many groups (later to become known as 'factions'). For 
example, although a monarch would be called upon to raise the 
problem of its merchants with the Pope, many merchants were to 
resent the seemingly confiscatory nature of the 'mint' in 
ensuring only coins of the realm and not pure gold were allowed 
to stay with merchants. At the same ti me merchants would see the 
'value' of increasing the monetarisation of the economy through 
the increasing influx of gold ... 
IIi 
As early as 1481 merchants had prevailed upon King Edward IV 
of England to petition the Pope to allow free trade in Africa: 
As it is advantageous to the Christian religion that 
wealth and other things precious for their natural 
excellence, should be drawn into its power from the 
hands of the infidels, he willingly permits his subjects 
to pass over to any parts of Africa for traffic and the 
exchange of baser merchandise for nobler, provided this 
be sanctioned by the Pope's authority. He therefore 
prays his holiness that no suspicion may attach to this 
voyage and to grant letters for the aforesaid purpose ... 
And in 1555 merchants claimed to Queen Mary the freedom of the world 
to trade: 
First we saye we be merchantes, who by the commune usage 
of the wDrlde do use traficque in all places of the 
worlde as well Asia and Africa as Europe, and have never 
be restreyued from resorte arive place wherunto we comme (2). 
The most significant period for state assistance for merchant 
and trading causes came in the seventeenth century. As the sixteenth 
century is agreed to be a period of economic expansion so the seventeenth 
is a period of depression (3). It is a period of falling prices in 
Europe and a reduction in foreign trade. However, these aspects of 
economic and social depression are misleading. The seventeenth 
century may more clearly be seen as a period of realignments in western 
Europe and the development of powers which are to dominate trade and 
other activities in the Gold Coast for many years - in the case of the 
English until the twentieth century. The seventeenth century also sees 
(1) Petition of King Edward IV of England to Pope Sixtus IV regarding 
A Voyage to Africa 27 February 1481 , Document 107 in Blake, op. cit. 
p. 297. 
(2) Merchants of England claim right for Free Trade in Guinea 1555: 
Document 140, ibid., pp. 335-6. 
(3) 1. Wallerstein, 7Fe Modern World System II, Mercantilism and 
the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1/50, 
(USA: Academic Press, 1980), see a1so-, T-. -G-. -Frank, (197-aT 
op. cit., Chapter 2. 
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the Dutch seizure of the Portuguese fort at Elmina in 1637 and the 
driving of the Portuguese from the Gold Coast in 1642 (1). Despite 
the seeming depression of the seventeenth century for the Dutch it 
is also a golden age, one where they usurp power from the declining 
Portuguese and from 1618 are dedicated to an expansion in overseas 
markets by displacing the interests of weaker countries. The result 
of this activity is that there is a failure to develop a different 
productive base for further capitalist development. Dutch merchants 
instead were content to centralise existing money capitalrather 
than generate new opportunities for capital accumulation through a 
process of concentration. As one writer has observed: 
while the seventeenth century d6wn swing lasted, 
European mercantile capitalism expanded on its New 
World frontier but without significant. productive 
impulse or investment or commercial success - and 
with frequent commercial failures of the colonising 
and/or trading companies (2). 
One such company was the Dutch West Indian'Company which 
was chartered in 1621 and began trading on the Gold Coast in 1623. 
This brought to Holland an estimated 40,461 marks of gold in the 
years up to 1636 (3). There were numerous difficulties in sustaining 
a continued return of 
' 
gold to-Holland. Partly this was because of 
difficulties in obtaining sufficient quantities of trade goods to 
exchange for gold, partly because of inland Akan wars and also because 
of continued and escalating competition for the metal especially from 
(1) This coincided with Portugal's demise in Europe of which both 
Holland and England took advantage. Portugal separated from Spain 
in 1640 and the. treaties of '1642,1654 and 1662, which led to the 
Treaty of Methuen in 1703 between England and Portugal ensured Britisý 
supremacy over Portugal. See Frank, (1978a), op. cit., p. 76. 
(2) A. G. Frank, (1978a), op. cit., p. 97. Compare, Vilar, o' cit. $ P. 19E (3) Garrard, op. cit., p. 153. ritish and Dutch East In la ompany were 
chartered7"77M and 1602. See Frank, (1978a), oe. cit. p. 67 who mal 
the point that they did not become profitable until the 
ýast 
part of 
the seventeenth century when there began the eighteenth century boom, 
see also Vilar, op. cit. 
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the British. The Dutch West Indian Company collapsed through 
bankruptcy in 1674. The decline in their gold takings can be seen 
from Table Two. Total Dutch receipts for the second half of the 
century were only 565,000 ounces. 
TABLE TWO (1) 
Estimated Dutch Gold Takings for the Seventeenth Century 
Annual Average Total 
(troy ozs) (troy ozs) 
1601-22 20,000 440,000 
1623-36 23,000 325,000 
1637-50 20,000 280,000 
1651-67 17,500 300,000 
1668-76 2,800 25,000 
1677-1700 10,000 240,000 
1 610,000 
Competition was a factor hastening Holland's decline of the 
gold trade. This competition from English interlopers became sizeable 
around 1631. Between 1632 and 1672 it accounted for the influx to 
England of an average of 5,000 ounces a year (2). The system of 
obtaining the gold was similar to the Dutch in the sense that chartered 
companies were formed often with only sufficient capital to enable one 
journey to the coast. The first was' The Company of Adventurers of 
(1) Garrard, op. cit., pp. 154-155. 
(2) Wid. 
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London in Africa formedin lo'lSt! hich was given a royal monopoly Oftrade for 
1000 years. This millenium was short lived, however, following the outbreak 
of the Anglo-Dutch viar of 1664-1665 which led to the formation of the Royal 
African Company of 1672. The latter was perhaps the most successful of the 
early English Companies. The Royal African Company had a better organisa- 
tional structure but still faced the difficulties of appropriating greater 
quantities of gold. For instance, its bullion coined at the Royal Mint 
for the years 1673-1700 yielded only approximately 506,000 guineas (1). ' 
This company gave way to the African Company of Merchants formed in 1750 
subsidised by a specific imperial government grant of il3,000. 
We give this list of different companies to illustrate the fragility 
of the period for trade to West Africa. The trade was always under threat 
from interlopers who very often could undercut the prices of the companies 
which had established themselves on the coast and which consequently had 
the costs of maintaining ýheir trading posts (2). This competition led the 
'established' companies to call for state backed monopolies of trade because 
the interlopers were undermining the extent of their unequal exchange with 
the Akan. Moreover, the willingness and ability of the Akýn to fraternise 
with interloper European traders, rather than 'official ' companies, led the 
merchants to become actively engaged in indigenous politics. Company trader 
recognised increasingly that it was only by becoming cognisant with the 
internal affairs of the coastal Akan, and with interfering in the local 
affairs of the Fante in the vicinity of the European forts, that European 
trade could be safeguarded and expanded. 
One of the main fillips to the expansion of the English companies 
was the development of banks and in particular the Bank of England, which 
was formed with the blessing of the state. 
(1) Ibid., p. 155. 
(2) TFe-re was also wider competition from Swedish companies and the Branden- 
burgers. See, J. Reindorf, Scandinavians in Africa, Guide to Materials 
Relating to Ghana in the Danish National Archives, Supplemented 
-P. E. Olsen, J. Simenson (editor), (Oslo: Universitforgayet, 1980). 
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The Bank of Amsterdam however, was founded in, 16'09 (1) before the 
formation of the English bank, as an attempt to obviate the mush- 
rooming of smaller private banks which were, "speculating in the 
disparity of silver content between different currencies, absorbing 
the strongest and putting the poorest back in circulation" (2). The 
banks' role was to regulate and redistribute the stocks of gold and 
silver used in international trade. The intention was to minimise the 
adverse inflationary effects of large quantities of these metals coming 
into Holland which were eroding fixed incomes-. A national bank provided 
the chance to stabilise prices in the interests of traders, not only in 
Holland, but more generally in Europe as a whole. 
(iii) The English State 
Mercantilists in Elizabethan England had petitioned the state 
for help in achieving five'tasks: the development of a political and 
economic framework to safeguard merchants' interests, to modify, 
centralise and consolidate the: 
older but still useful units of society; 
encourage and direct the development of a newp6l'-iti-cal 
economy; balance that evolution; and expand 
the resulting system abroad (3). 
The result was parliamentary legislation in 1563 to inter alia: encourage 
food production, improve the navy and generally facilitate a "concerted 
effort to diversify and expand overseas trade and colonisation" (4). 
These early state reforms laid the basis upon which an English 
(1) Vilar, op. cit., p. 205, see also, K. Marx, (1972, ) op. cit., pp. 317-319. 
(2) Vilar, op. cit., p. 206. 
(3) Applema-n Williams, op. cit., pp. 41-42. - (4) Ibid., p. 42. 
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bourgeoisie could establish its hegemony by 1688 and by 1720 become 
" one of the world's great class dictatorships" (1). 
Feudal barriers to accumulation in England were remove in 
the years between 1640 and 1720. The mercantilist state increasingly 
provided the rising bourgeoisie with the facilities to enhance 
accumulation at home and plunder abroad. Among the state provided 
institutions to hasten capital accumulation was the Bank of England, 
an efficient treasury, a rational taxing system and stock market 
security (2). 
Although not without conflict, there was surprising uniformitY 
between established political parties in parliament as to the direction 
which the mercantilist state should take. As one commentator has 
remarked, "Whigs and Tories differed about the pace of development, 
but both were taking the same road" (3). Perhaps the most important 
mercantilist state aid to the development and consolidation of the 
English bourgeoisie was the growth of long term national credit. This 
was facilitated by the formation of the Bank of England in 1694 but in 
actual fact the basis for this institution had been developed several 
years before (4). 
(1) Rosen, o. 't., p. 25. Some of the additional mercantilist state 
aid ca e ocated to 1703 with the Treaty of Methuen where England 
agreed to give Portugal political protection in return for 
commercial privileges: the Navigation Acts 1650-1651assured 
the development of the English fleet which was at the forefront of 
hostilities with the Dutch in 1664,1665, and their defeat in 1672. 
(2) Rosen, op. cit., p. 27. 
(3) Ibid., -p-. -2F- 
(4) 7e-e, ibid., and the account of "carnival-like concern with money, 
stocks and schemes for creating fortunes in Darien and Dorchester", 
and the suggestion that "Even before creation of the Bank of 
England money for supply was collected in the City and lent to 
the treasury as soon as the Crown needs were known", ibid., 
p. 35. 
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The development of the Bank of England towards the end of 
the seventeenth century helped stabilise the adverse effects of the 
influx of large quantities of gold and silver to London. It was just 
one part of a complex series of measures which had been and were to 
be enacted by the English mercantilist state which sustained and 
increased the power of English traders. 
The London gold market was no longer adequate or reliable 
to realise sufficient state funds to augment public finance in the 
form of taxes and loans to cope with the traumatic period following 
war with Louis XIV and the developing wars of Spanish succession, 
1700-1704 (1). The earlier years of the seventeenth century had seen 
merchants deposit gold ýurpluses with the gold merchants in return 
for which they accepted exchange receipts, which although private did 
have a large circulation. The gold merchants' were thus in a ýposition 
to advance loans as they were confident that there would not be a 
call for all their money at any one time. The result of the system, 
however, was inevitable speculation and the use of only the worst 
coin for circulation in England while best coin went overseas for 
international commerce. 
The possible monetary difficulties that this system of 
'banking' posed had led the Crown and London merchants to jointly 
accuse'. 
the gold merchants of speculation, usury, clipping 
coin and even insolvency. In 1694 (then) when the 
Ibid, p. 215. It should be noted that Vilar overstresses the 
importance of wars at this time as the reason for the development of 
the Bank of England. See Rosen, op. cit., p. 25. "The credit system , built between 1690 and 1720 came-in-to being only after the process of 
basic accumulation of wealth had been secured and not as a result of 
wars. The wars on the contrary were financed successfully only because the owners of exchequer tallies knew adequate returns were 
safeguarded" . 
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King had asked the merchants for a loan of 11,200,000 
sterling, they used a new body to raise it. The Bank 
of England (1). 
The development of this institution, and the monetary reforms which 
followed the immediate inflationary period, were to provide England 
with a monetary base from which to sustain the country's dominance of 
the seas and colonial expansio n to the end of the nineteenth century (2). 
This was based, moreover, on the further discoveries of gold on the 
Gold Coast and also the seizure of silver from other parts of the globe. 
We have spoken little in fact about the relationship between gold and 
silver in this period as meanswhereby European economies facilitated 
the development of national industries and international trade and 
exchange. This relationship, is documented well elsewhere (3). The 
point to be made here is that the appropriation of gold from the Gold 
Coast, up to the end of the seventeenth century, was important for the 
development of mercantilism in Europe. It is not insignificant that 
the 1630's in Europe, a marked period of depression within the general 
seventeenth century downturn, was also one of intense competition and 
rivalry on the Gold Coast and of a reduction in gold export from the 
West African littoral. 
TABLE THREE (4) 
EuroDean Gold Takinqs from the Akan 1601-1650 
Date Troy ounces 
Portuguese 1601-40 160,000 
Dutch 1601-22 440,000 
1623-36 325,000 
1637-50 280,000 
English 1632-50 95,000 
Interlopers etc 1601-25. 50-000 
1626-50 150: 000 
- 1,500,00 9 
(1 Ibid., p. 215. 
(2) ToTr-details of the reforms of this' period, see Vilar,, op. cit., Chapter 
(3) See Vilar op. cit. 
(4) Adapted fUm'-G-arrard, op. cit., p. 156. 
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England emerged from the seventeenth century in a much 
stronger position than its European neighbours for the reasons already 
r, v-ntioned. Most crucial of these was the underlying importance, and 
different nature of the state in England and its expansion into areas 
which were previously spheres of activity solely reserved for merchants. 
In fact, merchants began from as early as the fifteenth century to 
enTist the help of the monarchy. to develop international trade and 
the appropriation of profit from unequal exchange. 
The seventeenth century can most easily-be seeN as a period 
of consolidation of gains achieved in the sixteenth century. In 
relation to the influx of gold this meant that the seventeenth century 
saw a slowing down in the rate of gold imports. to Europe. This was 
only reversed in the eighteenth century when the source of gold was 
largely from Brazil (1). 
Our discussion of the increasing use of gold in Europe and in 
particular that received from the Guinea Coast can now be extended. We 
can now look at how this gold was appropriated and exchanged for 
European trade goods and the impact that the European traders had 
upon the people of the coast and the inland Akan groups. 
IV GOLD IN THE AKAN SOCIAL FORMATION AND THE COLONIAL 
INCURSION OF THE GOLD COAST 
Before we examine specifically the structural and less 
qualitative impact of European contact with the Akan, we need to turn 
briefly to a closer look at the role of gold in the Akan sotial 
formation in the seventeenth century (2). This will be done briefly 
See Table Two where it can be seen that there was no increase in 
the quantities of gold for the second half of the seventeenth century. 
See also Vilar, op. cit., pp. 197-198. 
(2) The role of gold varied between the different Akan groups. Our 
emphasis here is on the forest kingdoms and the western states. 
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because we have already discussed in some detail the way in which 
gold was produced, and the trade routes through which much of it was 
exchanged for\commodities in the territories bordering the North and 
the coastal region (1). 
We are concerned here with the position of gold in the Akan 
economy. Was it a means of exchange, a currency, or did it simply have 
a use value or serve the function merely of decoration? In trying to 
answer these questions we are faced again with a lack of data. Most 
of the information that we have on the uses of gold by the Akan refer 
specifically to the Asante in the nineteenth century (2). A recent 
attempt has been made, however, to trade the origins of the Akan gold 
trade from which it has been noted that unlike the areas surrounding 
the Akan to the East and West, the Akan from an early stage had a 
currency of gold dust (3). The use of gold dust as a currency was 
pre-dated by iron until North African and Arab-traders journeyed to 
West Africa. As early as 773 a Baghdad scholar referred to the ancient 
Kingdom of Ghana as, "the land of gold" which remained an important 
source of gold for north-African traders until the development of the 
Mali Kingdom in the twelth and thirteenth centuries (4). 
It was not until well into the fifteenth century that the 
developing forest societies of the Gold Coast were more fully integrated 
into the gold trade emanating from the North. The sprawling and 
(1 ) See Chapter One. 
(2) On the more general issue of wealth and gold in Asante see, I. Wilks, 
'The Golden Stool and the Elephant Tail: An Essay on Wealth in Asante', 
in, G. Dalton (editor) Research in Economic Anthropolo . gy, Volume 2, (London: JAI Press, 1979) see- a-. Tso, I. Alilks, Asante in the Nineteenth 
Century, The Structure and Evolution of a Political Ord Cdýibridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 
(3) 1. Garrard, op. cit., p. 2, see a so Ivor Wilks, 'Wangara, Akan and 
Portuguese in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, I The Matter of 
Bitu', JAH 23,3,1982. 
(4) Quoted Tn-Garrard, op. cit., p. 10. 
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successful Mali kingdom established the trade in gold through 
Wangara merchants which was assisted by the development of Timbuktu 
and where a Tuareg settlement, in ca. 1100, attracted increasing 
numbers of traders from North Africa and the Sudan (1). The spread 
of Mande and Wangara traders and merchants into West Africa hastened 
the promotion of Akan gold production. Throughout the early period 
gold trade to the North equalled and sometimes outstripped exports 
to Europe (2). In 1513, for example, the Portuguese Governor of 
Elmina protested that gold was directed North instead of to the coast 
through; "this Mandiqua leak which was never so gaping as at present"(3). 
The Mande obtained gold from the Akan in the forest areas and traded 
for it with woven cloth from the north at Bonduku_, which became 
important as a market town just north of the forest region. 
By the late fourteenth century the influence of the northern 
trade upon the Akan was such that they began to weigh their gold on 
their own scales (4). We will see below that the expansion of Akan 
gold production to trade with merchants from the north, increased the 
rivalry for gold between the European merchants on the coast. As one 
tradercommented in 1688 the Akyem: 
do their main trade with the interior of Africa, 
with the Arabs and Moors of the Niger, and with 
their neighbours in gold, garments, cloths and other 
merchandise (5). 
Akan political power grew as the trade in gold increased. We see in 
(1 ) Ibid., p. 11. See maps pages xvi and 38. 
(2) 7o-mpare Tables III and IV. 
(3) Quoted in Garrard, op. cit., p. 26. 
(4) On the significance o go d weighing and weights see Garrard, 
it., and pp. op* cl, 
(5) See J. -Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and South Guinea, 
Volume V of ChLFr-chill'-s-, --ToTI-eýc-ti"" '(5'; 7q-e`s--a-nT7rave1s, (London: 
1746, lst ed., Paris 17ý2). 
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the following chapter how the development of gold production and 
slave trade added to the wealth and position of sections of the 
Asante. The desire to secure trade routes which carried gold 
became one of the driving forces behind state formation. For example, 
while the British and Dutch were plundering and looting on the coast 
in an attempt to extend their informal colonial powerthe Akan state 
of Gyaman was subordinated to Asante rule. Gyaman had become an 
important gold trading state during the late sixteenth century and 
had been attacked at different times by Tekyiman, Dormaa and Asante. 
In ca. 1730 the Asantehene, Opoku Ware, sacked Bonduku and made Gyaman a 
subject state. Similarly, later in the century the Asante army invaded 
Dagomba and Gonja subjecting them to actual tributes. 
The presence of northern and particularly Muslim merchants 
facilitated the expansion of the Asante political economy. Gold which 
had previously been used for decorative purposes took on a new value. 
It became a vital trading commodity which could be exchanged for the 
products of the north and it was soon to become a universal currency; 
that is, money for use in exchange and for hoarding in the accumulation 
of wealth. Before interest in gold was generated by the northern 
traders iron was used as a currency. It is suggested however that from 
ca. 1700, and the establishment of the Asante Empire, gold dust was 
to be used for trade (I): 
There was no gold for money before the Mande came. 
When they came the money was called som E. This was 
of iron, small like an axe; it was a-ro-d-about three 
inches long. It was the first money here (2). 
Garrard oe. cit , p. 3. (2) See, T Garrarý, 'Notes on Begho', Department of Archaeology, 
Mimeo, University of Ghana, Legon, 1976, p. 8. 
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The changing role and importance of gold in the Akan 
political economy had a number of repercussions within Asante. The 
increased demand for gold from northern traders and also from Europeans 
on the coast led to an intensification of gold production. In all 
likelihood the labour intensity of the productive process of this 
period increased the need for slave labour (1). The two way development 
of trade also increased the opportunities for the accumulation of money 
wealth. This increased wealth, consolidated the position of Asante 
office holders who tried to direct the mining and trading of gold. 
A monopoly of trade for the Asantehene, however, was not always possible 
and the rise of an Akan class of merchants often posed a threat to 
established office holders. Such a threat emerged. following the 
opening up of the gold trade at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century to private African merchants. By the nineteenth century the 
Asantehene had developed a form of state trading. A company was 
established which traded on behalf of the Asantehene. The merchantst 
or court representatives of this company, traded on specifically 
demarcated trade routes to the coast. When state trade was relaxed, 
such was the clampur for trade among private Asante, that a class of 
wage earning carriers developed to transport the goods from Kumase to 
the coast (2). The carriers of this trade came predominantly from the 
ranks of the Fante. This posed a threat to the Asante hierarchy who 
saw the position of middlemen as a potential obstacle to their authority 
and hitherto complete control of trade. Finally, in 1844, a decree was 
passed in Asante preventing the residence of coastal traders in Asante (3). 
(1) See Chapter One above for techniques of gold mining. (2) Wilks, (1975), op. cit., p. 195. 
(3) Following this TF-erewas a revival of Asante carriers and state 
oriented trade. 
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From the use of gold merely to decorate and adorn the person 
the Asante developed an intricate economy based upon the use of gold 
dust as currency central to the successful trading of slaves, ivory 
and kola nuts. We talk later about the nature of the intricacies of 
the Akan economy, about the collection and payment of taxes in gold 
dust to the state treasury and how the Asantehene sought to control 
trade (1). 
The point of mentioning here, the increased'-use of gold 
within the Akan economy, is to show that the Akan gold trade began 
in a northerly non European direction. Indeed, it took a long time 
before European interests dominated the gold trade. The direction 
of indigenous trade was only dominated by European demands in the 
phase of the Atlantic slave trade. In this sense, in the period up 
to ca. 1750, the Akan were equal partners in trade with Europe. They 
were exploited through unequal exchange of their goods with those 
from Europe but they controlled the supply of their products. 
Moreover, they determined what Daaku has called the terms of trade 
with the Europeans by specifying the colour and quality of the imported 
goods. The early Portuguese, for instance, had to trade in the already 
tested north African shawls from Morocco and Tunisia for Akan produced 
goods. The Portuguese in fact established factories elsewhere in 
Africa, for example in Benin, to import locally produced goods like 
cloth, leopard skins and slaves into the Gold Coast. Between 1633-1634 
the Dutch alone imported about 12,641 pieces of Benin cloth to the 
Gold Coast (2). - 
(1 ) Chapter Four below. 
(2) K. Y. Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), Chapter Two. 
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The pull of trade to the south resulted in the increased 
production of gold within Asante. This did not however 
structurally transform the indigenous social formation. Instead, 
many embryonic relations of production and power were intensified. 
Hence indigenous slavery grew to satisfy the greater demand for gold 
and power holders extended their authority over commoners as the 
former acquired greater access to gold. Gold became the currency of 
the Asante. It was used in the payment of trade goods from the north. 
The latter in turn, because of their Orestige status, enhanced the 
position of the office holders. At the same time, opportunities grew 
for merchants not directly in the control of the Asantehene to trade 
gold both northwards or south t9 the coast. However, whenever this 
increased commercial activity posed a threat, real or otherwise, to 
the Asantehene sanctions were imposed on trade from Kumase. 
Now that we have briefly assessed the importance that gold 
played within the Akan economies we can turn again to a more detailed 
look at the effects of European merchants trading on the coast for Akan 
products and especially gold. We will argue that rather than European 
encroachment at this time, (ca., 1471-1700), having a transformatory 
affect upon the Akan social formation, its impact was largely felt 
simply through an intensification of indigenous relations of production that 
were developi ng from an essential Iy 'internal' dynami c. We wi 11 al so argue, 
however, - that the European presence on the Gold Coast can be seen 
to hasten later structural changes in the Akan social formation and 
future development. The changes result from the impact of colonial 
violence, the importation of firearms and the creation of a middleman 
class of African traders among the Fante. 
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(a) Non Structural Changes On the Coast 
It has already been establ i shed that the basis for European 
contact with the Akan people of the Guinea Coast was trade and the 
chief vehicle for this was the Chartered Company. The instructions 
to the first General on the coast for the Dutch West Indian Company 
make this quite clear: "for the defence, help and assistance of the 
merchant ships of these lands, trafficking and drawing their trade 
there " (1 ). The main bulk of this trade was in gold and when the old 
company was liquidated in 1674 a new company kept this part of the 
charter "for the execution of a secret design to extract with little 
cost gold from earth and sand which may be invisibly contained in 
it" (2). 
One aspect of European contact, and its impact upon gold 
exports, that needs examining is the suggestion that there was an 
immediate switch in the direction of gold exports from the Guinea 
hinterland from northern trade to the coast (3). This suggestion needs 
examining carefully because as can be seen from Table Four it is only 
after the period 1651-1700 that the trade to the North declined 
substantially. 
(1) F. C. Nl, 1610-1623, p. 35. 
(2) W-. =.. 40. Secret Minutes of the Meetings of the Assembly of 
Ten 17, January 1675, contract with Jan Baptista Liefrininck: 
cited in A. van Dantzig, op. cit., p. 20. 
(3) The change in direction oT trade is seen as one result of 
European contact on the coast and not the sole-result as is 
alludedto by K. Y. Daaku, 'Trade and Trading Patterns of the 
Akan in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in 
C. Meillassoux (editor), The Development of Indiýenous 
Trade and Markets in West7frica, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971). See also Garrard (1980), op. cit., pp. 161- 
163. 
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TABLE FOUR (1) 
Akan Gold Exports to the Northern Trade 1400-1900 
Annual Average (oz) Total (oz) 
1400-1450 5,000 250,000 
1451-1500, 10,000 500,000 
1501-1550 12,000 600,000 
1551-1600 17,000 850,000 
1601-1650 10,000 500,000 
1651-1700 10,000 500,000 
1701-1750 8,000 400sOOO 
1751-1800 8,000 400,000 
1801-1850 4,000 200,000 
1851-1900 1,000 50,000 
1400-1900 85,000 4,250,000 
The above table shows clearly the difficultyfacing the 
Portuguese in establishing European hegemony and a trading monopoly 
on the coast for Akan gold. It also implies that the Sudanic and 
Trans-Saharan trade remained the dominant direction of exports until 
the arrival of the Dutch who were more successful in encouraging the 
Akan traders to direct their gold to'the coast. Akan gold production 
did not simply increase to cope with European demand but a change in 
the direction of trade occurred following a number of factors. One 
of these was the civil war in the Niger bend following the demise 
of the Songhai Empire after defeat by the Sultan of Morocco in 1591. 
(1) Garrard, (1980), op. cit., p. 163. 
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There was a further reduction in the direction of gold to the north 
following the death of al-Mansur in 1603, and the ensuing outbreaks 
of civil war in North Africa. Trade did not suffer a complete slump 
however and later in the early eighteenth century it picked up to 8,000 
ounces from the seventeenth century figures of 10,000 ounces a year (1). 
The persistance of the northern trade is evidence to support 
an argument that European contact initially did little other than make 
available for the Akan people an extra outlet for trade 1) 
if the conditions 
for them were agreeable. Indeed, a notion that the Akan did little 
else than obey market forces for their commodity is tenablegiven the 
often voiced complaint by merchants that apart from adulterating the 
gold with copper and sand, which they exchanged for clothes, the Akan 
quite easily closed trade routes and put a stop to trading in gold until 
the price of their goods rose. This does not mean that the Akan gold 
merchants were not subject to the unequal exchange of their products 
imposed by European traders. floreover, - Akan commoner and slave 'gold 
producers were also subject to unequal exchange. It is rather to say 
that the Akan were not totally made subject to the demands of European 
merchants. Indigenous Akan merchants, for example, still determined 
the rate and quantity of supply of gold dust to the coast. 
The fluctuating demand for gold from the Europeans is just 
one aspect of exchange relations with the Akan. Another is the supply 
of goods from Europe to exchange for the gold. In addition to the 
clothes and beads which we have referred to, slaves, copper and kettles 
were exchanged for gold. Most important of all , however, was the 
European introduction and spread of firearms on the Guinea Coast. We 
(1 ) Ibid. 
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will discuss the structural changes that this trade facilitated for 
the Akan in a moment (1). All that needs to be said now is that 
most of the large African and European trading nations on the coast 
used firearms as a means by which to secure the safety of their 
trading station from each other and also from indigenous disputes. 
In order to ensure the security of the trading post the Dutch and 
English companies relied increasingly on recruiting the assistance of 
inland people. 
f 
As we will see this became a forerunner to the system of 
indirect rule on the Gold Coast, and certainly represents the political 
form of subordination of the Akan people stemming from informal 
colonialism. Gifts were often exchanged between chiefs and those 
trading on the coast ostensibly as tokens of friendship but this 
'agreement' became a basis for much conflict. For the Europeans it 
represented the right to purchase land on the coast and to demand 
allegiance and loyalty from the coastal people to secure a monopoly 
of trade. For the Akan, European token payments, which later became 
known as the 'notes', only reflected traditional payment to chiefs 
for temporary rights over land and certainly not property rights in 
land. 
These introductory comments on the impact of European contact 
with the Akan social formation, in-the period, ca. 1500-1700, have 
focussedon an increase in the demand for gold for circulation and 
hoarding in Europe. This gold was to form the basis for primitive 
accumulation in Europe, and led to merchants who were busy securing 
trading posts on the coast to protect their mercantile operations. 
(1) This will include in Chapter Three the process of state formation. 
I 
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The immediate impact of colonialism was to raise the intensity of 
production and extraction of gold among the Akan. European contact 
with the Akan hastened the development of indigenous merchant capital 
and the desire among the gold producers to satisfy the new demand for 
the metal on the coast. For the coastal people, opportunity was 
provided by the European presence for monetary gain, new employment 
and the production of new commodities. New skills were developed by 
the Fante who lived in the immediate vicinity of the European forts 
where food production was increased to satisfy the demand of European 
merchants together with artisanal skills needed by the Europeans 
The European clamour for Akan gold was accompanied by an influx 
of European products. Early colonial transformation of the Akan social 
formation may largely be associated with the nature of these products. 
We can now begin our assessment of colonial transformation in the period 
between 1500-1700 with a closer look at the colonial use of terror and 
violence. 
(b) Structural Changes on the Gold Coast 
(i ) Violence as the basis for Colonial Transformation 
The violence needed by merchant capital to impose itself upon 
non-capitalist society has only recently received broader discussion (2). 
I 
(1) Lynn Garrett, The Gold Coast Comprador in the Eighteenth Century, 
Ph. D., University of Birmingham, 1981. 
(2) See, inter alia; P-P Rey, Colonialisme, Neo-colonialisme et Transition 
au CaAHZa i-ý-me. Exemple de la 'Cckmilog' au Congo-Brazzav-ille, arls: 
Maspero, 1971), see also the discussion of Rey in Anthony-grewer, Marxiý 
Theories of Imperialism, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). B. Bradl 
77F-eTestruction of natural economy', Economy and Society, 4,2 1975, 
R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, (London: Routledge 
i Kegan Pi 
1951). Also the interesting material on L sophone Africa: Gerald Mend, 
Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the 
, 
Reality, (London: Heinemani 
1978), Allan F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistence in Mozambique: An 
Colonial Activity in the Zambesi Valley 1850-1921, (London: Heinemann, 
M; ý-, G. Clarence Smith, Slaves, Peasants and Capitalists in Southern 
Angola 1840-1926, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, -Afric 
Studies Series, Number 27,1979). 
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The earliest account of the need for the violent subjugation of 
indigenous people's associated with the process of colonialism came in 
the nineteenth century. Karl Marx included in his analysis of primitive 
accumulation an assessment of Dutch mercantilism, the importance of 
colonies for Holland and the seizure of commodities: 
The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised 
looting, and murder, floated back to the mother-country 
and were there turned into capital. Holland which first 
fully developed the colonial system, in 1648 stood 
already in the acme of its commercial greatness (1). 
Early colonial expansion was often based upon the role of 
force which was used to sustain European. merchant capital's incursion 
into African non-capitalist social formations. Some, of the earliest 
records relating to European incursions on the coast refer to the use 
of violence (2). The Dutch faced tough opposition from the inhabitants 
of Tacorady (Takoradi) to their increased presence and trading 
activities. Following an attack on a trading vessel a party of 
musketeers went ashore and set fire to the whole negro village 
so that the Blacks finally retired into the bush" (3). In retaking 
the fort, which in the meantime had belýn blown up, the Dutch carried 
out further acts of terror on the inhabitants of Tacorady. The local 
population were encouraged to attack the Dutch by the British who were 
attempting to extend their sphere of influence westwards along the 
littoral from Cape Coast Castle. The Akan resisted the Dutch landing 
at Tacorady but for their pains had a number of their villages set on 
fire (4). 
Karl Marx, (1974) op. cit. , p. 705. (2) F. C-M 1610-1623, ýor examples of Portuguese aggression, 10 July 1610. 
(3) F. C. N14 Journal of the ship "Middelburgh Ad Coll Archief 
xxxvi Six Extracts. 
(4) Ibid. Extracts from Vice-Admirals de Ruijters Letter Book, M-67 xcv ý4. 
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There is a sense in which European violence was endemic in the 
process of colonising the Gold Coast. This is certainly the case if 
by violence we mean the process of establishing trading forts on the 
Gold Coast and thereby attempting to impose European trading patterns 
on the indigenous people. We need, however, to look at the notion of 
violence in less simplistic terms. A clearer understanding of this 
early phase of colonial transformation recognises the interrelationship 
between colonial violence and the political as well as economic 
subjugation that ensued. The process of fort building marked the 
penetration' of indigenous trade networks. Politically, however, the 
Akan traded as equals with European merchants in a whole range of 
products. Despite the unequal exchange of gold which, benefitted 
European merchants on the coast, when it was used to mint. currency in 
Europe, and generally assist in the process of capital accumulation 
there, indigenous political structures often managed to control the 
flow of the mineral to the colonial traders. When the flow of gold 
to the coast from the forest kingdoms stopped, for exam'ple, or slowed 
down, the price paid to the Akan for the product rose following an 
increased demand from the European merchants. This is not to say 
that the process of informal colonialism did not also witness immense 
violent acts of European looting which enhanced transactions of unequal 
exchange. Similarly, asWe will see later in the thesis, at a more 
advanced time of colonial contact, merchants used violence to enforce 
extra or new productive activities on the Akan and ultimately to control 
indigenous states by waging war. The latter often went hand in hand 
with the establishment of 'indirect rule' and the political subjugation 
of the Akan to colonial rule. 
Although there is no a priori reason for the use of violence 
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in the process of colonial expansion into a social formationwe can 
observe historically its use in the Gold Coast's incorporation into 
the international economy. Ultimately, the use of force was used in 
the mines and in railway construction at the end of the nineteenth and. 
early twentieth century. The effect of European violence in the 
eighteenth century was to initiate the articulation, and ultimately 
the disarticulation, of the indigenous Akan social formation with European 
embryonic capitalist development. In fact European merchants sought 
to maintain peace around their newly established forts through a 
policy of 'detribalisation' (1). This was a process whereby the 
merchants enforced an abrogation of traditional loyalties of those 
Akan in the immediate vicinity of the fort and substituted the 
suzerainty of the merchants. For example, when the Portuguese first 
arrived at Elmina they severed the dependence whihh the Elminds had 
on the members of Fetu and Eguafo.. The area was turned instead into 
an independent municipality ruled by local headmen who became increasingly 
dependent upon the Portuguese. This process of detribalisation was 
enacted by all the companies which traded from forts on the coast. 
It escalated the degree of competitiveness between merchants together 
with the intensity of feeling felt by the Akan people. Having suffered 
at the hands of the Portuguese the Elmina! s became faithful (albeit 
temporarily) to their wishes to enforce a trading monopoly with them. 
They fought the Dutch for the Portuguese when this European competitor 
attempted to usurp Portugal's trading areas. 
The importance of securing friendship among the Akan was 
continually asserted, and recognised by those trading on the coast: 
(1) Daaku (1970), op. cit., p. 50. See also, L. Garrett, op. cit. 
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If we have the Natives on our side, and they work 
well with us (as we are confident) they can do us 
very considerable service, and help us in time of 
need (1). 
The Dutch desire to reduce the Portuguese sphere of influence on 
the coast resulted in numerous internal agreements. In 1598 there 
was a trade agreement with the Asebu to bind them together for the 
purpose of trading. In 1624 a 'formal' link was established with 
the Fante who agreed that they would help the Dutch if the latter 
were attacked by the Portuguese. 
The importance of this agreement extended beyond simply 
providing help against a Portuguese attack. It was of strategic 
importance for trade in the sense that the Fante people lay between 
the Dutch and inland traders and that they could, (and often did), 
to enhance this location place obstacles in the way of continuous 
trade between the Dutch and inland Akan. This powerful position of 
the Fante was astutely recognised later by the British Governor of 
Cape Coast Castle: 
The Waterside Country people and several inland adjacent 
countries, through whose territories traders must come 
have no gold or elephants teeth and but a few slaves to 
part with of their own. Their business is to disturb 
trade, or to make the Dutch and us pay for it ... The Waterside Country people are desirous to have the 
traders give them their gold, teeth and slaves to bring 
us to sell, and then they give the upland people what 
they please for it; to which the traders are not willing; 
and this often causes contests and disappointments in trade (2). 
(1 ) Copy of letter XIX, WIC to Gold Coast, Letter book WIC OV10 
16 August 1656, FC N7 1656-1657, pp. 6-7. 
(2) Cape Coast Castle 26 Nov-e-m-E-e-rT709, Letter to R. A. C. EIO, p. 103, in 
FCTS 11 1707-1715, FCN38, p. 103. See also Dalby Thomas's comments 
on separating inland peo--pl'ýe-from coastal people because of the 
formers love of trade. "The coastal people have nothing and therefore, ý' 
it is in their interests to stop trade. The Royal African Company 
therefore must make friends with allies of the inland people and make 
their enemies the company's enemies. " See FCTS I. p. 228. Thomas also 
makes proposals for greater friendship between the RAC and the WIC. 
The characterisation of the inland people as traders was reinforced 
by the Dutch who observed four classes of blacks among the coastal Akan 
(Fante) 
. These were the inland negroes seen to 
be similar to 
European peasants; and also a group called 'Kabusaeus' who were 
likened to the nobility of Denmark. There was also a specifically 
merchant class, 'Klapilopers' or 'Meraderes' which was more clearly 
translated as brokers (Meklever). These were a group who came to the 
forts with the inland negroes to trade for them and act as their 
interpreturs . The final division of the Akan as observed 
by the 
Dutch were the 'canoeman' who resembled European seamen who had a 
similarly good knowledge of paddling and sailing in the very rough 
surf (1). In identifying a division of labour within and between 
coastal people and inland Akan groups it was hoped that an intricate 
system of alliances could be developed whereby trade could be enhanced. 
This was done through a system of consent and coercion. 
Attempts to develop alliances with the Akan, like the one 
tentatively forged by Britain to prevent increasing Dutch presence on 
the coast, became, very popular and were developed not solely to exclude 
other established European powers from trading. The maintenance of 
peace on'. the coast to facilitate greater amounts of trade, and the 
constant haranging of indigenous people for not trading with the 
'agreed' European companieswere the biggest problerrsfacing the merchants. 
The satisfaction of these two- objectives was frustrated by the limited 
range and capability of European guns based in the forts. 
The trading stations had become the focus for trading activities 
with the European merchants using their superior weaponry to support 
FCTS 11 1767-1715 N38 Unsigned entry pp. 110-111 date 1709. 
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agreements made with local inhabitants. Constant attempts were 
made by different 'factors' to encourage the indigenous production 
of foodstuffs which would help the merchants living in the forts. 
Instructions to a 'factor' going to Ardra, for example, from the West 
Indian Company in 1687 suggested that alternative forms of trade might 
be sought with the natives and in particular any activity which might 
reduce the company's cost of subsistence on the coast: 
lie, (the factor) should try to find out from the Natives 
whether trade in any new commodities could be opened 
there, and whether any such commodities like pepper or 
other agricultural products could be cultivated, and we 
should in particular encourage the natives as much as 
possible to cultivate rice, which would be extremely 
useful for the company (1 ). 
The Dutch tried many plans in the 1690's to encourage 
indigenous production of cotton, indigo, coffee and sugar. to supplement 
the gold trade and also-the rapidly developing slave trade (2). There 
was a, contradiction though in relation to the latter which limited the 
success or possibility of plantation agriculture. It was difficult 
to develop a labour force to both cultivate the land and at the same 
time export increasing numbers of these potential labourers as slaves. 
Moreover, it was more profitable for the merchant companies to sell 
the slaves to those with interests in the plantations. of the New World 
where labour supply was short. This was already the period when the 
demands for slaves in particular, but the interests of the people 
trading on the Gold Coast more generally, were being subordinated to 
those with interests in the New World. This signals a further aspect 
(1) WIC, 228 Instructions Book. Instructions for Martin Witte, 
who is going to Ardra as Commies (factor)dated 3 July 1687 
sgd Isaac Jan Nys, in A. Van Danzig op. cit., p. 25. 
(2) See also FCN46,1747-1750, p. 39 for discussion of Dutch 
plantations at Saccondie in 1748. 
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of the Gold Coast! s incorporation into a world economy (1). It became 
easier for European companies to concentrate less on the development 
of alternative forms of indigenous production on the coast, (in the 
hope of developing systems of agriculture comparable with those 
developing in the East Indies), and more on the exchange of slaves 
for goods from Europe. This trade was to take on giant proportions 
in the following century and is a reflection of difficulties 
encountered by the merchants in securing as complete a domination 
of the Gol d Coast as they woul d have 1i ked. 
In short, the European difficulties in extending the authority 
of the fort beyond those already detribalised areas, arose from the 
strength of the indigenous social formation and Akan resistance to Dutch 
and English merchant advances. This resistance reduced the chances of 
success in the proposed alternative trading and European productive 
ventures. The Dutch merchant's made this difficulty abundantly clear 
when reporting back to their company in Amsterdam: 
It is impossible to make progress in the cultivation 
of sugar cane and indigo in this country. The authority 
of the company does not extend beyond the range of the 
cannon. Such cultivation requires an extensive area of 
land. The malice and jealousy of the natives can destroy 
by fire in one night the long awaited harvest in the 
plantations. The slaves working in there are not under 
proper control and run away ... Such enterprises cannot be undertaken so long as the Company does not possess 
this country in full ownership ... The slaves imported for sugar cultivation are now employed in more useful 
work of cutting beams and sawing planks at Boutry for 
the upkeep of the forts (2). 
(1) See Chapter Three for discussion of the slave trade. 
(2) FCTS II N38 1707-1715 21 June 1711 (GC) Minute Letter The 
GentleFen of the Direction of H. Harrig P. Holdennar and 
Ab Engelgrap Robbertoz to Ass X 14IC Amsterdam, p. 156. 
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Conflicts between and within the Akan groups on the coast 
clearly adversely affected European traders'profits and the amounts 
of gold that they appropriated: 
The highest interest of the company consists in the 
furtherance and prosecution of the trade on the coast 
and thereby to get gold into the chest and this is 
always stopped and prevented by wars and the disasters 
proceeding from them (1). 
The European merchants were always faced with the difficulty of 
enforcing compliance of their agreements with the inland people. 
More often than not, despite the frequent harsh treatment inflicted 
on those groups which did not comply with the wishes of the Dutch 
and English companies, the indigenous traders would exchange their 
produce only with those who paid the highest price, thereby reducing 
European gains from unequal exchange. Moreover, these transactions 
were often not with established European merchants but with interlopers. 
The need to consolidate the existing trade, and develop further links 
with inland peoplds, was reiterated by the Royal African Company in 
London to English merchants at Cape Coast Castle: 
So often as you make reprisals on the Natives 
fiý; negotiating contrary-to their agreements and 
for giving encouragement to interlopers, you must 
endeavour to make them sensible of their injury done 
to the Trader in general. By dealing with interlopers 
they discourage the Company who otherwise would always 
support them against all their enemies (2). 
The turn of the eighteenth century was a period of varying 
fortunes for the European traders and this was especially the case 
during the ascendency of what was to become the Asante Empire following 
(1) FCTS II Letter Ass, X. WIC., Amsterdam to Director General 
Harey and Councillors Elmina, 27 September 1712. (WIC 56), p. 174. 
(2) FCTS II, T70/52 letter RAC London to C. C. C. 14August 1713, p. 219. 
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the demise of Denkyira. Indeed, increasing numbers of 'internal' 
disputes severely restricted European trade: 
It will always be constantly true that so long as these 
natives continue their uncivilised manners and customs, 
and the country is divided into-so many small powers, 
plundering one another at the least quarrel, the company 
must have a stronghold on each country for carrying on 
its trade, as being so many entrances and gates to the 
larger countries which when they are in discord, close 
the paths and forbid traders to come to the seaside (1). 
These continuous demands from the coast to the directors of the 
chartered companies in Europe for a more extensive incursion into 
the Gold Coast were not always met with enthusiasm. There were 
frequent calls not to become embroiled in internal wars which could 
inflict losses on the company. It became clear, however, to those 
in the forts on the coast, that without the development of closer 
links between themselves and the indigenous people trade would not be 
as profitable as it could be. 
The two hundred year period 1500-1700 marked the increased 
incorporation of the Gold Coast into the economies of Europe. This 
last section has been important in tracing two of the processes through 
which this occurred. This was through trade and the violent incursion 
of the indigenous social formation by European merchants. In addition 
to outlining the nature of these processes on the Gold Coast this 
section has been particularly useful in building the picture of the 
nature of European expansion and the development of a global economy 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In section three above 
we focussed upon domestic European developments which helped facilitate 
the expansion of mercantilism. We have now shown the other side to 
Ibid., pp. 220-221. WIC Letter Director General Harey, Elmina, toý 
A-S-Sx WIC Amsterdam, 11 June. 
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European expansion; that is the problems which were involved with 
establishing trading relations with the people of the Akan social 
formation. We have tried to show here that these relations were not 
always forged through peaceful means and that the presence of 
European merchants often meant the destruction of villages and 
certainly the playing of one group of Gold Coast Inhabitants off 
against another. This form of colonial control of indigenous people 
was to be perfected by the establishment of 'indirect rule' in the 
nineteenth century. This forerunner to the later colonial period 
however was an essential prerequisite to what was to follow. We 
need now to look at a corollary to the early fort building and 
'protection' of villages by European merchants and the means whereby 
this protection was offered. By this we are talking less about the 
Dutch and English suggestion that they would protect local inhabitants 
through the use of the castle's armoury, which had structural limitations, 
and more about the indirect method of the sale of firearms and powder 
to the Akan. The latter became a predominant as; ect of the, relations 
between Europeans and the Akan. This was a feature of course which 
could quite easily, and often did, 'back fire' on the Europeans who 
became targets of their own weaponry, 
(ii) Firearms 
Firearms were included in the earliest Portuguese and Dutch 
I 
shipments of goods for exchange on the Gold Coast (1). European powers 
openly took part in the subjugation of rival groups on the coast at the 
call of their newly formed cli, ents. In 1613 the King of Great Accra 
(1) R. A. Kea, 'Firearms on the Gold and Slave Coasts from the 
Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries', JAH, 12,2,1971. It 
must be noted that for a short time the Portuguese banned the 
exchange of firearms. 
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asked for Dutch help against the Etsi and this was given willingly 
in the form of twenty five musketeers who assisted 1,000 Accras (1). 
Directmilitary intervention by the merchant companies to quell 
disturbances and secure trade routes howeverwas obviously not as 
agreeable as getting the Akan to police their own areas, and this 
became a major reason for the exchange of so many (albeit ageing) 
firearms. Chiefs who thought it was possible to control a trade routep 
or the activities of another state by force and military prowess 
received guns, often in exchange for commodities which they delivered 
to the coastal forts. Guns were thus used as a means of exchange 
for gold and the increasing number of slaves for which there was a 
growing demand in the New World. 
Merchants on the coast called continually for larger quantities 
of firearms and powder to facilitate greater amounts of trade. For 
exampl e: 
I request that I may have the powder and sheets 
lately asked for with all speed, as at the end of 
this month I am expecting a party of Asiantyn 
traders. If there were good muskets here, I should 
receive as much gold in the company's chest as 
never before (2). 
The importance of the firearms trade can be seen more clearly by 
recent estimates of the scale of the trade in guns. The period 
1673-1704 saw the Royal African Company of England ship nearly 66,000 
firearms and more than 9,000 barrels of gunpowder to West Africa. 
Between 1701 and 1704 32,954 small arms were sent (3). Although 
there is no break down of these figures between the Gold and Slave 
Coasts and the rest of the West African littoral, it is fair to assume 
(1) Ibid., p. 183. 
(2) Tý-NS I T/70/5 Letters received 6 September Letter from Factor 
landFan dd Axim I. A. 1706, p. 199. 
(3) Kea, op, cit., pp. 194-195. 
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that the former two areas received the greater proportion of weaponry 
given their increasing importance to the economies of Europe. To 
these figures must be added those of Dutch firearm imports. In 
December 1687 there were 8,717 muskets at the Dutch establishments 
on the Gold Coast. The Director General requested a further 6,000 
muskets in July 1704 and the West Indian Company had on hand at the 
Gold and Slave coasts a total of 7,741 guns (1 ). The Dutch and English 
desire to exchange firearms and powder for gold and slaves, or to often 
simply give them away as gifts, had immense consequences for the way 
in which the Akan people related to each other. This is because the 
use of guns became a way of developing and enhancing power relations (2). 
We will be looking at the development of different states on 
the Gold Coast in a following chapter. It should be pointed out here 
though that the suzerainty of Denkyira, in the years up to its downfall 
at the hands of Asante, was partly predicated upon the influx of guns 
from the coast to support the Denkyira army. The Denkyira were 
supported by the Dutch in their war against the Asante (ca. 1690) and 
were supplied with muskets and powder together with three cannons (3). 
The second half of the seventeenth century saw a transformation 
of indigenous military arrangements which stemmed from the influx of 
firearms. The coastal states reduced what had previously been four 
kinds of infantry to one armed simply with firearms and swords (4). 
This period also saw the development of the now renowned asafo system 
(1 ) Ibid, p. 195. 
(2) See, for example, Daaku (1971), on, cit., p. 19, "The greatest 
single disintegrating force in was the importation of 
firearms". 
(3) Kumah, 
, 
op. cit. When the Denkyira were defeated by Asante the 
Dutch changed allegiance and supported the Asante. 
(4) The previous kinds of infantry were, Archers, spearmen with shields, 
swordsmen with battle axes and musketeers. The latter appeared 
especially in the 1620's and 1630's. See Kea op. cit., pp. 207-208. 
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as the basis of military organisation on coastal or inland states 
where young men in a village were divided into companies (asafo) 
each with their own officers. 
These developments were to cause much unrest on the Gold 
Coast within and between inland and coastal Akan, and between European 
merchant groups which had provided the people of the Gold Coast not 
only with the means for the securement of trade, but also weapons 
which could be used against further merchant encroachment. In 1706, 
Dalby Thomas, for. example, the English resident at Cape Coast Castle 
pleaded with the Dutch not to provide the Kings of Saboe, Fetu and 
Commany with powder because the English were in dispute with them. 
This request was denied because it would have not been in'ithe Dutch 
interests to stop satisfying this large demand through the agency of 
the West Indian Company (1). 
The seventeenth century thus saw the proliferation of firearms 
which were used by merchants on the coast as a vehicle to make safe 
not only their own fortresses and trading installations but, through 
trade with the Akan, to keep open the trade routes to the hinterland 
and the sources of Akan gold. This process led to an increase in the 
number of internal battles because of the incentive to try and placate 
more powerful merchant fo rces on the coast. These forces demanded, 
but did not always receive, strict obedience in the form of a monopoly 
of trade from coastal people and through them access to inland traders. 
The increase in the volume of firearms to the coast at the 
same time as raising conflicts between neighbouring states also added 
to the potential for antagonism between different groups within the 
See FC NS I op. cit., p. 6. Letter General Pieter Nayts to Ass 
X WIC dated 25 May 1707. 
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Akan. The end of the seventeenth century marks the period of 
transition to greater importance attached to the slave trade and 
the increase in the availability of firearms to inland slave traders, 
which in turn raised the chances of acquiring more captives. Moreover, 
before this transition, the increase in firearms ensured that potential 
for rebellion were reduced by those non-slave owning groups and those 
who did not control the appropriation of gold dust. Indeed, it is 
fair to say that the increased availability of guns and powder represented: 
goods which ... (facilitated) the acquisition and exploitation of captives (and) ensure(d) a steady 
reproduction of the social relations upon which the 
power and prosperity of the dominant classes rest(ed). (l). 
As we will see in a following chapter, the social processes which the 
importation of firearms helped to create led, at the start of the 
eighteenth century, to the development of the Asante State. 
(iii) Middlemen and the consolidation of Detribalisation 
A thread throughout the second part of this chapter has been 
the need to recognise the number of ways in which European merchants 
tried to sustain a favourable trading situation on the Gold Coast 
which led inevitably to them realising that they could not remain 
oblivious to political changes within the territory. 
Following the forceful subjugation of rebellious states, which 
were not agreeable to European incursions on the coast, and help 
afforded to those states whose cooperation was necessary to uphold 
the interests of merchant capital, the Dutch and English sought to 
find more permanent ways of ensuring the smooth running of trade and 
E. Terray, 'Classes and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of 
Gyaman'; Translated by Anne Bailey in M.: Bloch (edito r), 
, 
Marxist Analyses 
and Social Anthropology, (London: Malaby Press, 105), p. 98. 
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commerce. The method used to do this, not always successfully, was 
to support the development of a class of 'merchant princes'. These 
were people in local communities who became significant traders and 
arbiters between Europeans on the coast and inland gold and slave 
dealers. These merchant princes became increasingly associated with 
mulattoes - offspring of European men and Akan women who received a 
special attention in the community. As one observer has remarked: 
The greatest problem that faced the Europeans was 
the education of the mulatto children, and how best 
to replenish their dwindling corps of personnel and 
improve the efficiency of the companies' servants (1). 
An uneasy relationship developed resulting from European 
attempts to support local chiefs against enemies, who might disrupt 
trade, and support which was also*given by Europeans to develop numbers 
of individuals who became challengers to chiefly power. The contra- 
dictory nature of this early period of informal colonial rule was that 
although the Dutch and English sought to support chiefs, who secured 
trade routes into the interior, the development of autonomous indigenous 
traders posed a potential challenge to chiefly power. For their trade 
to be successful the Europeans needed to have good relations with the 
local people and emerging states. They also attempted to erode the 
powers of the local chiefs (2). 
We have already seen the way in which Europeans tried to develop 
greater trading links with the inland people through the use of violence 
and the importation of firearms. The system of detribalisation referred 
to earlier was the prerequisite to the development of special relations 
(1 ) Daaku, (1970), op. cit., p. 99, the development of merchant princes 
occurred specifically-in the coastal areas. 
(2) K. Y. Daaku, 'The Basis of Dutch Relations with Axim',. Ghana Note-s 
and Queries, 8, January 1966, p. 19. 
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with distinct groups in the communities. When the Dutch finally 
took over Portuguese possessions they sought to impose their judicial 
and political forms onthepeople of Axim (1). Subjugation of the 
Axim became of paramount importance to the Dutch. The Axim were 
involved in a carrying trade of cotton cloth from the Ivory Coast 
which posed an unfair threat to Dutch. traders. Interference in local 
affairs reached a peak in Fetu where the Dutch insisted in choosing a 
woman for the stool - something which was quite unprecedented for the 
state (2). This meddling in the internal affairs of a state emanated 
from Dutch attempts to maintain a trading monopoly. Very often, 
however, such interference ledto the depopulation of previously flourishing 
coastal towns as the inhabitants fled seeking safety elsewhere (3). 
This disruption added to the loss of traditional chiefly authority 
as communities were broken up and Kings were subordinated to a 
dependency upon European merchants on the coast. An English report 
of 1704, for example, suggested that "the king of Aguafo live(s) 
upon the charity of the Dutch and had not a slave to wait upon him" (4). 
Although traditional rulers were still seen as people through 
whom control of the commoners could be exercised, increasingly, in the 
e 
seventeenth century, Dutch and English merchants turned to the 
development of a new class of African merchants. The emergence of this 
group stemmed from increasing numbers of European trading estabishments 
on the coast and the appropriation of: 
(1) Judicial powers had previously been developed by the Portuguese. 
At Mina and Axim a Portuguese Captain, a ruler of a small fortress 
city, tried all civil cases whether they involved Portuguese or 
Africans. See D. Birmingham, op. cit., p. 1. See map p. 204. 
(2) Daaku, (1970), op. cit. 
(3) Elmina's popula-f-ion-, --for example, is estimated to have fallen from 
12,000 to 1,000 in 1702, ibid., p. 35. 
(4) Quoted in ibid, p. 95. 
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a common trading language (which) threw up a new 
class of middlemen who acted as a liaison between 
African and European traders (1). 
TheAfricar/mulatto traders served as an invaluable link between the 
coast and inland states and received an elevated status in the form 
of regular salaries from the Europeans. It was those who were not in 
the direct pay of Europeans, however, which posed the greatest threat 
tothe Dutch and English. 
The merchant princes who often had served apprentices with 
European traders became powerful forces often playing one group of 
merchants off against another. The Akrosam brothers in 1640-1662 
challenged the Dutch attempts at making Fetu the economic backwater 
of Asebu and Komenda. Perhaps the most renowned merchant prince was 
John Kabes who was accused of being a cheat by both the Dutch and 
English, especially when favouring the more lucrative interloper 
trade (2). Kabes was a person of immense power whose: 
liberal commercial policy won him the respect and 
love of the inland traders, and enabled him to cultivate 
the friendship of the Asante king who was the most 
powerful ruler on the Gold Coast (3). 
The influence which Kabes could bring to bear on the trade directed to 
the coast is reflected in the suggestion that the reduction in the 
flow of gold, to the English around 1705, was directly a result of a 
dispute between Kabes and Dalby Thomas. It was Kabes who helped the 
British take Takorady by force in 1707 much to the chagrin of the Dutch 
who had previously refused his services. 
Ibid, p*. 91. On the development of this new class of African merchants, 
see, Daaku (1970), op. cit., Ch. V. This is not to ignore the possi- 
bilities for indigenous wealth creating within the Akan social 
formation. 
(2) See C. Darkwah, 'J. Kabes, the Dutch and the English, 1680-1716', 
Institute of African Studies, Mimeo, University of Ghana, Legon, 
March 1967. 
(3) Daaku (1970), op. cit., p. 141. 
The importance of Kabes to the English trade was not 
recognised by Dalby Thomas's successor, Baillie, whose arrogance 
in dealings with Kabes resulted in the latter doing little or nothing 
unless there was more than'ample financial remuneration (1). These 
difficulties in Kabes' latter years stemmed from the English failure 
to recognise that Kabes was an independent trader. 
The point of illustrating the power which the merchant princes 
possessed is to show a further area where European encroachment on 
the coast disrupted indigenous relationships. Before the advent of 
the whiteman gold and slaves had not been directed to the coast for 
trade in such large quantities. Moreover, any commodities which di'd 
move southwards did not become the prerogative of an increasingly 
specialised group of traders, which at the time of the European 
incursions onto the coast became separated from the power of the 
traditional chiefs and rulers. 
Chiefs were now subordinated more and more to Dutch and English 
'protection' with their power circumscribed by a European presence. 
Furthermore, as the volume of trade increased, and a brokerage system 
developed between internal and coastal states, a potentially contra- 
dictory situation mounted for the European traders. This was that 
although a system of intermediaries, that is, merchant princes, had 
developed, this same group which dould facilitate trade could also act 
to obstruct its improvement. This could especially follow if it 
wished to inflate the price of its trading commodities by withholding 
their supply from the interior to the coast. This usually meant 
occasional short-term hoarding of gold until European ships came to 
(1) Darkwah, op. cit., p. 10. 
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port thereby increasing the merchant princes' bargaining position. 
Colonial rivalry. 
A further underpinning dynamic to this early period of informal 
colonialism on the Gold Coast was an often intense colonial rivalry 
and competition for gold and later slaves. It will be remembered that 
the basis for successful merchant capital accumulation was the mono- 
polisation of trade and the exchange of goods at a price greater than 
that for which they were originally purchased. The nature of merchant 
capital's profitability meant that it was particularly susceptible to 
encroachment of its trade by interlopers, and foreign competitors who 
either imported goods at cheaper prices than their rivals, or forcibly 
cajoled the indigenous inhabitants into agreements whereby they would 
not patronise alternative sources of goods. On the one hand, therefore, 
interloper competition had the tendency to increase the volume of 
trade between the Gold Coast and Europe by breaking down company 
monopolies on trade. On the other hand, the competition served to 
reduce the profit margins gained by state backed monopoly companies 
through unequal exchange. 
Disputes between different European merchant companies was a 
dominant theme throughout the seventeenth century and was inextricably 
linked to the nature of European mercantile presence on the coast. 
This presence was based upon coastal fortresses and commercial stations 
which imposed a number of limitations on increasing the rate 
at which gold was appropriated. 
I 
We have not discussed the often intricate way in which this 
exchange of Akan gold for European cloth took place. This is well 
documented elsewhere (1). Neither have we said much about indigenous 
(1) K. Y. Daaku, (1970), op. cit. 
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rebelliousness to European incursions. Our contribution to under- 
standing the nature of informal colonialism on the coast has rather 
focussed upon the disruptiveness caused by European traders, in their 
attempt to encourage an increase in Akan gold production. Part of 
this disruption was caused by the influx of certain European goods, 
namely, firearms, and the use made by developing a group of middlemen 
through which negotiation for trade could be made: but these 
dislocations of indigenous life were further aggravated by colonial 
rivalry. The development of client relationships with different 
coastal state leaders led inevitably to problems of defining spheres 
of influence between the Dutch and English merchants. There was also 
the earlier added presence of the Brandenburgers and the longer stay 
by Scandinavians (1). An example of the colonial rivalry was given 
in 1679: 
In the territory of the King of Aguaffo we have a 
lodge at little Commany, which was erected in 1638. 
But we abandoned and reoccupied that lodge several 
times, the English did likewise ever since they started 
competing with us in that area. At Chama we have a 
small fort, where we get some gold from Adom, Wassa 
and Tjutter. At Sekondi for the English have crept in; 
in spite of promises to the contrary, the natives have 
allowed this (2). 
Needless to say similar complaints were made regularly to the Dutch 
by the English, who on several occasions made overtures to the former 
requesting better relations on the coast to facilitate greater profits 
for their respective companies. Writing to the Royal African Company 
in London the English Director of the Gold Coast said: 
The Dutch still goes on in giving us all the Affronts 
they can. They have panyarred our goods as was coming 
(1 ) See J. Reindorf, op. cit. 
(2) ARA: Rademacher Arch. No. 587: Heerman Abramsz to Assembly of Ten, 
23 November 1679 (written after his return)in Van Danzi-g, E-cit-1 
p. 13. 
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from commander by Traders and they will do it till 
they give our notes out. I don't know if your Hons are to 
trade Under them or by their leave. When our affairs are 
a little better settled I believe I shall venture to make 
them an example for it (1). 
The resul t of European competition and ri val ry 1 ed to a greater 
influx of firearms on the coast which were used as weapons, not simply 
for merchant protection but as vehicles of trade with the Akan. 
Attempts to quell internal disquiet, and the demarcation of spheres 
of influence, added to incessant quarrels between merchants and also 
different inland people , ýqho were coerced into supporting either the 
Dutch or English. One such dispute occurred in 1748 over the allegiance 
of the villages of the town of Boutry, which the English had previously 
claimed as a sphere of influence only to find that Dutch merchants 
had usurped the former's dominant position: 
.... your chief of Boutry had corrupted the inhabitants 
of our town of Bushaw and have drawn from their duty 
and aTlegiance to us, and has dared to hoist a Dutch Flag 
in our Town, and su-p--ppl ied the people with two pieces of 
cannon to plant against us, and has induced ANTERRY, the 
Caboceer, of that place, to send a message to our chief, 
im-porting that it is by your order these things are done 
and without your order, they will not close hostilities. 
The Town of Bushaw is within our Guns, consequently the 
sole riqht and i)ror)erty of our masters. the Poyal African 
These attempts by European merchants to secure the allegiance of 
different groups of coastal people, and in particular of the increasing 
numbers of middlemen which acted as intermediaries of trade between 
the European inland people, reflected the gradual awareness by the 
Dutch and English of the inadequacies of the fortress trade; and the 
need to develop indirect forms of political control within the Gold 
(1) F. C. NSI c. 1707 T70/175 Dalby Thomas to Royal African Company. 
(2) Letter, tockwell and Husband, 14 December 1748 Cape Coast Castle to 
van Voorst, p. 44, FC N46 1747-1750, Emphasis Original.. For the 
location of the Eurýipean forts on the coast, see map five. 
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Coast itself. 
v CONCLUSION 
Conclusions to be drawn from this chapter are tentative and 
exploratory and may be divided into two sections. 
The first of these refers to the need which merchant capital 
had to sustain or develop mercantilist economies based upon unequal 
exchange and the evolution of a monetary economy. We have seen quite 
clearly, in parts two and three, that the economies of Europe which came 
increasingly to dominate the world depended upon the use of gold as a 
basis for trade and primitive accumulation of capital . This particular 
metal was sought from the Guinea Coast because gold was already being 
produced by the Akan which was part of a well established African 
gold trade. The pre-existence of Akan gold mining facilitated the 
possibility for a trading relationship between the early European 
merchants to the Gold Coast and the Akan which led to the initial 
reinforcement of pre-colonial indigenous relations of production. 
The sixteenth and seventeenth century economies of Europe and especially 
England and Holland, were economies in transition to capitalism which 
required a 'world', that is, international, market for its produce 
but more especially territories from which it could plunder and seize 
specific products required for mercantilist development. The nature 
of this European contact with the Gold Coast has been the focus for 
the remainder of this chapter and forms the second section requiring 
some more extensive concluding comments. 
A lack of historical data to provide a basis from which to 
assess the early Akan social formation, prior to European contact, 
makes a detailed account of the effect of European incursions difficult. 
We have reduced this difficulty in the p rev ious chapter by try in g to reconstruct 
early contact relations of production by combining an examination of 
oral traditions with an assessment of the theoretical issues surrounding 
the construction and understanding of the Akan and Asante early ontact 
social formations. Itwas concluded that theearly contact Akan and Asante social 
formations comprised an articulation of a domestic mode of production and three 
servile modes of production. These forms of organising the production 
and the reproduction of the conditions of existence of the Akan social 
formation survived the early period of merchant contact on the coast 
but not wholly without modification. 
It might be argued that the servile modes of production were 
generally reinforced (although not without contradictions, see below) 
in the way two writers have suggested (1). This was a possibility 
because of the greater demand for gold from the inland Akan groups 
which were dependent largely, but not exclusively, upon the use of 
slave labour. Moreover, the increased use of firearms towards the 
end of the period meant the greater likelihood of larger numbers of 
captives being seized from neighbouring areas to augment a very 
important supply of labour to produce gold. This may also have laid 
the basis for later state development and the enhancement of chiefly 
power and authority. 
The organisation of production around the domestic unit perhaps 
took the greatest impact of merchant capital at this time. European 
demand for gold probably meant an intensification of the productivity 
of labour and the heightened need for labourers to extract gold from 
the auriferous rock. It is likely that the increased demand for gold 
from the coast enhanced already existing relations of production. 
Ik 
P-P Rey (1971 ) op. cit. , and G. Dupre and P-P Rey, 'Ref 1 ections 
on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of Exchange', 
EconomX and Society, 2,1973. 
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At the same time the agents behind merchant capital on the coast 
set. in motion processes which led to contradictions, between and 
within earlier Akan modes of production, together with the basis for 
opposition to and the negation of merchant capital's success. This 
dialectical relationship between merchant capital and Akan modes of 
production has best been seen at the political level through the 
impact that firearms and colonial violence had upon the indigenous 
social formation. The use of violence by European merchant companies 
on the coast was seen as the necessary basis from which an advantageous 
trading position could develop, and which in turn was used to subjugate 
the Akan immediately surrounding the coastal forts. In 'defensive' 
zones around the forts attempts were made to create a client group 
of villages, and ultimately states, which in the long run could assist 
in the furtherance of European trade to the inland gold producing 
areas. 
However, there was also a contradictory aspect of this for the 
Europeans, in that it created the possibility for greater unrest among 
local states by vastly eroding the powers of the traditional rulers. 
The possibility of this occurring was hastened by the development of 
the merchant princes. This group became more powerful as time 
progressed, and certainly may be seen to represent a split from 
traditional authority holders and in so doing disrupted quite 
considerably the previously outlined domestic based mode of production (1). 
No longer were the chiefs and elders sole beneficiaries of the 
productive labour of families. The presence of strangers on the 
coast established an independent money makinq group whose concern 
was to facilitate trade between the hinterland and'the coast. and to also 
It should be noted however that often chiefs combined a role of 
merchant princes with that of 'stool caretaker'. 
I r' . 1.1.1 
increasingly set up as traders in their own right. When the latter 
occurred the indigenous traders position was enhanced vis-a-vis the 
Europeans and merchant princes could trade from a vantage point. 
The influx of firearms, with which the inland traders and 
coastal people alike were meant ostensibly to keep the peace, also 
had adverse effects for European trade which generally followed an 
increase, rather than a reduction, in hostilities between the Akan. 
We can now focus our attention on the most serious and violent 
aspects of European capital's presence on the Gold Coast and this is 
the Atlantic slave trade, which was ushered in by the English and Dutch 
who were concerned increasingly less with the appropriation of gold 
from the Akan, for which they found alternative supplies, and more 
with the procurement of labourers to work directly their more profitable 
plantations in the West and East Indies. 
!i ý11 
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11 APTERTHREE 
A CENTURY OF SLAVE DEALING: ca. 1700-1800 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, 
the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in 
mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning 
of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, 
the turning of Africa into a warren for the 
commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the 
rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. 
These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta 
of primitive accumulation. 
Karl Harx, Capital, Volume One 
I INTRODUCTION 
The eighteenth century was perhaps the most traumatic in economic 
and social terms for the inhabitants of the Gold Coast. This period 
witnessed the increased incorporation of the West African territory into 
the economies of Western Europe and the Americas through the demand 
made by the merchants of these countries for African labour., The gold 
trade which had flourished so much in the seventeenth century lost its 
earlier importance as western Europe demanded labour for possessions 
in Brazil, the Caribbean and the southern part of North America. It has 
been estimated that as many as one hundred million Africans were seized 
for this trade in human beings but of course a far smaller number reached 
their destination on the opposite side of the Atlantic (1). 
It is not our intention to examine in any great detail the 
history of the Atlantic slave trade. This has already been the subject 
A. G. Frank, World Accumulation 1492-1789, (London: Macmillan, 1978a) 
The literature on the Atlantic sl-E-vetrade is extensive, but, inter 
alia, see the recent collection, Henry A. Gemery and Jan S. HogenFo-rn, TeýTitors), The Uncommon Market: Essays in Economic Hist2ry-2f the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, (NewYork: Academic Press, 1975), and J. E. Inikori, 
Forced Migration: 
_the 
impact of the export trade slave trade in TRR-can societies, (London: Hut-c-h-inson, 1982). 
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of extensive study. Instead, we intend to locate the growing and 
changing interest in the Gold Coast, by western merchants and 
traders, with the period of state formation on the coast and the 
internal struggles which accompanied this many sided process. We need, 
for example, to continue our examination of European incursions into 
West Africa which take an increasingly more violent role in this 
period. A further question to ask is whether the Asante social 
formation could satisfy the growing demand for slaves 
on the coast without any change in their modes of production or, if 
structural transformations did occur, what were these changes and 
what precipitated them? We will turn our attention to the nature 
of Akan society and the pressures which it found itself under resulting 
from an increased European presence. We have already seen, for example, 
that the influx of firearms onto the coast by Europeans had a series 
of consequences for the Akan. Moreover, the European presence on the 
coast created a number of violent conflicts both between the traders 
and Africans and also within the respective groups themselves. 
The seizure of huge numbers of Africans, to sustain the 
Atlantic slave trade, created further extensive conflicts and ensured 
the greater incorporation of the Guinea Coast into a series of what 
were to become internationally dominant economies. Britain, Holland, 
France and Portugal were the leading countries in promoting the slAve 
trade which became the basis for a 'triangular' trade linking West 
Africa, the Caribbean and Europe (1). Before the eighteenth century 
was finished Britain was to command a dominant position in western 
Europe and enter a stage of capitalist development which was to make 
(1) This tem can only be used as a broad description of the 
directions of the bulk of the trade. 
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the country the forerunner of an ilhdustrial age. Eventually, West 
Africa was no longer required for the labour that it could provide 
for mercantilist interests and the plantation economies of the 
Caribbean. Instead, the Gold Coast was to be flooded with the 
commodities produced by a developing industrial power. Africans were 
to be shown the merits of increased indigenous production of suitable 
commodities for Europe, and to develop new industries from which a 
now hegemonic capitalist political economy could benefit. This period 
of 'legitimate' trade will be examined in the following chapter. We 
must now turn our attention to the Akan state formation and the inter- 
relationship and outcome that this had with different forms of colonial 
encroachment. 
II STATE FORMATION I 
The early beginnings of the Asante state have already been 
briefly mentioned (1). We will not concentrate here on the different 
historical 'events' leading to the shedding of the power of Denkyira 
and the development of the Asante Union in 1701 (2). We will only 
refer to the historical data when explaining what was behind the 
development of the Asante Empire to illustrate the processes of class 
formation and likely areas of conflict reflected in the internal 
Akan power struggles and the growing desire for contact with European 
traders. 
Three periods of Asante state development have recently been 
identified beginning with ca. 1000-1400 as the time of initial local 
(1) See Chapter One. 
(2) These events are covered by, inter alia. Adu Boahen, 'The Origin of 
the Akan', Ghana Notes and Qu-erýies, -9-, -1966. See also Ivor Wilks, 'The 
Mossi and Akan States, 1500---18001, in M. Crowder and J. A. Ajayi, 
(editors), History of West Africa, Two Volumes, Volume One (London: 
Longman 197TI-. 
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development of proto Akan agricultural production based upon iron 
technology. There followed the development of urban settlements and 
small principalities between ca. 1400-1600, where improved metal 
technology aided the development of gold exploitation and a degree 
of militarisation which led to the development of long distance trade. 
Finally, the period ca. 1600-1850 has been seen to represent "the rise 
of large kingdoms stemming from the profitable long range international 
trade" (1). 
The validity for laying so much stress on international trade 
is examined below. More importantly we need to examine the relations 
of production underpinning these developments. An account of Akan 
state formation needs to be formulated which breaks from previous pre- 
occupations which reify isolated emerging pol itical institutions. We need to 
understand the develooment of these institutions but not simply as an 
idealistic expression of chieftainship (2). 
Internal Organisation of Akan-Asante Society 
The role of women and commoners in the daily life of Asante 
has already been discussed briefly. We can now focus upon an examination 
of unfree, (that is, slave), labour in early Asante society and assess 
its significance for the emergence of the powerful Asante Union. There 
are two important reasons for using the different forms of servitude 
as bases from which to evaluate Akan state formation. 
First, by locating our analysis of state development within 
James Anquandah, 'State Formation Among the Akan of Ghana', Sankofa, 
The Legon Journal of Archaeological and Historical Studies, l-, T-9I-7S-, p. 57. 
(2) See, for example, Alfred Kof-i-Qua-rcoo, `The sto-ol did not usher in 
a Republican Constitution, it gave. a new dimension to a known 
monarchical system in which the ruler was not above but under the law 
which crystallised that object of art - the stool", 'The Akan Stool 
Polity: A Political Organisation', IAS, Mimeo, University of Ghana, 
Legon, n. d. 
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Asante in internal rather fhan wholly external factors we get a 
clearer picture of the role that labour of all kinds played in early 
Asante society. This analysis is located within an historical and 
materialist perspective which sees productive relations between people 
and nature as the basic social act of any society. Second, by examining 
forms of servile labour, we can see clearly the kind of impact that 
the more recognisable international slave trade had upon early Asante 
society. Was it this form of European contact, for example, which 
created indigenous unfree labour or did slavery exist within the Asante 
social formation before the European presence? If the latter was the 
case, what was the social position of the slave within the Asante 
hierarchy? Was there morethan one form of slavery and what were slave 
relations with free Asantes? 
For Rattray, relations between people in Asante were. those of 
'voluntary servitude. Indeed, in "West Africa it was the masterless 
man and woman who ran the imminent danger of having ... 'their freedom' 
turned into involuntary bondage ... " (1). This notion among the Asante 
was seen to stem from the idea of indebtedness and communality within 
the lineage as the focus for the cohesiveness of Akan society. More 
recently, within an idealist framework, it has been stressed that: 
Akan traditional society can be characterised by three 
key aims which follow from the social premis of Akan 
matriliny ... these aims are jural corporateness, economic classlessness and political rule by consent (2). 
R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and 
University Press, 1929-), p. 3 
B. Cruikshank, Eighteen Years 
Frank Cass and Company, -[tT. -, 
p. 313. 
(2) A. Noman Klein, 'The Cultural 
in Akan-Asante Society't Unpu 
Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford 
T-Co-mpare similar comments by 
on. the Gold Coast of Africa, (London: 
Second edition, 1966) Volume 1, 
and Historical Context' of Inequality 
blished paper, Mimeo, 1979. 
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Both these views seek to stress the existence of a non class 
society in which different groups coexisted without the exploitation 
of a ruling class of people who subordinated the interests of the 
majority of villagers to their wishes. This view of Asante society 
has been supported by seeing people's status in Asante as graded on a 
continuum between freeman and slave. A range of five categories, for 
example, has been identified between voluntary and involuntary labour (1). 
Voluntary servitude was the position of the Akoa, a condition of 
servitude in which every man and woman stood in relation to some other 
person or group. For- example: 
A man's nephew and niece are their uncle's nkoa, a man's 
wife is her uncle's akoa a man's children a-r-e-tt-heir 
unclds nkoa a subjec-toT a small Chief again is the 
akoa of--tF-e greater, and so, on in an ever ascending 
scaTe, until, at a later date, we reach the era of 
the great Amanhene (petty kings), who in turn became 
the nkoa of the c tral authority at Kumasi, the 
ýsan-t-e-ffene (King of Ashanti). He was the akoa of 
tli-el. samanfo (spirits) and of Nyame (the supreme'God) (2). 
There were increasingly more servile statuses ranging from a 
Pawn, that is any Awowa, to an Odonko -a purchased non Asante; a 
Donom -a prisoner of war from another state and an Akyere which was 
a slave found, guilty of a capital offence but whose slaughter was 
delayed, often for years, until a suitable 'festive' occasion (3). 
This classification of servitude in' Asante has more recently 
been simplified into a three fold schema, with the intention of 
demonstrating the inability of a slave owning class to develop (4). 
(1 ) Rattray op. cit., p. 34. 
(2) Ibid., ;. --3-, T-, Emphasis in original. 
(3) T5-7., pp. 35-43. 
(4) AT7. Klein, 'West African Unfree Labour Before and After the Rise 
of the Atlantic Slave Trade', in, K. Foner and E. D. Genovese 
(editors) Slavery in the New World, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1969), p. 8ý--. 
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An Odonko, for example, a foreign born 'slave' was "indistinguishable from 
a freeman so far as his relation to the land and the product of his own 
labour was concerned" (1). This person might often be able to hold the 
usufruct to land andtheproduct of his own labour (2). The possibility 
to accumulate such wealth has been seen to thwart the development of an 
Asante slave owning class as it has been suggested that: 
There was no mechanism in Ashanti society for any 
group of slave owners to liberate themselves from 
preoccupation with the mundane problem of subsistence 
production in favour of intellectual and other 
noneconomic activities (3). 
What then was the purpose of an Odonko? If s/he operated as 
his/her own economic agent in society, what prevented them from 
usurping the reins of power? For both these commentators it is the 
isolation of the slave from any Akan lineage that distinguishes an 
Odonko from a free Asante (4). Such a status, or lack of it, ensured 
that whenever human sacrifices were required the subjects were always 
those without a defence group to support their plea for life. This 
isolation also meant that there was great difficulty for the Odonko 
to organise any resistence to his/her fate (5). 
The wholesale slaughter of large numbers of people, and 
therefore the withdrawal of their labour power from the economy, has 
also been given as a further argument denying the existence of a 
slave owning class. Who could imagine, for example, that a slave 
owning class would systematically kill off its labour force? (6). 
(1) Ibid., p. 90. 
(2) A-77 Klein does not explore the control in the hands of a female Odonko. 
(3) A. N. Klein, (1969), op. cit., p. go. 
(4) Ibid., p. 90, Rattray, op. cit., p. 42. 
(5) 'T-nterviews by the author'wit hiefs and elders of Chichiwere, Aboso 
and Abontiakoon. 
(4) AM. Klein, (1969), op. 
_cit., 
p. 90. 
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The second status in the simplified schema identified in Akan 
society is the Awowa or pawn. Pawning occurred, usually throuýh 
indebtedness of an individual or lineage, when someone was 'leased' to 
a creditor. Whereas the Odonko would have access to their own 
products, a pawn would have to concede part or all of his/her productive 
efforts to the lessee-creditor but such a relationship was terminated 
when the debt had been repaid. This relationship has been seen as 
reflecting the increased incursion of themarket into Asante lifestyles 
because of the risk involved for the lessee (1). Unfree status 
is seen only to exist for an Akoa-pa. An Akoa-pa was an 
unredeemed pawn who was sold outright to the creditor and whose status 
was most seen to resemble that of an American Negro slave because the 
new owner became a master for life. This last category of servile 
labour provides even the writers who deny the significance of unfree 
labour in Asante with a dilemma. It is logical that in recognising 
the category of Akoa-pa in Akan society, Klein should also, for example, 
recognise the presence of slave owners and the relationship between the 
two: namely the processes whereby the slave owners extracted surplus 
labour/produce from the slaves. This he does not do. 
We have now established the backcloth of past and current 
debates on servile labour in Asante. Both the work of Rattray and 
Klein has been clouded by an anthropological desire to perceive early Akan 
society through the eyes and ears of indigenous people. The result is 
a 'reconstructed' Akan society drawn along the lines desired by 
anthropology and which reflect the controlling groups interests in 
The existence of a creditor at all needs explaining. We will see later, 
Chapters 4-6, how indigenous developments of commoditisation, the 
increased use and spread of money payments, is enhanced and advanced 
by the encroachment of colonial capitalism. Adultery payments were one 
of the earliest forms of commoditisation in Asante and this is described 
in detail by T. C. McCaskie, 'State and Society, Marriage and Adultery: 
Some Considerations Towards ASocial History of Pre-Colonial Asante', 
JAH, 22,1981. 
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eighteenth century Asante (1). These groups of chiefs and elders 
were those with most to lose if Asante life had been perceived as 
being not simply inegalitarian, but also based upon the exploitation 
of an 'unfree' labour force of captives as well as that of 'free' 
women and commoner men. 
Plantation slaves are mentioned by one of the above commentators 
only to stress their non-importance in Asante (2) as if their non- 
existence is uncontentious. We can now examine more clearly the 
presence of unfree labour in Asante. This is done not simply to 
describe its existence but also to present an alternative conceptualisation 
which locates the exploitation of servile labour in losing control over 
the products of its labour and of its progeny. Moreover, we examine 
the importance of servile labour within the broader framework of Asante 
state development and look more clearly at the different categories of 
slaves and their relations with the 'free' Akan members of Asante. It 
is not axiomatic, as one writer claims, that "Asante slaves did much the 
same work as free Asante's and that ... slave labour did not mark a 
departure from the traditional economic organisation" (3). 
Our search for clarity, and the need to locate the nature of 
the relations between people living in Asante, precedes our assessment 
(1) See the introduction for a detailed criticism of the role and 
position of anthropologists in interpreting early Asante society. 
The difficulty with the available literature of course is that it 
refers "implicitly" to late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Asante. 
(2) A. N. Klein, (1969), 0* cit p. 92. 
(3) See, Name Arhin's ar are and Economy in Asante: An essay in 
methodology', IAS, University of Ghana, Mimeo, 1977a, p. 14, also his 
'The ýinancing of the Ashanti Expansion', IAS, University of Ghana, 
Mimeo, 1965, p. 17. 
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of the formation of theAsante state and the argument that it was the 
result of the exploitation of slaves performing different tasks, and that 
the product of their labour was usually appropriated by the chiefs and 
elders of Asante. In other words we concentrate in this first half of 
the chapter upon internal developments within Asante and especially 
those which can be identified as contributing to the formation of the 
Asante state. In the last section we draw out the importance of the 
relationship between internal Asante developments and those of the 
Atlantic slave trade. Indedd, the contention throughout this thesis 
is that to achieve an understanding of the nature of colonial trans- 
formation, we need first to recognise indigenous developments and 
changes within the territory being colonised. We then need to turn 
to an assessment of the specific dynamic of the colonial contact and 
then back to see their (dialectical) impact on indigenous change. 
Only with this approach can we achieve a thorough examination of the 
dialectical relationship between colonialism and the colonised. 
III TRADE AND STATE DEVELOPMENT II 
The Arguments 
Until recently the most forceful argument to account for 
Asante state development has been in terms of the desire to seek greater 
trade links on the coast and also northwards in the western Sudan (1). 
This view has been called "the barbaric or nonsense theory of Asante 
history" (2). That is to say it is wrong to see the formation of the 
Asante Union solely in terms of the inland peoples demand for trade 
(1) See, Name Y. Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast 16GO-1720, * 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970) and Ivor Wilks, 'The Northern 
Factor in Ashanti History: Begho and the Mande', JAH, 11,1,1961. 
(2) Kwame Arhin, 'The Structure of Greater Ashanti 17MT-1824, JAH, 8,1, 
1967, see also his, 'The Structure of Greater Asante: A Restatement', 
IAS, University of Ghana, Mimeo, 1977b. 
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goods. Instead, for Arhin, the Asante wars which marked the beginning 
of the state's development, reflected a politically expansionary 
process which sought to include people with whom Asante's enjoyed a 
large degree of cultural homogeneity (1). Thus, European trade is 
seen as facilitating, and not causing, the organisation of Greater 
Asante (2). Arhin gives this account of Asante state formation to 
stress the existence of a political foundation upon which an economic 
superstructure was built. This contrasts with the alternative position 
mentioned above where the basis for Asante expansion was seen as largely 
economic. It is our intention here to show that it was an interrelation 
of internal political and economic considerations that prompted, and 
sustained, the Asante Union of 1701 interacting with the increasingly 
more pervasive European contact on the coast. It is crucial to recognise 
the dialectic between these forces for social change in eighteenth 
century Asante. In particular we will aim to show that the Asante 
Empire developed to secure greater trade opportunities, as a basis 
and outlet for the surplus produced by the exploitation of different 
groups in Asante society: women, commoner men and increasing numbers 
of slaves. The focus for this chapter is with slaves. 
A major consideration for sections of the Akan seeking union 
in the later seventeenth century was to shed the oppressive yoke of 
Denkyira. This was achieved by Osei Tutu forming an alliance with 
Akwamu in the east and persuading the chiefs of Kokofu, Kumawu, Dwaben 
Bekwai and Nsuta to form a political union. The migration resulting 
from this union has been seen to lay in the desire for more land rather 
(I ) Arhin, (1967), op. cit. 
(2) Lbid., p. 66. 
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than merely to control the Begho trade route (1 )- We will see 
shortly, however, by examining the relationship forged between the 
Asante states, within what has been called greater Asante, that a 
predominant relationship was trade. 
A three fold classification of the Asante Union can be made 
identifying, first, some states as 'provinces' whose task it was to 
help Asante in times of war (2). Second, 'tributary' states which made 
annual contributions to the Asante economy and manpower, usually under 
threat from Asante if this contribution to the Union was not volunteered. 
These states were normally culturally and spatially different from the 
Asante. They nevertheless played a strategically important position 
economically and politically within the Union. An example of a state 
in this category was Dagomba (3). The third group of states in the 
Union were 'protectorates' which formed important economic entrepots 
on the coast as a safety valve to any difficulty occurring between 
Asante and the Fante states. As one writer has put it: 
... the coastal towns were an economic counterpoise to the trade posts in the Fanti coastal stretch, and this 
accounts for the gentle nature of the pressure that was 
extracted on them (4). 
These protectorates included Accra, Ada, Aowin and Elmina. 
A basis for this threefold organisation of Greater Asante was 
a stately apparatus around which a degree of unity could be forged 
between both Akan and non Akan groups. The Asante national army formed 
part of this apparatus. This was not a regular unified army. Instead, 
(1) J. K. Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbours 1700-1807, (London: 
Longmans, 1971) p. 29--. 
(2) Arhin, (1967ý o cit., p. 76. 
(3) Ibid., p. 77. on page xiv. 
(4) p. 77. 
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it was the responsibility of each divisional state within the 'union, 
to supply a quota of troops depending upon the requirement of different 
campaigns. Further unity was achieved with the notion of the 'Golden 
Stool' and Odwira festivals supported by broader inclusion of different 
areas within a constitution (1). The function of this paraphenalia was 
quite clear. The Golden Stool was specifically the innovation of 
Osei Tutu and his high priest Komfo Anotche. It symbolised the 
embodiment of the spirit and safety of the Union, while lack of 
attendance at the Odwira festivals, was seen to be an act of disloyalty. 
There was, in addition to this already impressive array of state 
regalia, the development of songs-representing traditional history 
with the aim of establishing common origins among the groups involved 
in the Union. Moreover, to mark the beginning of 'Asante' a new 
capital was established at Kumase. A degree of autonomy was allowed 
within the Union. The Omanhene. or head for example, of different 
divisions, had to pay a war tax which represented a national levy 
imposed by the king for specific purposes. Nevertheless, they maintained 
control over their land which was seized before the Union. Trade 
regulations, however, had to be obeyed and to enhance the Asantehene's 
strength an administrative structure was developed whereby the Omanhene 
could only approach the Asantehene between the meetings of the Union 
through a representative (ýdamfo) in Kumase (2). 
These were the events leading up to the middle period of Asante 
development based upon the charismatic leadership of Osei Tutu, and 
external coastal influences. The latter were in the form of increasing 
(1) See R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923). 
(2) The ultimate submission o the Omanhene in this way is controversial. 
See Fynn op. cit., p. 35, where 'itis suggested that such a move 
would have created too great a strain in the Union. 
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European desire to create friendly relations with the new force on 
the hinterland of the Gold Coast (1). The cohesiveness of Asante 
was severely tested following the death of Osei Tutu when a violent 
civil war broke out until Opoku Ware, (1720-1750), could secure his 
position as the new Asantehene. Internal strife was sufficient to 
allow Asante to be defeated by Akyem and to encourage rebellion from 
the provinces of Aowin, Sefwi, Wassa and Twifo (2). 
It was only after these rebellions that the already mentioned 
sacred oath was invoked by the elders of Kumase. In addition there 
was the stationing of resident commissioners in the conquered areas 
to ensure the smoother running of affairs and the less likelihood of 
future rebellions. 
A recent review of the duties of these residents, in fourteen 
areas from Accra to Salaga, shows quite clearly the reason for these 
innovations and in particular the benefits to be reaped from them (3). 
All the duties assigned to the commissioners involved ways and means 
of procurring greater financial renumeration for the Asante state either 
through the collection of taxes or with the promotion of trade and the 
securement of internal order. A commissioner was established at 
Elmina, for example, in1765 with the precise instruction to act as an 
intermediary between the Asantehene and the Dutch to promote trade. 
In 1820 a travelling commissioner was appointed at Cape Coast to act 
as intermediary between the Asantehene and the British traders (4). 
(1) See Fynn ,0 cit., p. 52. For Europe's desire to maintain links with Asante esp the Dutch following a reduction in the power of 
Denkyira. See Chapter 2 above. 
(2) There was also conflict at this time, 1721-22, be tween Asante and Techim 
the latter being opposed to Asantes expansion int o the ivory rich areas 
of Brong. 
(3) K. Arhin, (1977a), o it " pp. 14-15. (4) 1 bid., p. 14. It should be-noted that Arhin makes the false distinction 
wF-en referring to the duties of the commissioners between the functions 
of trade and political matters. This is once mor e symptomatic of reify- inq "the Political" instead of attenotinq to see the interrelationshin 
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The purpose of outlining this period of Asante state 
development has been to look briefly at the reasons usually given 
for the development of Asante: the desire for more land, greater 
contact with people of a similar culture and to secure greater and 
safer access to trade routes with Europeans on the coast. None of 
these factors for the development of the most powerful west African 
state are wholly inoperative. There is an interrelationship between 
the increased desire by sections of the Akan for 'cultural homogeneity' 
and the formation of a new Akan state without the suzerainty of 
Denkyira and the security of trade with coastal Fante states which 
inevitably acted as brokers for goods from the hinterland. One writer, 
for example, has gone as far as to say that: 
The success of the Asante in the early eighteenth 
century depended in considerable measure on the 
friendship of the influential African merchants 
on the coast, who saw their destinies inextricably 
interwoven with the fate of Ashanti (1). 
Our position is that to understand the processes associated 
with Asante state formation we need to try and identify the actors, 
and their interests, within the Akan who facilitated the emergence 
of the Asante Empire. Our concern is therefore less with attempts to 
document a correspondence of different historical events with the 
'facts' of Asante development and more to try and explain Asante state 
formation. We can only do this if we ask the questions who were the 
Akan that created the conditions for the Asante state and what were 
the relationships between them? This involves, among other things, a 
more detailed analysis of slavery. 
(1) Daaku (1970), op. cit., p. 179. 
171 
(b) The Basis of Trade and the Dynamic of State Formation 
The presence and importance of indigenous slavery to the Ancient 
Sudanic zone of West Africa, from the fourteenth century, has been 
downplayed as the crucial factor in determining the formation of the 
Asante Empire (1). Discussion about state formation has instead 
focussed upon the importance of long distance trade. This is related by one 
writer in particular to actual relations of production by suggesting that 
there was an 'African mode of production' where the state had the 
exclusive control of one group over long distance exchange (2). Little 
attempt has been made to isolate the foundation upon which groups of 
merchants acquired the goods which they traded so profitably. A 
further view has located the basis of state formation in the advances 
of technological inputs into different societies. For example, Jack 
Goody has told us that ýiith the introduction of metals, kingdoms are 
on the cards" (3). This is the case, moreover, because the influx of 
iron facilitated the transition from a society, where the bow and arrow 
was the most common weapon, to one where the firearm was used to secure 
Indeed Walter Rodney went so far as to suggest that slavery on the 
Guinea Coast was the product of European colonial encounter. See, 
W. Rodney, 'African ST-a-very and other. Forms of Social Oppression on the 
Upper Guinea Coast in the Context of the Atlantic Slave Trade'. JAH, 
3,1966. An exception to this view is the work of E. Terray, and 
C. Meillassoux. See Chapter One above and C. Meillassoux, 'The role 
of Slavery in the Economy and Social History of the Sudanic Zone of 
West Africa', Paper prepared for the Conference on the Economic History 
of the Savanna, Kano, Nigeria, January 1976, translated by R. J. Gavin, 
Mimeo. 
(2) Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Research on an African Mode of 
Production', in G. W. Johnson and M. Klein, (editors), Perspectives on 
the African Past', (Boston: Little Brown, 1972) and C. --C-oquery-Vidrovitch 
'The Political Economy of the African Peasantry, and Modes of 
Production', in Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, (editors), 
The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, Volume 1, Sage Series on 
African 14odernisat-lo-n-a-nU--Development, (New York: Sage, 1976). 
(3) Jack Goody, Technology, Tradition and the State, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), p. 46. 
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law, order and peace to ensure more successful trading. The 
importance of technological inputs as a factor in the specific case 
of the Akan state formation has also been made: 
The boost given to the agricultural aspect of the 
economy by iron technology and the stimulus given 
to the commercial aspect of the economy by the early 
gold mining industry and by the salt industry in the 
Etsi coastlands were aids to urbanisation and state 
formation (1). 
Goody has recognised briefly the importance of acknowledging 
the relations between people as a first step in understanding early 
state formation. This is done by showing the relative shortage of 
manpower in relation to the abundancy of land, which ensured a greater 
propensity for slave labour as a means. of producing subsistence and 
subsequently trade. This argument, however, is a form of technological 
determinism. Goody's position subordinates the crucial recognition 
of the need to e xamine relations of production to a deterministic 
observation that it is the instruments and techniques of production, 
and/or the ecological balance, which determine the sequence of events. 
State formation in Africa becomes related to a dependency largely 
upon the commodities imported into the specific states rather than 
the interrelationship of embryonic, indigenous class forces with the 
social processes entering the indigenous social formation. We can 
now work towards this latter holistic approach to understanding state 
formation among the Asante by taking another look at the role of slave 
labour in sustaining the developing Akan social formation. 
(i ) Slave Labour and State Formation 
In re-examining slave labour we recognise that access to 
political power in Asante, rested not on control of material factors 
of production or over long distance trade but with control over 
(1) James Anquandah, op. cit., p. 55. 
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people. By linking the productive activity of people in Asante 
with the formation of the state, we will show that Asante society 
was dominated by a ruling class of chiefs and elders, which rested 
Upon the successful trading of the surplus extracted increasingly 
from groups of slave labourers (1). Control of long distance trade., 
here does not represent the sole vehicle for the accumulation of 
wealth. Rather, long distance exchange and trade become ýthe point 
at which surplus already extracted was realised. Production, in 
excess of indigenous consumption requirements of gold and agricultural 
products, could be exchanged for luxury products and firearms which 
could then be used to sustain the dominant position of chiefs and 
elders and ensure the capture of more slaves. 
In a society where the number of dependents enhances the 
ability to accumulate wealth, the capacity to increaae the number of 
people under one's control is crucial. At a clear advantage in thE 
appropriation of people for their labour were the kings and chiefs 
of Asante who could use the captives from military forays while the 
'free man' could only mobilise his immediate dependents (2). 
The chiefs and elders of the domestic community extracted 
surpluses from commoner men and women. Women were exploited in the 
(1 ) This argument is owed very much to the work of E. Terray. See, inter 
alia: 'Long Distance Exchange and the Formation of the State: Th'6 5--se of the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman', Economy and Society, 3,3, 
1974, 'Classes and Class Consciousness-i`F-t-F-e-Abron Kingdom of 
Gyaman', in M. Bloch (editor), Marxist Analysis and Social Anthro- 
pology, (London: Malaby Press, T975T. 
(2) This situation was modified in time and most noticeably during the 
period of legitimate trade which involved the Akan, in amongst 
other things, becoming directly involved in the production of 
agricultural produce for exchange with European merchants. The 
overall effect of the increase in trade was the wider spread and decomposition of wealth within Asante. A result of this more frEquent 
contact with the Europeans was that 'commoners' increased their 
opportunities for acquiring slaves. 
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'home' through their domestic production over and above that used 
to sustain themselves and also through their position in the reproduction 
of the lineace. Both sexes were compelled to perform communal labour for 
the chiefs at different times during the year (1). To recaD: we suggest 
that the different forms of Asante commoner household, where although 
because of matriliny the married woman often resided away from her husband, 
(duolocal), the husband still tended to have exclusive sexual rights 
over the Asante woman. This is despite the fact that the Asante woman 
remained within her matrilineage. Indeed we recognise that the payment 
of: 
tiri nsu gave the husband exclusive sexual rights 
in t rl-ý'ýT--wife, made him legal father of the woman's 
children during the period of the marriage, and 
obligated the wife to perform economic and domestic 
services (2). 
This is not to say of course that Asante women were completely passive 
agents in a male directed society. Instead, we argue that the ideology 
of matriliny in Asante did not guarantee women freedom from exploitation 
as women: that is through their capacity to reproduce as well as their 
role in production (3). 
Initially, domestic production tended to be orSanised around 
the family and kinship relations, mobilising as many as possible in the 
planting and harvesting of crops and in the mining of gold. But the 
(1 ) The sexual exploitation of women as well as their exploitation 
in production is discussed more fully above. See Chapter One. 
(2) Harry W. Basehart, 'Ashanti', in, Matrilineal Kinship, D. M. Schneider 
and Kathleen GOL: gh (editors) (Berkeley and Los Angele's: University 
of California Press, 1962), p. 290. 
(3) On matrilineage in Ashanti, see, inter alia; R. S. Rattray, (1929), 
op. cit., and M. Fortes 'Time and-So-cia=tructure: An Ashanti 
Case ý_tudy', in, Social Structure, Essays Presented to A. R. 
Radcliffe-Brown, F. Eggan and M. Fortes (editors), (Oxford: 
Oxford Universi y Press, 1949). 
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nature of the most profitable form of gold mining, with the need to sink 
a number of shafts deep into the ground, meant a degree of labour intensity 
which could not be supplied by ordinary family production units (1). The 
result was that power holders who received the captives taken in wars of 
expansion enhanced their wealth by setting to work slaves on plantations 
for agricultural production; in mines for the production of gold, and in 
their courts -for domestic chores and where there wasa'need for especially 
dirty work to be performed (2). The increased use of slave production in 
turn released local aristocrats to raise their opportunities for trading 
in'luxury goods of materials and alcohol, and also to appropriate the 
necessary firearms to gain access to greater numbers of slaves. 
The view of the relations between people in Asante society that 
we have just outlined has recently been criticised. Briefly, Dumett 
has suggested that we should examine alternative sources of wealth 
for the chiefs (3). Chiefly power, it is argued, was inevitably 
sustained less through the use of slave labour, in plantations and 
mines, and more through the relationships within the 'abusua'; relating to 
land tenure and forms of taxation, albeit which were still under the control of a 
chiefly elite. To say this, however, is to miss the point. This is that 
the role of taxation and land tenure, as formulated during the development 
of the Asante Union, were integral parts in the creation of an unified 
Asante state. The latter was governed by groups of chiefs and military 
aristocrats whose power was based upon the exploitation of three 
groups of people, both Akan and non Akan; commoner men, women and 
(1) See Chapter One. 
(2) "Atantanie nti na ye to odonko" - Asante proverb, "We buy an odonko because f filthy work". RaFt-Tray, (1929) op. cit., p. 44. 
(3) R. E. Dumett, 'Precolonial Gold Mining aný the State in the Akan Region: With a Critique of the Terray Hypothesis', in G. Dalton, (editor), 
Research in Economic Anthropology, Volume 2, (London: JAI Press, 1979). 
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captives. The exploitation of these groups was consolidated by the 
development of a series of politico/ideological instruments of 
government. The first of these was enshrined in judicial power where 
kings and chiefs had a monopoly as to what could be imposed for 
breach of conduct. Fines for misdomeanors were paid to chiefs in 
gold which allowed them to purchase greater numbers of slaves and 
guns. If fines could not be paid a pawn was taken in lieu of the 
debt until such time that the payment had been made or worked for. 
An increase in the frequency of pawning occurred for such things as 
being unable to pay for a trial. Slave, and periodically commoner 
labourers, worked on the kola farms of Asante chiefs in the expansion 
of a trade crop. The tendency was thus for the expansion of trade in 
some areas to be dominated by chiefly calculationsor nominees of 
chiefs. It should be noted that this informal monopoly was not 
institutionalised as in the case of Dahomey (1). Instead, the 
rronopolisation of trade activities occurred because of the increased 
de facto control that chiefs had over the control of human labour (2). 
The second politico/ideological weapon used by chiefs in 
Asante was diplomatic in nature. The importance of resident commissioners 
in conquered territories was mentioned earlier. This strategy was used 
especially in the Asante drive towards the coast where milita ry 
supremacy ensured that no rival could gain access to what was obviously 
a crucial aspect of Asante trading outlets and sources of-supplY foýfiýearmsý 
E. Terray, (1974), op. cit., p. 331 : See also P. Manning, Slavery, 
Colonialism and EcoFo-mirc Growth in Dahorrey, -1640-1960, African 
Studies Seri6s 30, (London: Cambridge University Flýes's, 1982). 
(2) This de facto control' was nevertheless in the process of 
trans'itfE-nto de jure. legitimation of chiefly subjugation of 
commoner activ1tY-. 
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Slavery Re-examined 
The view that Asante state development was premised upon the 
extraction of surplus produced by slaves, places unfree labour at the 
centre of the analysis of Asante relations of production. It is in 
marked contrast to the earlier comments made about slavery attributed 
to Dumett's view of state formation. In contrast to DUmett, our 
conceptual isation of Asante state formation is predicatedupon the 
chiefly exploitation of slave (and commoner) labour to produce goods 
for long distance exchange and also sustain internal food prodL; Ction (1). 
One such area of slave labour in Asante, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century was on chiefly plantations or at work in a mine. This was 
carried out primarily by a Donum -a prisoner of war captured or 
seized during an Asante war of expansion or from a raiding party. 
Work on plantations ran by the Asantehene (2) was also carried out by 
Odonko's who were purchased usually from the people on Asante's 
northern border. The Odonko also became domestic slaves (3). Both 
these groups of slaves were augmented at different times by Asante's 
pawned normally to wealthy councillors in lieu of repayment of debt. 
Domestic Slavery 
J 
In addition to slave labour on plantations in Asante there 
was something which has become known as domestic slavery. We earlier 
paraphrased two writers of Psante history who saw domestic slavery 
akin to nothing more than the incorporation of a pýwnor the integration 
of a captive into the domestic community. So common was this view of 
(I ) Compare, Wilks, (197ý, op. cit., pp. 176-177. 
(2) See, J. Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee, (London: Henry 
Cc-lborn, -1824), pp. 59-60 and p. 6'5"-. 
(3) A third form of slavery, those captured for the Atlantic slave trade 
is examined in Section IV below. 
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Asante society that early writers saw that: 
there are hundreds of families in which it is 
quite impossible for even the members to discriminate 
who amongst them are slaves and who are free (1). 
Similarly, it was stated about the same time of writing th. at distinct 
from those involved in the Atlantic slave trade, a 'domestic slave' 
was little affected by his: 
state of. bondage inasmuch as he continued as a 
member of the same cominunity and has access to 
the same limited sphere of enjoyments within the 
reach of all (2). 
This view pf incorporation within the family for the unfree 
labourer tells us little about the real nature of his/her servility. 
More fundamentally, if such incorporation occurred, what was the 
basis for the category 'domesti'c slave'. Why were individuals so 
labelled in Akan society? In other words, despite the argument by 
nineteenth century European travellers, and later twentieth century 
anthropologists, that Akan society was egalitarian without exploitative 
social relations of p roduction, the very use of the category slave 
implies a social subordination which is not in our mind,, adequately 
explained. For example, the price paid by the offspring of unfree 
women in Asante when they were 'assimilated' into the Asante lineage 
has been seen by Fortes to lie solely in private, personal and psycho- 
logical issues: namely the threat of exposure for not being an Asante (3). 
(1) Thomas J. Hutchinson, 'The Social and Domestic Slavery on Western 
Africa and its'Evil Influence on Commerical Progress', Journal of 
the Roýal Society of Arts, 26, ii, 1875, p. 316. 
(2) B. Cruickshank, op. cit., volume one, p. 312. - (3) See A. Norran Klein, 'T e Two Asantes: Competing interpretations 
of "slavery" in Akan-Asante culture and Society', in, P. E. Lovejoy, 
(editor), The Ideology of Slavery in Africa, Volume six, Sage Series 
on African-Fciý-ernisation and Developm-e--nt-, 7London: Sage 1981a). 
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Li ttl e mention is made about the work the new 1i neace recrui ts do and 
their relations with other members of the abusua. 
The notion of domestic incorporation within the family suggests 
a conceptualisation of slavery as a process. By this is meant a slave 
is seen as passing along a sliding scale of servility from being an 
unfree slave to beccming a member of a kin group (1). A slave at the 
time of capture or purchase might, for example, be seen to have a status 
cn the margins of the enslaving society (2), but become increasingly 
incorporated into the kinship structure of his/her master through 
'formal' incorporation, (acceptance of legal rights and duties), and 
then of 'affective' incorporation through being held in greater dsteeni 
by his/her master's kin (3). 
This explanation of slavery, whether in general or when talking 
about domestic slavery, does little more than simply duplicate the 
'ideology' about slavery. This has been seen recently as "the 
fictitious quasi kinship relationship" meant to exist between the 
master's lineage and the-slave who seeks constantly to be incorporated'. 
into kinship structures, thereby reducing his/her marginalised status.. 
In fact, even this latter notion is misleading. 'Quasi' is quite 
clearly the wrong word to use when slaves bore the offspring of free 
men and women thereby establishing kinship realtionships. Moreover, 
(1) Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers, 'African'Slavery' as an institution 
of marginality' (hereafter cited as African slavery) in, I. Kopytoff 
ard S. Miers, (editors), Slavery in Africa: Historical and Arth 0- 
loýical Persýectives, (U The University of Wisconsin-Press, 1977) 
and the critique oT-this position by J. Watson, 'Introduction', in, 
J. Watson, (editor), Asian and African Systems of Slavery, 
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1980). 
(2) Kopytoff and Miers, 'African Slavery', op. cit., p. 15. 
(3) Ibid, p. 19. 
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the incorporation of slaves taking generations rather than the life 
cycle of an individual has been documented (1). In extending the 
analysis of slavery and our understanding of slave relations of 
prodL; Ction, it is helpful to look at the wider dynamics employed by an 
enslaving society and in parti. cular the degree of violence used to 
capture the future labour force. Indeed, it is to the broader context 
of the relationship which existed between the enslaving society, and 
the society being enslaved, that we can extend our discussion of Akan 
state formation, to show that it involved one dimension of the process 
of class conflict between masters and slaves. Connected to this on 
another 1 evel is the need to hi ghl i ght more cl early the nature of the 
domestic slaves relationship with his/her master. 
Although at pains to illustrate the integrative processes'of 
domestic slavery, Rattray admitted that in Asante, despite marriage 
and property, "the status of a slave ... could never be lost" 
(2). 
This was the point even though, "in nine cases out of ten an Ashanti 
slave would merge and be intermarried within a specific group". The 
fact remained that when a human sacrifice was required, "an otherwise 
kind and considerate master would turn instinctively to the man who 
had no friend in the world" (3). Where slaves married female slaves 
the offspring would always remain slaves (4). Similarly, where a 
female slave married a free man, other than her master, the children 
remained the possession of the master. Slaves were denied control 
(1 ) See A. Norman Kl ei n, (1981 ) Op. ci t. , and I. Wi I ks (1975), op -ci t (2) Rattray, (1929), op. cit,., 
;. -4-Z. 
(3) Ibid, p. 42. 
(4) TFU, pp. 38-39. 
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over their progeny despite their so-called integration into the 
domestic community. Such a denial might be seen to lay in the normal 
"rights in person" (1) but this wasnot the position of other 
indigenous members of the community. We are told that it was not 
uncommon for slaves to hold property-and that large sums of wealth 
were amassed (2). This does not deny the existence of an exploitative 
and unfree relationship existing between master and servant especially 
as it was noted: "ultimately everything the slave possessed went to 
the master" (3). As such, it is not surprising that masters would 
allow their slaves to occupy and cultivate land by themselves to 
make full use of relations of production that might expand the stock 
of wealth for the owner of slaves. 
A domestic slave was thus exploited, not only through the 
labour he/she performed surplus to that needed to reproduce his/her 
conditions of existence, but also-through relations of reproduction 
established between the slaves and their masters. We might suggest 
that the incorporation of the slave into the families of slave 
owners served three important functions. First, incorporation into 
the abusua lessened the risk of organised slave rebellion against 
their social conditions. Second, the slave owners had control over 
the surplus generated by the unfree labourers. Finally, an invaluable 
source of further labour was safeguarded by control over the slaves' 
offspring. 
See, Kopytoff and Miers, 'African Slavery', op. cit. 
(2) For example, Dutch Factor Landman at Axim wrote in November 1706, 
to the WIC, that a Prince Zaay had transferred his kingdom with 
its dependencies to his slave the caboceer Amaniquandjn. This 
disturbed the WIC because they feared trade might fall. Although the 
Caboceer was recognised as a great trader Zaay was seen to nevertheleSs! jI 
place little importance, on him, see, FCN37,1706, p. 200. 
(3) Rattray, (1929), op. cit., p. 40. 
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Slaveowners of unfree labour on plantations were those 
villagers who had enough resources to facilitate either the capture 
or purchase of slaves. Inevitably they were the chiefs and elders, 
and not the 'ordinary' commoners, whose humble position barely allowed 
them sufficient income to sustain themselves satisfactorily (1). The 
system of pawning also helped those who got their income from trade 
and control over land. This was because they 'alone had the resources 
to lend 'money' as they claimed a pawn when debt was not paid. 
What then was the nature of domestic slavery in late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Asante? What have we seen as 
the difficulties involved in conceptualising this form of unfree 
labour and of slavery in general? In brief, we view domestic slavery 
as involving exploitative relations between master and servant 
although we recognise that over generations the servant may well 
become integrated fully into the master's household. The process of 
assimilation of the slave was lengthy. Moreover, before assimilation 
was complete the domestic slave, like other forms of slave labour, 
was prey to exploitation by the master. The slave was exploited by 
doing unpaid labour. The basis for this exploitation lay in the 
kinlessness of the slave: the slave lacked integration and also 
protection by the lineage. This precarious situation became 
particularly pronounced at times of human sacrifice. A further 
indicator of the exploitation of the slave bythemaster was the 
former's lack of control over its progeny and the insecurity of any 
Interview: Kyichiwere, "the elders of the town could go to the 
north buy slaves". The use of slaves by commoners became 
more frequent in the mid nineteenth century. See Chapter Four 
on some of the effects of 'legitimate trade'. 
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of its wealth or property holding. These general characteristics 
of Asante slavery with specific bearing on domestic slavery can now 
be compared with what we know about plantation slavery at this time. 
Plantation Slavery 
The use of unfree labour on the plantations of the Asantehene 
was an essential means for the Asante aristocracy to secure and 
consolidate its position as power holders in the Akan social formation. 
The major distinguishing feature that separated plantation slavery 
from domestic slavery was the different social relations of production 
and reproduction that were involved in the slaves captivity. Work on 
the plantations of the Asantehene was on a much larger scale than was 
experienced within the more established domestic community and 
crucially: 
Work rhythms were no longer determined by the 
labourer in response to his and his family's needs 
and the seasonal flow of tasks, but were set by an 
owner attuned to changing demands of the market (1). 
The slave generally worked here in gangs under supervision. The 
organisation and direction of the slave's surplus production was 
determined for him/her whereas in the situation of domestic slavery 
the slave might have worked on a plot of land in his own time. 
Pawns might also have experienced this transformation in work 
routine and in the amount of work expected of them. The only comfort 
that they might hav'p- had was the prospect of being redeemed. A pawn 
was the only type of unfree labour that could resume his/her previous 
status but the likelihood of manumission always depended upon the 
financial fortunes of their faýil'ies. 
(I) Frederick Cooper, 'Review Article: The Problem of Slawry in African 
Studies', JAH, 20,1,1979, 'p. 115. 
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The presence of plantations in and around Asante, ca. 1780- 
IL 
1ti 
I 1820, became an increasingly frequent sight (1). Labour was acquired from northern forays or it is likely from sections of neighbouring, 
more reccntly conquered territories. The odonkos or donums were 
therefore not simply the product of local raids. This is important 
because to continually seize labour, from areas recently brought into 
the Asante Union, would have been to sow the seeds of dissent and 
unrest before Asante suzerainty had been sustained (2). This lays 
down a parameter within which the continual expansion or raiding 
activities could not be exceeded. There was always a preference for 
captives from outside the Asante Union. This was because their 
'integration' into a new work routine would generally be smoother, 
due to their geographical isolation from home, which made the likelihood 
of rebellion more remote (3). We can now extend this discussion by 
drawing on the recent work of Meillassoux (4). Although the 
suggestions are essentially theoretical, it is useful to develop our 
earlier point that the relations between an enslaving and an enslaved 
society informs our understanding of the plight of the slave in Asante 
and the slave's relationship with his/her new master. 
The need to procure slaves from outside the immediate locality 
of Asante situates for us the first of three levels of exploitation 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
See, Dupuis , cit., and T. Edward Bowditch, Mission 
from Cape Coast I 
Castle to Ashantee, (London: Frank Cass & Co, Ltd, Third Edition- ]9bb).! 
This general theoretical point is made by C. Meillassoux, 'Histoýical 
Modalities of the Exploitation and Overexploitation of Labour', 
Critique of Anthropology, 13-14,4,1979. 
This is perhaps the reason for so few slave revolts. See Interviews. 
It is interesting to note that Asantehene Osei Name did not allow 
the export of captives originating from -the kingdom. See, Terray, (1974 
op. cit. 
C. MeiTlassoux, (1976), op. cit., and, 'From reproduction to production 
a marxist approach to economic anthropology', Economy and Society, 1., 
1,1972, 'Correspondence', Eccnomy and Society, 7,1978, Maidens-, --Meal 
and Money, Capitalism and the Domestic Community, (Cambr'lTg-e 
Cambr dqe University Press, 1981). 
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involved in the process of slavery in Asante (1). This is first, a 
relationship between a slave catching group and the raided population, 
the latter often being the target for ideological abuse which labels 
them as non human thereby justifying capture. When captured, by the 
increasing military organisation of the Asante state, the slaves would 
usually become the 'property' of Asante chiefs and military captains. 
Only when these officeholders had been placated would the elders, 
through the system of 'patrimony, ' be eligible, because of their status, 
to receive slaves for domestic use. The exploitation between the 
raiding and raided society was based upon the continued reduction of 
the labour force of the latter and its subsequent subjugation 
militarily of labour power. 
A second social relationship which was involved in the increasing 
use of slaves was that between the master and slave which involved two 
forms of exploitation. By setting the slave to work on the plantations, 
or in the mines, Asante chiefs had access to surplus production in 
excess of that required to sustain the life of the slave This involved the 
Initial exploitation of -the newly arrived slave. The secondlevel was the'contro' 
over the progeny- of the slave thatwas exercised by the sl avelaaster and which 
mightformabasis for 'domestic slavery'. Neillassoux offers the insightherethat I 
Slaves are different from the other members of the 
community in that they are rightfully deprived of 
offspring. Their status as foreigner is permanent (2). 
Control over the slaves' offspring became a way in which slave numbers 
could be sustained., the slave could be reproduced without the risk of 
constant military debacles that marked the early periods of enslavement. 
(I ) C. Meillassoux, (1979), op. cit. 
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The relationship between the domestic mode of production and 
the increasing development of unfree slave labour is important. The 
two forms of production necessarily co-existed, and indeed were 
integrated in the case of domestic slavery, as the stability of the 
state was jeopardised if indigenous plantation slavery became too 
dominant. There was a greater chance of rebellion against power 
holders if the'balance between free men and captives was upset. The 
risks of slave rebellion were always present and none were more aware 
of these than the Asantehenes. Osei Bonsu slaughtered masses of slaves 
in 1818, following the abolition of the slave trade, because of the 
fear that if he did not kill them they would kill, his subjects (1). 
This inbuilt political restriction to the increasing exploitation of 
slave labour, and the necessity for it to co-exist alongside domestic 
family based production was reinforced by economic factors. These 
refer to the substitution of slave labour for any productive activity 
that the chiefs and elders might have performed, (before the increased 
exploitation of slaves), which was not directed to the greater 
production of exchange value, but rather to the conspicuous consumption 
needs of the Asante dominant class. This meant that it was the needs 
of consumption which determined the volume of slave labour and not the 
need to realise commercial profit, at least at this pre-Atlantic slave 
trade stage of Asante development (2). 
The use of slaves for the satisfacti6n of domestic needs has 
(1) Dupuis, op. cit. 
(2) This point is of its very nature tentative. This is because 
. 
we do, in. fact, know very little about the pre-nineteenth 
century period. Our suggestions are built upon fragments of 
data and the theoretical and empirical investigations of 
E. Terray's work on the Abron, op. cit. 
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thus been put forward as a reason for the lack of their more intense 
exploitation compared with that endured by slaves on the plantations 
in the Caribbean. It is also given as a reason for the continuation 
of the kin based domestic mode of production. The latter stabilised 
the development of-Asante: its producers could not be allowed to be 
too discontented with their subordinated position to the dominant 
class of chiefs and elders. Tribute had to be kept at a 'reasonable' 
level. This reduced commoner disquiet and also facilitated commoner 
participation in the wars of enslavement. At the same time the 
ideological baggage of the Asante state consolidated the ruling groups 
dominant position by informing the people of the egalitarian nature 
of land holdings and the need to satisfy the wishes of the spiritual 
forebears (1). 
Slaveryin Asante was not used simply to. "enlarge one's kin 
group, and the desire to have clients, dependent servants, and 
retainers"(2). Although these considerations were not inconsequential, 
to obtain a clearer picture of the role that unfree labour played in 
early Asante we need to locate it within the wider perspective of 
Asante political economy, and in the process of state formation. 
A preoccupation with examining legalistic notions of 'rights in 
people', or 'property relations', tells us little about the relations 
between the Akan other than that they were sanctioned by the society 
involved. We need to discern why they were sanctioned and indeed 
promoted by the Asante. This leads us to a view of Asante which sees 
a class of chiefs and elders exploiting commoners and slaves to sustain 
their dominant positions at the level of the Asante state. These 
91 
(1) This supports our contention in Chapter One that slavery always 
appears in association with other relations of production. 
(2) Kopytoff and Miers, 'African Slavery', op. cit., p. 67. 
chiefs and elders also, however, developed stately apparatuses which 
worked to incorporate commoner interests and stressed a uniting bond 
between all the Akan people. In this way we can best understand unfree 101, ý 
labour in Asante if we see it within: 
(iii) 
a complex network of social, economic, political, 
and military relations thatmust be first considered 
to understand the nature of its exploitation in 
relation with the master (1). 
Asante State Formation 
Any approach to understanding Asante state formation must be 
rrulti-dimensional. The developments between 1650 and 1800 should be 
situated within a framework which accounts for internal class struggles 
and external warfare. 
Before looking briefly at the impact which the Atlantic slave 
trade had upon the formation of the Asante Union, we can here tie 
the earlier discussion of state formation-together. This can be done 
by showing the precise means at the disposal of the Asanto state power 
holders for consolidating their class position of dominance over Asante 
commoners and slaves. Some of these factors have already been examined: 
these have been the politico/ideological paraphenalia developed by 
Osei Tutu and Komfo Anotche. The Golden Stool and Odwira festivals 
went a long way to consolidate the formation of the Asante Union which 
was built upon the expansionary policies of warring aristocracies in 
Kumase. The Asante rulers were also the military leaders and as such 
directly acquired the plunders of war, together with the desired tributes 
imposed upon defeated and incorporated states (2). The massive seizing 
(1) C. Meillassoux, (1978), op. cit., p. 322. 
(2) K. Arhin, (1977a), op. 
. 
Lt., p. 1. 
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of loot was accompanied by war indemnities likE those from Akyem 
Abuakwa to Asante officials in 1730 of 2,000 benders or 4,000 ounces 
of gold: Gyaman, unspecified but large sums of gold in 1744; Akwapem, 
436 slaves and Ak. yem 1,000 ounces of gold at the end of their 
rebellion in 1816 (1). 
In addition to this financial renumeration from warfare and 
plunder which was appropriated by the Asantehene and councillors, 
there was a further significant input into the formation of the Asante 
Union. This was the influx of skilled manpower into Asante which is 
more difficult to quantify. 
It has been noted that early European travellers were keen to 
describe central Asante as a hive of industrial activity (2). There 
were in fact various village specialisations: pot industries, gold 
smithing, wood work and cloth dyeing. There is also the suggestion that 
the development of these indUStries was very much based upon the 
'political and military revolution' in Asante (3). Oral traditiom, 
for example, have cited the transportation of goldsmiths, blacksmiths 
and weavers to Asante following the conquest-of Bonsu Mahso in 1722- 
1723. Moreover, the Asantehene, Osei Bonsu, (1800-1823) recruited 
carpenters from Elmina (4). 
The importation of these skilled crafts people further enhanced 
the wealth of the Asante rulers, a wealth which was displayed increasingly 
(1) Arhin, ibid., p. 6. See p. 147 above for the system by which Akan and 
non Akan states were differentially incorporated into the Asante Union.: ý 
(2) Arhin, (1977a), op. cit., p. 10. 
(3) Ibid, p. 10. i 
(4) TFU, p. 11. The status of these new 'recruits' is not fully dealt 
witT in the existing literature. For example, were they merely 
slave labour or was this the beginning of petty commodity prodL; CtiOn 
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more conspicuously. This was because warfare, and the wealth which 
!I 
the plunder of different states secured, became reified in seventeenth 
and eighteenth century Asante. The early Asante state rulers created 
the importance of, warfare as a means of extending. the state and 
producing wealth for its leaders. Such a process rendered impossible 
the ascendency of an alternative social group that would produce wealth 
indigenously. Instead, a 'consumer view of wealth' was developed, 
common perhaps to pre-capitalist social formations, which located the 
object of wealth as something for consumption, and not investment, 
thereby constraining the development of the Asante economy (1). 
With such conspicuous displays of wealth through the consumption 
af luxury goods we might assume the existence of greater stress and 
conflict within the Asante Union between those with and those without 
wealth. Such was not the case in Asante however. This was because 
of the partial incorporation of commoners and the communal ideology 
of the Asante polity (2). The latter was the myth, enshrined by the 
position of the Asantehene that he was the spokesman of the Asante 
state and that his actions, together with those of his councillors, 
were made in the interests of theAsante as a whole. As such, part of 
the dissipation of-the amassed wealth of elders and chiefs was spent in 
the assertion of superior worth by way of consumption (3). Major office 
holders of the Asante state would enhance their regalia, fulfill 
Ibid. This situation did not last indefinitely. Indeed one of the 
major transformations within the Asante policy was the increasing 
spread and dispersion of wealth, We discuss this along with indigenous, 
changes and new processes within the economy in this period, 1750- 
18,50, in the following chapter. See also I. Wilks, (1975), 0- 
-- 
Cit 
and T. C. McCaskie, 'Office, Land and Subjects in the History. 6-f tKe 
Manwere Fekuo of Kumase: An essay in the Political Economy of the 
Asante State'. JAH,, 21,1980, and T. C. McCaskie, (1981), cit. 
(2) Something refer-reU to earlier as, amongst other things, economic 
classlessness. See p. 31 above. 
(3) See Arhin., (1977), 'op. cit., p. 13. 
191 
Ii 
arrangements for obligatory hospitality and perform funeral rites 
consuming cattle and goats as sacrifices to the major deities. These 
actions were intended to be seen in the interests of all Asantes. In 
reality they reflected individual specific examples of wealth, wealth 
which distinguished the officers of state from the commoners and slaves. 
Nuggets of gold mined by commoners were appropriated by the Asantehene 
and although there was a limited amount of hoarding of gold dust there 
were no professional money lenders. Only rulers and functionaries did 
the lending of gold dust: they then used the interest on such loans to 
pay for war parties or prestige spending (1). 
The position of the power holders in Asante was thus cons6lidated 
by the ideology and ritualistic practices that we have just alluded to. 
These practices formed the necessary corollary to the chiefs and elders 
appropriation of the means by which trade goods, that is, slaves, were 
produced and of the large scale production of gold. Attempts to reduce 
this 'institutior. alised' monopoly of trade were resisted by the rulers 
of Asante viell into the nineteenth century. Asantehene, Osei Kwame, 
for example, was destooled for faVOUring the development of Islam 
within Asante which might have undercut the dominant power base in 
Asante (2). 
(1 1, bid., p. 14. Again, this system of money lending is modified during 
tHe nineteenth century and becomes more open. Interest rates, for 
example, could be as much as 33.1/3 per 40 days. Any private 
individual who lent money was often forcibly involved. in actions in 
the courts to prevent the development/control of such 'private' lending. 
See, Bowditch op. cit., pp. 335-336. Arhin's analysis is very useful 
and clear here b-A--h-e-is equivocal on the role of slave labour: One 
moment he says they were not put to work as a separate category of 
workers (c. f. Dahomey) and that Asante slaves aided family labour to 
produce for consumption but he further says that they were put to worK 
on farms and trade and that they became members of the chief's household (2) One reason given for this was the so-called levelling process of Islam 
which would have posed a threat to the 'great captains' in Kumase. 
See, Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 238-239 and I. Wilks, (1975), Op. cit., p. 253. 
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A more detailed examination of the mechanics of the way in 
which rulers in Asante sustained their power will follow in the next 
chapter. Suffice to say here that of all the 'formally accepted' means 
whereby the chiefs of Asante sustained their wealth, death duties were 
the greatest (1). 
Death duties were exacted by the Paramount ruler over ýpart of 
the estates of a deceased lower ranking in the polity. The latter might 
be an obrempon or panyin who was a head of a semi autonomous division of 
an oman state. In turn, the obrempon or panyin could then appropriate 
the estate of a subordinate odekro - that is the head of a village under 
the latter could do the same to a family or lineage head (Abusua-panyin). 
This was one example of indirect appropriation which had its 
ideological disguise unmasked by the Akan people. At; -. the level of 
rhetoric the system was meant to show that the Paramount ruler was indeed 
the caretakEr for the interestsof the Asante citizens. Attempts to avoid 
the tax however, were frequent although not often successful. Commoner 
tactics like the transference of property before death occurred and 
the burial of gold nuggets resulted simply 'in the 'tax collector' fabricating' 
charges to facilitate access to the property. In addition, Paramount rulers 
seized caches of gold as 'ahumtuo' - treasure trove (2). 
IV THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 
It should now be apparent thattohave concentrated solely on the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade in the period under review would have neglected 
crucial areas and issues in the development and consolidation of the 
Asante state. The history of colonial transformation in the eighteenth 
(1) Formally accepted here refers to means other than the direct 
appropriation of surplus production. 
(2) Arhin, (1977a), op. cit, pp. 16-17. 
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century has warranted a close look at the internal Akan relationships 
before and during the initial stages of the European trade in slaves. 
It is not our intention here to repeat the debates over the quentities 
of slaves transported across the Atlantic. Instcad, we want to examine 
the nature of the slave trade and its impact upon the developing Asante 
state. 
The Trade 
Although European voyages to the Guinea Coast for slaves can be 
dated from the fifteenth century (1) the trade did not begin in earnest 
until the second quarter of the seventeenth century. It did not displace 
the European demand for gold there until the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century (2). There are a' number of reasons behind the demand for slaves 
by Europeans. A simple explanation is that labour was needed to work the 
newly developing plantations and areas occupied by the Portuguese, Spanish, 
English, Fr6nch and Danes in Brazil, Central America and the Caribbean 
Islands. The demand for slaves thus rose correspondingly with the 
I 
I 
increased amount of land cultivation in Barbados by the British for sugar 
The question might be raised here, however, why West Africa became 
the exporter of slaves and not the home of sugar production? In part the 
reason can be put down to unfavourable climatic conditions of the Gold 
Coast, and the early development of sugar plantations in the Caribbean 
dating from 1650 (4). At the same time the sparsely populated Caribbean 
Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave 
Trade to America, 2 volumes (Washington: Published by Carnegie Insfitu- 
tion of Washingt n, 1930), Volume 1,1441-1700. 
(2) Basil Davidson with F. K. Buah and J. F. A. Ajayi, The Growth of African 
Civilisation: A History of West Africa, 1000-1800, (London: Longman, 196-il 
p. 208, and -, R. Bean, The British TFa-ns-Atl antic Slave Trade, 1650-1775, (Ph. D. University of Washington, 1971, Microfilms, 1974) and R. Bean, The 
British Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1650-1775, (New York: Arno Press, 1 
(3), The percentage of land under sugar increased from 40% in 1645 to 80% in 
1667. See Bean, (1974), op. cit., p. 37. 
(4) Eric Williams, Capitalis-m a_FFSlavery, Chapter One (London: Andre Deutsch, ý 
1981) 
proved ideal areas of plunder for white settlers intent on benefitting 
from the employment of forced labour. Territories in the Caribbean 
contrasted markedly with many social formations in Africa which were 
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still in the prccess of being politically and militarily subjugated. The 
latter was an ongoing concern, for the Europeans in West Africabut because 
of indigenous protests the outcome was not certain to be settled in favour 
of European interests. An understanding of the Atlantic slave trade MLISt 
take account of both European demand for slaves, (and of the European 
merchant interests in Europe and the Caribbean) as well as developments 
within indigenous African societies. The Atlantic slave trade was 
dependent upon the reproduction of slaves from the Guinea coast which 
was subject to internal constraints and conflicts. In assessing the 
multidimensional nature of the reasons for the Atlantic slave trade we 
must also not lose sight of the fact that the slave trade was a more 
profitable European business in itself. As one writer has said: "the 
slave trade was more than a means to an end it was also an end in 
itself" (1). The result was that British slave traders reaped the 
benefits of trading slaves not only to their own plantations but also 
to those of their competitors. 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were to witness the 
increased incorporation of the Guinea Coast into the demands of the 
economies of western Europe. This process had began earlier with the 
demand for gold but now the merchant classes in England and Holland, 
aided by help from the state, transported in excess of half a million 
(1) Ibid., p. 33. 
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Africans from the Gold Coast (1). 
British and Dutch state help for the slave trade came in the 
form of Royal Charters for two of the leading companies of this period, 
as well as the recognition of the need to maintain a monopoly of trade 
for these concerns. A monopoly of trade was essential to secure the 
maximum profitability from a trade which was based ultimately on buying 
commodities more cheaply than for which they. were sold. Although the 
eighteenth century saw the increased development of a dominant capitalist 
class in Europe, and this is translated increasingly into attempts to 
initiate agricultural-development on the Gold Coast, we cannot talk about 
the demise of overt merchant capital interests until the turn of the 
nineteenth century. As such, monopoly'remained the philosophy of the 
age allowing mercantilists greater security for their trade as the 
colonies were meant to supply their products to England with only 
English ships (2). 
National monopolisation of the slave trade was'most successful 
for the Dutch West Indian Company. This company had almost total Dutch 
control of the slave trade in the period between 1629 to the 1730's 
The terms of the West Indian Company Charter were for commercial monopoly 
in Africa and on the American shores of the Atlantic. Their administration 
on the Gold Coast was at Elmina which had been siezed from the Portuguese 
in 1637. 
The English participation in the slave trade had its. equivalent 
4, 
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(1) The period between 1761-1810 alone yielded 172,049 Africans shipped by 
British slave traders on the Gold Coast and 1675-1795,89,100 for the 
Dutch. See, Roger Anstey, The Volume and Profitability of the British 
Slave Trade, 1761-1.807', in, S. L. Engerman and E. D. Genovese, (editors), 
Race and S. lavery in the Western Hemisphere: Quantitative Studies (PrinceJ 
ToFn- 'Princeton University Press_, __T_975Tp. 13, see also, Jo-hannes p stma, 
'The Origins of the African Slaves: The Dutch Activitieson theGuinea Coasý 
1675-1795', in, S. L. Engerman and E. D. Genovese, (editors), op. cit. (2) E. Williams, op. cit., p. 56. 
of the West Indian Company in the Royal African Company. The latter 
was formed in 1672 following from the Company of Adventurers of London 
in Africa and the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa. All 
these companies had significant state and royal family backing for 
their exploits, and had considerable help from the political and 
economic climate resulting from the Glorious Revolution, the Ten Per 
Cent Act of 1698 and the Navigation Laws (1). 
The presence of two strong European companies on the coast posed' 
difficulties not only for the indigenous inhabitants but also for the 
respective Dutch and English traders. Both the Dutch and English 
traders became incensed at their competitors' incursions into what 
was seen as their own specific monopoly (2). 
Such was the conflict in 1707 that Sir Dalby Thomas, in charge 
of the Royal African Company operations at Cape Coast Castle, drafted a 
letter to the Dutch factor at Elmina calling for greater cooperation 
between the two companies in an attempt to maximise profitability: 
It will not be denied that if all the forts and lodges 
on this coast belong to one company it would be easy 
toýsubject the trade and people to its wishes. There- 
fore if both companies joined to subject the trade and 
people to the interests of both, then the two of them 
must take the same measures as if one of them had the 
coast alone; therefore in governing these people we 
must join together heartily and sincerely as if we 
were on land (3). 
This offer was not accepted because although the Dutch were also 
suffering from interloper competition they still saw the need for 
(1) See Chapter 2. The navigation laws were particularly directed at the 
Dutch and also to reduce the threat of an independent Scottish 
African Company developing. See Williams, op. cit., p. 56. 
(2) Colonial rivalry at this time and before is examined in Chapter 2 above., 
(3) FCN 37, 1701-1706, p. 235. 
With hindsight this rejection by traditional company monopolies. 
the Dutch was justified as the West Indian Company did not have its 
monopoly on the western side of the Gold Coast eroded until the 1730's. 
By 1702 the Dutch had almost totally depopulated Elmina from 12,000 to 
"a mere 1000"; the behaviour of their Factors had severely alienated 
the local inhibitants and as a result the transportation of slaves to 
the coast had slowed dow n (1). This traffic increased by 1705 but the 
period since 1700 had seen attempts by the Dutch to generate the 
development of plantation agriculture as an alternative source of 
revenue. These attempts were not implemented successfully but reflected 
a search for a form of-economic exploitation to either run parallel 
with, or displace the slave trade. They are in fact a foretaste of 
what was to be attempted on a large, scale. a hundred years later. 
A particular attempt to develop cotton and sugar cane was initiated 
by the West Indian Company in 1701 on the river banks near Chama 
Boutry and Axem. At first two hundred and fifty slaves were to be 
imported to work the project. but there is'little doubt that use of this 
labour was to hopefully infect the indigenous people with the desire 
to initiate their own crop production on a large scale: 
We may convince the natives, by our example, that 
the planting of cotton is profitable, and induce 
them to grow those plants to their own profit, because 
this work can only be profitable when done on a large 
scale; we will require an instrument like the mills 
which are in use on Curacao and other places in order 
to purify the cotton (2). 
(1) Letter, W. de la Palma to Ass. of X, Elmina, 26 June 1702 in 
A. van Dantzig', The Dutch and the Guinea Coast 1674-1742, 
(Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Science, 1978), p. M-. 
(2) W. de la Palma to Assistant of X, Elmina, 26 June 1702, quoted 
by van Dantzig, op. cit., p. 84. 
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Five years later there were English suggestions at developing the 
production of crops on the Gold Coast. This was. the idea to make 
use of Scotland's incorporation into the Union and the offer to 
Scottish families of quick gain overseas. The intention was not to 
involve Africans with the Olanting of crops but for the settlers to 
plant indigo, tobacco, and cotton. themselves. Moreover, these crops 
were not to be exported on their own behalf but the Royal African 
Company was to act as broker at moderate rates. The idea was for this 
influx of Europeans to act as a stabilising force for the Royal African 
Company. As the sub-Governor of the company said, the new Europeans 
would only be under obligation to act with the merchants "to suppress 
the insolences of the natives and to prevent any encroachment from 
the Dutch" (1). Suggestions like these, although not adopted until the 
end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
represent European schemes to try and reduce the harmful effects of their 
trade in slaves. The latter suffered periodc'ally throughout the 
eighteenth century because of internal conflicts and disagreements 
with the African merchants. Similarly the chartered companies could 
never quite deny themselves the chance of developing indigenous gold 
production or of directly mining it themselves. In 1706, for examples 
the Royal African Company suggested to Dalby Thomas that correct 
encouragement should be given to the natives to allow white men to 
help dig for gold, with the intention that long run profit might be 
similar to that gained by the Portuguese in Brazil (2). 
(1) Letter, Thomas Pinder, Sub-Governor R. A. C. to Sir Dalby Thomas, 
C. C. C. London 16.10.1706, FCTS, 1, p. 245. (2) Letter, RAC to Dalby Thomas-, -T. -C. C., London, 22.8.1706, in FCTS 
1, p. 243. It was noted that the Portuguese were gaining mo-r-e-than 
11 million a year through their exploits in*South America. 
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The Dutch too were concerned that trade in gold should not 
completely be eroded and that if the natives objected to the 
movement of the Dutch along the Ancober river, for the development 
of their own mineworkings, then defence installations should be 
built to protect the European miners. The Dutch wish to develop 
their own workings was to be disguised and that: 
All possible kinds of precaution should be 
taken that our true intention of mining nevqr 
be discovered, and it should always be said 
that our aim is to pursue our Trade with greater 
force (1). 
The desire to extract gold from the Gold Coast in this period was 
nevertheless subordinated to the demand for slaves*and it is likely 
that. the insecurity resulting from the turmoil of the slave trade 
also reduced the production of gold (2). 
The procedure for acquiring slaves would vary. Often 
transactions were through middlemen on the coast whose interest it 
was to maintain constant supplies of slaves at a high price. When 
dealings-were done direct with those who were trading the slaves, 
the hierarchical order through which the European buyers had to deal 
was very apparent: 
Before one is allowed to. start the trade, one is 
compelled to pay the King 720 lbý cowries customary 
duties, 200 lbs to the captains, and 30 to the 
town crierwho announces when the traders are allowed 
r 
(1) W. I. C. 42: Secret Papers Assembly of Ten 20 November 1720 in Van Dantzig 
0 C*t p. 215. See also pp. 184-185 and 196-197. 
(2) Al b, ert*hn Dantzig, . Effects of the Antlantic Slave Trade on Some West African Societies' , Revue Francaise D'Histoire D'Outre- 226-227,1975, p. 263. 
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to sell their slaves. Subsequently one negotiates 
the price with the King, Carte and Ago, but one 
should be careful to exclude from this price what 
is paid to the King and the two aforesaid Captains, 
because to them one has always to give more than 
to the private traders; i. e. to the King 120 and 
to the Captains 100 lbs cowries (per slave) .. Jý first one has to agree with them about the nu&r 
they will furnish for that high price, because 
otherwise they will buy all the slaves from the 
private (persons). Furthermore, one has to pay 
120 lbs cowries "for the tronk" (slave camp) with 
which they guarantee that the slaves will not run 
away. One has also to pay (the value of) one 
slave for the interpreter, before he is willing 
to announce your desires to the King, one dito 
for the watchman who receives and guards the goods 
when they are brought ashore, and 400 lbs cowries 
for the carryi*ng of the goods from each ship (1). 
From 1720 onwards. the West Indian Company suffered increasing 
encroachment from interlopers on the Slave Coast and trade was 
further disrupted by the rise of the Dahomean state (2). This 
made trade more important on the Gold Coast as a source for slaves (3). 
Problems of maintaining a monopoly of trade were also present on'-the 
Gold Coast. Indeed, the competition for slaves increased the price 
above that which the West Indian. Company saw itself able to pay. 
The result was that for a short time the West Indian Company sought 
its revenue by taxing the interlopers that it could catch. -These 
were especially Portuguese and Brazilian ships carrying Brazilian 
gold, indigo cotton and tobacco for which the Dutch later sought 
Encl 4: "Short information about the manner of slave trade during 
the two and a half years that I have taken care of it" by J. Van 
den Broucke, 10 November 1705, quoted in Van Dantzig (1978), 
op, cl t"p. 124. 
(2) To-rt, -Fe geography of the region see map on page xvi. 
(3) Postma, o* cit " p. 36, where the point is made that by the 1740's, the Win wa ast had superceded the Gold Coast as a market for 
slaves. 
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to exchange slaves (1 ). 
Eventually, the Dutch West Indian Company having already been 
iý reduced for many years to trade with whosoever it could, received 
official notification that its monopoly on the coast had been dissolved 
and the company was now officially directed: 
to buy goods and acceptable slaves, and to sell them 
at liberty to either Dutch or French or English ships 
and to store trade goods acquired for them in their 
store houses, using those goods again for their trade (2). 
Partly as a result of this, other Dutch companies developed on the 
Guinea Coast like the Middlesburgsche Commercial Compagnie and 
Coopstad and Rochnsen. In this 'free trade' period the Gold Coast, 
and in particular Elmind, accounted for about 40% of all Dutch Free 
Trade purchases including those of the Slave Coast. This figure, 
however, does not include those slaves which passed through small 
trading stations at Akim, Shama, ' Kormantin and Accra (3). 
By 1730, it was recognised that the Gold Coast had become 
almost exclusively a focus for slave trading. At the same time 
increasing unrest within the territory *was making the prosecution of 
trade, in anything apart from slaves, extremely difficult and 
even the slave trade was hindered by the proliferation of inland 
wars precipitated by: "the great quantity of guns and powder which 
the Europeans have brought there" (4). 
(1) W. I. C. 41: Secret Minute, Ass of Ten, 3 December 1712, in 
Van Dantzig, (1978) op-cit., pp. 161-62, also, ibid., p. 1ý2. (2) NBKG Journal 2 May i7qU-IýnVan Dantzig, (1978), - ý. cit., p. 351. 
(3) Postma, op. cit., pp. 37-40. 
(4) ARA 
' 
Rade'macher Archives number 596; extracts from the minutes of 
the meeting of the Directors of the Chamber Zeeland held 7 February 
1730,. in, Van Dantzig, (1978), op. cit., p. 240. 
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Triangular trade is the name given to the activities of mainly A. 
British merchants who sold goods produced in British colonies to 
West Africa. These goods were then exchanged for slaves on the Gold 
Coast and the slaves transported to work on the Caribbean sugar 
plantations. The produce of the plantations was then transported to 
England thus completing the triangle. The Royal African Company wrote 
to Dalby Thomas in 1706 explaining that the company wanted a quicker 
despatch of negroes to Barbados and Jamaica and the Company in London 
would satisfy the increased demand for goods on the West African 
Coast (1). This was a lucrative bqsiness. for each cargo of six hundred 
Africans carried across the Atlantic resulted in a 100% mark up of the 
original 16,000 cargo shipped from England to West Africa (2). 1 
The extent to which the triangular trade aided British industrial 
development is a contentious issue (3). In trying to work out such a 
calculation it is wrong to debate the possible profitability acquired 
by merchants in the slave trade, withOLit locating the significance of 
slave latour to the triangular trade as a whole (4). In doing the 
latter not only are merchants' interests in the Caribbean recognised 
but so too is, ' the fact of the added input that the two. Atlantic legs of 
(1) FCNS, II, RAC to Dalby Thomas, C. C. C., 22 August 1706. 
(2) Tpi-d. 
(3) Tee-, inter alia; E. Williams op. cl 
(4) Anstey assumes the profitabiii-ty-of the slave trade can be 
*t 
calculated without broader discussion of the trade as a whole.. 
This is implicit in his calculation, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
See also the complicated workings of H. Gemery and 
J. Hogendorn, 'The Economic Costs of West African Participation 
in the Atlantic Slave Trade. A preliminary sampling for the 
Eighteenth Century', in, Gemery and Hogendorn, (editors), 
(1975a), op. cit. 
0 So 
;'A, the trade had for promotion of trade in England, in wool, cotton, the 11: 1 
ref i ni ng of sugar and the devel opment of metal 1 urgi cal i ndustri es (1 )- 
Indeed: 
By 1750 there was hardly a trading or a manufacturing 
tovin in England which was noti nsome way connected 
with the triangular or direct colonidl trade (2). 
The importance of this trade was not lost on the members of 
the companies resident on the coast. They kept up a continual barrage 
of demands to the Royal African Ccmpany in London for additional 
supplies and firearms to satisfy what was thought to be an insatiable 
African demand for products: 
If the Trade of Africa is to be carried on in 
earnest Forts and Castles must be increaseTas 
the-Dut-ch increase, and I how is it to be done7y a 
Company 5-at-'F-asno Stock and whose body consiýts 
of separate interests: people who will trade no 
longer than profit attends them ... (3). 
Common to the wares taken to the Gold Coast in exchange for 
slaves were cotton and linen goods, silk handkerchiefs, copper kettles 
and hardware of all descriptions together with guns, powder and shot. 
The trade in guns proved profitable for the Royal African 
Company which had the support of the London gun makers and the latter's 
eagerness for the former's monopoly of trade, between 1700 and 1710 to 
continue. The Birmingham gun merchants, however, preferred the 
advantages to be gained from a broader distribution of their products 
(1) Williams op. cit , pp. 51-84. This ignores the increase in banking 
and shipUlding 
ýctivities 
and the vessels needed to carry Africans 
to the Caribbean. Exports from Britain to West Africa alone in the 
eighteenth century rose by 100% between 1701-1712 (176,750 p. a. ) to 
1794,580 between 1793-1800, see, David Richardson, 'West African Con- 1, 
sumption Patterns and their influence on the Eighteenth Century Englishl 
Slave Trade', in, Gemery and Hogendorn, (editors), (1975a), op. cit., p. 305-1, 
(2) Williams o t., D. 52. 
(3) FUSIlLeýter* .. O. C. 
*to RAC 26*Novembe'r 1709, p. 102. 
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and consequently fought to reduce the Company's monopoly (1). Guns 
were not solely used for the capture of slaves by internal Akan groups, 
but the result of regular strategic (political) warfare was often the 
4ncreased accumulation of slave labour (2). The increased demands 
for captives on the coast nevertheless acted as a fillip to the number 
of raiding activities ensuring that: 
slave supply was enhanced since conquered provinces and 
tributary states were expected to provide annual slave 
quotas to the central government (3). 
Slave raiding parties tended now to use infantry groups in 
their predatory pursuits when it was a matter of seizing captives 
alive (4). The case on the coast, however, was different. Here, 
where large armies were not the norm, it was often the practice to 
encourage regular wars paying for thE! captives with imported-European 
firearms. 
To sum up., the people of the Gold Coast were incorporated 
increasingly into a series of dominant European economies which 
demanded slaves on the West African littoral, in exchange for wares 
from Britain. The slaves were then transported across the Atlantic 
to work on sugar plantations in the Caribben and North America. The 
produce was later transported to Europe to enhance the development 
of merchant and capitalist interests. 
As the eighteenth century progressed incorporation of the Gold 
(1) This example of conflict over the desirability of monopoly demands 
was a foretaste of increasing disquiet and unrest between different 
sections of merchants and 'capitalist' producers about the benefits 
to be 
, accrued 
from foreign trade. 
(2) Van Dantzig, (1975) op-cit., p. 262. 
(3) P. E.. Lovejoy and J. L-To-gendorn, 'Slave marketing in West Africa,, in, 
H. A. Gemery and J.. Hogendorn, (editors) (1975aý op. cit., p. 223. 
(4) Ibid., p. 262. 
.1 
20E. 
Coast into the world economy increased but the vehicles for this 
incorporation changed (1). From 1750, 'An Act for Extending and 
Improving the Trade to Africa (2) opened the English trade in Africa 
to all English subjects to be organised by the Company of Merchants 
Trading to Africa. The Royal African Company and its previous monopoly 
was dissolved and the responsibility for maintaining the Gold Coast 
establishments was left to a committee of nine people chosen annually (3). 
The development of this new arrangement for. trade on the Gold Coast 
opened the way for more and more interlopers and hence greater 
competition. The Company of Merchants trading to Africa failed to 
prevent what was becoming the inexorable slide of the West African 
trade to a more open and less controlled commercial activity. 
Independent traders from Liverpool and the West Indies were less 
guarded in their slave dealings on the coast than the representatives 
of the Royal African Company had been, and for at least two years 
the old and the new Company traded side by side. 
The limitation that the new company should only trade with 
Portugal on the coast was violently opposed (4). Perhaps the greatest 
difference resulting from this opening of trade, however, was a 
conflict between the company officials resident in England and those 
trading in Africa. The latter could carry on private trade while the 
former could not, This caused a great deal of animosity and abuse 
(1) The forr.. i of incorporation changed following heightened debates in 
European countries of the role of competition and monopoly as the 
most profitable way to increase returns from the colonies. See, the 
first part of Chapter 4. 
(2) Donnan, op. cit., Vol .1, p. 474. (3) Ibid., pp. 474-475, also, E. C. Martin, The British West Africa Settle- 
ments, 1750-1821, Imperial Studies No. 2, (London: Longmanl927), pp. 8-14. 
(4) Donnan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. x1ii. 
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from those resident on the coast. A large source of conflict 
persisted between the merchants of the cities involved in the trade 
in England. The centres of commerce in Bristol, Liverpool and London 
were continually vying for greater participation in the trade to Africa, 
and some members were calling for the development of a new Joint Stock 
Company for this purpose (1). The complaints about the organisation 
of trade on the Gold Coast and its repercussions for the demise of 
profit were raised again at the end of the eighteenth century following 
the influx of trade goods by Rhode Island merchants. It was now: 
... alleged that this depression in profits was 
due 
to the rising prices of slaves on the Gold Coast which 
were attributed in turn to disruptions in the flow of 
slave supplies to the coast, changes in the character 
of the gold trade and the illegal dealings of factors 
residing at the forts of the company of merchants 
trading to Africa (2). 
Increased competition on the Gold Coast for the attention of 
African merchants trading in slaves together with the underhand 
practices of those in charge of trading estabishments on the coast, were 
now compounded by a heightened degree of conflict between mercantilists 
and manufacturing interests in England (3). We can now assess the 
impact on the Akan of the Dutch, English and interloper trade for 
slaves on the Gold Ccast in the light of our examination of Asante 
state formation. 
(b) The Impact of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
It is very difficult to fully assess the impact of the trans- 
There were, of course, additional', obstacles to the furtherence of the 
slave trade. like for example, English wars with the French and 
Spanish in 1744 and 1748. 
(2) D. Richardson, op. cit., p. 326. 
(3) This is looked at in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Atlantic slave trade on the Akan people of the Gold Coast. In part 
this is because of the need to situate the trade within the broader 
sociopolitical context of the development of the Asante Union, and in 
part it is also because of the lack of documentary evidence with which 
to achieve this. 
We have dealt here less with the accounting issues involved in 
judging the number of slaves transported across the Atlantic, a'nd more 
with the Atlantic slave trade. as a further vehicle for the incorporation 
of the Gold Coast into a growing international world economy. Moreover, 
we have not looked at the Atlantic slave trade in isolation from the 
presence of indigenous slavery in Asante, and the power positions within 
the polity stemming from differential access to the surplus which 
accrued from this source of labour. It is now established: 
that slavery and slave trade existed in West Africa 
... before the fifteenth century and that much 
earlier slaves were already transported far from 
their place of origin (1). 
We reject the thesis that slavery on the Gold Coast was solely the 
result of an external demand for slaves. The development of a 
plantation economy in the Caribbean and North America and, the shortage. 
of a labour force there, prcmpted Europeans to use slave labOLr 
transported from West Africa. The availability of the slaves from 
the Gold Coast, however, largely depended upon indigenous reproduction 
cf unfree labourers and the interplay between indigenous power holders 
and their European merchant counterparts. 
By suggesting that forms of slavery existed before the onset 
(1 ) Van Dantzig, (1975), op. cit., p. 254. 
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of European contact on the Gold Coast we do not argue that a priori 
the indigenous Akan social formation was transformed by the Atlantic 
slave trade (1). Indeed, in talking about the hundred year period 
cf the Gold Coast's history, ca. 1700-1800, it is essential to show 
that the internal organisation of production was geared towards, and 
power structures were largely dependent upon, forms of unfree labour. 
The domestic and slave modes of prodL; Ction in the Akan social formation 
could facilitate the extra production of slaves when the demand so 
arose. In itself the development of the Atlantic slave trade did not 
immediately and qualitatively transform indigenous relations of 
production. The transformatory nature of European contact on the Gold 
Coast only became. apparent as the Atlantic slave trade intensified, 
and began to impose such quantitative (non structural) demands on the 
Akan that they eventually led to qualitative changes in the structure 
of power in Asante (2). There were, however, two areas where the 
Atlantic slave trade had some impact upon indigenous modes of prodVction 
and we can, in conclusion, look at these briefly. 
(i ) Warfare 
The accumulation of slaves in addition to the reproduction of 
existing stocks could only be facilitated by capture. The majority 
(1) This is the thrust of Walter Rodney's account of the history of the 
Upper Guinea Coast. See, inter alia his, 'Gold and Slaves on the Gold 
Coast', Transactions of th-eff'ist'orical Society of Ghana, 10,1969, and 
'African slavery and other forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinei 
Coast in the Context of the Atlantic Slave Trade', JAH, 3,1966. 
(2) These are detailed in the following chapters and to-g-et-her with 
processes of corrmditisatior. of land and labour form the basis of 
chapters 5 and 6 below. For a discussion of the resilience of 'lineage' 
(pre-capitalist modes of production) to the incursion of capitalism, sel 
P-P Rey, Colonialism, neo colonialism et transition au capitalisme, 
(Paris: Maspero, 1971), also his 'Historical materialism and Class 
Strucgles (Materialism historique et luttes de classes) Mimeo, n. d. Th 
work of Rey is also discussed in Anthony Brewer, Marxisi _tFeories of 
Imperialism. A critic, -l survey, (London: Routledge and Kegan Pau 80 
Rey's iaeas contrast markedly with those of Rodney on the impact of 
capitalism on pre-capitalist societies. 
zols. 
of slaves in the eighteeenth century were of this latter type. If 
they were not captured through warfare then they were certainly the 
product of a previous war between the Asante Union and other territories, 
and came into the possession of the Asantehene and COL: ncil of elders 
as tribute. 
Warfare became increasingly common during the eighteenth century 
in the Asante region where the power of enslaving societies over those 
enslaved was enhanced by the influx of European firearms. We have 
already seen that the influx of guns increased tension and internal 
unrest within the Akan areas of the Gold Coast. It was observed that 
the possibility of wealth accruing to Asante's through warfare 
reduced their previous enthusiasm for the mining of gold. This 
recognition by European traders as the Atlantic: slave trade increased, 
that the imported goods were partly transforming the nature of indigencus 
production activities, was soon seized upon and advantage taken. For 
example, in 1749, the West Indian Company reported to Amsterdam that 
the Asante King involved in disputes with his chiefs, was not 
maintaining the open trade routes especially with the people of Wassa. 
This was not too detrimental to Dutch trade for thE-- Dutch 'Factor' was 
able to satisfy his slave requirements from those displaced by internal 
troubles caused by Wassa's disputes with its neighbours (1). 
These disputes and wars created depopulated areas where villages 
that had been attacked for their labour often simply disappeared. If the 
village remained, community life was totally disrupted with the creation 
of a shortage in labour supply often resulting in chronic food shortages 
(1 ) FC N46,1747-1750, pp. 20-21 . 
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and insecurity. Depopulation, however, was not felt everywhere for: 
The slave trade not only led to the de-population 
of certain areas it led also to the concentratior. 
of population in others (1). 
(i i) Concentration of Wealth 
The European demand for slaves thus increased the numbers of 
internal conflicts within the, GUinea hinterland. A further effect, 
generated by the interrelationship of changing Europeandemand for 
slaves and the already existing- slave relations of production in 
Asante, was an enhancing and added fillip to the concentration of 
wealth into the hands of the chiefs and military aristocracies of 
Asante. 
The Asante chiefs had already established themselves as power 
holders of a union baseý upon the politico-ideological paraphenalia of 
the original state builders Osei Tutu and KomfoAnotche. The basis 
for these accoutriments of state was the position of chiefs as 
exploiters of slave labour and the labour of commoners. With the 
advent of the slave trade, and the possibility of slaves for sale, 
there wasnow an added dimension to the possibility for accumulating 
wealth. This presented itself in the use of slaves as objects of 
exchange value as well as for the production of exchange value rcalised 
on the markets of long distance trade. 
Van Dantzig, (1975), op. cit., p. 266. Food shortages often resulted 
in people's 'voluntarý7'---enslavement by sale to Europeans to be able 
to provide sufficient food for their families, see ibid. It is 
wrong to invoke a neoclassical notion that it was o-n-T-ythose people 
who were 'surplus' to indigenous requirements that were thE: products 
of slave raiding parties. See J. D. Fage, 'Slave and the Slave Trade 
in thE context of West African History', JAH, 10,3,1969, and 
C. C. 1-1rigley's seeming agreement in, 'Hi-ýtoricism in Africa Slavery 
and State Formation', African Affairs, 70,1971, p. 114. 
Zu 
v CONCLUSION 
The foregoing has offered what can only be a partial and 
selective review of the period of eighteenth century Akan developments. 
We have not documented the intricacies of the Atlantic slave trade but 
have tried to show the need for en integrated analysis of the period 
which combines internal developments, especially the formation of the 
Asante state, with the new phase and form of European merchant contact 
on the Coast. 
Our analysis has shown that the eighteenth century phase of 
European merchant expansion locked the people of the Gold Coast 
-increasingly into a system of tradd which was to enhance, and 
later 
undermine, indigenous relations of production and that the nature of 
the trade changed as well as intensified. 
Gold production in the Asante region fell, to be replaced as 
the major export commodity by African slavery. In the process the 
ruling class of elders and chiefs in Asante increased their position 
of power which had ddVeloped since the end of the seventeenth century. 
The class position of chiefs and elders was based upon the exploitation 
of comrmners and slave labour, together wi-th the sale of gold and slaves 
through long distance trade to' the coast. Both practices of trading 
slaves and gold had existed previously, mainly to the north across the 
Sahara, but now the wealthy aristocracies took advantage of the added 
demand for slaves by Europeans on the coast. 
At the time that the eariy Akan relations of production were 
enhanced they were also undermined, albeit less tangibly, by the 
consolidation of the processes. of merchant capital incursion on thE: 
Gold Coast. By this we mean the production activities of the Akan 
21Z 
groups became subordinated to, but also conserved by, the interests 
of European merchant demands. This was the forerunner of later neo- 
colonialism in politically independent Ghana where: 
The rulers of West African states were transformed 
into the comprador class of European capitalism in 
the era when the system literally demanded flesh and 
blood from Africa (1). 
This does not mean that the Akan already had prescribed for 
them their every activity (2). Rather, the interests of merchant 
capital, which in the eighteenth century were firmly set on the 
development of the Caribbean with African labour, were too strong for 
the African to resist. Indeed, our analysis here of the processes of 
change in the Gold Coast, between ca. 1700-1800, has shown that to 
achieve a fuller understanding of the impact of encroaching European 
eemand for slaves, we need to recognise the internal composition of 
the Akan social formation. For example, by examining . Asante state 
formation we have highlighted thE- importance of indigenous domestic 
and plantation slavery to the production, and reproduction of the Akan. 
This examination of Asante state formation has served two further 
functions. First, we have stressed the hierarchical nature of the 
power structure in Asante, and we have suggested that the basis upon 
which the Asante powerholders maintained their positions of dominance was 
by appropriating the surplus labour of slaves and commoners. Second, 
our emphasis on the role of unfree labour in Asante has suggested 
that initial relations of production and reproduction existed within 
(1) Rodney, * (1966) '0p. cit., p. 22. (2) Such a deterministic point is not made here. There is, for 
example, considerable indigenous opposition to the international 
slave trade because of the harm it was seen to cause; see, 
Basil Davidson, et al, op. c-it.,, pp. 284-286. 
A 
the Akan social formation from which European slave traders Could 
take advantage. The Atlantic slave trade in our aralysis is not an 
episode of history determined solely by European demands for slaves 
to work in America. -Instead, the Atlantic slave trade. and the shift 
from European demand for gold to the demand for slaves, is eyplained 
by the interaction and outcome of internal and external processes 
associated with colonial transformation on the Gold Coast. 
We can now look at the impact which the intensification and 
then decline of the Atlantic slave trade had for the Asante. We can 
do this by examining ýhe transition from a European informal colonialism, 
based upon the buying cheap and selling dear of products on the coast, 
to European colonial attempts at initiating indigenous production of 
commodities in the period of t he nineteenth century, euphemistically 
called the period of 'legitimate trade'. 
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CHAPTERF0UR 
'LEGITIMATE' TRADE AND THE TRANSITION TO 
FORMAL COLONIALISM ca. 1807-1874 
INTRODUCTION 
In examining further the integration of the Gold Coast into the 
international economies of western Europe and north America we are 
confronted in the nineteenth century with the political watershed of 
colonial rule. We examine in this chapter, some of the reasons which 
necessitate the change in direction of the colonial states' policy 
towards the Gold Coast and why formal colonialism is finally adopteýd 
as a strategy for continued British presence in the territory. 
The process of incorporation of the Gold Coast in the 
nineteenth century is significant for the transforamtion of the 
territory into one dependent increasingly upon the export of 'natural' 
forest produce compared with the earlier eighteenth century demands 
for slaves. lie review briefly what became known as legitimate trade (1) 
both in its meaning as commerce and the exchange with Europeans of 
products produced inlandand in the sense that trade increasingly 
involved new forms of indigenous productive activities which were 
encouraged by traders on the littoral. 
Later in the chapter we examine the forms which British 
colonialism took in its interaction with indigenous social formations 
and in turn the changes which the Akan experienced. How did the 
Asante respond to the decline in the slave trade for instance? And 
(1) See especially, A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa. (London: Longman, 1973), E. Reynolds, Trade and Economic Change 
on the Gold Coast 1807-1874, (London: Longman, 1974b). 
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did the increased demand for cash crops change the lifestyles and 
relations between power holders and commoners within Asante? 
II FORMAL COLONIALISM 
The transition from informal to formal British colonial 
rule on the Gold Coast occurred in the nineteenth century. The 
territory south of Asante became known as the Gold Coast Colony in 
1874 but de facto colonial control was exercised much earlier. It is 
this form of colonial control that we are first going to examine and 
its link with the processes of legitimate trade. Before we do this 
we need to make an important theoretical point. This relates to the 
issues raised in our discussion above about the nature and impact on 
the Akan of European merchant capital on the Gold Coast (1). We have 
ýpoken specifically in terns of the impact being determined by the 
demand for different produce in the colony. We have examined the 
demand for gold and later for slaves which led us to an understanding 
of how these "commodities" were produced in the indigenous social 
formation. It is possible in the nineteenth century, like the period 
up to 1807, to periodise the- nature of British colonial control on the 
Gold Coast by the kind of produce which it sought to exploit and profit 
by on its sale in Europe and elsewhere. The first half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed the switch by British merchants from demanding slaves 
to work in the plantations of the West Indies to demanding cash crops, 
notably palm oil, which could be used to sustain economic development 
in Europe. This way of understanding the impact of British colonialism 
on the Gold Coast adds further specificity to our principal form of 
(1) For a fuller discussion of merchant capital see Chapter Two. 
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characterising European contact through the transition of merchant 
to industrial capital. The nineteenth century marked the consolidation 
of capitalist development in Britain and witnessed the transition from 
the dominance of mercantilism to that of industrial capital. Because 
of this transition in Europe, there was a tendency for trading on the 
coast to become dominated less by the dynamics of merchant capital and 
more by the requirements of industrial capital. 
We see below (1) what many of these new requirements involved 
on'the Gold Coast: inter alia, the use by Europeans increasingly of free 
wage labour, greater access by colonialists to indigenous land resulting 
in its commoditisation, the spread of cash nexus and so on. The 
nineteenth century marks the early beginning of the transition of an 
economy characterised by these processes and the increased presence 
and investment by Europeans of fixed capital on the Gold Coast in plant 
and machinery. This investment sought to facilitate the cheap supply 
of raw materials and food for a growing demand in Britain while at the 
same time develop a market on the Gold Coast for European manufactured 
goods. These developments contrast with a previous European concern 
of simply buying commodities from Africans more cheaply than the price 
for which they were eventually sold. 
This latter form of trading continued, however, and was 
eventually extended with the use of monopoly powers by the merchants 
which allowed them to depress the prices paid to producers of commodities 
for export and to raise the prices of the items of import. Simultaneously 
there was increasingly the transition to forms of capitalist production. 
This process was slow and piecemeal and arguably its incompleteness is 
(1) Chapters Five and Six. 
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a measure of the persistant underdevelopment of Ghana's political 
economy (1). 
As merchant capital had been the partial initiator of 
productive capital in Europe so Kay is probably right in arguing that 
it continued to be the agency through which newly hegemonic productive 
capital operated on the Gold Coast (2). As the nineteenth century 
progressed, this form of colonial expansion through merchant capital 
changed. Merchant capital, the trading of commodities in the realm 
of circulation rather than the active engagement by the merchant in 
transforming the way products were produced, gave way more and more 
to the direct intervention by Europeans in the production of African 
commodities, including the natural produce of the forest region. 
The earlier detachment of European merchant capital from the 
productive process lay in, amongst other things, the more profitable 
activities in the realm of circulation. This point is especially 
born out by the persistence of long distance trade in commodities with 
a particular high value and low bulk to weight ratio. As long as new 
lines of trade could be found, adequately secured by early British 
colonial adventurers, the dominance of merchant capital and the 
reluctance of merchants to become involved with investments in 
production itself continued (3). As the phase of the carving up of 
the territories of the world among the colonial powers grew to a 
(1) See G. Kay, Development and Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1977) 
and S. B. D. d-e-Tilva, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul , in association with the Institute 
of South East Asian Studies, Singapore 1982). 
(2) See, G. Kay op. cit., compare the point made by de Silva op. cit., 
that in England the capitalist industrial revolution had 
ýeeý initiated 
by the accumulation of capital by merchants and the role that this clas 
played in concentrating wealth with profits gained through speculation 
, and usury. 
Much of this wealth was directed as credit to producers. 
For example, the Manchester Cotton Industry in the sixteenth century 
depended upon credit given by Irish merchants, p. 417. 
(3) de Silva, op. cit., p. 419. 
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close at the end of the nineteenth century the way in which European 
commercial gain was secured from the occupied territories had already 
begun to shift. From the period of purchasing slaves cheaply, and 
selling them more dearly in the Caribbean, West African merchants 
were forced to trade in 'legitimate' commodities. The latter were of 
increasing use to European economies in need of raw materials to fuel 
capitalist expansion. The increased dominance of productive capital 
in Europe was slowly transported to West Africa where colonial interests 
became focussed upon the exploitation of gold once again but this 
time through the establishment of European mining operations. Together 
with the interventions in the production of gold through concessions 
there also occurred the encouragement of cash crops through attempts 
at developing plantations. As one writer has recently commented: 
Industrial capital comes into its own when the 
extensive forms of growth which merchant capital 
fosters are superceded by investment in depth (1). 
These introductory comments serve two functions. First they 
reiterate the two ways in which we are seeking to understand colonial 
transformation on the Gold Coast. This is first through recognising 
the types of product colonialists demanded, which leads us to an 
analysis of the way in which the products were produced and whether 
colonial contact necessitated any change in the way that they were 
produced. Second, we understand the development from informal to 
formal colonialism by periodising expansion from Europe in terms of 
the transition from merchant capital to industrial capital and its 
effect upon the Akan social formation. Our brief assessment of the 
transition from merchant to industrial capital is crucial to our 
(1) Ibid, p. 421. 
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understanding of the so called pragmatic approach of British 
foreign policy in the nineteenth century (1) and provides the second 
reason for these introductory remarks. It is only by understanding 
the changing balance of class forces within the British state in the 
nineteenth century that we can understand more fully the repeated 
calls for the abandonment of Britain's Gold Coast possessions and the 
stronger interests for the maintenance of colonial interests in this 
part of West Africa (2). 
We talk later specifically about the nature of British 
investment in the colony and attempts to initiate a clearer pattern 
of production in the colony for the markets of western Europe (3). 
The process of cash crop production, however, predated the renewed 
British interest in gold mining in the area. Before we look at the 
development of legitimate trade we can now try and unravel the reasons 
for the creeping expanded jurisdiction of the British merchants and 
imperial government on the coast. We make this assessment before we 
examine the specifics of legitimate trade, because to do so is to 
situate the much documented economic expansion of trade between Africa 
and Europe within a framework of changing class interests in Britain (4). 
(1) See Abu Boahen, I Politics in Ghana 1800-1W, in, J. F. A. Ajayi and 
M. Crowder (editors), History of West Africa, vol. 2 (London: 
Longman Group Ltd, 197TT-. 
(2) We do not have the space here to discuss in detail the class compositic 
of the British nineteenth century state and the way it articulated 
interests of industrial capital over those of mercantilism. The follow- 
ing section will, however, show that 'traditional' historical accounts 
of the 'muddle' and 'confusion' of British imperial policy at this 
time did not reflect the pragmatism of British policy makers but a 
conflict of interests between different classes in Britain. For tradi- 
tional views of colonial policy see, D. Kimble, A Political History of 
Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism 1850-1928, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1963), A. Boahen op_. cit., Peter Mathias, The First 
Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain l700-19TT_, _T_Lon on: 
Methuen and Co Ltd 1974). Contrast these accounts witF-C-. -Tobsbawm, 
Industry and Empire (London: Penguin 1968). 
(3) Chapters 5 and 6. 
(4) The analysis'of indigenous Gold Coast class relations is the focus 
for the second half of this chapter. 
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Direct responsibility for British possessions on the coast changed 
hands four times in forty years. This gives an indication of the three 
fold series of conflicts which helped shape Britain's foreign 'policy' 
at this time. These were the conflicts between, landed and developing 
capitalist interests in Britain, merchants on the coast and Members of 
Parliament in Britain and the conflicts of interests between indigenous 
African producers and European merchants. A review of this period is 
essential to examine the earliest moves of legitimating British 
control of the territory which they occupied on the coast and is a fore- 
runner to the later consolidation of the colony. 
(a) Early Expansion of British Jurisdiction 
We dealt in an earlier chapter (1) with the development of 
mercantilism in Britain and the removal of feudal barriers to the 
accumulation of capital. The active involvement of the nineteenth 
century state in the-British political economy was modified, at least 
on the surface, from its seventeenth to eighteenth century position. 
The nineteenth century. was the period of laissez faire in Britain, 
the period of free trade and minimum government interference in the 
economy. This did not, and cannot mean that the British state abstained 
from any involvement in the development of industrial capitalism and 
the ascendency of Britain by 1352 to the position of 'workshop of the 
world'. It mus t now be commonplace that all governments influence 
economic life (2). 
The ethos of 'laissez faire' in nineteenth century Britain can 
better be understood as providing the dominant interests represented 
(1) Chapter 2. 
(2) This is even recognised by modern day monetarists who use the 
state to try and create the perfect market conditions. 
222 
in the apparatus of the state, with a framework for ensuring the 
best conditions for capitalist development. The first half of the 
nineteenth century saw the British state providing the conditions for 
an "essentially self regulating and self expanding system" (1). The 
priority of the British state at the turn of the nineteenth century 
was to thus create the conditions for industrial capitalist development. 
These conditions were not fully secured until the abolition of the 
Corn Laws in 1848 (2). The protectionism which these laws established 
for landed interests in Britain, reflected the still hegemonic position 
of agriculture over industry in the years which immediately followed 
the Napoleonic Wars. Tile ascendency of an industrial middle class 
with interests opposed to the artificially high prices of food stuffs 
led to the erosion of policies formally associated with the age of 
mercantilism. The period of mercantilism, as we have seen was one 
where the state fostered 'national' wealth. The nineteenth century 
state was still to regulate the economy but this was often done in an 
uneven manner - reflecting among other things the persistende of 
conflicts of interest between different factions of industrial and 
landed capital. Britain, for example, was the only country where the 
state at this formative period of industrial capitalist development, 
refused any fiscal protection to national industry (3). 
The conflicts between landed interests and those of industry 
and the questions surrounding a state policy of laissez faire had a 
number of consequences for the way in which representatives of the 
(1 ) Hobsbawm, op. cit. , p. 191 . (2) Ibid, Chap-te-r-Tand 12. 
(3) Tb-i7, p. 197. Bri tai n was al so the only country where the government 
J77not build or help finance any part of the railway network. Two 
crucial areas of state involvement however, during this period of so- 
called 'laissez faire' occurred in taxation and currency regulation. 
2-23 
British state viewed Britain's colonial possessions. Indeed, the 
constant changi ng of the Bri ti sh possessi ons on the Gol d Coast in the 
first half of the nineteenth century can only-be understood with the 
knowledge of the conflicting and competing class interests in Britain. 
For example, there was in the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century, a dissatisfaction among emerging businessmen in Britain, with 
the persistance of monopoly trading powers by British companies on the 
Gold Coast. Such a practice was notin line with laissez faire and it 
was seen as necessary, perhaps ironically, for the government to 
intervene and take affairs out of the hands of the company. It was to 
be another fifty years, after the 1820's, before the British government 
finally established the Gold Coast colony and with it a colonial state. 
Already, however, a developing bourgeoisie in Britain reflecting 
industrial interests voiced strong concern thattrade with the Gold 
Coast be put on a secure and open footing without the hitherto 
obstructive company monopolies. 
The abolition of the slave trade had rendered illegal 
approximately nine-tenths of the trade carried out by the British 
company of Merchants Trading to Africa (1). Representatives of the 
latter at this time had managed to prevail upon the British government 
to keep British forts on the Gold Coast. Promoters of abolition saw 
the need to actively pursue British trading interests in I-Jest Africa 
now that the export of slaves was illegal. But what was the basis on 
which this new trade was to be organised? What kind of exchange of 
commodities and what direct European participation in production was 
See Chapter 2 above for the development of British trading 
companies on the coast. 
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to be involved? For the Governor of Sierra Leone and a member of 
the Anti Slavery Society: 
The forts on the Gold Coast, if properly employed 
might be made very important engines of oromotinq 
the mutual benefit of Great Britain and Africa (i). 
Talking more generally about the West African coast the same person 
saw the need for British representatives to inform chiefs of: 
the advantages from cultivating white instead of 
the red rice, because in that case a vent might 
be easily obtained for their surplus produce ... 
either in Great Britain or in the West Indies (2). 
The shift to this new fo, rm of European trade and contact with 
the Gold Coast where the focus was on encouraging the African 
population to grow crops for export, was gradual and uneven. This 
was partly-because of the shifting balance of class forces which 
affected British governments' attitudes but also because of indigenous 
African conflicts in the Gold Coast itself. For the moment, the 
Company traders won the day while a government commission was appointed 
to assess future trading prospects. The commission recognised a complaint 
by the merchants about the demise of the latters' livelihood. As a 
result the salaries of trading representatives on the coast were 
increased twofold. There was an overall increase in the British grant 
to the territory from 113,431 to 123,000 per annum. 
British government reports in 1811 and 1816-1817 which examined 
British merchants' activities on the coast were highly critical of the 
(1) Zachary Mecaulay to Lord Castlereagh, 8 May 1807, document 2 quoted 
in G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, Documents of Ghana History, 
1807-1957, (London: Thomas Nelso Sons Ltd, 1964), p. 6. 
(2) I7U-., -'Ma-caulay also suggested the possibility of cultivating indigo, 
cotton and coffee, p. 5. 
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way in which merchants carried out their trading activities. 
Moreover, they were surprised to see that the slave trade continued 
most notably by the Portuguese and Dutch traders (1). The Select 
Committees on African Ports of 1816-17 concluded that British 
interests should continue on the coast because of the need to 
instruct and improve the lot of the natives. This had not been 
accomplished hitherto by the Company hence greater government super- 
vision was now to be exercised. The Company's main concern, however, 
had been the need to promote legitimate trade and it was recognised: 
with very few exceptions that the natives would be 
easily induced to raise and cultivate the articles 
of tropical produce to which their climate and soil 
are suitable, if they had adequate encouragement by 
a demand and market for them (2). 
By 1821 it became clear to trading interests in Britain that 
the Company on the coast was not adequately advancing their interests. 
Trade was not progressing in terms of exports from the forest region 
or through the Company promotion and engagement in production directly. 
An equally important issue of criticism was that the Company was seen 
to be unable to placate the demands of different indigenous groupss 
notably the Asante's. The Asante Empire claimed sovereignty over the 
Fante states and this resulted in a number of conflicts with different 
coastal groups at the turn of the century (3). In the attempt to reduce 
the conflicts a British representative, Bowditch, made a treaty with 
Asante which called for peace between Britain and Asante (4). This 
proved to be ineffectual. Provision was made for a British resident in 
Details of both reports are to be found in Metcalfe, op. cit., document- 
14 and 31, see also Reynoldslop. cit., Chapter 2. 
(2) Metcalfe p. it document p- 4a. 0 cl 
(3) 1807,1811,1814-1816 and later 1823-1824,1826,1863. See Reynolds, 
op. cit., see also, J. K. Fynn, (1971a), 'Ghana-Asantel, in M. Crowder 
(editor) West African Resistance (London: Hutchinson, 1971). 
(4) Metcalfe, ýp. cit., docume'nt 33-5 p. 46. 
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Asante and the division of jurisdiction of Africans under the British 
protectorate and those within the domain of the Asantehene. This 
treaty represented one of the earliest attempts to demarcate the 
respective jurisdiction of Britain and indigenous groups. A measure 
of the British governments dissatisfaction with the merchants on the 
coast was that the former appointed theAsante resident directly and 
not in consultation with the Company. The representative, however, 
assumed atT independence which created many difficulties for the British. 
The new Consul in Kumase accepted, for example, the Asante's 
dissatisfaction with payments for the 'notes' held on the forts (1) 
but persuaded the Asantehene to accept a sacred oath of allegiance 
and fidelity to the Crown of Britain. Members of Parliament in Britain 
and merchants on the Gold Coast protested against these clauses. The 
merchants were further angered about the increased recognition by the 
British representatives of Asante's sovereignty over the people of 
Cape Coast. The inhabitants around the British fort at Cape Coast 
had for some years been allied with, and promoters of, British trade. 
Now however Britain recognised Asante claims to sovereignty over 
Cape Coast (2). 
Conflict between interests in Britain calling for greater 
freedom with the Gold Coast trade, and the merchant company's 
representatives which wanted to maintain mercantilist monopolies 
came to a head in 1821. The failure of any dramatic increase in 
trade as we saw earlier was blamed by manufacturing interests in 
Britain upon the merchant company's monopoly position in trading (3) 
(1 ) For explanation of these see below. 
(2) For merchant criticism of this situation see, Metcalfe, op. cit., 
documenýt 44. Commodore Sir G. R. Collier to J. W. Croker, 16 Apri 
1820, p. 61. 
(3) Ibid., document 48, p. 63. 
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and the waste of government resources as British competitors, most 
notably the Dutch and Americans, took advantage of the confusion. 
. 
The conflict of interests between the company on the coast, 
seeking to keep trade within its own domain, and a burgeoning 
capitalist class of free traders in London was resolved in the 
latter's favour. The British government was prevailed upon to dissolve 
the African Company and transfer the forts and possessions of the 
territory to the Crown. In 1821 the British possessions on the Gold 
Coast became dependencies of Sierra Leone under the command of its 
Governor. Trading conditions on the Gold Coast however remained 
difficult. Once more issues of sovereignty concerning coastal people 
and most notably those in the immediate vicinity of British forts at 
Cape Coast came to the fore. This issue was to remain unresolved and 
a matter of tension on the Gold Coast for years to come. 
The Asantes claimed sovereignty over the people of Cape Coast 
while the British also sought the allegiance of these people and the 
latter's continued compliance with the requirements of British trade. 
This brief period of early direct British government involvement on 
the coast closed in 1828. The withdrawal of direct British government 
links in the area followed an encounter with the Asante which had been 
sparked off by the question of which country had the allegiance of a 
Fante sergeant killed by the Asante - the King of England or the 
Asantehene. Direct British government involvement on the territory 
had followed the death in battle of the Governor of Sierra Leone 
against the Asante. A war with Asante and the ensuing battles which 
erupted between Asante and indigenous states was not conducive to 
trade on the coast. The reduction in trade, together with the 
continued expense of maintaining British establishments on the coast 
ZZL, 
forced the withdrawal of a direct British government presence in 
the territory (1). Once again, however, in this continuously changing 
situation the merchant lobby on the coast and in Britain was strong 
enough to allow a nominal merchant presence on the coast; this time 
under the control, in the British capital, of a committee of three 
London merchants who had interests on the Gold Coast. 
The committee ran the affairs of the Gold Coast Colony on a 
shoe-string budget of usually less than 14,000 per annum. This 
interregnum of what was to prove a brief retur6 to merchant control 
on the Gold Coast was crucial for the history of the future Crown 
Colony. It was under this latest administration of merchants, led by 
President G. Maclean, that merchant jurisdiction in the form of 
developing British legal sanctions was extended. 
The ten years immediately preceding 1843 on the Gold Coast 
were noted for their relative peacefulness. The effect of successive 
treaties and the 'martyrdom' of McCarthy (2) had the result of drawing 
the Fante, in the immediate vicinity of the coastal trading stations, 
more closely to the British traders. This increased dependence of the 
Fante upon the British was actively developed by Maclean. Maclean 
sought for the first time to regularise relations with neighbouring 
Africans through establishing, "a system of public law over and above 
the law of the tribe". As a later agreement was to put it, he sought 
to transform "the custom of the country to the general principles of 
British law" (3). 
(1 ) The cost of repairing Cape Coast Castle and James Fort was estimated 
at il6,000 and 148,000 respectively. 
(2) Kwame Arhin, 'The Akan, Mande and Mole Dagbane Peoples 1800-1880' 
IAS, Mimeo, University of Ghana, Legon, 1976, p. 24. 
(3) G. E. IFe-t-Eal f e, 'Macl ean of the Gol d Coast' , quuted in Margaret Pri estl ey West African Trade and Coast Society A Family Study (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p. 45. 
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We focus upon later legal changes in the following chapter. 
This period, however, is important in that it represents the first 
time attempts were made to integrate indigenous groups more closely 
into a growing institutional apparatus for merchant exploitation. 
Conflicting interests in Britain between merchant companies, the 
gentryand adeveloping industrial bourgeoisie which sought freer trade 
with 'colonial' possessions were not fully resolved in 1828. A com- 
promise agreement in this year had been for limited merchant activity 
on the Gold Coast with freer trade. The merchants though, overstepped their 
mark for a British government careful not to expand its territories 
without good reason. To ensure peace for their flourishing trade (1) 
the merchant administration had extended its jurisdiction beyond the 
forts and consequently beyond the terms of reference for which they 
received government assistance. Maclean sought treaties with the 
Asante, he. interfered in disputes between different groups and led 
expeditions against chiefs who disrupted trade. He also held chiefs 
on bail for good behaviour and held for trial chiefs accused of 
murder (2). Maclean also sought to minimise the external slave trade 
and to reduce the instances of human sacrifice. In London, news that 
Maclean was extending jurisdiction of the merchants inland was heard 
with alarm. This increased with the rumours that foreign slavers 
used the Gold Coast to replenish their stocks of foodstuffs. Pressure 
from the anti slavery lobby for more British government supervision 
of the territory mounted. Once more the debate came to the fore as 
to whether the area should continue to receive government support. 
Imports through the British forts on the Gold Coast increased from 
1131,000 in 1830 to 1423,000 in 1840 and exports for the same period 
rose from 190,000 to 025,000. See, J. D. Fage, 'Some General 
Considerations relevant to Historical Research in the Gold Coast', 
TGCTHS, 1,1,1952, p. 118. Palm oil production was encouraged 
and by 1844 represented the Gold Coastt leading export. 
(2) Ibid., p. 112. 
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Evidence was gathered at two Parliamentary Commissions in 1840 and 
1842 where representations were taken from merchants. Opinions 
varied as to whether government intervention on the coast should 
increase, and thereby assist developing free trade at home, or whether 
the government had interfered enough on the Gold Coast and that in 
accord with laissez faire commercial interests should be self supportive. 
A debate about future government involvement hinged on the kind of 
Governor that would be appointed and how much control the merchants 
could exercise over this officer and the Judicial Assessor (1). 
Crown rule resumed in 1843. The Gold Coast was separated 
from Sierra Leone in 1850 and a new Legislative Council was appointed 
with two merchant representatives compared with three from the 
government. The resumption of Crown rule was the last time that the 
official ruling body changed hands. Another Committee was estabished 
in 1865 to examine the continuing viability of British trade but it 
was resolve'd in the affirmative. 
Although on the surface Crown rule in 1843 may seem to be the 
culmination of muddle and confusion. said to have beset British foreign 
policy for hundreds of years, it would be a grave error to suggest, as 
one writer has, that the British: 
... approach was mere pragmatism and the growth was 
an accidental product of the uncoordinated and at 
times illegal activities of officials, traders and 
missionaries on the coast (2). 
Instead of this interpretation for the development of Britain's 
G. E. Metcalfe, 'After Maclean: some aspects of British Gold Coast 
Policy in the mid-nineteenth century', TGCTHS, 1,5,1955. There was 
also debate within the government as to the likely expense of once 
more intervening on the coast. 
(2) A. Boahen,. op. cit., p. 205. 
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colonial empire, we suggest that colonial possessions reflected the 
outcome of a series of ongoing and, multidimensional class struggles 
in Britain. For instance, we have tried to show in the above 
discussion of the changing of hands of British possessions on the 
Gold Coast, that there was an underlying process accelerating, 
(albeit in a circuitous manner), the final placing of British 
territories in the hands of the British government. We have 
suggested that the early nineteenth century was a period in England 
of changing dominance of class forces, namely, the erosion of landed 
aristocratic power and the ascendency of a bourgeois power bloc. 
The British state acted as an initial arbiter of these interests and 
then increasingly acted for a new hegemonic bloc of classes which 
hdd their basis in industrial as opposed to landed interests. 
The British government now took full cognisance of industrial 
and trading pressures for the expansion of trade on the Gold Coast. 
Among these measures the British Crown established a local Chamber 
of Commerce on the Coast as a forum for merchant interests. However, 
merchants remained dissatisfied with the extent of their incorporation 
into the government to be established at Cape Coast. The merchants 
were more pleased with another aspect of the transfer of authority to 
the Crown. This was in the latter's continuation of some of Maclean's 
policies of expanded jurisdiction. The British government both 
criticised and respected much of what Maclean had sought to do. It 
was seen clearly that for trade to be extended peace and stability 
needed to be maintained in the immediate vicinity of the British forts. 
Maclean had sought to satisfy this prerequisite for trade by extending 
the laws of the fort to include neighbouring tribes. This had been 
condemned by the government in Britain because the merchants had no 
authority for so doing. Maclean had acted ultra vires and the House of 
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Commons' report of 1842 noted this. It had been recorded that Maclean 
had no authority to be concerned with the administration of justice at 
all (1). The British government acted to regularise this position 
by extending the jurisdiction of English law to include people 
outside British territory - as long as the local chiefs agreed. 
This was facilitated by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act in 1843 (2). 
Maclean was appointed as Judicial Assessor with specific instructions 
to uphold: 
the exercise of that jurisdiction which has been 
established ... in the case of crimes and 
misdemeanours committed among neighbouring tribes (3). 
Although Maclean had received much criticism for the 
extension of British jurisdiction preceding the Crown takeover in 1843, 
it had been accepted that he had usually obtained the permission of 
both the British government and indigenous people before introducing 
English legal precepts into the area. The procedure, however, whereby 
permission was received from indigenous power holders needed regularising. 
This was achieved with the Bond of 1844(4). The Bond was the name given 
to a series of treaties between Britain and the Fante chiefs where the 
latter accepted that: 
(1) People living adjacent to the British forts acknowledged the 
power and jurisdiction of the Crown. 
(2) Human sacrifice and panyarring "are abominations and contrary 
to law". 
(3) Offences will be examined by Queens judicial offices "moulding 
(1) Metcalfe, (1955), op. cit., p. 183. 
(2) See, D. Kimble, ý2. ýcit., p. 194 and W. E. F. Ward, A History of 
Ghana, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. -T-9ý 
(3) Despatch of 16 December 1843, Stanley to Hill quoted in, ibid, p. 194- (4) Ibid, p. 194, Metcalfe, (1964), o_p. 
_ 
cit., p. 196. 
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the customs of the Country to the general principles of British 
law" 
The Bond was the first formal recognition by the Africans on the coast 
of 3ritish protection. It also reflected the British attempts at 
invoking a. regularised and uniform set of institutions and legal 
paraphenalia which could greatly facilitate the development of trade 
on the coast. Protection of the Fante's was now extended in lawand 
chiefs recognised formally the "objects of law" as "the protection of 
individuals and property" (2). The Bond established de jure what had 
been the de facto pos ition on the coast for years. 
We have summarised here the importance of the first forty 
years of the nineteenth century for the consolidation of colonialism 
in West Africa. After an uncertain start to the century with the 
official end to the slave trade the British government became formally 
entrenched on the Gold Coast. The interests of British merchants 
came increasingly under the security of the British colonial umbrella 
on the coast, which itself became dependent upon the extension of a 
British juridical and military presence. British merchants were no 
longer allowed a simple monopoly of trade on the Gold Coast. Instead, 
representatives of the British state in London were prevailed upon by 
industrial interests there to open and regularise trade to and from 
(1) Declaration of the Fante chiefs (the 'bond) 6 March 1844, document 
145, in, Metcalfe, (1964), op. cit., p. 196. Panyarring was ýhere a 
creditor seized a person in any way connected with the debtor - 
or even a complete stranger to all concerned. "The kindred of the 
person thus made prisoner came down upon the debtor's family and 
compelled them to pay the debt, plus a sum ... to compensate the person seized in order that he might 'wash his soul". R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1929), 
p. 370: For further reference to Panyarring see Chapter one above. (2) Metcalfe, (1964), op. cit., p. 196. 
the Gold Coast. Merchant companies were not now to exercise de jure 
authority and monopoly on the coast without the approval from a 
British Governor and Judicial assessor (1). 
British merchants seeking the opening up of trade on the 
Gold Coast benefitted greatly from the establishment of British 
authority on the coast which gave added security to the operations 
of the merchants. This was to become more important as time progressed 
and as European commercial interests became more concerned with not 
simply facilitating additional trade (commerce) carried by Africans 
from the hinterland, but in becoming actively involved thems.: 21ves 
in the production and extraction of the produce of the Gold Coast. 
Before we look at later developments in detail, that is in 
the European productive activities in concessions bought for mining 
and agricultural production towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
which reflected the increasing dominance of industrial over merchant 
capital, we can look now at the early nineteenth century European commerci al 
exploits on the coast . This is the activity called legitimate trade. 
(b) Legitimate Trade 
Following the abolition of the slave trade European traders 
were forced to find alternative commodities for export to sustain 
their commercial zeal. The trade in slaves did not end overnight. 
British merchants sought to clamp down on the trade, however, for 
while it continued it made the expansion of alternative trading 
goods difficult. This was because first, British merchants suffered 
0 
We have also seen that these lines of conflict were not always 
straightforward. For example, it was while the coast was under 
merchant control, that is with Maclean, that indeed a regularisation 
of trade and day to day practices of law and order were started. 
236 
an economic disadvantage while their competitors, the French, 
Portuguese and Brazilians still traded in slaves. Second, while the 
I inland indigenous people concerned themselves with the capture and 
seizure of slaves for export to the Caribbean, internal productive 
activity was being neglected. It was this latter activity which 
concerned British merchants most. Now that the British government 
had outlawed the export of slaves, and set up a naval control of the 
coast to prevent its continuation, alternative use had to be made of 
the trading establishments on the coast. 
The early nineteenth century witnessed the gradual transformation 
of the relationship between the economies of Europe and those of the 
Gold Coast. As Hopkins rightly states, the development of the Legitimate 
Commerce represented a break with the past and signified a new phase 
in the growth of the market (1). It heralded the dawn of modern 
economic history in West Africa. It is to the changing fluctuation 
in the nature of the trade that we must turn to understand the 
partition of West Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
We can agree that legitimate trade comes to dominate the 
economies of West Africa in the nineteenth centurybut we must remember 
that this was a gradual and uneven process. It was gradual in the 
sense that it overlapped with the slave trade; there was also much 
upheaval and conflict which emanated from the denial of a market for 
slaves which had previously been nurtured by Europe. It was uneven 
because of conflicting interests being represented in Britain, 
interests which sought to hang on to the slave trade (mercantilist) 
and those of a burgeoning indvstrial class which sought profitability 
(1 ) A. G. Hopkins, op. cit., especially Chapter 4. 
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through the development of manufacturing industry in Britain based 
Upon cheap raw materials from overseas territories. Some of the 
latter debate was resolved by 1850 but was to reappear with another 
Select Committee appointed to examine the viability of British 
possessions on the coast in 1874. By 1874 however legitimate trade 
was well developed. Indeed palm oil exports by 1841 had reached 
42,745 hundredweight and by 1862 this accounted for 185,910 in 
value (1 ). 
British development of legitimate trade had a forerunner. 
The Dutch competed for the trading favours of the Akan (2). Before 
the Dutch finally gave up their possessions to the British they tried 
to develop trade in legitimate products and to initiate the export 
of agricultural products on a grand scale. It is illuminating in. a 
number of ways to look briefly at the activities of Dutch competitors 
in these years. First, it highlights Dutch attempts to build 
stronger links with the Asante and thereby pose a threat to British 
interests on the Coast who also sought the friendship and trade of 
this inland power. Second, it clarifies the process through which 
theEuropeans sought to initiate legitimate trade and thereby transforin 
indigenous structures. One aspect of this process set in train by 
the Europeanswas the early attempt at sustaining peace inland between 
warring indigenous groups so trade could flourish more easily. Dutch 
attempts to initiate legitimate trade through plantation agriculture 
also represented one early (albeit unsuccessful) attempt by colonial 
(1) For detailed breakdown of import and export figures between Europe 
and the Gold Coast see tables 1-4 in the Appendixes to this Chapter. 
See also Reynolds (1974b), op. cit., p. 133. 
(2) The more general issue of colonial rivalry has been discussed above 
in Chapters 2-3. 
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groups to have greater access to land and to impose a particular 
labour process on African producers. It marked an early attempt by 
Europeans to initiate and hasten private ownership of land and 
property 
(i) The Dutch and Legitimate Trade 
Following the laws to abolish the slave trade in 1816 Dutch 
traders and merchants were eager to seek alternative ways to exploit 
the-Gold Coast. They were assisted in this by the Dutch government 
which specifically instructed the newly appointed Governor General 
of the Dutch possessions to seek peace, trade and conditions for 
increased indigenous agricultural production (2). Elsewhere on the 
coast, the British and Danes were trying to achieve similar conditions (3). 
Both the Danes and British were experiencing difficulties in imposing 
plantation forms-of agricultural production. The main reason for this 
was the conflict between indigenous forms of agriculture - the use of 
bush fallow methods and the permanent systems associated with plantations. 
A further reason was that the labour force and indigenous relations of pro- 
duction were unused to the supervision associated with work on plantations (4) 
The Dutch made every effort to secure the basis upon which a new 
kind of trade could develop. Instructions were given to the Governor 
(1) These themes are only outlined here to show the premature nature of 
Dutch attempts at developing capitalism on the coast. See also 
Chapter 3, section IV above. We discuss them more fully below, 
Chapters 5-6. 
(2) Most of this section is drawn from H. W. Daendals, Journal and 
Correspondence Part 1 November 1815-January 1817, IAS Mimeo, 
University of Ghana, Legon, 1964. 
(3) The Danes first began developing plantations in 1788, see 
G. NOrregard, Danish Settlements in West Africa 1658-1850, translated 
by S. Mammen (Boston: 1964). 
(4) The permanent cultivation of plantation systems of agriculture con- 
trasted sharply with bush fallow methods of the Akan. The direct 
producer, for example, lost control of his own labour. The British 
for the moment sought to emulate success in the West Indies. On the 
labour process used in plantations see, de Silva, op. cit., and 
Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
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General to inform local chiefs and kings that now the slave trade 
had officially ended they needed to encourage: 
their people to cultivate sugar, coffee and other 
products by the exchange of which for European 
merchandise mutual accommodation is provided (1). 
Unlike earlier periods of trading, monopoly was specifically outlawed 
although not always maintained. Trade on a wider scale was to be 
encouraged. Perhaps the most significant series of instructions 
issued to the new post of Governor General however was first; the 
need to use indigenous hired labour and second, to appropriate 
wherever possible tra cts of land for colonial use. 
The experiments in these early years of the nineteenth century 
precede the generalisation of later colonial moves to capitalist 
forms of production as the colonial regimes sought to reduce the 
importance to the economy of slave labour. (2). The persistence of 
slavery and the Atlantic trade even after abolition, created much 
unrest in the hinterland among indigenous groups and seriously 
affected the prospects of initiating profitable legitimate trade. 
In reporting the plight of Dutch trade on the coast the Governor 
Ceneral frequently stressed the effects of the slave trade. The 
result on Dutch trade varied. On the one hand, trade suffered badly 
wherever the slave trade had been most active. Areas were depopulated, 
resulting in a lack of African products for exchange on the coast: 
The slave trade has caused the tr4fficking of goods 
for gold and ivory to be very greatly diminished. 
It has extinguished industry and not only caused 
a reduction in the number of gold diggers, but also 
the regular work in the mines to cease in the dry season. 
(1) Daendals, op. cit., Instructions for the Governor General, 1815, p. 15. 
(2) Ibid., p. TG-. 
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and again: 
The uncertainty of not any day being seized and sold to 
the ships extinguished the courage for all peaceful 
labour, and made the negro into an armed and restless 
robber ... (1). 
On the other hand depopulation of certain areas meant that indigenous 
groups did not need access to so much land which became more and more 
at the disposal of the Dutch. The need to have greater access to 
indigenous land was crucial for the plans of the Dutch and in particular 
those of the Governor. Daendals wanted to appropriate land and make 
it available to his countrymen from the Netherlands. The idea was to 
establish a Dutch settlement with its own plantations. The need for 
private property was thought to be essential by the Governor: 
I have been convinced by experience'that no 
enterprise of any importance can be done upon 
ground which is not the property of the person 
undertaking them, because one thus rightly 
hesitates to incur expenditure for others (2). 
This statement represents an early call for the commoditisation of 
land on the Gold Coast. The form of landappropriation was seen to 
be simple: 
... only a very few formalities have to be observed 
with the King of Great Commany, or the Caboceer of 
another Crom, in order to warn the natives that they 
cannot take these lands for farming because they have 
been made over to private ownership. The expenses are 
some drink and if the piece of land is of any importance, 
some fathoms of cloth besides; so that a plantation of 
100, yes of 200 acres can be obtained for f25 (3). 
(1) Report to the Department of Trade and Colonies regarding the state 
of trade on this coast in, ibid., p. 250. See also Report to the 
Department of Trade and colonies on the Cultivation of Colonial 
Products in the Dutch settlements on the Coast of Guinea, in ibid, 
p. 255. Caution should be expressed, however, in assuming that sTave 
dealing per se determined the nature of Asante's politics. See Chapter! 
1-3 above anT-later in this Chapter. See also, K. Arhin, 'Warfare and 
Eccnomy in Asante: An essay in methodology' I. A. S, Mimeo, University 
of Ghana, Legon, 1977a. 
(2) Ibid., diary, 10 October 1816, p. 186. 
(3) IFTU., despatch, Governor General to Director General of the 
Nepartment of Trade and Colonies, 17 June 1816, p. 127. 
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This rush for land was to be monitored very carefully. Only the 
government was to be able to allow Dutch traders to enter agricultural 
ventures and a plantation would have to be registered. The new 
occupiers of land would also have to render services of road 
maintenance and partake in necessary taxation from the Netherlands (1). 
The corollary to the Dutch plan of initiating agricultural 
plantations run by the Europeans was to encourage the indigenous 
cultivation of cash crops. Daenadals' vision- was for Asante to 
become a second Java with the production of coffee, cotton and 
peppers which could then be sold to traders on tile coast (2). 
Dutch plans to emulate their success in the East Indies, however, 
came to nothing. This was partly due to a lack of financial resources 
because of an ailing domestic economy. More significantly the Dutch 
failed to establish successful plantations or initiate new forms of 
agricultural production on the Gold Coast because of the detrimental 
effects of the Atlantic slave trade (3). The Dutch had sought to 
remedy the disruptive effects to Akan agriculture resulting from the 
slave trade by initiating plantation agriculture. The latter was seen 
to be an efficient and more productive way of ensuring the flow of 
food stuffs and raw materials from the Gold Coast to Europe. The 
transport of approximately half a million Africans from the Gold Coast 
during the Atlantic slave trade meant that there was a shortage of 
labour to work on their newly introduced schemes. 
Ibid, p. 127. The duty of paying taxes was soon dropped ' ibid, p. 249. (2) 7e--spatch of Governor General to Director General of Trade and Colonies 
No. 62, St George Del Mina, 6 December, ibid, p. 249. 
(3) We have already mentioned indigenous reTEýTon to the imposition of 
different relations of production and labour process. These are 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 5-6 below. 
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(ii) British Legitimate Trade and African Merchants 
The British were a great deal more persistent than the Dutch 
in their attempts at making their activities on the Gold Coast 
profitable. After the Napoleonic wars they were assisted by a stronger 
national and international base from which to work (1). 
Legitimate trade paved the way for a new form of colonial 
contact with the people of the Gold Coast. Before ca. 1807, Europeans 
had stayed mainly on the coast venturing into the hinterland on 
occasion to 'pacify' warring African groups which were disturbing the 
flow of trade to the coast, and infrequently Europeans had sought to 
start their own mining operations. The early nineteenth century had 
seen Dutch attempts at developing plantation agriculture as a substitute 
for the decline of the slave trade but European attempts generally at 
this form of proauctive activity had been half-hearted (2). As the 
years progressed trade was to take a different form. There was to be 
a gradual decline in the floating trade and an increase in the use of 
European forts as 'factories' (3). The former was a more lucrative 
occupation for London traders who placed European and East Indian goods 
in the care of a captain who exchanged them on the coast for gold and 
ivory from the interior. Most trade was to be carried out through the 
forts, however, and was dispersed among three trading houses (4). 
(1) For the changing fortunes of the Dutch and their decline from the 
international stage, see 1. Wallerstein, The Modern World SXstem: 
Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of--t-F-e-'European World Economy 
Tnth-e- Sixteenth Century, (London: Academic Press, 1974) and the Eo-Tern 
World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European 
World Economy, T600-1750, (London: Academic Press, 1980). 
(2) E. Reynolds, 'The Rise and Fall of, an African Merchant Class on the 
Gold Coast, 1830-1874', Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 54,14,1974a, p-253. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) IFTT, Messrs Forster and Smith, Swanzy and T. Hutton. See also, 
'R1, -. -Roward, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana, (London: Croom 
Helm, 19781-. 
Trade through the forts came to dominate British contact with 
the Gold Coast until later in the century when the nature of earlier 
legitimate trade changed. Trade in the old staples of ivory and gold 
dominated legitimate trade until the start of the exploitation of palm 
oiliwhich was concentrated mainly on the Eastern side of the colony. 
As one writer has said: 
If ivory was the genesis of British legitimate trade, 
it was the expanding market for palm oil which 
permitted the rapid growth and which occurred in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century (1). 
It was not long, however, before competition for this product from 
other colonies outweighed the benefit to British industrialists of the 
Gold Coast trade: 
By mid nineteenth century ... the silent imperialism 
of the steamship was beginning to bring vegetable 
oils and substitute products from other continents 
besides Africa (2). 
Technological innovation, the development of other colonies, 
and later colonial rivalry all added to a change in the emphasis and 
direction of British contact with the Gold Coast. As we have already 
discussed it took-, a long time for industrial interests to prevail 
themselves upon the British government to ensure that the Gold Coast 
possessions be kept, and indeed expanded. Arguably, merchant pressure 
alone at the turn of the century ensured the continued British presence 
in the territory (3). By the end of the nineteenth century contact 
(1) George E. Brooks, Jn, Yankee Traders, Old Coasters and African 
Middlemen: A history of American--E-egitimate Trade with st Africa 
in the Nineteenth Century, African Research Studies--No. 11, TFoston 
University PresS 1970), p. 15. 
(2) Hopkins, op. cit., p. 131. 
(3) Compare D-ý7-66"m`Fs, The Gold Coast, Britain and the Netherlands 1850-74 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 3-4 and the suggestion 
British presence on the Gold Coast was due solely to humanitarian 
feeling and not commercial interest. 
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with the Gold Coast was to take the form of increased colonial 
government assistance to merchant traders (working on behalf of 
industrial interests in Britain) to gain access to land for concessions 
to work for gold and agricultural products. These latter developments 
are the focus for the following two chapters. Here we can concentrate 
on a transitional period where more use was made of indigenous groups 
in facilitating trade inland. We can then look at the consolidation 
of this phase of British colonial contact before looking specifically 
at the developments within Asante at this time. 
The emergence of an. indigenous class of merchants on the Gold 
Coast has been traced elsewhere (1). Our concern is with the impact 
that the development of legitimate trade-had upon developments already 
underway on the coast namely the effect of the presence of groups of 
African merchants. What was the result for the indigenous power 
holders of a group of African merchants linked more closely with the 
European traders on the coast? And what was the relation between 
European and African traders? African merchahts were not new on the 
coast (2). The difference, however, between the African merchants of 
the nineteenth century compared with the Merchant Princes of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century was that the former were not 
simultaneously indigenous rulers and the trade was not geared solely 
to benefit the state (3). 
Opportunity for the development of merchants rose with the 
Administration of Maclean who prompted the integration and direct 
Kwame Y. Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast 1600-1720, (London 
Oxford University Press, 1970), E. Reynolds (1974a), (1974b), p-cit-, 
M. Priestley, op. cit. 
(2) See,, Daaku op. Eit., ad references to Kabes and Kenny above, Chapters-2 aýd 3. 
(3) Reynolds, (1974a), op. cit., p. 254. 
24 &too 
participation of Africans on the coast. Indigenous traders were 
usually the offspring of an European father and had links with 
traditional powerholders. They also were educated to a higher level 
of learning than other Africans (1). These individuals were given 
similar treatment and favours on trade as theirEuropean counterparts. 
They became essentially low cost importers and specialists acting 
as either independent wholesalers and retailers or as agents who sold 
goods on commission for manufacturing firms in Europe (2). The role 
of credit in these transactions was essential and worked both ways. 
Not only did the Africans receive goods from Europe before making 
payment for them but European trading houses often received Gold Coast 
exports before financial transactions sealed the exchange. There were 
of course difficulties with the exten! Mon of credit. The result of a 
series of defaults by African merchants who preferred to invest their 
credit in conspicuous consumption, rather than buying more produce, 
led to the passing of a bankruptcy law in 1858. Despite these 
difficulties European merchant houses recognised the need to use local 
African merchants in the distribution and sale. of western products. 
Greater opportunities for trade, provided by increased European contact 
and the development of trading houses on the coast, added to the number 
of African merchants drawn into international trade. The numbers of 
small scale African traders also rose with the advent of the African 
steamship Company in 1852 which helped increase the tonnage of West 
African shipping from 57,000 tons in 1854 to 504,000 in 1874 (3). 
(1 ) Reynolds (1974b), op. cit. 
(2) Hopkins ' op. cit:, 
--CFa-pter 4. Some of these Africans who received 
goods on credit in the Maclean period from London were George 
Blankson Sr, and R. J. Ghartey, Reynolds (1974a), op. cit., p. 254. 
(3) Reynolds, (1974b), op. cit. 
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The greater accessibility to trade in European goods, and the 
African traders to help facilitate this was accompanied by increased 
development of another social group in the mid nineteenth century. 
This was the group of so called 'educated' Africans which were to 
become a significant force for Gold Coast nationalism towards the end 
of the century. The educated African, often in fact with little formal 
education, frequently overlapped with the group of African merchants (1). 
They were the product usually of a Mission School and often sought jobs 
linked with European trade and consequently were grouped around the 
major towns of Cape Coast and Accra. 
The increased importance of these two groups had a direct 
bearing upon the'declining power of chiefs and elders. Inroads into 
the power of chiefs and elders followed disruption initiated by 
colonialism and the decline of the slave trade but: 
whatever vestiges of the traditional rulers economic 
power and political influence remained by the middle 
of the nineteenth century were eclipsed by the 
emerging indigenous merchants . (2). 
The increase in the importance of indigenous merchants marked a 
hastening of the transformation of the African economies; from one 
where wealth accumulated by chiefs was loc'ated in their position as 
traditional stool holdersto an economy where positions of power and 
high regard became based upon individual assimilation of money wealth. 
One writer has summarised this transformation: 
In Gold Coast society in old times, status was 
either inherited or attained by political skills, 
rhetorical eloquence, diplomatic ability or military 
prowess. By the middle of the nineteenth century 
(1 ) The development of an 'educated elite' is discussed in more detail 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
(2) Reynolds, (1974b), op. cit., p. 118. 
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status was achieved through the creation of 
wealth by trade and production for market by a 
group whose commercial and political interests 
frequently overlapped (1 ). 
The erosion of chiefly power is one of the most crucial 
transformations to occur in the period of colonial contact and we 
return to it in detail later (2). By way of linking the issues of the 
early nineteenth century with those that followed, however, we have 
begun here to draw out the increased differentiation of indigenous 
groups. The development of African merchants as a separate group 
from chiefs and elders was both prompted by and in turn helped further 
facilitate the expansion of European trade on the Gold Coast. 
Accompanying the European merchants' trading activity on the coast 
was the attempt, as we have already briefly seen, by the colonial 
government to secure its own political and legitimate presence on the 
littoral. 
It was not coincidental that the process of increased merchant 
activity in the trade of products from the forest belt and later the 
direct involvement in production occurred in tandem with the extension 
of British authority on the coast. Since 1846 (the abolition of the 
Corn Laws in England) there was agrowing recognition of the need for 
certain forms of government intervention in maintaining and regulating 
the British political economy, the philosophy of laissez faire not 
withstanding. This increased Government involvement also included 
generating and safeguarding British interests overseas especially in 
(1) Ibid., p. 256. See also, I. Wilks, 'The Golden Stool and the Elephant TaY-71: An Essay on Wealth in Asante', in, G. Dalton (editor Research 
in Economic Anthropology, Volume 2, (London: JAI Pr'ess, 197V, -p`-. F-. 
(2) Thi ýro- ess of declining chiefly power is dealt with in depth in 
Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
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securing products necessary for capitalist industry in Britain. We 
can now see how the Crown consolidated its activities on the coast 
and laid the political and institutional groundwork for later formal 
colonisation of the territory. 
(c) Consolidation of British Control on the Coast 
The British consolidated their position on the Gold Coast by 
separating, for administrative purposes, the territory from Sierra 
Leone in 1850. In the same year the British purchased the Danish 
castles at Osu in Accra and three others at Ningo, Ada and Keta. The 
major benefit that this flurry of activity was thought to bring for 
the British was a better opportunity for the collecting of duties from 
trade. This was not successful,, however, because the Dutch refused to 
impose customs duties at their castle at Elmina and thereby attracted 
greater amounts of trade to their ports where merchants could escape 
the costs of trading at British enclaves. Also in 1850 the British 
introduced a Legislative Council which had two merchant representatives. 
The most important development at this time in the British attempts 
to consolidate their position on the coast, and to sustain later 
colonial development, was the plan to collect revenue from Africans 
and thereby to develop a money economy. In 1852 a Poll Tax was introduced 
of 1/- a head for any man, woman and child (1). It was to be applied in 
the area known collectively as the Protectorate and Governor Hill hýd 
made a provisional estimate that it would raise E20,000 per annum from 
a population of 400,000. 
The Secretary of State Lord Grey's explicit calculation behind 
(1) Fqr the detail, see, Kimble, op. cit., Chapter 4. 
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the Poll Tax was that sufficient funds could be raised for the 
indigenous groups to provide for their own amenities and development. 
The British regime on the coast wanted indigenous people to provide 
the services which would facilitate the further expansion of British 
trading interests. Couched in terms of making the Protectorate pay 
for itself, the underlying effect of the Poll Tax was to help monetarise 
the Gold Coast economy and thereby make it more open to the transactions 
of European capitalists. 
The chiefs of the Gold Coast met in assemblies organised by the 
British in April 1852'at Accra and elsewhere. The British administrators 
wanted the chiefs to constitute themselves into a Legislative Assembly. 
This would be recognised by the British Government and would have "full 
powers, to enact such laws as it shall deem fit for the better government 
of those countries" (1). By organising the chiefs together the British 
on the coast hoped to get the African leaders to identify with the 
need for direct taxation and indeed to make its collection easier (2). 
The British informed the chiefs that the latter should contribute to 
the running of the government. A Poll Tax was agreed by the British 
administrators to be: "the most productive, the least burdensome, and 
the most -, equitable" form of taxation (3). 
Governor Hill saw the establishment of a Legislative Council 
for the chiefs as the best way of drawing the indigenous holders more 
closely into the direct running of the government while also increasing 
(I ) Ibid., p. 172. 
(2) ITHis does not mean that there was unaminity among the colonial regime 
as to the prudence of establishing an assembly for the chiefs. 
Cruickshank and Bannerman, forexample, feared the development and 
presence of large organised bands of armed men in the assembly. See, 
ibid, p. 171. 
(3) TF-J, p. 173. 
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the revenue of the colony and mi nimi si ng Bri ti sh expendi ture (1 ). 
Governor Hill had grand plans for the building of schools and other 
projects with the revenue from the tax but these were to come to 
nothing. Although collection of the tax began well, 17,567 in the 
first years, by 1860 only il, 725 was collected (2). There were 
inefficiencies in the collection of the tax but also mounting 
opposition from Africans who saw no benefit from payments and who 
reacted against the imposition of British authority (3). 
As the British sought to draw the Fante chiefs and tradars 
more closely into the'running of the colony (something more satisfactorily 
achieved by Governor Pine after 1857 (4), the coastal people becarr,. e 
increasingly dissatisfied. This was particularly noticeable after the 
exchange of territories with the Dutch in 1867. Hitherto the British 
had defended the people of the Gold Coast against Asante incursions, 
in 1853 and 1863. In 1864, however, the Fante were told by the British 
that they were meant to look after their own defence more (5). When 
the British exchanged territories with the Dutch without informing or 
consulting the people of the Protectorate they made the inhabitants 
of the latter feel betrayed. The exchange with the Dutch ensured the 
tightening British grip on the coast to the east of Sweet River and 
avoided the "inconvenience of having Dutch and British forts mixed 
together"(6). There was, however, local unrest relating to increased 
(1) A clearer indication as to the services which*might be provided by 
the Poll Tax followed in an amendment to the Poll Tax Ordinance 1858. 
(2) Reynolds (1974b), op. cit., Chapter 4. 
(3) For example, the Christiansborg Rebellion, 1854. 
(4) See, Kimble, o cit , p. 183, about the development of district 
councils in C t, Accra and Anomabu and a treasury to receive 
collections of the Poll Tax in Accra and Cape Coast. 
(5) For these important observations see Arhin, (1976) op. cit., pp. 27-29. (6) Ward, o 't,, p. 236. See map on page 2Z4 for th-e-situation of EuropeNLTArlý on the coast. 
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British control of the coast. Opposition manifested itself in the 
Eastern part of the Protectorate to the Poll Tax. In 1854, the Ga town 
of Labadi had been bombarded and in 1858 the Krobo had been subjected 
to attack from the British and incurred a fine (1). 
Accompanying the opposition to the Poll Tax was the objection 
by the chiefs to the continued erosion of their status, power and 
authority. Already, the increased power of indigenous merchants and 
their links with European merchant houses drew ecnomic power away from 
traditional authority holders. The establishment of the Legislative 
Council by the British was meant in part to obviate this erosion of 
chiefly status but the accompanying legal changes imposed by the Britis h 
hastened the fall in chiefly power (2). The chiefs complained to the 
British in 1864 about the establishment of British courts and imprison- 
ment for trivial cases. The chiefs also complained about being tried 
in the same courts as their own subjects (3). 
Aggrey, the chief of Cape Coast was deported after he complained 
about this levelling process, the independent status of his own court 
and the legal basis of the Protectorate (4). 
The culmination of Fante opposition to the British at this 
time was the Fante Confederation (5). Although at first it received 
support from the British authorities because it drew together Fante 
chiefs and the educated elite it was later seen as a threat to British 
(1) Arhin, (1976) op-cit., p. 28. Objection to the collection of the Poll 
Tax 
' 
had 
' 
been L-t-aElýished in the Western. part of the territory as well. 
ý2ý For an outline of the legal changes see Chapters 5 and 6 below. 3 Arhin, (1976) op. cit., p. 29. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) T-. -Tgbodeka, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast, 
1868-1900: A study in the forms and force of protest, (London: 
Longman, 1971) and D. Kimble, op. E-it., Chapter 6. 
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authority. The Fante Confederation represents a preview of the role 
that the educated elite were to play in the struggle against the 
B-ritish and as such highlights the contradictory effect which 
colonialism had upon indigenous groups. The colonial presence 
hastened the development of the educated elite which simultaneously 
acted to reduce the power of British colonialism. 
The cession of the last remaining Dutch settlements to the 
British in 1872 prepared the way forlater control of inland states. 
The Asante had always claimed a right to Elmina and on the withdrawal 
of the Dutch the Asante renewed their claim to the states of Assin, 
Denkyera and Akyem. With the demise of the Fante Confederacy, and 
thereby the coastal peoples plan of self defence against the Asante, 
the attitude of the British to extending their authority was modified. 
If the Fante could. not satisfactorily defend themselves against Asante 
attack then the British, in the interest of preserving peace and 
. 
existing trade routes should protect them. There was no better way to 
do this than to strike at the heart of the invading force within Asante 
itself. To this end the British invaded Asante in 1874 and imposed the 
Treaty of Fomena, whereby Asante dropped their claims over the coastal 
Akan and promised to keep open the trade routes to and from the coast 
and Kumase. 
We have now traced briefly a number of the processes initiated 
and assisted by British contact and increased control on the Gold Coast 
in the early part of the nineteenth century. These processes included 
the extension of British jurisdiction on the coast especially in the 
vicinity of the trading forts. In developing British control the 
'colonial' regime sought to bolster the power of chiefs so that the 
latter may be used as an arm of British trading interests. The outcome 
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of extended British involvement however, was the increased differentiation 
within indigenous groups and a decline in the power of the chiefs. We 
have also seen the early attempts by the British to establish on a 
firmer footing a monetised economy through the inauguration of direct 
taxation. Indigenous opposition to this form of collecting revenue 
ensured that direct taxation was not to be placed on the colonial 
administrators agenda again until the close of the century. 
Our concern in this chapter has been mainly with the coastal 
Akan Fante groups and their reactions to colonial contact, and how 
colonial administrators coped with the complex of indigenous social 
groups. We can now turn to examine in more detail the nature of social 
processes underpinning developmentý in Asante. Were social proces. ses 
that we have touched on above, resulting in a decline in chiefly 
authority and growth of alternative powerful indigenous groups occurring 
in the Asante forest kingdom too? What kind of indigenous social 
structures were these processes undermining? 
III SOCIAL CHANGE IN ASANTE 
Asante history is probably one of the most fully documented in 
Africa (1). As such we do not need here to recount in detail the 
events of the nineteenth century. Our focus is on two of the most 
interesting issues underpinning nineteenth century Asante which will 
help clarify the impact of the British presence upon indigenous society, 
(1) Recent work includes inter alia: Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth 
Century: The Structur-e-anU 7voTution of Political Order, (Cambridge: 
University Press 1975), Thomas J. Lewin, Asante'Before the British: 
The Premýean Years, 1875-1900 (Kansas: Th-e-R-egents Press, Lawrence, 
1978), William lordoff, Aslia-nti Under the Prempehs, 1888J1935 (London: 
Oxford University Press 1965), T. Caskle, 'Office, Lan-T and Subjects 
in the History of the Manware Fekuo of Kumase: An Essay in the 
Political Economy of the Asante State', JAH 21,1980, and 'State and 
Society Marriage and Adultery: Some Consl-(Fe-rations Towards A History 
of Pre Colonial Asante, JAH, 22,1981. 
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and which will help us assess the transitions within the nature of 
colonial contact. The first of these issues to be examined is the 
accuracy of the premise upon which Asante political culture is said 
to have been based before European contact: the ideas of assimilation, 
classlessness and egalitarianism (1). We need to understand the 
validity of these characterisations of pre-colonial Asante society 
before examining the social processes at work during the period of 
European contact. The second theme we raise here is an assessment of 
the divisions which emerged within Asante in the nineteenth century 
as to the most appropriate form of Asante expansion: whether it should 
be based upon military endeavour to satisfy the demands of Asante 
power holders (imperialist) or whether the prosperity of Asante shoold 
be founded upon trade and commerce without the aid of militarism 
(mercantilism) (2). 
(a) Pre-colonial Asante 
-The background to early Asante state formation has already 
been traced (3). So too has the nature of early social relations 
within Asante from which we concluded that Asante society was dominated 
by chiefly control of commoners, women and slaves. 
Thomas McCaskie has suggested that there was a temporal 
correlation between the establishment of an agrarian Asante society 
and the emergence of chiefdoms which became "forged into the componential 
elements of an increasingly complex state centred on Kumase" (4). The 
(1) This discussion is based around the two recent articles by McCaskie, 
(1980) and (1981 ), op. cit. 
(2) For this division oT--i-n-terests see Wilks (1975), op. ci 
(3) See Chapters 1 and 3 above. 
(4) McCaski e, (l 981 ), op. ci t-, pp. 483-4 84. 
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, demands for food and the ecological difficulties of sustaining 
agricultural production led, he asserts, to a number of accepted 
principles underpinning Asante relations of production. These were 
principles of cooperation and mutual assistance, consensual decision 
making and the right to arbitration, fraternity and sorority 
hospitality derivpd initially from the transactional needs of the 
work group, but since enshrined as the ideal or ur-parameters of 
folk behaviour (1). 
The ability to produce food in the hostile envrionment of the 
forest also lay the terrain for what has been recognised as 'primordial' 
Asante perceptions of life as struggle (2). The antagonistic and 
inimical 'natural' surroundings of the forest needed to be subjected 
to demands of the Akan people; this could only be achieved by 
establishing the precepts above, but also by establishing a society 
of plentiful supplies of food: a society based upon maximisation and 
abundance which denied the forest its dominance over people (3). 
The crucial point about this last observation is that 
attempts to maximise the production of forest products can lead to 
accumulation which as a social process may also result in social 
differentiation. There is here then a possible disjuncture and 
conflict between early Asante 'ideology' of communality, cooperation 
and fraternity and the patterns of accumulation which emanated from 
the material need to wrest from the forest. the conditions to sustain 
life. It is this irreconcilable tendency "towards an equalising co- 
(1) Ibid, p. 484. 
(2) =1 . (3) Wsante's recognition of the forest as a harsh environment becomes 
enshrined in ideology as a spiritual threat see, ibid, and R. S. Rattray, 
The Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland (London: Oxfor-d-University 
Press 1932). 
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operation and a differentiating accumulation ... contained within 
the same ideology" that has been seen as "perhaps the fundamental fact 
of Asante history" (1). 
This last point becomes clearer when we introduce the Asante 
state into our discussions. The Asante state (2) sustained the 
logically contradictory ideology relating to accumulation and 
assimilation, it resulted from, but also orchestrated the differentiation 
between and among the Asante's. The state elevated the processes of 
differentiation through the notion of the 'good citizen' (okaniba) 
which was based upon an individuals, (male), ability to accumulate 
wealth in land, gold dust and people (3).. This accumulation of wealth 
was carefully monitored and sanctioned by the state so the power 
holders of the latter could not be too quickly or readily'displaced. 
The Asante state raised the position of Kumase above that of the rest 
cf Asante and in so doing distanced itself from the reality of village 
life (4). The state became a benefactor which had in its power the 
conferrment of office and status increasingly regarded as desirable 
by Asante ideology. The state also had the right to facilitate access 
to trade; it had the power of taxation and was the mediator of a 
growing market in land and people (5). All these factorý added to 
the internal dynamic within Asante towards a hierarchical society which 
(1) McCaskie, (1981 ), op. cit., p. 485. 
(2) See below 
(3) McCaskie, (1931), op. ci , p. 486, and (198Q op. cit. p. 192. This was taken further 
with the 'ahenkwaa ethic"- ie a ruling ideolo; y "of competition, achievement 
accumula-Cion and maximisation" McCaskie (1980) op. cit., p. 487. Wealth 
in people did not simply mean slaves but also women. For this 
important point and discussion of matriliny in, --Xs-ante see, McCaskie, 
(1981) o cit and Chapter 1 above. McCaskie argues the point 
convincingly tiýat the accumulation of women became an indicator of 
differentiation "being qualitatively a prerogative of those participatil 
in the power of the state" ibid, p. 487. See also, I. Wilks (1979) op-cit 
(4) This separation of Kumase a-stTe seat of power from greater Asante 
was to sow the seed for later unrest. 
(5) McCaskie (1980), op. cit., p. 192. 
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had its apex in Kumase the seat of the power of the Asantehene, his 
elders and councillors and the subjects in greater Asante. 
In contrast to the premise of communality and cooperation 
there developed an increasing differentiation centred around the role 
cf the Asante state which was the agency that directed the struggle 
for survival against the 'natural' elements; but simultaneously 
enhanced the position of office holders above those of commoners, in 
Asante. 
The mechanisms of the Asante state were already established 
when the British became more concerned with pushing northwards into 
the hinterland. Indeed, the practices of the Asante state through 
its involvement in trade andthemilitary forays of expansion, drew 
the attention of the British and the recognition by the latter of the 
need to disrupt many of the affairs of the Kumase hierarchy which 
were detrimental to British commercial gain. An Anglo-Asante treaty 
of 1831, for example, ended the hostilities of 1824 and 1826 between 
the two powers. The treaty served to consolidate British control 
over many areas previously recognised as within the domain of the 
Asante government (1). In return the British guaranteed Asante 
commercial access to Gold Coast coastal ports. As we will see in a 
moment, the development of different interests within Asante, 
especially following British interference in Asante affairs on the 
coast, led to innumerable internal disputes. Accompanying the. 
ascendency of the 'war' party in Asante during the 1870's were heavy 
debts, food shortages, the. closure of trade routes and heavy taxation (2). 
In sustaining a war footing the Asantehene, Kofo Kakari, imposed 
(1) Lewin op. cit., p. 42. Asante relinquished control over Accra, Adangme, 
Ahantý, -WH-apem, Akwamu, Akyem, Aowin, Denkyira, Fante, Sehwi, TwifO 
and Wassa. 
(2) Ibid, p. 45. 
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stringent measures on commoners who opposed the moves of war. The 
resulting defeat by the British in 1874 led the latter to support a 
centralised government in Kumase but ensured a fragmented and disjointed 
relationship between the Asante capital and its metropolitan areas. 
On the one hand relations with Asante eroded the power of 
some chiefs in the attempt to encourage a greater freedom for all in 
trade.. On the other hand the power of chiefs in the Protectorate 
were enhanced as long as an anti Kumase stance was adopted. As one 
writer has suggested: 
The British, therefore, strove to maintain the integrity 
of the Asante Nation and keep the central government 
strong but intended to make absolutely certain that it 
never regained its earlier nineteenth century power 
The development of the Asante state was marked by a number of 
constraints imposed by office holders upon commoner participation in 
trade, and the purchase of commodities. This did not occur without 
a number of conflicts. Now that we have traced briefly two theses 
about some of the underpinnings to the development of the state we can 
look in more detail at the broad conflicts which emerged within the 
Asante in the nineteenth century. We will then continue in the concluding 
chapters to assess the impact of colonial presence in the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. 
(b) Pressures for Mercantilism and Imperialism in Asante. 
(i) The factions 
Two major pressure groups existed within the nineteenth century 
Asante social formation. Groups which sought Asante development through 
(1) Ibid, p. 52. 
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war or peaceful means have been labelled imperialist and mercantilist 
respectively (1). The existence of these two groups was recognised 
as early as 1820 by Dupuis (2) and have been seen recently to have 
reflected serious political divisions within Asante society. The 
peace group, for example, was identified more specifically with 
mercantilist policies of expanding trade through the medium of the 
state while the war party subscribed to imperialist policies of 
expansion, where the role of the state was seen to lie more directly 
in the control of occupied territory and the appropriation of tribute. 
Support for these two strategies for Asante development varied 
throughout the nineteenth century. They serve as an indicator of class 
forces and pressures for change from within and outside the forest 
kingdom. For example, at the turn of the nineteenth century we are 
told that the war party was on the ascendency in Kumase and was 
enhancing its position for maritime trade in slaves. When the abolition 
of the slave trade became effective, however, enthusiasm waned within 
Asante for the continual military endeavour in the Southern Provinces, 
which often provided the slaves for export to the Caribbean (3). As 
one writer has commented: 
The decline in the maritime markets for slaves ... had the effect of making warfare less profitable 
and therefore less popular and the dominant 
position which the peace interest enjoyed in 
council between 1826 and 1863 was undoubtedly 
predicated in some measure upon this fact (4). 
(1 1. Wilks, 'Dissidence in Asante Politics: Two-Tracts from the Late 
Nineteenth Century', IAS Mimeo, University of Ghana, Legon 1974. 
J, Dupuis Journal of a Residence in Ashante, (London: Cass, 1966). ý3 
Wilks (16/b), Op. cir.., p. 680. 
1ý 
(4) Ibid.: P. 681. --rFe-cost of continued military endeavours also 
mounted and was taken note of. See, ibid. 
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Although the imperialist faction came to the fore for a short while 
in the 1870's, developments in the nineteenth century Asante political 
economy were based essentially around attempts to sustain trade; 
based less on the sale of people and more on the trade in the products 
of the forest and its environs, resulting from increasing European 
demand on the coast. Yet this greater concentration upon 'legitimate' 
trade and prodpctiop was to be channelled through the Asante state 
as the leading actor in commerce, its representatives receiving the 
protection of the state from the competition of private traders. 
Increased contact with British traders on the coast raised 
the demand Within Asante for a relaxation of the state monopoly of 
trade and the control of trade routes. Entrepreneurs within Asante, 
I 
especially during the 1870's and 1880's, responded 
on the coast for products of the forest like gold, 
palm oil. Unlike previous traders closely associa 
the new group-of asikafo (men of wealth) began to 
separation of trade from the state and a reduction 
taxation. Thus: 
to greater demand 
kola, rubber and 
ted with the state, 
insist on a 
in government 
Asante's increasing participation in the world market 
and the development of new commercial activities in the 
metropolitan region constituted a major threat to the 
centralised economic power and control of the Asantehene's 
government in Kumase (1). 
We need here to explore how this trend in the formation of a new class, 
and the ensuing conflict over the state and trade related to the 
'policy' conflict between the 'war' and 'peace' parties within the 
state. 
(1) Lewin, op. cit., p. 53. 
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A state monopoly of trade in Asante had not been welcomed 
by. Dupuis, a European represenative in Kumase who wanted to see 
greater numbers of Akan traders on the coast. To this end Dupuis 
urged the Asantehene Osei Bonsu, in 1820, to open trade to all 
Asante's rather than restrict trade transactions to those linked 
with the state. The argument used was that if this was done the 
Asantehene could raise the states' revenue by imposing a tax on all 
transactions. Osei Bonsuls reply was that "only kings and great men" 
trade in Asante (1). Another early,, European representative in Kumase, 
Bowditch, noted that the Asantehene's advisers had fears that a free 
for all in trade would inevitably develop a class of private 
entrepreneurs, something which we have noted was already occurring. 
The apprehension among Asante office holders was that profit alone 
would become the overriding concern of a class of traders while the 
natiod's security would suffer. Moreover, "an uncontrolled merchant 
class would in time present a revolutionary threat to the chiefly 
establishment" (2). As Bowditch put it: I 
were they (the chiefs) to encourage commerce, pomp, 
the idol of which they are most jealous, would soon 
cease to be their prerogative, because it would be 
attainable by others; the traders, growing wealthy, 
would vie with them ... they would unite to repress the arbitrary power of the aristocracy (3). 
Fearful of increased encroachment upon stately prerogatives 
of trade the Asantehene often used 'foreign' Muslim, rather than local 
(I ) Dupuis, op. cit., p. 167. See also, Wilks, (1975), op. cit., p. 685. 
(2) Wilks, ( op. cit , p. 685. (3) Bowditch . quoie"d in Wilks, ibid, pp. 685-686. For a detailed 
account of the development of---the changes which Bowditch suggested 
were imminent see, Reynolds, (1974b), op. cit., especially Chapters 
1-3 and for the development of African-m-e-r-Fants Chapter 4; see 
also Reynolds (1974a), op. cit. 
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traders in Asante. Already, however, the seeds were sown through the 
development of the State Trading Company, (Bata Fekuo), for an 
increasingly more dominant group of traders to erode the powers of 
traditional authority holders (1). Traders in the Bata Fekuo. were 
to use their privileged position within the state to develop 
opportunities for autonomous trading activities. 
The dominant group in the Asante social formation (2) at the 
turn of the nineteenth century was a faction of chiefs and elders which 
represented interests for trade, through the organisation of the 
state and indigenous merchant capital, as opposed to those concerned 
with imperialist military expansion to safeguard the Asante Empire. 
As the European presence on the coast increased and the nature 
of the contact changed from a demand for slaves back to a demand for 
gold and in the new direction of legitimate trade, additional 
pressures were brought to bear on the Asante state. These pressures 
were in the form of an increasing demand by Europeans for locally 
produced agricultural products, while leaving in Asante an 
excess number of ýlaves, for which no immediate occupation 
could be found (3). 
The official demise of the Atlantic slave trade did not mean that 
trading in slaves stopped completely. Slavery as such was not 
officially outlawed in the Gold Coast Colony until 1874 and until 
(1) Wilks (1979), op. cit. calls this a bourgeoisie. 
(2) Of course there were more than two groups in Asante as a whole - 
commoners, slaves, women etc. The two factions discussed here refer 
to the principle pressures on the state. 
(3) Asantehene Opoku Frere commented in 1817 that there were too many 
slaves in the country and that they were a threat to public order. 
See, Wilks (1975), oR. cit. 
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that date, and after, slavery and unfree relations of production 
persisted. Many of the slaves found work in the Gold Coast where 
there was a shortage of unskilled labour in and around European trading 
areas but many also continued to be exchanged on northern trade routes. 
Paradoxically there seems to have been an actual increase in slavery 
despite abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade in 1807 (1). The reasons 
for the end of the international'slave trade were to satisfy the 
changing European demands for produce instead of labour (2). There was 
also the recognition following the transition to free wage labour in 
Europe that greater commercial benefit could be gained from employing 
labour power in the colony rather than ship it elsewhere to work on 
plantations (3). There was a gap in the time between the official 
ending of the slave trade and the development of alternative supplies 
of commodities to the Europeans on the coast. One reason for this 
resulted from the encouragement which the international slave trade 
had given to indigenous society to adapt to structures which facilitated 
the capture, trade and exploitation of slaves. Moreover, "the demand 
for tropical products made the exploitation of slave labour ... 
increasingly more remunerative" (4). Slave labour was set to work on 
plantations in Asante for example (5). Bowditch commented that slaves 
were used: 
to create plantations in the more remote and stubborn 
tracts; from which their labour was first to produce 
appropriate supply to the household of their chief, 
(1) M. Klein, 'The Study of Slavery in Africa: A Review Article", JAH, 
19,4,1978. 
(2) For a fuller discussion see Chapter 3 above and Eric Williams, 
Capitalism and Slavery, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981). 
(3) As we have seen above, early European attempts at developing indigenous forms of production and trade on plantations, for example, were not 
successful. Benefits from putting indigenous labour to work instead of 
shipping it overseas are not reaped until later. SeeChapters 5 &6 below. (4) M. A. Klein * cit., p. 13. (5) Wilks, (19ý5ý0p, -g. cit., p. 93 and Lewin, op_. cit., pp. 61-63. 
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and afterwards an existence for themselves (1). 
Slaves were used in most aspects of nineteenth century AsarT,, te 
life. Much of the newly developing wealth among the asikafo was used 
to purchase slaves. But as we saw earlier, together with commoners, 
slaves created a part of the wealth for they constituted a section of 
the labour force. Slaves were used to clear forests and to plant and 
raise crops on plantations and farms which provided a supply of food 
to towns and villages (2). The largest plantations were worked by 
slaves of the Asantehene in and around Kumase. The market for this 
agricultural produce was essentially the royal'household. Slaves also 
continued to be used in the mining of royal gold fields, and ivory 
collection. Slave labour was, moreover, invaluable in carrying the 
products of the newly lucrative local production of palm oil and kola 
to the Europeans on the coast. 
In all these activities and others too, slaves were put to work 
following the end of the Atlantic slave trade- Some of the suppl ies 
of unfree labour went northwards. The rest were, after time absorbed, 
perhaps as domestic slaves, into newly commercial agricultural 
production. European demand for produce, palm oil, food stuffs and 
later rubber, all added to. the importance to Britain of securing trade 
links with the Asante. The people in Asante to benefit most, and at 
first, from the change in nature of European contact with the hinterland 
(1) Bowditch, quoted in Wilks (1975), op. cit., p. 52. See also Arhin's 
brief discussion of plantations in7-rTFe-Tmpact of Europe: 
Traditional Societies and the Constraints of Colonial Rule: The 
Pressures of Cash and its Political Consequences in Asante in the 
Colonial period 1900-1940'. African Studi'es Association, U. K. 
Conference, Mimeo September 1974, p. 44. There was also a third reason 
why the presence of slavery did not decline immediately and this was 
because 'the Asante were continually improving their weapons and 
techniques of capture. 
(2) Lewin, 'op. cit., p. 61, see also Chapter 3 above. 
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were those linked directly with the apparatuses of the state: the 
Asantehene and his councillors and those Asantes seeking to attain 
higher status through stately recognition of trading and wealth 
accumulating achievements. The channels to achieve the latter in 
the first quarter of the nineteenth century wer-e few. The Company of 
State Traders had the protection from commoner trade. The Asantehene 
Osei Bonsu, in 1816 and 1817, persuaded European merchants on the Gold 
Coast to give preferential treatment to the company thereby reducing 
the threat of competition from private entrepreneurs (1). 
Although th6'ideology of Asante was therefore for everyone to 
ýeek wealth, the Asantehene protected his own trading interests and 
those of some of his councillors and chiefs against competition. The 
Company of Traders had similar assistance in trading northwards where 
the Asantehene would close roads at the beginning of a trading season 
until the statetraders had taken advantage of the prevailing high 
prices in the northern markets. The Asante state also established its 
own markets where trading transactions occurred. 
The Asante state here is seen as the "hierarchy of power 
holders and their councils and also the groups of asomfo, functionaries 
who were authority holders" (2). Sections of these estabished the 
policy for the state traders. Specifically the company revived 
guidelines from two legislative councils; the territorially representative 
(1) Wilks, (1975), op. cit., p. 689. Despite this many people traded to 
the coast saying tFe-ywere the Asantehene's representatives when 
they were not. Osei Bonsu was later to in-sist that Europeans traded 
only with those Asante's who had his cane or a letter of introduction, 
ibid. For detailed discussion of the organisation of the Bata Fekuo 
see 14ilks, ibid, and Lewin, op. cit * (2) K. Arhin, `Mte intervention in the Asante Economy', Universitas, 3, 
3, New Series, 1974c, p. 40. Hierarchy of power holders ranges from 
heads of councils, adekrofo, village chiefs or headmen, abrempon or 
ahene, see ibid. 
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Asantemanhyiamu and the metropolitan based Council of Kumase. The 
Bata Fekuo also received specific instructions from the Exchequer in 
Kumase, the Gyaasewahene and his staff (1). The Asante state and its 
power holders thus controlled the majority of trading transactions in 
the mid nineteenth century but in the process set in train a series of 
contradictions which came to threaten the supremacy of its tendency to 
mnopolise trade. 
These contradictions were based around the increased provision 
for'individuals within the state apparatuses to accumulate wealth and 
become rich men (asikafo) (2). The opportunity for accumulation, 
enshrined within the ideology of Asante society, increased as first; 
contact with the British extended and second, disquiet mounted among 
the asikafo, because of the dominance of the Asante state in trading 
concerns. This disquiet was-reflected in a groundswell of support 
from sections of the Asante ruling class for the imperialideology. 
Many rich men who managed to accumulate wealth through trade whether 
surreptitiously or through their position in the stately hierarchy 
still recognised the need to finance the army if Asante was to remain 
i ntact. 
Mid nineteenth century developments facilitated an increasingly 
powerful group of individuals with interests divergent from the pursuit 
of state directed mercantilism. Members of the company of state 
traders began to accumulate wealth in their own right. Early in the 
nineteenth century the company sent representatives to the coast and 
purchased commodities with monies (or forest produce) covered by the 
(1) This is discussed in detail in Wilks, (1975), op. cit., and 
I-lilks, (1974), op. cit. 
(2) Wilks, (1970, , op. cit. 
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Gyaasewahene (head of Exchequer personnel) and the Asante treasury 
However, towards the end of the mid nineteenth century period the 
agents of the Company became a class of financiers, utilising loan 
capital provided by the Treasury but also their own resources to 
generate profit for the goverment and for themselves (2). More and 
more state representati'ves began to accumulate individual wealth which 
was also facilitated by the demand for new cash crops on the coast (3). 
Individuals working for the company traded more and more on their own 
account. In so doing however, they were confronted by the monopoly 
of the state. Moreover, attempts by the wealthy class to transmit after 
their death, whatever monies or goods they accumulated while alive 
were frustrated by a whole series of state restrictions (4). The 
working together of the asikafo within the state company increased 
their recognition of a. common interest. This was to throw off the 
yoke of mercantilism and to increase the freedom to trade on their own 
initiatives free from the oppressive burden of the state. 
The whole nature of the Asante 'mercantilist system' was based 
upon the role of the state (and the prerogative (class position) of the 
Asantehene) in accumulation rather than in an individual's ability to 
accumulate. One such trusted method of the asikafo, was the system of 
taxation. Taxes were put on hoards of gold dust, on slaves purchased 
for sale on the coast, on ivory, on the permitted 'increase in the number 
(1) Wilks, (1975), op. cit., p. 700. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) T-or discussion of these opportunites for wealth namely rubber and 
cocoa, see Chapter 6 below. 
(4) We discuss some of these, namely death duties. on one occasion an 
asikafo, a wealthy Asante trader, tried to invest 170 ounces of gold, 
worth a proximately HOO, with a company in Cape Coast in 1881. The 
trader was discovered by the Asantehene and condemned to death. See, 
Wilks, (1975), op. cit., p. 701 and (1979), op. cit. 
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of gold ornaments and of course the state was entitled to all gold 
nuggets (1). Opposition to these taxes had been present before but 
this took on an added dimension in the 1850's when death duties, and 
thus the failure of the asikafo to transmit their wealth after death, 
became a particular point of contention. 
The rising groups of traders found greater scope to accumulate 
their own riches on the accession to power in 1863 of the war party. 
Asantehene, Kofi Kakari, tried to reduce the mounting bureaucratic 
nature of the state by encouraging private traders (2). War and 
subsequent defeat by the British in 1874 however, ensured the end of 
the brief return of the imperial power bloc in Asante. The deficit 
spending and erosion of trade plunged Asante into crisis. The new 
Asantehene, Mensa Bonsu, initiated a programme of Imodernisation, of 
the Asante infrastructure. The institutional structures of the state 
were to be transformed and a state bureaucracy to be rationalised. 
Infrastructural, changes were to include the development of a professional 
civil service, a number of European expatriate advisers and a new armed 
police force known as the Hausa Regiment (3). These new reforms were 
expensive and necessitated increased taxation which began once more to 
alienate the rich. Such was the disquiet generated by the increase 
that the 1880's saw bloody internal conflicts within Asante (4). 
(1) This list comes from Arhin, (1974), op. cit., p. 50. See also Wilks, 
(1975), op. cit., p. 701.. ' 
(2) Wilks, J975ýToR- cit., p. 702. 
(3) On the nature o-f-t-Fe-rEforms and professionalisation - ascendency 
to state positions by merit rather than lineage membership - see, I. Wilks, 'Aspects of Bureaucratisation in Ashanti in the Nineteenth 
Century', JAH 7,2,1966. See also, G. P. Hagan, 'Ashanti Bureaucracy: 
A Study or-tNe'Growth of Centralised Administration in Ashanti from 
the time of Osei Tutu to the time of Osei Tutu Kwamina Esike Bonsu', 
T. H. S. G., 12,1971. 
(4) 'Fo-rt-TFe detail see, Wilks (1975), op. cit. 
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In brief, the turmoil which developed into civil war in Asante 
in 1830 was prompted by independent trader opposition to the reforms 
of the state. Private trading had become more possible and profitable 
among sections of state representatives in the 1870's. This was 
especially notable in the neoily productive export crop of rubber. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that it was the traders involved in 
rubber production which prompted the coup of 1333. This coup unseated 
Mensa Bonsu from the Golden Stool and opened up the possibility for 
Twerebana to seek the positionofAsantehene. (l). After much unrest a 
group of office holders seeking to renew a mercantile system of commerce 
were reinstated. On this last occasion the drive for mercantilism was 
assisted even more by the state, so much so that for one writer the 
Asante political economy took on the character of state capitalism: 
By the last decade of the nineteenth century the 
Administration which was firmly in power in Asante 
was committed to policies which ultimately - through 
the catalytic participation of European money and 
skills - would have transformed the old mercantile 
system into essentially a state capitalist one (2). 
Asante and the British - An Introduction 
The above sketch of developments within Asante in the 
nineteenth century has three purposes. First, we have sought to show 
the kind of life which existed in Asante prior to European contact and 
thc-tindigenous society had its own dynamic and conflicts. In this way 
we have built upon our earlier discussions about the early contact Akan 
and Asante social formations (3). Specifically, we have discussed in this 
I 
chapter the principle, essentially an ideology, on which Asante culture 
has been said to be based. 
(1 ) Wi 1 ks, (1974), op. ci t 
(2) Ibid., p. 9. 
(3) 7eFe-Chapters One and Three above. 
270 
f 
Second, we have examined a number of contradictions and class 
conflicts which emerged during the nineteenth century to upset the 
ideological rhetoric that Asante society was characterised by 
egalitarianism and classlessness. We have used the two policy 
categories and pressures for 'mercantilism' and 'imperialism' as 
indicators of more deep seated class conflicts within nineteenth 
century Asante. By examining the nature of support for these two 
options of Asante expansion we have uncovered the demand. 'for an 
opening of state trade, by state traders themselves, who wanted to trade 
. 
on their own behalf without obstruction from the state. Finally, we 
have alluded to the fact that though we have stressed the need to 
examine indigenous developments within Asante, these cannot in any 
account of the area in the nineteenth century be separated completely 
from the European endeavours on the coast. Indeed, we have shown that 
it is not only necessary to recognise the existence of indigenous class 
conflicts and. developments in understanding the process of Asante's 
incorporation into a world economy, but that we nee. d to plot also the 
class conflicts within British colonialism before we can adequately 
assess the outcome of the contact between Asante and Britain on the coast. 
Asante ideology which put increasing emphasis on the need for 
individual accumulation helped fuel, and was in turn fuelled by, the 
greater chance for such accumulation when the Europeans on the coast 
increased trading activities there and sought to extract in greater 
quantity the produce of the forest region. European contact also added 
great strains to the indigenous political economy. By facilitating 
greater amounts of trade between the coast and Asante, the Europeans 
strengthened the Asante state but also added to dissentions between 
the ranks of As'4nte power holders. The British sought to get the added 
2 71 
benefit from peaceful trading with the Asante but were dissatisfied 
with the restrictions placed upon trade by the Asantehene. As such 
the British were not averse to assisting the erosion of chiefly 
dominance of trade wherever possible, even if this meant in 1877 a 
wholesale invasion of Asante. This practice of colonial interference 
with internal class conflicts was common on the Gold Coast and became 
increasingly so in Asante, especially later in the nineteenth century 
when the Asante refused to accept Protectorate status from the British (1). 
British policy towards Asante was unpredictable. During the 
Asante civil war the British had not allowed an Asante government in 
exile to use the Gold Coast colony as a base. Now that the Asantehene 
Prempe I, was seeking to reintroduce a concerted p_-olicy of mercantilism, 
which was to directly benefit specific concession companies, the 
British undermined the Asante state. Itis possi bl e that the Bri ti sh 
were fearful of an uncoordinated number of concessions going to 
unscrupulous companies without British vetting. The British were 
certainly unsure about the developments in Asante which might once 
more have flared up into violence and made trade with the coast 
difficult. As a result, the British withdrew their recognition of 
Asante Prempe as Asantehene of the whole Asante Empire and w'ere later, 
in 1900, following the Yaa Asantewaa war to impose their ow-n nominees 
as the head of the Asante. We look below at more of the issues 
surrounding this war, but it should be noted that the British took 
great advantage of opposition groups within Asante that opposed the 
rationalisation of the Asante state. 
The of f er of Protectorate status was ref used in 1888,1891 and 
1894. See Wilks, (1974) op. cit. 
7 o"; p 
From a tentative start at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, in initiating cash crop production and establishing clearer 
guidelines for colonial control, the British marked the end of the 
century with the occupation of Asante. Britain had established a 
firm footing on the coast and began to impose British juridical 
precepts in daily transactions there. By the 1890's the rush for 
concessions and the purchase of land had begun inland. This had 
been started apprehensively by the Dutch before them but British 
companies sought easier access to land which contained gold and the 
possibility of establishing European productive activities inland. 
The Asante obliged the earliest of these traders, most notably with 
the Herivel and Re. ckless Concession in 1892 and 1895 respectively. 
Both these agreements were made by the Asante government seeking a 
quarter of the net profits from the latterand cooperation in 
establishing machinery and industry in Asante from the former. The 
Asante, togetýer with the Akan in the western region were to realise 
that this new phase of colonial presence, where Europeans sought to 
work the land directly and establish plant and machinery, was to pose 
more difficult problems for them than the preceding period of colonial 
backing of legitimate trade. 
Now that we have traced in outline the period of transition 
to formal colonialism on the Gold Coast, and the increased incursion 
into Asante, we can focus in our concluding two chapters upon the 
impact of Britain's attempts at consolidating its rule by introducing 
more rigorously the requirements of capitalist production. 
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APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER FOUR 
Recorded Trade to EuroDe and North Ar-,, erica from CaDe 
Coast and Accra for the Period 1831-1840. 
CAPE COAST 
Imports Exports 
1831 1130,851 3s llid 1 90,282 9s 6d 
1832 1188,067 7s 1181,104 
1833 1151,439 12s 4d E124,147 los 
1834 081,262 5s 7d 1182,737 
1835 E175,935 3s 9d 1171,705 los 3d 
1836 1243,023 1174,832 los 3d 
1837 1264,990 il22,703 
1838 1159,405 1124,207 5s 7d 
1839 1354,460 il94,576 19S ld 
1840 1423,170 E325,008 
ACCRA 
Imports Exports 
1831 No returns No returns 
1832 123,716 5s** 162,474** 
1833 E61,607 10s 173,613 5s 
1834 118,359 16s 9d** 187,299 10s** 
1835 120,638** il2,435** 
1836 124,986** E52,311** 
1837 128,957 6s 5jd** E 5,062 12s 10id* 
1838 No returns 166,450 10s* 
1839 No returns No returns 
1840 H5,000 to 00,000 i85,000 to 05,000 
* For a three-month period ** For a six-month period 
Source: Adapted from E. Reynolds, (1974b) op. cit., p. 83. 
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APPENDIX IV TO CHAPTER FOUR 
Principal Imports into the Gold Coast 
G71ven total imports into the GM coast* 
Year Manchester Beads I Spirits and Year 
goods in i Wines in is 
1850 40,960 5,060 7,142 1850 88,656 
1851 28,360 5,325 15,060 1851 84,880 
1852 14,000 4,880 17,000 1852 71,635 
1853 16,000 3,220 16,580 1853 60,000 
1854 38,000 6,600 21,200 1854 107,200 
1855 68,187 4,033 11,330 1855 149,587 
1856 30,837 6,179 37,491 1856 105,634 
1857 36,838 2,083 13,011 1857 118,270 
1853 42,050 2,563 29,924 1858 122,457 
1859 43,060 2,910 23,704 1859 114,596 
1860 35,089 1,497 3,156 1860 112,454 
1861 74,628 1,006 39,991 1861 162,971 
1862 63,000 - 40,773 1862 145,100 
Source: Adapted from E. Reynolds, (1974b) op. cit., p. 137. 
The figures of total imports given in the official records are 
at best very rough estimates because the itemised individual 
imports between 1850 and 1856 exceed the official totals. 
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CHAPTERFIVE 
COMODITISATION OF LAND AND LABOUR: ca. 1874-1930: I 
THE COMERCIALISATM OF LAND 
I INTRODUCTION 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the 
consolidation of British colonial control 'on the coast and its estab- 
lishment in Asante. The departure of the Dutch in 1872 left Britain 
more firmly in control of the growth of legitimate trade. Moreover, 
the way now lay open for the British to assemble the legal and 
institutional paraphenalia which was by many seen as a necessary corollary 
to military and merchant occupation of the territory. 
British Government 'policy' on the Gold Coast had been piecemeal 
and unclear throughout the period of contact. Arguably it was only the 
merchants' interest which persuaded the government in England to keep a 
foothold in the area in 1828. Another moment of decision for the British 
occurred in the 1860's when once again the Asante and southern districts 
came into conflict with each other. The result of the foray was the 
establishment in 1865 of a Select Committee to enquire into the West 
African settlements (1). The outcome was equivocal. The recommendation 
of the Committee was for no further extension of territory, the abolition 
of Executive Council Supreme Court and the placing of British settlements 
under one government, based in Sierra Leone. The feeling of British 
representatives on the coast was the reverse. Indeed, although in 
(1) G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, Documents of Ghana History, 
1807-1957, (London: Published for the University of Ghana, by 
Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1964), pp. 305-318. 
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principle a non extension of the territory was recognised by the 
Acting Governor in 1865 it was felt that within the existing boundaries 
stronger control should be exercised (1). This opinion was not 
sanctioned immediately but certain events on the coast did encourage 
the governmentin England to reconsider its recommendation. The 
Conservative government realised that with the withdrawal of the Dutch 
more revenue might be appropriated and directed towards Britain. The 
demise of the Fante confederation similarly made the colonial regime 
more confident of its sphere of influence and this was adequately 
demonstrated with the-British defeat of the Asante in 1874. From 
tentative moves of withdrawal the colonial power, albeit slowly, 
recognised the more obvious benefits that could accrue from a prolonged 
stay on the Gold Coast - one which should nevertheless see the transfer 
of power increasingly to the indigenous people (2). The possibility 
of the latter, however, was very much reduced given that the British 
settlements were soon to be converted into a Crown Colony of the Gold 
Coast and the Southern States into a Protectorate in 1874. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the issues 
raised by the deeper involvement after the mid nineteenth century of 
the British in the Gold Coast and later in Asante. In particular our 
concern here, as with the following chapter, is to look at some of the 
affects for the people of the territory resulting from their increased 
(1) 
- 
Ibid., p. 305. 
(2) ýe--eResolutions of the Select Committee, 26.6.1865., "the object of 
our policy should be to encourage in the natives the exercise 
of those qualities which may render it possible for us mor ,e 
and 
more to transfer to them the ministration of all the Governments, 
with a view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except, probably 
Sierra Leone". Emphasis in Original. QUoted in ibid., p. 311. 
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incorporation into a developing world economy. We will not trace or simply 
catalogue the 'events' of the period. Instead, we examine the questions 
raised by the accelerating number of concessions in the territory, for they 
introduced a relatively new form of colonial exploitation of the land and 
people living on the Gold Coast whose effects will be our main focus. In 
particular did the alienation of land initiate any change in the way in 
which the Akan or coastal people related to each other? Was there a change 
in the relati've positions of different groups already identified in the 
colony - women, commoners, chiefs and elders? What effect did the increased 
commoditisation of land have for Africans and was there an acceleration in 
the general monetarisation of the economy? 
In looking at these questions we need once more to remember that this 
particular phase of colonial contact did not find a passive amorphous mass of 
indigenous inhabitants ready to accept, in whatever way, the transformation 
of their political economy. The traditions of resistence and protest have 
been well documented, not only for the Gold Coast, and mention must be 
made at least briefly of these activities (1). Our major concern in this 
and the following chapter is with assessing the impact of the numbers of 
concessions which mushroomed in this period, most particularly in mining 
and later in timber and agriculture, and to see the early beginnings of 
the development of a wage labour force. The demise of the slave trade 
had been officially celebrated in 1807 but the use of slaves in the colony 
persisted through the nineteenth century. The erosion of this 
activity was continually SOLght by the District Commissioners and 
(1) See for'exampýe, Francis Agbodeka, African. Politics and British Policy 
in the Gold Coast 1868-1900, A-study in the forms and force of protest, (Illinois and London: Northwestern UniversiFy--P-r-ess, Longman, 1971) 
M. Crowder (editor) West African Resistance (London: Hutchinson, 1971) 
for comparison of South East Africa, s-ee--ATlen F. Isaacman The Tradition 
of Resistance in Mozambique Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambesi Val-T-ey 
1850-ý1921, (Londo einemann, 1976Y. - 
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Colonial authorities, and we can examine some of the results of this 
policy in readiness for the following chapter which will examine in 
more detail the problem of labour supply to an economy not used to the 
rigours and traumas of permanent wage employment. We also need here 
to recognise and also, explain, the increased formalisation of British 
colonial control ; the development of several legal initiatives which 
were used to both legitimate and advance colonial authority and to see 
what relationship existed, if any, between the entrenchment of formal 
colonialism and the mushrooming of concessions on the Gold Coast. 
ii MINING CONCESSIONS IN THE TARKWA AREA 
We have already seen the importance of the Gold Coast to the 
Engl i sh economy as a suppl ier of i nputs to an i ndustrial i si ng nati on 0)- 
United Kingdom imports of palm oil alone rose Oom 1 000 tons in 1810 to 
more than 40,000 tons in 1855 (2). European reliance upon items like 
these from legitimate trade on the Gold Coast declined as the boom in 
mid nineteenth century England drew to a close (3). It was again gold 
which at this time became a major concern to Europeans. Although the 
first 'modern mining' can be dated back to 1861 it is only really with 
the return of British soldiers from the Asante war, of 1873-4, that the 
cry went out that Asante and the western part of the country was riddled 
with gold (4). So impressed was Bonnat, for example, with the actual 
0) For more on this see Chaper 4 above. 
(2) A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, (London: Longman, 1973) 
p. 128. 
(3) There was, for example, a fall in the price of palm oil of 50% between 
1862-1866, ibid. 
(4) David Kimble-, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast 
Nationalism 1850-1928, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) sees Thomas Hughes, 
as the first to iFport modern mining equipment in 1861 which is destroyed 
by local chiefs in Western Wassaw. Bonnat, however, is usually recognised 
as the pioneerof the gold boom in 1877. See Kimble, ibid., and Jim Silver 
'The Failure of European Mining Companies in the Nin'E-t--eenth-Century Gold 
Coast', J. A. H., 22,1931, p. 512. 
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and potential production of gold, something which he recognised 
during his four years as a captive in Asante, that he helped form 
the first joint stock mining company to exploit gold production on 
the coast (1). This was the African Gold Coast Company in 1878 shortly 
to be followed by'the further entrenchment Of Messrs Swanzy and 
Company in 1879 and the Effuenta Gold Mining Company and the Gold 
Coast Mining Company in 1880 (2). This increase in the number of 
companies, seven more were registered in 1831 and eleven in 1882, was 
at first welcomed but later became a source of concern for the colonial 
authorities on the coast (3). 
We will look in a moment at the specific forms of legislation 
that the colonial regime tried to introduce to regulate the allocation 
of land. We will also assess whether the alienation of land in this 
way marked a new departure for the Akan. What needs to be stressed 
here is that having previously had a somewhat indifferent and uncertain 
attitude towards economic activity on the coast the British occupiers 
saw the gold boom, and the presence of joint stock companies, as a 
rational way of exploiting the resources of the Gold Coast but one 
which nevertheless did not warrant, at this stage, increased colonial 
state assistance. These companies represented a way of transforming 
solely trading entrepots into major concession areas and in the process 
creating a more productive wage labour force freed from the constraints 
of the pre-capitalist economy. , 
(1) See, Sir W. B. Griffith to Lord Knutsford, Papers Relating to H. M. 
Colonial Possessions. No. 66 Gold Coast, Reports on Gold Mines 1889, No-1, 
Parliamentary Papers 1889, LIV, Accounts and Papers, Londdn, HMSO 1889. 
(2) J. Silver, op. cit., p. 513. See also W. F. Holmbs, 'Notes on the Early 
History of-Tar-T-wa as a Gold Mining District', Gold Coast, Revi6. w,, I I, 
i, 1926, and, N. R. Junner, Gold in the Gold Coast, (Accra: Ghana 
Geological Survey Department Memoir, No. 4, Rep'rinted, 1973). See flap 
of Gold Mining Concessions in 1879, p. 262. 
(3) J. Silver, op. cit., p. 513. 
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The colonial government was equivocal throughout the latter 
part of the nineteenth century as to the speed and extent of proletariani- 
sation of the indigenous labour force. Moreover, the government was 
concerned with the pace at which expatriate companies began to purchase 
land, fearful that such alienation would too quickly disrupt indigenous 
relations of production. Indeed, the pace at which colonial capitalism 
was to be established and the extent of its incursion in creating a 
wage labour force becomes a crucial question for the colonial state. 
Unlike the suggestions of some authors we will seethat'. the outcome of 
the establishment of formal colonial rule on the Gold Coast was neither 
the complete destruction, or the graýual dissolution of pre-capitalist 
modes of production (1). Instead, in furthering the establishment of 
capitalism on the Gold Coast the colonial regime was cautious not to 
completely disrupt indigenous relations of production because of the 
consequences it would have for the colonial state. This will become 
clearer as we examine the colonial moves to establish indigenous cash 
crop production and especially in the colonial attitudes to reducing 
the pace of capitalist relations of production in the formative period 
of the cocoa industry (2). 
The 1890's saw the suggestion that the Crown alone should have 
the opportunity to approve concessions, although to the dismay of the 
companies European traders still had to negotiate with the chiefs and have 
(1) On the former see, A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolu- 
tion? (New York and London: Monthly Review Pres -1969), and on the 
latter see P-P Rey, Colonialism, Neo-Colonialisme et Transition au 
Capitalisme: Exemple de la 'Comilog' au Congo-Brazzaville, (Paris: 
Maspero, 1971), G. Dupre and-15-P Rey, 'Reflections on the pertinence of 
a theory of the history of exchange, Economy and Society, 2,1973, and 
C. Meillassoux, 'From Reproduction to Productiorf, Economy and Society, 
1,1972. 
(2) See Chapter 6 below and B. Grier, 'Underdevelopment, Modes of Production 
and the State in Colonial Ghana', African Studies Review, 24,1,1981. 
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'respect' for 'customary law'. Before looking at the disputes specifi- 
cally over land and the developing colonial states' apparatus to cope 
with these, we can now look briefly at some of the difficulties that 
were encountered by the concessionaires in acquiring their concessions 
and in beginning their business operations. 
Principal alluvial gold deposits were situated in and around 
Tarkwa on the western side of the old Coast colony (1). For one official 
gold mining in Tarkwa had been a dominant form of local economic activity 
for many years before the 1880's. It was a place where: 
a floating population ... move(d) from place to place as new surface workings for gold are discovered 
and opened up in different places (2). 
It was here that Bonnat began his mining in earnest. Local prospecting 
on the Ancobra River's existing workings in Tarkwa were to be further 
exploited. The bell shaped pits of indigenous prospectors had already 
reached the water table at sixty feetýand rather than simply sell them 
pumps to facilitate greater indigenous gold production Bonnat sought to 
exploit the area himself (3). Indeed in 1382 only 5 years after Bonnat 
arrived there were six other European companies established in the area. 
This rush, however., to gain access to the gold fields in Tarkwa was 
very uneven. The thought that a second Rand had been discovered was soon 
tempered as expectations were not met. This was reflected in the fact 
that after the buoyant start of eleven new companies being registered in 
(1) See maps Six and Seven on pages 262 and 265. 
(2) Papers relating to H. M. Colonial Possessions op. cit., p. 10. SeealsoGNA(A) 
ADM 27/l/l where it is recorded that there were more than 1000 men, 
women and children engaged in the washing of gold, in the late nine- 
teenth century at Tarkwa. 
(3) E. A. Boateng, 'The Tarkwa Gold Mining Industry -A Retrospect', Ghana Geographical Association Bulletin, 2,1,1957, see also GNA(A) AUT_ 
271111. 
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1882 none were inaugurated in 1384, and although an estimated il million 
had been invested in the Gold Coast only about 127,000 had been recouped 
by 1901 with the shipment of seven thousand ounces of gold (1). 
The poor return on monies invested certainly was not due to 
the unavailability of land, although the quality of the concessions 
can be questioned. The Civil Commissioner's reports for the Tarkwa 
area, for example, are filled with doubts about the prudence of so many 
concessions and so much land being alienated. For instance, the Ancobra 
concession covered much of the area and there was hardly a square mile 
in Apinto which had 6ot been rented (2). This was seen to have a 
deleterious effect upon the indigenous people. It was observed that, 
-those kings and chiefs claim to rule the district 
in which the land is situated but they are completely 
in the hands of one or other of the European managers 
who by (costly) presents keep them in their pay (3). 
This erosion of the independence of chiefs will be explored later. 
Here we can look at some of the difficulties which were besetting the 
companies. These were problems both internal to the company and to 
the nature of the joint stock companies, and those external to the. 
companies brought to bear on them by the people whose territory the 
companies sought to control and whose labour power it sought to 
appropriate. 
(1) J. Silver, op. cit., p. 515, quoting H. Louis, 'Gold Mining on the 
Gold Coast', Minin Journal, (1901), pp. 1108-1109. The gold rush at 
this time or TF-e--rJ-ungle Boom' was seen to have been based upon 
hysteria rather than economic rationality. See, S. Hymer, 'The 
Political Economy of the Gold Coast and Ghana', in, Gustav Ranis 
(editor), Government and Economic Development, (Yale: Yale University 
Press, 197Tý-. 
(2) GNA(A) ADII 27/1 /1 Tarkwa Dupl icate Letter Book March 1881 -Hay 1834, 
report January 31,1882. 
(3) Report December 31,1881 in ibid., p. 84. 
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(a) The Companies and Inadequate Capital Accumulation 
The problems associated with the internal organisation of the 
European mining companies and their'financing which inhibited their 
successful presence on the Gold Coast has recently been documented (I). 
Briefly, blame for the failure of European gold mining companies in 
the nineteenth century is seen to lie first, in their inability to 
accumulate sufficient capital for them to move beyond even the "prior 
stage of so-called primitive accumulation" and second, because of their 
inability to secure an adequate supply on the Gold Coast of labourers 
to work in the mines (2), 
In Tarkwa alone there were six companies working in 1882 but 
none of them had "an adequate amount of initial seed capital nor 
capital accumulated through the expropriation of surplus value" to 
facilitate "an accumulation of money capital in the hands of the owners 
of the means of production" (3). Thiý lack of resources was reflected 
on the coast where Civil Commissioners observed as late as 1894 that: 
All the mines are doing fairly well but the 
outlay is so great that they require to be 
extensively developed in order to make them 
pay (4). 
Part of the reason why insufficient capital could be accumulated was 
(1) J. Silver, op. cit., p. 516, see also C. Illegbune, 'Concessions Scramble 
and Land ATTenation in British Southern Ghana, 1885-1915', African 
Studies Review, 19,3,1976. 
(2) J. Silver, -Op. Cit. 1 Pp. 516-517, the issue of primitive accumulation is discussed Tin__Mapter Two above and more fully in Chapter Six below, 
see also Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1970). 
(3) Silver, 0 P. c it., p. 516. 
(4) GNA(A) 277T7-6--Duplicate Letter Book, Quarterly Report, July-September 
1894. The nature of this 'outlay' in the form of infrastructure is 
examined below. 
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the pursuit of profit through speculation. Shares floated for Gold 
Coast mining concerns soon became known as 'Jungle shares'. This 
was because of the activities of 'share pushers' in the exchanges in 
London and Paris and 'concession mongers'. The latter's activities 
severely limited the amount of capital available by companies for gold 
extraction. Concession mongers would buy concessions from 'stool' 
holders cheaply only to sel, 1 to companies at vastly inflated rates. 
Severe debts were thereby imposed on companies that paid dearly for 
the purchase of land rights and who were consequently left with little 
money for equipment and running costs (1). 
It was not only a question of being able to acquire sufficient 
machinery for the extraction of gold that posed problems for the 
European companies, but also what kind of machinery and how was it to 
be transported from the coast through the forest to the mines? The 
level of European technology was poor. Before the introduction of the 
Macarthur-Forrest cyanide process in 1895, the use of stamps to crush 
the ore and water and gravity to separate the gold had to be supplemented 
by the labour of African women using calabashes to pick the ore out by 
2). This peculiar paradox, of the importance of pre-colonial forms hand (4 
of gold mining and extraction coexisting side by side with modern 
imported techniques was recognised early. The Civil Commissioner of 
Tarkwa in 1882 recorded that: 
The native miner will for a long time to come be 
the real prospector of the mining wealth of the 
country and be very useful both to Europeans and 
native land owners (3). 
(1) Silver, op. cit., p. 5. 
(2) Ibid., p '. 521. In addition there was considerable ignorance of geology. 
(3) -G-N7F(A) 27/1 /1 January 31 , 1882, p. 94. 
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Great store was placed upon the use of machinery but there were 
immense problems of transportation associated with carrying very heavy 
equipment on often impassable roads, not to mention the obstacles to 
get reluctant employees used to such strange equipment (1). It took 
Abontiakoon mines two weeks, for example, to transport one and a half 
tons of machinery from Bonsah by truck (2). 
A further factor which inhibited a successful rate of return 
to the companies was their own managerial inadequacies and lack of 
mining expertise. "The fault in the mine (Akantoo) appears to me to 
be that it has not been efficiently managed hitherto" (3) was the 
comment by one official on the coast. Indeed a recent observer has 
suggested that the inability of the mine managers to get the cooperation 
of Africans in transporting equipment inland was just part of the 
former's inadequacy in general management issues (3). 
Many of the early concessionaires were clearly dilletantes - 
speculators trying to make a quick killing without being familiar with 
scientific mining techniques. This was partly because after the mining 
activity on the Rand 'took off' South Africa was seen to be a more 
engaging prospect than the intemperate and uneven possibilities in 
West Africa. 
This section has emphasised the inadequacy of the mining 
companies to sustain a relatively new form of capitalist enterprise. 
The joint stock company had its roots in productive activities in 
Europe and was now increasingly used to sustain colonial interests 
overseas. The lack of enthusiasm showed by the colonial state in 
ý 1) Papers relating H. M. Possessions 0 cit., pp. 3-4. 
2) GNA(A) 27/l/l op. cit., Report Juneý! 
ý & ý82. This road was built by 
indigenous commoners at the behest of the mines, see ibid, Report 30 
September 1882, where the King of Wassaw is criticised for only bringing 
out 18 men. 
(3) Papers relating to H. M. Possessions, op. cit., p. 3. (4) P. Rosenblum, 'Gold Mining in Ghana, 1874-19001, Ph. D Columbia University, 
1 0,7ý, IýI. 
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entrusting and encouraging the exploitation of gold was a major 
stumbling block to the mining companies' success. The colonial regime 
on the coast had favoured the greater extension of British control in 
the area, but a change of emphasis away from peasant agricultural 
production of the nineteenth century to mining had not yet been fully 
sanctioned. A 'policy' of actively encouraging the mining companies 
would have meant higher expenditure by the colonial state on infrastructure 
like railways. This expenditure could only have been met with the 
imposition of taxation on the colony, but the backlash and opposition 
from such a move was not something the colonial authorities wanted to 
face (1). At the same time the greater alienation of land was needed 
for the security of the company which in turn would have separated the 
direct producer from the means of production thereby creating a freer 
wage labour force. This was to come, in fits and starts, but was not 
something the colonial state at the moment felt it wanted actively to 
engage in. 
(b) African Imposed Constraints on Mining Companies 
African resistance to wage employment and the rigours of 
regulated industrial work was a large constraint imposed on European 
mining companies in the nineteenth century (2). For much of the time 
(one estimate is until 1893 (3)) African gold production actually out 
produced European companies, reflecting the persistence and greater 
(1 ) Expenditure in the mining areas always seemed to exceed revenue: compare 
the figures in GNA(A) 27/l/5, and a major item of expenditure, the sub- 
sidy of roads by government forthe first quarter of 1894; revenue 
1219-10-2 while expenditure = 14ll-10-8. 
(2) This contrasts with the view which sees colonial difficulties in getting 
labour rooted in the failure of individual people to respond to market 
conditions and in particular to a cash nexus. For an extended critique of 
this latter position see S. B. D. de Silva, The Political Economy of Under- 
development, (London: Routl edge & Kegan PauV in asýo`ciation with South 
East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1982. ) On transforming indigenous labour 
rocesses see below Chapter 6 and on the theoretical debate, Theo Nichols 
editor), Labour, A Marxist Primer (London: Fontana, 1930). 
(3) Silver, op. cit., fn. 65, p. 523, compare figures given by R. Dumett 
quoted in ibid for the year of 1889. 
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suitability of African forms and relations of production in gold 
mining. Indeed one mining company showed a preference for using 
African relations of production choosing simply to appropriate one 
third of the employees production as rent and allow the Africans to 
keep two thirds (1). 
The persistance of pre-colonial relations and organisation of 
gold production is a testament to the difficulties with which a number 
of undercapitalised mining companies could superimpose a different set 
of relations of production upon indigenous forms of production. This 
also alludes to the problem of labour shortage which faced the mines (2). 
The companies had to face and overcome a contradictory position. They 
needed more workers for the mine and at the same time they wanted to 
maintain the production of local foodstuffs for the sustenance of the 
workers. In time this contradiction imposed a tension between expatriate 
interests andthe'colonial state. The former wanted the speedy release 
of workers from pre-capitalist relations of production while the 
latter, although in agreement with the onset of supplies of wage labour, 
were unsure about its pace of development and the disruptive impact 
which the process of proletarianisation might have on indigenous authority 
structures. 
The issue of food shortage was constantly being recorded. On 
one occasion Tarkwa was seen as "the most expensive and difficult station 
(1 ) This company was Wassaw (GC) Gold Mining Company which leased its 
shafts to local producers. See Silver op. cit., p. 523. This company 
also worked a variation of this. When automated, one third of gold 
stamped out went to all the indigenous work force. See GNA(A) 
27/l/I op. cit., entry, Report June 30,1882; this company also used 
African managers. 
(2) The issue of labour is examined more closely in Chapter 6 below. 
29 on:; o 
to obtain food" (1). In later years the fears of dislocating food 
production by using immediately neighbouring labour were temporarily 
offset by the use of a migrant work force (2). Indeed, even at this 
stage local labour was not used as much as was desired, but this was 
for other reasons. For the Civil Commissioner of Tarkwa, for example, 
"The natives of these parts are bad workers and are employed as little 
as possible at the mines" (3). Consequently Kroo workers were imported 
from the Liberian coast but this proved'a costly and unreliable affair 
as the workers rarely stayed more than a year at a time. 
The poor responsiveness of local labour however, to the demands 
of European commercial activities was not universally recognised. For 
one writer the reluctance of local Africans to become involved in the 
European organisation of production was because of the brutality of the 
regime and the treatment of the workforce (4). European difficulty 
wi th Af ri can 1 abour was cl early not a questi on of the perreni al 1 az i ness 
of the Negro, oft quoted in Victorian England. Indigenous production 
of gold, as already stated, exceeded that of European companies for 
many years. Rather, it was the preference Africans had (at prevailing 
wages and in prevailing conditions) for Akan relations of production 
over capitalist wage employment whichpreventeda continuous flow of labour 
GNA(A) ADM 27/l/4 Tarkwa Dupplicate Letter Book 1891-1893, Report 
Quarter ending 30.6.1892. 
(2) For the use of migrant labour in another context for cheap reproduction 
costs see H. Wolpe, in H. Wolpe (editor), Articulation of Mod es of Product- 
ion, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). It might tentatively be 
suggested here that the development, albeit uneven and uncertain of a 
migrant labour force on the Gold Coast was somewhat of a compromise 
between the companies and the colonial authorities in satisfying the 
labour requirement of the mines. 
(3) GNA(A) ADM 27/l/l, Report 31.8.1882. 
(4) E. D. Morel, Affairs of West Africa, (London: 2nd Edition, Frank Cass & 
Co Ltd., 196-gT-Appendix, The Gold Coast Mining Industry. We need only 
look at DC's court figures for a greater idea of the severity with which 
white miners treated black workers. See for example GNA(CC) Accra 146, 
1965. 
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to the European mines (1). The constraints of regular time keeping 
and the appropriation of all the product of one's labourwas new to the 
Akan gold producers. It was true that the chief appropriated, through 
the abusua system, all large nuggets of gold and in other ways regulated 
a labour force of commoners and women, but ways had been devised of 
trying to obviate the loss of much of the gold produced (2). Indeed, 
such was the development of ways of 'cheating' the chief of his 
'rightful' amount of gold, the chief was more than willing to sell 
gold bearing land to Europeans so as to return to a steady income - 
one denied to him by the tricks of his previously reliable labour force. 
Work discipline per se was not new to the Akan but it was an 
innovation to have it imposed under the rigours of capitalism. Throughout 
this period up to the end of the nineteenth century and beyond, the 
colonial authorities, acting almost at the behest of the mining companies, 
pleaded with the chiefs to ensure a constant flow of labour to the mines. 
After all it was seen to lie in: 
the interests of your (King Enimil Kwow of Amantson) 
people as well as the company that the mining industry 
of this colony should thrive. I trust that you will 
use your utmost endeavour on behalf of your people by 
exercising all reasonable influence to induce them to 
work and not to take them away from this work (3).. 
This particular episode of pleading with local authorities was in direct 
response to the King of Amantson sending his linguist to the Tarkwa and 
Aboso mines. He instructdd all Amantson workers there to "immediately 
vacate their respective employment"- amove which in the words of the 
mine manager "means the entire stoppage of the works" (4). 
(1) Silver 'o cit., see also Rosenblum, op. cit. (2) See Chap bove. 
(3) DC to King Enimil Kwow, February 16 1894, GNA(A) 27/l/5 p. 304. 
(4) Ibid., January 31 1894, DC to King Enimil Now. 
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African resistence to imposed work routines in the mines was 
clearly potentially enormous and this was often realised. The form 
of this resistence tended to be sporadic and individualistic. There 
was no economic reason for Africans to work in the European companies 
because indigenous forms of gold and peasant production were financially 
more renumerative. Dissention with the wage system would come in the 
form of withholding the best forms of gold. There was also a riot in 
Prestea in 1895 following management attempts to withhold part of a 
five month outstanding wage bill for good behaviour (1). 
The ability to acquire sufficient and suitable labour was 
perhaps the greatest problem which beset the mines. The difficulty 
grew steadily worse. Appealing for help-the District Commissioner of 
Tarkwa wrote to the Under Secretary in London in 1901: 
The labour question here everyday becomes more and 
more difficult (and I am afraid) that this will 
deter Europeans coming out moreover (1) believe 
that many a mine will shut down for the want of 
labourers or on account of the great expense 
attachable (2). 
Silver, op. cit., p. 528. The possibility of more riots because of 
overcrowU-ingand the throwing together of people under conditions of 
capitalist enterprise was recognised by the Dt of Tarkwa in 1901. 
Commenting to the Colonial Secretary he wanted some 'influential 
miners' to be granted ministerial powers. He recognised also that 
poor sanitary conditions promoted unrest. The DC wanted mine police 
with the power of arrest and a similar force for the railways. See 
GNA(A)'27/l/7. See also Jeff Crisp, 'Labour Resistance and Labour 
Control in the Ghanaian Gold Mining Industry, 1870-1980', Ph. D. 
University of Birmingham, 1980, especially Chapters one and Two on 
early forms of indigenous resistance to European mining ventures. 
There was a dispute in 1892, for example, at Gia Appantoo mine involving 
as many as 300-500 workers. I am grateful to Jeff trisp for permission 
to cite this. See also Jeff Crisp, 'The Labour Question in the Gold 
Coast 1870-1906', SSRC/Third World Economic History Group, Liverpool 
Conference, 17-19 September 1982; on different forms of worker conscious 
ness and resistance, see the interesting recent article by Robin Cohen, 
'Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers, 
ROAPE, 19,1980. 
(2) GNA(A) ADM 27/l/7, pp. 162-3. 
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In another communique the District Commissioner stressed the need: 
For the mines to have cheaper and better labour 
I have the honour to ask his excellency's 
consultation to have imported labour from 
India or some one of his majesty's other 
colonies or China and to meet the expenses of 
their transport to this colony on employment a 
head Tax should be paid (1 ). 
Issues relating to the mining companies' demand for labour 
will be picked up again in the following chapter (2). We have 
illustrated here the change in European capital's demand for labour 
in the years between ca. 1870-1910 as opposed solely to the production 
of cash crops which prevailed since 1807. The pressure for a free 
wage labour force was one part of the ongoing transformation of the 
Akan social formation, a transformation which-saw increasing attempts 
to disengage sections of the work force from pre-colonial production 
activities and incorporate them within a developing capitalist 
circuit of production on thecoast. This circuit of production was not 
autonomous or dependent solely upon the activities of people on the 
coast but was linked with developments in Europe. Moreover, the process 
of increased separation of Akan peasants from pre-capitalist relations 
of production was not without difficulties. Some of these presented 
themselves in the form of African resistance to incorporation in 
capitalist work practices but"some were also the result of inter 
colonial conflicts as to the desirability of detaching a work force 
for the mines from pre-capitalist modes of production (3). We can now 
(1 ) Ibid., p. 163. 
(2) T-nparticular see section 11. On attempts at colonial control of the 
reproduction of the work force for the mines and the pressures between 
the mine owners and colonial authorities over the viability of a 
'migrant labour force system' see llb. 
(3) On some of these disagreements see section IH below. 
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see some of the effects that Europe's greater interest in the Gold 
Coast had on issues associated with land and trade in the colony. 
The legal structure used to regulate the increased commoditisation of 
land and the struggle to implement the legislation occurred between 
1894-1900. This followed the realisation by the colonial authorities, 
notably Carnavon in England and Governors on the coast, that the 
incorporation of the Gold Coast people into the developing capitalist 
economy in Europe had to be rationalised and sanctioned by legal 
paraphenalia. As late as 1899, for example, the Captain Resident on 
the coast wrote to the'colonial Secretary in Accra condemning the lack 
of procedures to facilitate the orderly purchasing of concessions: 
Now nearly all the prospectors who have lately 
been in Ashanti have been going about getting 
concessions from people who have no rights to the 
land at all, they have never been to Kumasi nor 
applied here to have their concessions filed (1). 
The consolidation of the Gold Coast Colony (officially demarcated as 
such in 1874) was now to be enforced through a series of proclamations 
and ordinances in an attempt to impose English forms of legal control 
and authority upon traditional property rights (2). The desired 
impact was to control the development of concessions and to secure 
inter alia; the development of the gold mining industry. A stop had 
to be put to the sale of fraudalent worthless concessions as they: 
(1) GNA(A) ADM 45/l/l Letter Book for Mines, 30 March 1899-23 March 1901. 
(2) See the quote by Carnavon, 1878, in Francis Agbodeka OP-Clt-, 
p. 114. These concerns were finally contained in an 
6rUinance of 
June 1878. For example: a chief to be summoned and held responsible 
and the ability and right of Governors to subdivide villages and 
groups. Head chiefs and councillors to make bye laws subjects to 
Governors veto. Rights of appeal from native court to court 
commissioners. 
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will bring great losses to the general public 
who will be the sufferers, as well as driving away 
sound capitalists from investing their money in 
Ashanti (1). 
LAND AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS 
The increase in the number of concessions which occurred at this 
time began both to impose and hasten several new facets to the Akan 
political economy which are associated with a developing capitalist 
economy. Most noticeably these were the alienation of land for 'private' 
use, the monetisation of the economy and the commoditisation of labour 
0 
power. We are here going to concentrate on the impact of colonial 
incursion and the buying of concessions on land use. A little later 
we will see the impact of monetisation and legal structures upon 
idigenous inhabitants of the Gold Coast (2). 
The colonial governments' attitude to the increased number of 
concessionaires was at first undecided. It was seen increasingly 
necessary to establish clear cut procedures whereby Europeans could 
acquire land to work gold deposits or begin agricultural development. 
Before a more organised strategy for dealing with the influx of 
concessions was developed colonial authorities relied upon informal 
contact with chiefs advising them, through the use of circulars, that 
it was up to the traditional authorities to safeguard their own allocation 
of concessions. A circular to a chief in 1891, for example, suggested 
that: 
(1 ) GNA (A) ADM 4 5/1 /1 . (2) The issue of land rights is clearly complex and has partly been 
dealt with in Chapter 1. We examine the monetisation and 
commoditisation of labourc)ower in Chapter 6 below. 
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any contract, grant or concession which you make will be 
made entirely at your own risk and that the government can 
assume no responsbility whatever in respect of it (1). 
As time wore on the granting of concessions was to cause enormous 
concern for both the colonial and indigenous groups. For the colonial 
authorities it was recognised that land grabbing by companies in a 
haphazard way would be disastrous to the long run attempt at capitalising 
upon cash crop production in the territory. 
A consequence of European interest with gold mining, and 
concessions was the increased use of fuel and shaft props for the mines, 
a European industry began to be centred around the felling of trees in 
theforest. Demand for timber was also the product of more construction 
activity on, the coast and the extension of the railway system (2). The 
expansion of European production activity into the forest areas placed 
an increased strain on relations between capitalist adventurers and 
indigenous inhabitants. This emanated from concessionaires recklessly 
'purchasing' land without any controls on the size or procedure for 
appropriating areas on which to exploit minerals or other natural 
resources. Chiefs would be approached for the 'sale' of their land in 
ignorance of African forms of land tenure. But what was this form of 
tenure? 
To recap what was said earlier (3), rights to land were 
dependent upon membership of the common ancestry, to the abusua or 
segmentary Akan matrilineage which safeguarded reproduction by control 
(1) D. C. Vroom, Circular Letter to Chiefs of Wassaw September 16,1891, 
GNA(A) 27/l/3 Emphasis in original. 
(2) The construction of railways served other functions in addition to that 
of carrying mineral wealth to the coast. The development of a railway 
'system' is one of the few examples of colonial capital input and 
serves as a form of economic expansion. The railways also served to 
extend British political and military expansion. There were conflicts 
in the development of a colonial transport policy. See Chapter 6 below. 
(3) Chapter 1. 
29.9 
over access to land and the ability to produce goods for consumption 
and trade. Our argument has been that access to land was similarly 
crucial and the restriction of this imposed by chiefs, together with 
the greater 'allocation' (appropriation) of land to chiefs and elders, 
was one way of generating and sustaining political power over commoners 
and women. This view contrasts markedly with many observerscomments 
on the position and importance of land in Asante (1). Indeed the 
'traditional' view of land, as made in declarations by indigenous groups 
themselves, sees interest in land vested in the stool rather than a 
specific person or group (class) of persons (2). We are told for 
instance that "no individual person owns any land or lands within the 
social division of Mampong" (3). Instead, allocation of land is made 
byr. the stool-*I- albeit through the chief - and Oman council. We have 
argued earlier that it is precisely this sanctioning of the allocation 
of land by the chiefs and councillors for use by members of the polity 
and strangers moving into an area, that provides this group of notables 
with a position of power. In short, although earlier writers, including 
(especially) chiefs, in answer to colonial questionnaires, underplayed 
their part as individuals in allocating land, emphasising instead their 
official position as guardians and chiefs for the whole polity, their 
position as chiefs precisely enhanced and elevated a position of power. 
In theory ownership of land remained with the stool. No land could be 
transferred without a chief's consent and the sale of a farm or any 
land within the Mampong Division, for example, did not affect ultimate 
(1) Compare D. Kimble op. cit. 
(2) See the Declaration of Native Customary Law made under Section 76(l) 
Ordinance No. 4 of 1924 X (Mampong) Division, GNA(K) ADM D Box 1907 
Customary Law 15/3/27-30/7/32. 
(3) Ibid. 
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ownership which resided with the chiefs. No 'stranger' could sell or 
lease land without consent of the chief and anyone who was not a stranger, 
who had built a farm and wanted to use it as security against a debt, 
first had to notify the chief and Oman council of the stool in which land 
ownership existed (1). 
This brief excursion into the 'accepted' notions of land ownership 
on the Gold Coast is used to once more dispel two opposing myths. The 
first is one of communal bliss and egalitarianism in early Akan society. 
The second is that the system of working the land through the abusua 
itself constituted a form of alienation. We will see shortly that it is 
precisely a new form of alienation that colonial authorities and con- 
cessionaires try and nurture because it is this which is seen to enhance 
colonial authority and secure higher levels of agricultural producti. vity. 
We can now look more closely at the general impact of concessions 
mentioned in section one and of new moves to develop agricultural areas 
and forest reserves. What was the procedure for these concessionaires 
and what problems or difficulties were encountered in the relationship 
between the land hungry Europeans and the chiefs from whom they 'requested' 
land to work? We consequently are not concerned with tracing or 
documenting the series of concessions (2). Rather, we want to uncover 
the nature of the very many disputes which erupted at this time with 
Europeans and the colonial state. In doing so we will use a selection 
of new concessions to illustrate the argument that disputes over land, 
(1) Ibid. The presence of debt here was itself the product of the 
increasing encroachment of European Capital. 
(2) Although the extent of land parcelled out as concessions is important 
in terms of the availability of more land for Europeans. On the extent 
of European land alientation, see, Ilegbune, op. cit., who estimates a 
total of European land alienation in the perioH-MO-1913 in Western, 
Central and Eastern Provinces of 25,108 square miles. 
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the right to concede it and the resulting increased recognition of a 
money value in land, led inexorably towards the increased monetisation 
of the Asante and Gold Coast economies. The increased desire for 
money income was an inevitable corollary of the colonial 'political' 
presence on the coast and something which both forms a basis for and 
is the partial outcome of the implanting of a colonial capitalist 
economy. 
(a) A Struggle for Land 
The period between 1880 and 1930 witnessed an enormous influx 
of European concessionaires on the Gold Coast and Asante (1). These 
created a number of problems for indigenous inhabitants. For example, 
there was a marked increase in the number of recorded land disputes 
between the indigenous people. Part of the difficulty was that only 
now was there an added incentive to specifically demarcate land areas 
between different groups and individuals on the coast because money was 
being offered to appropriate its use in mining, agricultural land and 
timber felling. As the Civil Commissioner of Tarkwa observed in 1832, 
the problem was that a chiefly land owner when leasing a piece of land 
did not know whether he had over-reached his neighbour's land (2). One 
such dispute, among many, occurred in 1893 between chiefs of Attobra, 
Kuma, Brufoe, Fairbil and Kaye, after concessions had been made to a 
European merchant for gold mining and timber cutting rights (3). The 
havoc caused by the sudden increase in the leasing of land gave 
opportunities for both African and Europeans, alike to cheat and swindle 
(1) For a summary of, British difficulties in developing reserves, which the 
colon ia1 authorities tried t3 create in part as a result of the impact of the European 
concessions, see Appendix 11 to this Chapter. 
(2) GýA(A) 27/l/I Tarkwa Duplicate Letter Book, March 1881-May 1884, Report 
31.1.1882. The suggestion was made for a joint meeting in the Tarkwa 
mining area to inform each other of people's boundaries. 
(3) GNA(A) 27/l/5 Tarkwa Duplicate Letter Book 24.3.1893-26.6.94. Report 
ending quarter 31 . 3.1893. 
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their opposite number in business deals and for chiefs to enhance 
their position over commoners through increased financial renumeration (1). 
these double dealing activities seemed to extend to Africans co-opted to 
work for the colonial regime. The Colonial Office in 1902, for example, 
wrote to Akropong Concession Limited following the latter's complaint 
of being hoodwinked; "coloured colonial officials are in with the 
natives in the matter of worthle'ss concessions". The colonial official, 
therefore, wanted to know how the company had "acquired rights of option 
over land which was found ... not to carry a trace of gold" 
(2). 
This confusion continued the whole time that an anarchic system 
of acquiring concessions remained without any safeguards for concession- 
aires or Africans alike. These were to come later only after a long 
struggle between colonial and indigenous authorities over the 
classification of African land. Meanwhile this period of colonial 
extension on the Gold Coast increasingly inipcsed changing property 
relations on the Akan with regard to land. Traditional chiefly 
control in many areas declined. This was partly because of their own 
preoccupation with the selling of concessions, often the. same one more 
than once (3). The extent of the manipulation and hoodwinking of 
See, for example, GNA(S) , Acc No. 2373 Horton's Aboso Concession 
Enqui ry No. 
211, where redrawing of boundaries was made to ensure land in the con- 
cessionbelonged tothe chief who was entitled to the smaller proportion 
of rent. This chiefly enhancement of power was nevertheless uneven and 
arguably shortlived. It diminished as opportunities increased for 
commoners to earn cash incomes. See below. 
(2) GNA(A) ADM ll/l/2 Case No. 100 MP 100/1900 UpperWassaw - Native Affairs 1900. (3) Chiefs were duped as much as they managed to swindle concessionaires. 
In 1904 for example the King of Adansi lent E200 to a representative of 
Ashanti Gold Concessions. The King complained to the DC that the repre- 
sentative dissented in repaying the money. When the DC questioned the 
firm about the deal the latter denied all knowledge and informed him 
the representative was now in South Africa (! ) GNA(K) 893. 
0 'SS' 
, sbest cited 
by the published claim of one indigenous people is perhap 
company to mineral and timber rights over an area of 7,000 square miles 
conceded by chiefs forDO - not all of which was paid (1). Chiefly 
control, moreover, was also subject to decline because of increasing 
possibilities of cash income to elders and commoners in newly established 
, 
industries (2). In 1883 it was noticed that chiefs were becoming 
"particularly powerless" in Tarkwa, an area of concentrated European 
gold mining concessions: 
As far as I have observed in no part of the 
Protectorate are the chiefs such non entities as 
they are here'- their sole idea seems to be to 
sell gold lands' concessions and to mine and wash 
alluvial on their account, consequently their 
villages and roads are sadly neglected (3). 
The concession boom on the Gold Coast was not centred solely 
around prospecting and mining areas but increasingly became focussed 
aroudd the purchase of land for the felling of timber and the development 
of an industry based on forestry. The mul ti pl ici ty of smal 1, of ten 
opportunistic and undercapitalised concerns duplicated those of 
prospecting and mining for gold. The colonial government adopted an 
ad hoc view of the development of a timber industry as it had over the 
development of mining concerns, at least until it recognised formally 
the possibility of a viable export industry centred on the west of the 
colony. It was not until the passing of the Forest Ordinance in 1927 
that a system of reserves was develondd to protect the forest areas 
(1) Kimble, op. cit., p. 339. See also Oral Data deposited in the African 
Studies Unit, University of Leeds; especially the interview with Chief 
of Aboso, about the whites seizing as much land as possible for a 
bottle of Schnapps. 
(2) More about the increased access to cash later. See also Chapter 4 on 
Akan class formation. 
(3)-GNA(A)'ADM 27/l/l, 19 March 1883 to Assistant Colonial Secretary in 
Charge of Native Affairs. 
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from so-called indigenous 'abuse', but this was only after a long 
and often bitter struggle with local inhabitants and the Aborigines 
Rights Protection Society (ARPS) (1). 
The decline in chiefly power through disputes associated with 
concessions and the increase in cash economy posed a serious threat 
to the colonial state which sought to develop a capitalist economy 
on the Gold Coast but one initiated through the customary power holders. 
The pace at which the Gold Coast economies should develop in line with 
colonial wishes had to be gauged so as not to disrupt the political 
framework employed by the state. The colonial authorities on the coast 
recognised that if, as had happened in mining, European adventurers 
came to take what they wanted in their own way, without any guidelines, 
the disruptive effects upon indigenous people would possibly also 
disrupt the smooth imposition and transition to a formal colonial 
political economyonce more geared towards the export of indigenous 
products for the benefit of the colonial power in Europe. 
It was earlier in the 1890's that a number of government 
suggestions were made to try and rationalise theuse of land generally 
I 
and to do this by vesting any unoccupied land in the Crown with'further 
concessions being made subject to government approval. In 1883 a Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance had been passed with the concern of administering 
the Gold Coast colony by acting through the chiefs. The chiefs and sub 
chiefs were given the power to make certain bye laws but the Governor 
retained a substantial power of veto. We will say more about these 
measures below. Suffice to say here that given'the increased commercial- 
isation of land following the development of European concessions and 
(1) See below. 
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concern with developing the resources of the Gold Coast, the colonial 
regime tried increasingly to ensure an institutional framework "to 
grapple with the problem of adjusting indigenous socio-political 
structures to alien rule and actual forces of social change" (1). 
Among these forces of change were increasing numbers of concessions 
following an increased presence of Europeans on the coast and their 
movement inland. It was in grappling with these European commercial 
interests and in directing them towards a coherent colonial policy, 'that 
the colonial regime got embroiled in attempts to demarcate the allocation 
and specification of indigenous land which in turn prompted vociferous 
opposition (2). The colonial regime recognised the need to both control 
the land and to determine its ownership in accordance with capitalist 
requirements of land as a commoditybut not always as an entirely free 
commodity. Although these concerns underscored the Crown Lands 
Ordinance of 1894,, the pronounced reasons for government legislation 
on such a thorny issue was to protect African owners from unscrupulous 
speculators and to check ruthless exploitations. 
Briefly, the Crown Lands Ordinance had three main pronounced 
concerns; to vest all rights in forest land and minerals in the Queen 
for the colonial government's use; future grants of waste land, minerals 
and timber to non natives were to be only at the agreement of the 
Governor; finally, "Native Rights" in land, grants of land by one native 
to another, were to continue as before (3). In the words of the Governor, 
(1) Bjorn M. Edsman, Lawyers in Gold Coast Politics ca. 1900-1945, 
(Sweden: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studies-Historica Upsaliensia 
111 , 1979), p. 102. (2) See Kimble ' op. cit., and Agbodeka, op. cit. (3) Agbodeka, 22- cif-- 
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the British government should be able to prevent the lands of the 
colony from "falling into the hands of concession mongers for a 
bottle of rum or a case of gin" (1). Although it wasassumed by the 
Governor, Brandford Griffiths, that the piece of legislation would go 
through unopposed, the assumption that there was anything called 
'waste land' was a grave error. Together with the Town Council's 
Ordinance this act of legislation was heavily petitioned against. 
There was of course no waste land. Instead, traditional forms of 
cultivation left areas unoccupied only to be returned to later for 
agricultural activity'. 
Opposition to the Bill reached a peak so that the colonial 
authorities themselves questioned the fruitfulness of such an act. 
Indeed, the Attorney General thought that the proposal to control 
concessions might frighten off speculative capitalists who after all 
were the chief hope for the future of the colony (2). The Crown Lands 
issue is, moreover, an illustration of the failure of the colonial 
state to act in a manner some writers have assumed was more or less 
rational. Apart from failing to understand indigenous land tenure 
ghts and wrongs and 
the colonial regime was unsure of the benefits, rin 
likely outcome of interfering directly in indigenous affairs in the 
attempt at channelling European investments (3). 
After much opposition by the ARPS in the form of a series of 
petitions to the Queen and pressure on parl iament, Governor Maxwel I 
proposed a revised ordinance. This new Bill was ostensibly to give 
ý1) Quoted in Kimble, 0 p. cit., p. 334. 
2) Quoted in ibid. % The form of the opposition is documented i-n-"Tbid., pp. 337. 
(3) See G. Kay (ed-1-tor) The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana, 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 197-21-7 
307 
the Crown rights of administration but not of ownership, for it was 
announced that the intention of vesting waste and forest land in the 
Queen had been abandoned (1). The 1897 Bill sought to regulate the 
transfer of land. No native land owner could grant land exceeding 
t%lenty acres without the consent of the Governor. Only the Governor 
could grant exclusive rights in land to companies, and annual payments 
in respect of land granted to companies or other bodies could be paid 
in whole or in part to any chief who had consented to the granting of 
such land (2). 
Opposition to this new, proposed legislation was also fierce. 
The government could still declare a piece of land unoccupied and then 
authorise its occupation. Moreover, indigenous rights of ownership 
were no longer, if they ever had been, recognised automatically: 
Occupiers to land would not be disturbed; but they 
would be entitled only to a settler's right, a 
permanent heritable right of occupancy which could 
be transformed into an absolute right on application 
to the governor by the grant of a land certificate (3). 
The colonial states' position was clear, although it took time 
for it to be articulated. It was crucial for the colonial state to 
enter into the complex issues of the control and administration of 
land on the colony. As government officials put it: 
It is necessary that the permanent power should 
exercise concurrently with local chiefs where 
necessary the power of allocating land and interests 
in land to applicants (4). 
(I ) Kiýible, op. cit. , p. 340. (2) Agbodeka, op. cit., p. 140. 
(3) Kimble, on. cit., p. 340. 
(4) Government Gazette Extraordinary, No. 8,1897, quoted in Agbodeka, 
op. cit., p. 140. 
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For the government this legislation would give greater security for 
the Gold Coast people over the land. Commercial transactions in land 
were to be regularised which would ensure greater colonial state control 
of the pace and nature of European incursions in land. For the chiefs 
and people living on the coast the Bill was yet another attempt to 
reduce'their control over their own destiny. Transactions in land 
were now to be subject to a version of English law and a new concessions 
board. 
Opposition to the bill mounted. This was orchestrated by 
newspapers on the Gold' Coast especially the Gold Coast Chronicle. 
This paper maintained that the colonial government's intention in 
introducing the Bill was nothing to do with taking care of the poor 
African in the face of capitalist concessionaires. Instead, another 
interpretation on the legislation was made. They quoted a speech the 
Governor had made to the Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool, wherein he 
argued land laws if left to: "the exclusive disposal of the native 
authorities enabled the native to run up his rural hovel with its grass 
roof in immediate congruity to the stone house of the British trader 
importing thus the dangers of contamination of every kind" (1). This 
statement was reported together with rumours that land legislation was 
to be used to appropriate land for the building of 'country houses' on 
the coast. The result was that members of the Legislative Council met 
and formed an organisation specifically to oppose the legislation (2). 
The ARPS was formed in 1897 to stress the importance of indigenous 
institutions in the light of colonial attempts to erode traditional 
areas of culture. This group thought that it was also the right moment 
(1) The Gold Coast Chronicle, 9 April 1897 quoted, in ibid., pp. 140-1. 
(2) Ibid. 
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to try and stress the needs for better forms of African representation, 
and in the process to stress African opposition to the Concessions 
Bill (1). 
The measures adopted for opposition to the Bill were reflected 
by a statement given by the President of the ARPS at the start of a 
mission to England. They were going to get ... "assistance of able 
and eminent council in the first ranks of the English Bar" to press 
their case in open debate (2). Unlike other opposition movements 
this form of protest was not to be violent or to take on the character 
ofattacking the institutions of the colonial state. Instead, the 
ARPS, led by African lawyers and professional men sought to use the 
legal channels at their disposal to prevent the decline in the chiefs' 
control of land. Tile protest movements concern with safeguarding 
traditional forms of land allocation reflected a desire in part to 
maintain the already hierarchised position of chiefs in relation to 
commoners and women (3). However, it was not always clear that the 
ARPS wanted simply to maintain an elevated position for chiefs in 
society (4). In their protests to the government the ARPS also sought 
greater opportunities for educated Africans'. For instance, how could 
(1) Agbodeka, ibid. 
(2) Quoted in 1571., p. 145. 
(3) For one wrilter it marks also the inability to later develop the forces 
of production; R. Howard, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1978. ) 
(4) The notion that the ARPS sought solely to maintain the position of 
chiefs is of course debatable. In particular see Terence J. Johnson, 
'Protest: Tradition and Change; An Analysis of Southern Gold Coast Riots 
1890-1920', Economy and Society, 1,1972. In this article Johnson is 
careful to highlight the impac: E that the Asafo companies, dissident 
young men (commoners), made to the ARPS and their motive for so doing: 
to protest increasingly against the chiefs as the main agent of colonial 
control. See the final section to th-is--c7apter and Chapter 6 below for 
a brief discussion of splits within the ARPS and the Native Congress 
of British West Africa (NCBWA). 
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an indigenous group of businessmen develop if they were persistently 
inhibited and prevented from acquiring sufficient land, inputs and 
favourable market conditions by the colonial state? Why were Africans 
always penalised in their aspirations to develop their own resources 
and why instead were European concession companies encouraged to develop? 
The ARPS was later to write in protest against the Timber Protection 
Bill that they sympathised with the government's desi're to restrict the 
cutting of immature timber but such a policy should not lead to penalities 
of imprisonment or fines on... African businessmen. This measure along 
with others infringed upon: 
the rights and enjoyment of private property namely 
that persons owning timber land or concessions are 
to be fined or imprisoned if they failed to attain 
the permission of a District Commissioner to cut 
timber onýtheir own land ... (1). 
The Bill of 1897 was seen to work against native investors laying 
them open to the mercy of the foreign speculator. Indeed, it was wrong 
for the colonial regime to focus solely upon export trades and the 
encouragement of foreign investment because: 
Besides its expenditure, there are local needs for 
timber and a great many of the people use lumber 
made out of timber trees growing on their own 
property in the way of furniture etc. Carpenters, 
joiners and other cabinet makers also largely buy 
and use local lumber for trade purposes (2). 
After a while, opposition to the 1897 Concession Bill intensified. 
For Maxwell this was orchestrated by African speculators. The leader 
of the ARPS had after all been linked with the Gold Coast Native 
Concession Purchasing Company Ltd which in turn was involved in 
negotiations for the Adansi Concessions, later to be owned by Ashanti 
(1) GNA(CC) 150 Timber Industry 27/2/1907-29/11/1935 Letter form ARPS 
protesting against the Timber Protection Bill. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Gol df iel ds Limi ted (1 ). The culmination of the protest was a delegation 
to London in 1898 and a petition to Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary 
which outlined three reasons for African opposition to the Bill. The 
first was that there was no unoccupied land for the Crown to take 
control of in the colony. Second, any procedures linked to the Bill 
should be judicial and not administrative, and third, that this judicial 
procedure should be subject to native law and not English law. 
Chamberlain gave assurances to satisfy the ARPS on pointstwo and three. (2) 
Despite these however a Lands Bill, in the form of a Concession 
Ordinance, was passed in 1900. This Ordinance was an attempt to limit 
the excesses of some unprincipled concessionaires while simultaneously 
aiding the development of the mining and timber industries. This 'new' 
Bill did not interfere with the right of landowners to make grants of 
land while a new judicial tribunal of the Supreme Court was to be 
established to investigate all concessions. Final approval was necessary 
however, before a concession was declared valid. A limit was to be 
placed upon the size of mining concessions of 5 square miles and of 
others to twenty. A specific time period was to be imposed on concessions 
rather than let pieces of land lie unworked, for purely speculative 
purposes (3). 
This legislation and the debacle with African opposition finally 
resulted in greater security of title for the concession holders together 
(1 ) Kimble, o cit , rp. 343. (2) Ibid., ýFi_g 
ý. *his 
volte face is suggested to be due to Chamberlain's 
reaTisation that West Africa was no placefor, permanent white settle- 
ment as in South Africa. As G. Padmore put it, quoted by Kimble 
ibid., p. 354 "The mosquitoes saved the Uest Africans not the eloquence 
of the intellectuals". 
(3) See Appendix I to this Chapter for an example of a concession with 
this new procedure and the various legal stages. 
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with a protection from fraudalent endeavours. Although the ARPS saw 
it as a great victory, and for one recent observer Africans remained 
in absolute possession of their lands, it was in name alone (1). A 
further inroad had been made into both real and potential forms - 
of Gold Coast productive activities through a clarification 
of the framework within which expatriate firms were to operate 
on the Coast. The legal paraneters established for continued under- 
development of the Gold Coast were established by the colonial regime 
as part of a 'development' policy to promote production for the export 
of gold and timber. 
The concession court was certainly busy in the first quarter 
after it was established in Tarkwa by the Concession Ordinance of 1900. 
For example, there were 65 criminal and 47 civil cases resulting in a 
revenue for the exchequer of M (2). The call from some colonial 
officials increasingly came to reflect mining interests. The demand 
was for a concerted attempt at developing commercial activities linked 
with the land. The District Commissioner in Tarkwa, for instance, 
following the establishment of the Lands Bill in 1900, began talking 
about the need for chiefs to be compelled to cultivate a certain portion 
of their land for growing corn and food for the mines first and then 
for export; all at fixed market prices (3). 
It (is) necessary that the chiefs be compelled to 
cultivate certain portion of their lands or some 
other means adopted whereby the resources of the 
country may be taken advantage of, at most of the 
mines European vegetables are a success and I 
believe it would increase the enthusiasm for the 
cultivation of vegetables if a competent gardener 
(1) Agbodeka, op. cit. 
(2) GNA(A) ADM-777178, Duplicate Letter Cook 1902-3, Report on Wassaw 
District for Quarter ended 30 June, 1902. 
(3) Ibid. 
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from Aburi was stationed at Tarkwa to advise the 
laying out of suitable gardens (1 ). 
Accompanying this increased interest by the colonial regime in promoting 
some African peasant production the colo-nial state souqht to impose legislation 
limiting activities in the forests. A Timber Protection Ordinance was 
introduced in 1907 to prevent the cutting of immature trees. The advice 
of the Conservator of Forests in Nigeria was that African farming 
techniques were wasteful and there was a substantial overexploitation 
of the forests for timber and fuel. The recommendation was for the 
establishment of forest reserves in areas particularly prone to deforest- 
ation. A Forestry Department was established in 1909 to overview 
developments in the timber industry and legislation was drafted to 
place 'waste lands' in reserves. The colonial regime, blind to the 
earlier opposition that this kind of wording and terminology had had, 
now sparked off a further round-of protest. For one protester, the 
people were with the stroke of a pen reduced to: 
mere squatters, depending, in effect upon the 
foreign capitalist for a daily wage as hewers 
of wood and drawers of water (2). 
An amended version of the Bill was drafted, making it clearer 
that ownership was not being affected. An owner remained in control 
of land until he failed to manage it prooerly. Supervision of theland 
passed to the Forestry Department. This was still an inadequate 
recognition of African.. land rights. The ARPS protested strongly and 
the Secretary of State took the opportunity to have a full inquiry into 
(1) Ibid. Report on Wassaw District Quarter ended 30 September 1902. Colonial 
representatives at the Botanical Gardens at Aburi became an important 
pressure for apparent 'Scientific' and progressive forms of agricultural 
production and play a key role in the later development of colonial rule 
and policy. 
(2) J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Land Tenure and the Forest Bill, quoted in 
Kimble op. cit., for the latter this is seen as an emotional appeal . On th( contrary this was an appeal which recognised the transformation of theGol( 
Coast economy into a monetarised and wage labour economy. 
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conditions governing the alienation of land (1). The Belfield Report 
of 1912 was unequivocal in its findings. The land was the property of 
the people and a concession was simply a contract to which the government 
was merely a supervisor. Too much advantage had been taken of inhabitants 
in the rush for concessions and the size of mining activities should be 
reduced from five to one mile. 
It was clear that any system of reserves proposed by the Forestry 
Department would create unrest among the inhabitants of the Gold Coast. 
Later discussions and attempts at establishing a system of forest reserves 
were fraught with difficulties (2). These varied from disputes between 
and within different groups on the land, 'confusion' as to whose land 
it was and the attempts toimposea, demarcated reserve where no farming 
was allowed on what would only ever be agricultural land. The 1911 
Forest Ordinance was never enacted. It was not until 1926 in fact that 
a similar Bill was passed and we will see some of the effects of this 
in the following chapter. 
The disuputes discussed thus far have been between representatives 
of the African classes and colonial state, and also between various 
capitalist interests which attempted to gain the support of the colonial 
state in plantation and mining concessions. There were also increased 
disputes within different Akan groups reflected by the number of destool- 
ments. The ability of a group to destool its chief has always been seen 
as a characteristic of democratic principles within the Akan. The 
frequency of these events rose dramatically with the onset of colonialism 
and the subsequent increase in debts incurred by individual chiefs, 
H. C Bel fi el d, Report on the Legi sl ati on Governi ng the Al i enati on of 
Native Lands in the Cold Coast Colony and Ashantis with some observations 
on the Forest Ordinance, l 911 . (London: 1912), p. 366. (2) See Appendix II to this chapter. 
1 e'--o 
and brought by them within the rubric of the stool (1). 
The increased disruption of the way of life of the indigenous 
African population was the product of an increasingly pervasive cash 
economy: not with the presence of cash per se but with the notion of 
the cash nexus instigated by the colonial authorities and European 
firms operating in the hinterland. Indigenous disruption also followed 
the rigours of the European supervised work discipline. One such 
expatriate firm which was relatively successful in its operation at 
this time was Mengel Mahogany logging company fron, Louisville, United 
States of America (2). - This Company was the only exporter. of mahoo-any 
and sought to cling to its monopoly, It had a substantial number of 
employees; approximately sixteen hundred Africans on the beach, rivers 
and in the logging camps. They began operations at the turn of the 
twentieth century. They also employed a selection of Africans in 
clerical work and as skilled labour. Their production figures compared 
very favourably with competitors. For example, in the nine month period 
Guggisberg gave the increase in destoolments as follows: 1904-08, =7; 
1909-13= 23; 1914-18 = 38; 1919-24 = 41. See Grier op. cit., P. 44, fn. 7. 
The only acceptable debts which could be incurred co-tT-ectively by the 
stool were for things like the building of stool houses or the burying 
of a chief. With the spread of concessions and cash economy chiefs 
incurred higher levels of indebtedness and presented them to the Oman 
for collective payment. The colonial authorities saw this as a 
destabilising effect. Stool debts were just one part of the increased 
malaise which afflicted Asante and the Akan followingthe bigger desire 
to earn money and to offer land to concessionaires. The vast major"Ity 
of cases recorded in the Civil Record Book by colonial authorities were 
for indebtedness emanating from disputes between indigenous groups and 
between the Akan and concession companies. See for example, GNA(A) 
SCT 4/4/1 Civil Record Book. Added to these examples of indebtedness 
following the advance'of colonialism should be numbers of criminal 
and civil cases after the development of concessions and mining 
companies. See inter alia GNA(A) ADM 27/1/14 Tarkwa Duplicate Letter 
Book 1909-1910 anFOATATADM 27/1/20 Duplicate Letter Book Prestea, 
1911-12. 
(2) GNA(S) 1973 Concessions, 8449 Bibiani Timber Concession 12/6/10- 
20/11/16. 
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January - September 1913 the company produced ca. 17891 logs from 
operations in Axim including Twin Rivers, Princes, Half Assini and 
Anabo (1). To try and maintain this rate of exploitation Mengel's 
supervised the drive of logs from the interior "all the way from the 
Bush to the Akanko, boom and work goes on through the day till 
finished" (2). Other firms were less fortunate in their appropriation 
of the forest resources because they were dependent upon the driving 
of the logs by African traders. European timber firms saw the latter 
as unreliable. This was largely because sections of the African 
labour force were becoming 'freed' from pre-capitalist relations of 
production but this separation was still only partial. For example, 
African labour involved in the shipping of logs was based on a tribute 
system where it was only financially remunerative to ship logs if there 
was sufficient demand for them on the coast. In 1926, the demand for non 
contracted timber was small; consequently few logs were shipped inland 
by Africans. Those working in the tributary system were in a position 
where the alternatives were either to sell at a loss, leaving logs to 
rot below Enibil or of returning them at expense to fresh water. Here 
vias a case where African producers had modified their relations of 
production to fit into an increasing market economy but, perhaps 
ironically a lack of demand had led to the withdrawal of the 'commodity' 
from the market. African labourers involved in the timber industry 
'got bored' when insufficient rain fell to transport the logs. They 
(1 ) GNA(S) 379 Tinber Industry 30/4/13-29/11 /30. Whi 1e tal ki ng about Mengel 's 
profitability it is interesting to note that it was not always obtained 
'fairly and squarely'. TheY viere not exempt from malpractice and non 
compliance with the regulations for concessionaires. Having paid the 
'exhorbitant'(') consideration fee of ilO5 for fifteen years timber 
concession in May 1908 they were fined E17,000 for default. See, GNA(S) 
1973 Concessions 8570 Kumasi Timber Concessions 19/12/12-14/l/13. 
(2) Ibid. D. C. Tarkwa to Commissioner Western Province, 25/10/1926. 
17 
therefore left to do something else (1). 
(b Pressures Tcwards Landlessness 
Together with the increased number of land dis. putes which 
resulted from the growing number of concessions and number of stool 
debts, mining and timber concessions also had the effect of drastically 
reducing the readily available amount of land traditionally used for 
cultivation. Most concessions had a clause allowing for the continuation 
of farming rights but a good many concessionaires ignored this proviso. 
The Ohin of Mansa, for example, complained in 1925 to the District 
Commissioner of Tarkwa that he was prevented, contrary to agreement, 
"from collecting firewood or cutting wood of any sort from the land" (2). 
This situation was to get worse later when a system of timber reserves 
was finally established which placed restrictions on the farming of land. 
The Ohene of Brakwa, for example, said that: 
after my enstoolment, I could find no place to 
cultivate as a chief of the town of Brakwa, and for 
this reason beg to apply that a little portion 
should be granted to me for the purpose of 
farming (3). 
It was in an attempt to prevent the continuation of a situation 
like this that a Lands Bill was introduced. The legislation was not 
intended to prevent the alienation of African land. It was rather 
intended to prevent its haphazard and uncoordinated appropriation. The 
Act took time to become operational and when it was enacted it was 
(1) We discuss colonial difficulties"with securing an indigenous labour 
force, separated (freed), from pre-capitalist relations of production 
in greater detail in Chapter Six below. 
(2) GNA(S) District-Administration Office Tarkwa: 174 Timber Firms and 
Industry 19/6/1924-9/2/1948, quoted in letter Commissioner Western 
Provinces to DC Tarkwa 18 November, 1925. 
(3) GNA(CC) District Administration Office ADM 23/l/452 Forest Reserves and 
Forestry 19/7/1929-23/4/1946; The Ohene of Brakwa 24 August 1929 
requesting part of Oboya Reserve. 
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not particularly effective. As late as 1930 British officials in 
Downing Street were telling one enquirer from Mexico, who wanted to 
work on the Ancobra river, that: 
The land in the Gold Coast is regarded as the 
property of the Native tribes and that leasing 
it is a matter of arrangement with them subject 
to validation by the government (1), 
However, it was still common in 1924 for timber to be cut without 
acertified concession being taken up. Payment in these cases was 
made for each tree felled and the district was then left as soon as 
the operator had two or three seasons in it (2). 
IV COLONIAL TRANSFORMATION AND MONETISATION OF THE GOLD COAST 
ANn A'%ANTP 
We can see already that the consolidation and drive to control 
the Gold Coast by the British, and the incursion of a capitalist money 
economy at the end of the nineteenth century had a number of consequences 
for the Akan. We will look specifically in this concluding section on 
the overall impact of the broader European capitalist presence on social 
relations of production in Asante and a number of reactions to it on the 
coast, specifically with regard to proposed colonial legislation to 
facilitate indirect rule. We shall first see what this legislation was 
and then what was its desired impact. We need in short to see more 
clearly the nature of the colonial capitalist impact at this time. 
The thrust of our argument is that the period leading up to 
the 
'Yaa 
Asantwaa war in 1900, and the early years of the twentieth 
(1) GNA(S) Transferred District Sekondi 379: Timber Industry, 30/4/13-29/11/30 
(2) GNA(S) 285 Timber Concession Reserves Ankobra and Sehvii District 
Provincial Commissioner Sekondi to Acting Conservator of Forests, 
20/6/1924. 
1 10, 
century, ý, Jtnessed the increased development of commodity relations 
in Asante and the further supervision by the colonial state of the 
conditions for the greater exploitation-of labour and land in the 
colony (1). One form of this 'supervision' was the development of 
legal measures to increase British formal colonial control over 
indigenous activities through policies of indirect rule (2). In turn 
these policies sought to further enhance the commercial viability of 
the colony and trade emanating from Asante but with the minimum of 
disruption for indigenous institutions. 
The significance of legal changes during the period of colonial 
and capitalist incursion has been discussed at length (3). Briefly, 
although specific forms of capital penetration had different effects 
on different historical social formations a number of general 
observations can be made relating to the desired impact of the legal 
frameworks imposed by colonial authorities to facilitate the easier 
incursion of the colonised territory. 
As British interests on the Gold Coast grew, especially 
following the separation of the colony from Sierra Leone in 1850 and 
the establishment of the colony in 1874, it was recognised that the 
(1) The role of the colonial state and the processes whereby capitalism 
enters non-capitalist social formations has been conceptualised in one 
manner by H. Sernstein, 'Notes on Capital and Peasantry', ROAPE, 10ý 1977. (2) See F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Imperial Africa--(Uondon: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1923). 
(3) Francis G. Snyder, Capitalism and Legal Change: An African Transformation 
Studies on Law and7ocial Control (London: Academic Press, _MTý_, see 
also 'Labour Power and Legal Transformation in Senegal', ROAPE, 21, 
1981. For a theoretical appraisal of the importance of law in 
capitalism, see Ergeny B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General 
Theory, Introduction C. Arthur, (London: Ink Links, 1978T. 
C. Sumner (editor) Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, (Lojidon: Heinemann, 1982). ' 
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interests of miners and concessionaires together with the colonial 
authorities could not be represented wholeheartedly by indigenous 
processes of decision making. If the colony was to develop satis- 
factorily, (that is, if, inter alia, the colony was to become more 
profitable), then a different legal framework would have to be imposed (1). 
This would lead to a rationalisation of decision making and a hierarchy of 
personnel leading to the entrenchment of the colonial state which could 
supervise all issues of law and order which had a bearing upon the 
further development of capitalism in the colony. Previous forms of 
social control, those, imposed by chiefs in their own right were not 
wholly conducive to the further penetration of pre-capitalist forms by 
colonial capitalism. The development of capitalism in the colony; the 
monetisation of Asante and the coastal areas, the imposition of taxation 
for revenue and for the partial separation of the labourers from their 
means of production together with much needed corvee labour could best 
be achieved peacefully with the minimum amount of disruption to 
indigenous social activity. Legal changes were invoked which tried to 
capture the agreement of indigenous peoples - hence indirect rule (2). 
Whenever this tactic proved difficult to implement, however, there 
was always the ultimate use of force at the disposal of the colonial 
state. 
Indirect rule was a strategy to utilise aspects of indigenous 
(1) Moves towards a different legal framework began in fact in the 
nineteenth century; see Chapter 4 above. 
(2) It was not as easy as simply invoking a policy of indirect rule as 
in the work of Lugard and there being general agreement on it. There 
was much disagreement as to the correct form of colonial administration 
and the pace of any change. These conflicts are discussed briefly 
below and in Chapter 6, they are dealt with more fully in Edsman, op. cit 
Chapter One and, J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, 'Coping with the Contra- 
dictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-19141, 
JAH, 20,1979. 
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forms of control while at the same time initiating and then reifying 
something cal I ed 'customary law' (1 )- It has been suggested recently 
for example that: 
Customary law was a concept and a legal form that 
originated in specific historical circumstances, 
namely the period in the transformation of pre- 
capitalist social relations that saw the consolidation 
of the colonial state (2). 
In other words, customary law was derived specifically from the 
"subordination of (the) African social formation to dapitalist 
relations" and was expressed through the state. We will see shortly, 
in our brief examination of the legal paraphenalia established by 
colonisation on the coast that customary law became a "framework for 
the insertion of rural classes into peripheral capitalist social 
formations" (3). It was part of the ideology of colonial domination 
and increasingly reflected the sUbordination of indigenous groups to 
an emerging local bourgeoisie and the even stronger metropolitan state 
and its representatives. 
The point here is simple. For the next phase of colonialism 
to be successful: for the incursion and subordination of Asante and 
(1) For one writer the "use of indigenous political institutions" for 
local government was dependent upon the modifications of these 
institutions which fall into two categories: "modifications of 
aspects of traditional government that were repugnant to European 
ideas of what constituted good government; and modifications that 
were designed to ensure the achievement of the main purpose of 
colonial rule, the exploitation of the colonised country". M. Crowder, 
West Africa Under Colonial Rule, (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 169. 
A further definition of indir rule is given by Hailey, African 
Survey, p. 413, quoted in K. A. Busia, The Position_ of the Mi-e-T-Tti 
5-eTo-dern Political System of Ashanti, published for 1AI, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 19581, p. 105, as "The system by which the 
tutelary power recognises existing African societies and assists 
them to adopt themselves to the functions of local government". 
(2) Snyder, (1982), op. cit., p. 40. 
(3) Ibid. 
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the hinterland, to reap the commercial rewards of trade and to break 
down the barriers of chiefly control by free market operations, a more 
substantial framework would have to be' imposedby the colonial state. 
This framework was to be essentially juridical, but as in the past, 
military operations were not excluded from the achievement of colonial 
objectives. As the commercial stakes rose and the need for more 
organisation and systematic exploitation of the territory grew so too 
did the need to control and direct the impact of these changes; an 
impact which began to erode the previous power and positions of chiefs 
N 
vis a vis commoners and elders as the renumeration for the latter 
increased opportunities for monetary gain (1). 
We can now look at the nature of this juridical component to 
British colonialism on the Gold Coast. Unlike previous accounts of 
the establishment of 'indirect rule' (2) on the coast vie situate the 
development of a legal infrastructure by the British *within the broader 
developing strategy of subjugating the Akan economically as well as 
, politically to the exigencies of metropolitan capital. 
However, as 
we have seen, the pace of the process of subjugation was to be carefully 
monitored and sanctioned wherever possible by the colonial state. 
, 
Officials of the latter were becoming increasingly aware that to 
dissolve pre-colonial relations of production too quickly would disrupt 
whatever benefits could be gained from the development of capitalism 
inland. Pre-colonial modes of production still offered the cheapest 
(1) The importance of a legal structure at a time when this process 
occurred was laid out in the nineteenth century and has more 
recently been discussed: "the-juridical element in the regulation 
of human conduct enters where the isolation and opposition of interests 
beqin'. ' Editors introduction to Pashuskanis, op. cit., p. 13, emphasis in 
original , and Karl Marx, (1970), o cit. (2) Compare Kimble, op * cit., W. E. F. War History of Ghana, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966). 
form of reproducing labour, hence the use of migrant labour in the 
mines and the use of the Northern Territories as a labour reserve (1). 
Moreover, the colonial authorities were very cautious in helping to 
facilitate the alienation of land for cocoa producers and thereby 
assist in the erosion of pre-colonial forms of land tenure. This was 
because the price of Gold Coast produced cocoa was located largely in 
small costs of production on family-or stool land. It was recognised 
that with the commercialisation of this land, costs for buyers and users 
of cocoa in Europe would rise. 
(a) Indirect Rule 
"Indirect rule" on the Gold Coast dates back to the 1830's when 
George Maclean, as second President of the Council of Merchants, 
interferrdd in', the internal powers of the chiefs (2). This interference 
took the form of eroding the power of chiefs to try breaches of law. 
For example, in 1853 a Supreme Court Ordinance established regular courts 
within the forts and settlements to deal with civil and criminal casesv 
and in 1856 an Order in Council allowed the Supreme Court to hear cases 
arising from protected territories without the cooperation of any native 
chief or authority. These colonial manoeuvres to rationalise the law 
created opposition and unrest in the territory. African grievances 
were reflected in a memorandum from a number of chiefs to the British 
authorities in 1864 and also the establishment of the Fante Confederation 
1868-1873 (3). Opposition to concerted British attempts at establishing 
a rigorous form of legal structure, however, reached a peak with the 
(1) See for exanple, Hii-K Plange, 'Underdevelopment in Northern Ghana: 
Natural Causes or Colonial Capitalism? ' ROAPE, 15/16,1980, and Roger G. 
Thomas, -'Forced Labour in British West ATýrica: The Case of the Northern 
- Territories of the , 
Cold Coast, 1906-1927', JAH 14,1,1973. 
(2) Some of this background is filled in by the -preceding chapter. 
(3) 'See Agbodeka, op-cit. 
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development of the ARPS and opposition to the Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance of 1883. 
The problem for the colonial authorities, was to facilitate 
the smooth transition to capitalism on the colony. This was a 
transition which could only at first be piecemeal and considerably 
uneven but could nevertheless be assisted by the legitimation and 
consolidation afforded it by a European inspired legal framework. 
In short, the latter was needed for the legal introduction of capitalist 
property relations and the further development of free wage labour. 
For example, a number of criteria had to be fulfilled to ensure the 
greater efficiency of mining companies which, as we have seen were 
hopelessly ill-managed and lacked a permanent labour force. To meet 
the requirement of a wage labour force to work in the mines or in 
concession companies while retaining the advantages of reproducing 
this labour force cheaply, the colonial authorities sought the partial 
separation of the Akan from pre-capitalist means and relations of 
production. This incomplete 'release' of the Akan from pre-capitalist 
relationsof production was needed to ensure a more permanent workforces 
which had to rely increasingly on the opportunities for sustaining 
itself provided by the colonial authorities and metropolitan capital. 
The separation of the Akan wholly from their pre-capitalist social 
relations of production could not occur instantly. Indeed, if this had 
been the case there would have been a breakdown of indigenous forms of 
production - forms which were still needed to provide subsistence food 
production and to prevent large scale social upheaval. The production 
of food was also required to maintain the workers in the mines so a direct 
separation of producers from their means of production was not immediately 
sought. Slow changes occurred in indigenous relations of production often 
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in a very limited way because changes began at first in the techniques 
of production and imposed social changes in the conditions of production 
rather than directly in the relations of production (1). 
The commoditisation of labour power was attempted in the Gold 
Coast as early as 1852 through the introduction of a Poll Tax. Although 
not implemented effectively the role of taxation was later to become 
an important aspect of colonial moves to undermine existing relations 
of production, and to force people into wage employment through the legal 
obligation to pay tax. The collection of taxes and revenue by chiefs 
was to form a large pa'rt of the thrust of the policy of indirect rule. 
Provision was made for direct taxation in the Kumasi Public Health Bill 
1925, and by an Ordinance in 1928, but it was not until the 1930's that 
direct taxation became operable. The chiefs were to collect taxes which 
were likened to the collection of 'tribute' while unfree labour was to 
be discouraged; 
By its means (i. e. taxation - RB) the upper classes 
can be paid salaries for public work; slavery, 
forced labour, and all other forms of exactions 
from the peasantry can be declared illegal without 
reducing the ruling-classes to poverty (2). 
The need was recognised by the colonial authorities to make 
thenecessary alliance with the chiefly classes to enhance colonial 
control and to change the material basis of chiefs' position and rule. 
For example, one Governor commented that: 
Ruling through the chiefs which is certainly the only 
manner possible of governing the remoter parts of the 
colony, necessarily involves making them responsible 
for keeping order among their people (3). 
(1) Bernstein, oe. cit., p. 61. 
(2) Lugard, op. cit., p. 233, see the following chapter for attempts at ending 
unfree 1-aFo--ur and developing wage employment. 
(3) GNA(A) ADM 11/1/2 Case No. 100/1900, Upper Wassaw Native Affairs 1900, 
Governor Nathan to Chamberlain 4/2/1902. 
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In 1877, Governor Freeling wanted to increase the powers of chiefs 
to allow them to mobilise resources, including labour in the 
construction of roads. The use of corv4e labour in public works 
became an important factor in facilitating the dominance of metropolitan 
capital in the territory. This form of labour, which received the 
euphemism 'communal labour', was needed to ensure the development of 
necessary infrastructure suitable for the transportation of commodities (1). 
The chiefs in the colony were frequently prevailed upon to fulfill their 
role under Native Jurisdiction and if they were not forthcoming in 
providing labour and in Drganising it satisfactorily for the completion 
of roads and clearing of paths, they were coerced. In 1901, for example, 
the Chief of Tarkwa was informed by the District Commissioner that one 
hundred men must be sent for. 6 months to work on the railways. For 
this, the chief would receive E20/0/0. When the chief did not reply 
to this request the District Commissioner wrote again, this time in 
stronger language citing specifically the Chief's Ordinance Number 9 
1895, sections 2,3 and 4 which gave the chief power to call out for 
service "persons of the labouring class in his town and village" and 
that if such people refused or neglected to comply they were liable 
to punishment according to customary native law and on conviction before 
the District Commissioner of a fine of VO or three months in prison. 
Similarly, the chief was eligible to the penalty of a fine but this 
time of U50 or six months in prison (2). 
(1 ) Requests were also madeý to chiefs for recruits into the colonial 
army. GNA(A) ADM 27/l/I Tarkwa Duplicate Letter Book March 1831- 
May 1883; March 17,1881 and a request from Civil Commissioner to 
the Chief of Tarquah for men to fight against Asante. 
(2) GNA(A) ADM 27/l/7. Tarkwa Duplicate Letter Book 3.11.1900-28.8.1901. 
In addition to the desire to ensure that the chiefs obeyed mounting 
legislation the DC of Tarkwa wanted to ensure the steady flow of 
labour to the mines by empowering mine managers to control local 
disturbances. A mines police was called for. 
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(i) Sovereignty and the Formalisation of Colonialism 
The issues of native jurisprudence are complex. We do not 
need to examine them in great detail for this has been done adequately 
elsewhere (1). We need here only concern ourselves with the general 
thrust of the legislation introduced by the British colonial power and 
the rationale behind it. We need to look briefly at the general 
conflicts which the legislation initiated within and between Africans 
in the colony and in particular the uneasy alliance which had sprung 
up between the representatives of the ARPS and the chiefs. That is to 
say between the educated elite or developing bourgeoisie and the 
traditional power holders. These themes will be examined briefly 
within the overall framework of assessing the colonial strategy of 
opening the colony to capitalist incursion. 
As we have seen already, the Native Jbrisdiction Ordinance (NJO) 
of 1883 proved unsuccessful in getting the registration of a significant 
number of chiefs. In that year only six head chiefs registered and by 
1903 there were only eighteen who had accepted the conditions of the 
Ordinance (2). A lack of clarity remained between the areas of juris- 
diction which were in the control of the chiefs and that which was in 
the control of the British. An attempt had been made at clarifying 
this in 1894 with an amendment to the 1883 Ordinance in which Governor 
Maxwell tried to stipulate that every native tribunal must be recognised 
by the Governor as a condition for exercising jurisdiction and that no 
native tribunal and chief except those so recognised could exercise 
jurisdiction. This amendment was withdrawn because of its 
exaggerated emphasis upon native tribunals and. a lack of 
M Edsman *t. 
2 Tho se 
ýh 
cept the Ordinance, however, seemed pleased to have 
been entrusted with powers from the Governor which were already 
chiefly concerns. See Letter from Chief Ennimil Coomah, 14 March 
1883 to Gove rno r, GNA (A) ADM 2 7/1 /1 . 
i 
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concern with the role of the chiefs. No further attempt was made to 
rationalise the respective areas of interest until 1904 when a new 
chiefs' Ordinance was passed to strengthen the Governor's powers of 
control over the appointment of chiefs and was to be extended further 
in a Native Jurisdiction Bill of 1906. This only became law and then 
in an amended form, in 1910 (1). 
Already in 1900 Governor Nathan had sought to bolster the power 
of chiefs and in 1902 a Department of Native Affairs was established 
to monitor developments in 'traditional' areas. The colonial 'strategy' 
was to place in the Governor, and not as had supposedly previously 
been the case in the Oman, the limits of the jurisdiction of native 
tribunals. The Governor was now to depose and dismiss chiefs. This 
clause in particular created much opposition to the Bill by the ARPS 
which at the same time was also fighting the colonial attempt to 
seize indigenous forest land. The educated elite in the ARPS were 
keen that some form of control was kept over the chiefs especially 
as their interests clashed with these holders of traditional authority. 
The importance of the ARPS objection was that control over the chiefs 
was necessary to ensure the smooth running of indigenous administration: 
but who should be responsible for ensuring this? Was it to be the 
uneducated chiefs or the literate and petty-bourgeois elite of lawyers 
and professionals on the coast? Which group could most ensure the 
transition to a market economy and the greater incursion by capital 
of a non-capitalist social formation? Hitherto, Governors had expressed 
the view that the development of western divilisation be implemented 
through the development of English law and justice on the coast, 
(I) Edsman, op. cit. , p. 39 and p. 43. 
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essentially through property laws. For the foreseeable future it 
was thought that these innovations would have to run side by side 
with traditional institutions and customs. It was not long in fact 
before consideration of upholding traditional institutions began 
to outweigh the former thoughts on initiating western legal forms. 
What has been called the Maclean approach of, "pushing forward Western 
civilisation by way of English law and justice and interventionist 
policies" was to be displaced by a government strategy of protecting 
traditional institutions and customs - of keeping traditional and 
western society clearly separated (1). There was to be some overlap 
however between !. traditional' and British jurisdiction, and this was 
to be the inevitable outcome of the intentions of a regime which sought 
to maintain stability and facilitate the controlled incursion of metro- 
politan and industrial commercial activities throughout the territory. 
Financial and administrative constraints facing the British on 
the coast partly account for the change in the attitUde of the colonial 
state away from the direct expansion of British jurisdiction towards 
greater rule through the chiefs. As one observer has commented, "the 
Maclean approach was risky and expensive" (2). There were too few 
British administrators to cope with the demands of direct rule. However, 
colonial opinion as to the fruitfulness of indirect rule was not 
unanimous. For instance, both Maclean and later Chief Justice Sir 
Brandford Griffith knew precisely the kind. of society which they wanted 
to develop on the coast. Griffith had called for the abolition of 
Native Tribunals in 1887 in the steady march of progress towards western 
'civilisation'. The promoters of indirect rule also wanted the onward 
(1) Edsman, op. cit., p. 42. 
(2) Edsman, p. 42. 
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march of western civilisation and particularly the imposition of 
British legal forms relating to property relations, but on the face 
of it the constraints on British domestic financing to the colony took 
precedence over direct rule. Instead, the chiefs and elders were to 
be encouraged to carry out much of the colonial states work (1). At 
the same time however, (the end of the nineteenth century) sufficient 
colonial resources were summoned to reduce the threat of Asante 
invasion of the southern Provinces which it was feared wo'uld. reduce 
trade. Resources were also to be sought to help facilitate greater 
infrastructural development in the form of railway construction. The 
seeming contradiction here, is resolved if we recognise that the 
colonial regime was thinking through more clearly the nature of its 
role in being able to facili tate greater corynercialisation of the Gold 
Coast. Administrative costs, wherever possible, were to be kept to a 
minimum principally by working through indigenous structures. Indigenous 
forms of political organisation were also to be used to control the pace 
of European economic expansion under the supervision of the colonial 
state. The latter was achieved by colonial attempts to regularise 
concessions and land sales as we have seen through the Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance and Land Bill. In other words the effect of 
thE colonial states' policies was to monitor and if possible avert the 
too sudden dissolution of indigenous relations of production. 
A complex series of debates continued about how metropolitan 
industrial and commercial interests could best be served tythe colonial 
(1) Our view here contrasts with Edsman's position which tends to see the 
promoters of indirect rule as "driving at nothing", ibid., p. 43. The 
debate here between different groups within the colo-ni-aT administration 
is similar to earlier conflicts between different interests in Europe 
and on the coast over the most appropriate form of colonial capitalist 
development in the territory. See above and Chapter Four. 
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state. In 1922 Governor Guggisberg introduced a redrafted Native 
Jurisdiction Bill. This Bill was an amended version of Clifford's 
attempts in 1919 to clarify the colonial authorities' position on 
British sovereignty on the coast. As will be remembered, an Ordinance 
in 1910 failed to distinguish jurisdiction between head chiefs, chiefs 
and subchiefs and this confusion had been made worse by the establishment 
of Native Tribunals as compulsory Courts of first instance, thereby 
increasing the judicial duty of the chiefs (1). This increased work 
load for the chiefs added to a number of malpractices which incensed 
different parties, and led to a clamour for greater clarification of 
the respective roles of traditional authorities. In an attempt to 
bolster the powers of chiefs the British had run up against increased 
unrest emanating from greater econom ic activity in the region which 
led to "political instability and frequent destoolments of chiefs (2). 
The redrafted Bill stated more clearly that British sovereignty was 
total; that Native Jurisdiction was derived from the Crown (3) and that 
the Governor had absolute power in either extending or reducing the 
authority of any tribunal. This was contested bitterly by the ARPS 
on behalf of the chiefs and by the latter themselves in a curious 
alliance which both attempted to restore the authority of chiefs, while 
simultaneously increasing the powers of the educated elite in a number 
of legal areas. 
(ii) The Protests 
British sovereignty was vehemently challenged as it was over 
(1) Edsman, o2. cit., p. 43. 
(2) Ibid., p. 44, the rising number of destoolments is traced by Kimble, 
op, c I t* , pp. 470. (3) THE're was also a separation of Native Tribunals into Head Chief 
Tribunals and Divisional Chiefs Tribunals. 
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the legislation affecting land. The British were reminded that the 
Bond of 1844 was an agreement between chiefs and colonial authorities 
containing affairs relating to areas of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
and not of sovereignty. Protests were critical of Britain limiting 
traditional authority. The ARPS and petitioners to the colonial authority 
were against any erosion of lesser chiefs' tribunals as contained in the 
1922 Bill. The ARPS also. had another grievance. This was that indigenous 
lawyers were excluded from Native Tribunals at a time when their interests 
and those of local merchants; inter alia, the ability to hire wage labour 
and secure a stronger position and status within Akan societywere under 
threat from the persistence of non-capitalist forms of organisation in 
production. Merchants now wanted the opportunity to sue in British 
courts. The lawyers saw themselves as a force for progress; as a 
force which maintained stability and nurtured good citizenship in the 
spirit of English law. The lawyers were walking a tight rope. On the 
one hand they wanted to preserve Native Tribunals, as in their protests 
of 1919, to uphold the authority of the chiefs: on the other Wd they 
insisted on the opportunity to choose between Native Tribunals and 
British Courts (1). The representation of these two seemingly contra- 
dictory interests reflected the lawyers desire to be respected by the 
colonial state as responsible arbiters of 'public' opinion, (which was 
still in effect that of the chiefs) while simultaneously recognising 
the need for the gradual transformation of the structure of Gold Coast 
society (2). To achieve the latter, thE: lawyers saw the need for a 
codified legal structure established by the Supreme Court: the British 
(1) This latter desire would mean the dependence of traditional 
Authority upon the Supreme Court and English legal concepts. 
(2) Edsman, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
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333 
too wished for a codified uniform traditional legal structure but one not 
wholly influenced by Erglisif law per se. The essence of indirect rule 
meant that on the surface at least traditional authority was seen 
to exercise a minimum amount of jurisdiction hence the need for the 
chiefs themselves to establish, through written statements, the true 
nature of customary law which could then be codified by the British. 
The colonial state was willing and anxious to allow the 
persistence of traditional forms of authority in decision making but 
they also wanted them to become uniform and be inaugurated by the 
colonial authorities. After establishing a 'traditional, framework 
within which certain issues would be examined British forms of law 
took over. On land disputes for example, the Provincial Commissioners 
Court was final unless leave-of appeal was granted to the Divisional 
Court. Customary law had jurisdiction in areas of insignificance. 
In the debates of 1922 which considered Governor Guggisberg's revised 
Bill the Attorney General made the position clear: 
the law of this colony only recognises ... native customary laws in so far as they are consistent with 
natural justice, equity and good conscience. Secondly, 
in so far that they are consistent with the enactments 
of the Colonial legislature and with such of the 
enactments of the Imperial Parliament which apply to 
this colony. These limitations already make a 
considerable inroad into any fanciful doctrine of the 
absolute sacrosanctity of native customary law in the 
Gold Coast Colony (1). - 
In short: 
The sovereign power in law and in fact in this colony 
residesin the sovereignty of the British Crown (2). 
British sovereignty was absolute. The chiefs now held their office 
(1) Debates of the Gold Coast 30/11/22 p. 581, quoted in Edsman, ibid., p. 50. (2) Ibid., pp. 576-578, quoted in ibid., p. 51. 
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sanctioned by the British. The chiefs had in principle accepted the 
notion of some kind of regulation of their powersbut certainly did 
not accept the British proposition that the authority of the chiefs 
emanated from the colonial regime. The chiefs now became increasingly 
aware of their need to intervene actively in politics, not at the 
behest of the ARPS which saw themselves as alternative arbiters of 
indirect rule, but as a force in their own right. This became more 
apparent with the Native Affairs Ordinance of 1927 (1). 
This review of the arguments behind opposition to British 
attempts at consolidation of indirect rule, through the imposition of 
legal instruments, has served to illustrate the development of 
different interests within the colony. A separation of interests was 
occurring between the chiefs and a new, educated elite as opportunity 
for the enrichment of the latter, and local commercial interests 
improved. At the same time, attempts at creating a unified customary 
law provided for the subordination of these newly developing social 
forces to metropolitan capital through the colonial state. This will 
be pursued further in the following chapter. We can now turn our 
attention from the Gold Coast colony as such to events in Asante and 
British attempts at securing this territory for greater commercial 
gain. 
(b) British Colonial Incursion into Asante 
We saw earlier how the development of concessions in the western 
region on the Gold Coast drew increasingly upon the labour and resources 
of Asante. We have looked briefly at the demand, for example, of more 
foodstuffs from Asante as well as the attempts by those in charge of 
(1) See Chapter Six below. 
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concession companies to erode the dominance of pre-colonial forms of 
gold production. We can now continue our examination of the major 
themes of the period: the monetisation and commoditisation of the 
political economy of Asante. In short, we will see that like the 
British 'policy'of indirect rule on the coast and in the colony, that 
is the attempts at seeking colonial control with the minimum amount 
of disruption, British activities in Asante were also unclear, equivocal 
and subject to constant revision following differences of opinion (and 
interests) among the British (1). 
Once again the British walked a tightrope. They wanted to 
maintain traditional forms of control in Asante, between the chiefs 
and commoners, while at the same time facilitating more trade and 
commercial transactions. The latter areas of commercial activity, 
however, were precisely those which hitherto in Asante had been the 
domain of chiefs and elders. With increasing colonial contact these 
areas became more accessible to other classes in Asante and thereby 
threatened the political stability of the territory. The major groupings 
within the Asante polity have already been discussed (2). We need not 
repeat the exercise here. Instead, we want to stress the tensions 
which were imposed upon Asante by Britain's continuing presence on 
the coast and the mounting contradiction which emanated from Asante at 
this time of increasing monetisationof the Asante economy. 
(1) We will not trace the specific details of: ýthe events in this period 
of Asante history. This has been covered adequately elsewhere. See, 
Ivor Wilks, Asante in 
- 
the Nineteenth Century, The Structure and 
Evolution of PoliticaT-'Mr-er, African Studies Series 13, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975) and, Thomas J. Lewin, Asante Before 
the British: The Prempean Years 1875-1900, (USA: The Reg-eni-Es--Pre-s-s of 
Kansas, Lawrence, 1978). 
(2) Chapters One and Four. 
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British Occupation and the Monetisation of Asante 
British colonial interests in the Gold Coast colony could 
only be secured by minimising the threat of military invasion of the 
coast from the Asante, and by linking the Asante with the commercial 
concerns of the territory as a whole. In part the latter had always 
been achieved as some individuals from Asante were permitted to trade 
on the coastý, and the latter made more tracts of land available for 
concessions and became involved in the use of cash crop production. 
The knitting together of commercial interests in Asante and those on 
the coast were not always successful as the events of the nineteenth 
century reflect. In 1807, for example, the Company of Merchants had 
wanted to extend its trade into the interior but this happened at the 
time of Asante's attempts to reassert its sovereignty over the Fante 
states. Hostilities in 1824 and 1826 were quietened with the Anglo- 
Asante treaty in 1831 which guaranteed Asante's access to certain gold 
routes. Hostilities in the southern provinces began again in the early 
1860's reflecting the increased dominance of 'imperialistic' forces, 
that is the camp for war within Asante (1). 
The war programme of the Asantehene Kakari and the disputes 
with Britain over Asante's occupation of the southern provinces 
imposed immense strains on the Asante social formation. Several 
stringent measures were imposed on Asante commoners by the Asante 
state. These included increased recruitment into the army, higher 
taxation and more supervision of trade routes, together with shortages 
of readily available foodstuffs (2). 
(1) See Chapter 4 for the account of the Asante power blocs between 
mercantile (peace) and imperialistic (war) parties. 
(2) See Lewin, op. cit_., Chapter 3. 
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Asante's two defeats by the British in 1874, culminating in the 
sacking of Kumase and the Treaty of Fomena, and again in 1900 in the 
Yaa Asantwaa war reflected Britain's desire to control the troublesome 
Asante hinterland and to secure outlets for coastal trade northwards (1). 
Control of the Asante gave the British greater access to territories to 
the North which became increasingly more contentious areas of inter- 
colonial rivalry. It is true that the 'scramble' for Africa at this 
time was partly associated with; "The fundamental demand of African 
traders ... for ordered conditions for a profitable trade"(2). 
The 
demand for securer procedures for trading were also made by Europeans 
on the coast who wanted more than simple assurances that monies lent 
on credit would be returned. This could only be guaranteed at'that 
time by the institutional apparatus of colonialism. At the same 
moment Britain's concern was with securing a broader environment of 
control into the hinterland of West Africa. This was translated into 
action only after the obstacle of the House of Commons Select Committee 
Report of 1865 was overcome. The findings of this Committee were for 
the non-expansion of British interests in West Africa. The position 
changed however following the flurry of French and German activity in 
the region. The French, for example, moved into the hinterlands of the 
Gold Coast from the Ivory Coast in the late 1880's and the Gold Coast 
Governor, Brandford Griffith was forced to send an envoy, George Ekem 
Ferguson, to make treaties with neighbouring areas for the British (3). 
(1) Attempts to completely divert commercial concerns away from the 
Asantehene failed. See, Lewin op. cit., Chapter 3. 
(2) J. D. HargrEaves, 'Towards a Histor-y-o-f the Partition of Africa', JAH, 
1,1960, p. 100. 
(3) See Bonifice I. Obichere, West African States and European Expansion: 
The DahomeZ-Niger Hinterland 1885-1898, (New en and London: Yale 
University Press, 1971). Chapter 5; ame Arhin, (editor) The Papers of 
George Ekem Ferguson A Fanti Official of the Government Of the Gold 
Coast 1890-1891. African ý, oclal Research Documents, (Leiden &C idge, 
African Studiec ntrum, Cambridge African Studies Centre, 1974). 
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The usefulness of this move by the British activities in the region 
became especially apparent after the annexation of the Asante (Ashanti) 
when the path lay open to 'colonise' areas which had already signed 
treaties with the British through the use of the envoy Ferguson 
As one observer has remarked: 
Aware of the increasing international rivalry 
for West African markets and the resurgence 
of Asante governmental power and authority, the 
acting governor pushed Colonial Office officials 
for territorial expansion and the annexation of 
the Asanteman (2). 
Following 1874 Britain favoured the rehabilitation of Kumase 
but not to its former glory. Instead, the states in the Protectorate 
which included, Denkyira, Fante, Sehwi, Twifo and Wassa (3), and 
anti Kumase groups, were supported by the British in the latter's 
attempts to reduce the threat of further military action against the 
colony (4). 
Underlying the British tactics of 
the continuous desire to keep the 
conduits open in order to placate 
African mercantile interests on t 
of course, the ever present fears 
military actions (5). 
expediency was 
commercial 
British and 
he coast and 
of Asante 
Asante's increased incorporation into an ever expanding inter- 
national economy posed an enormous threat to the centalised power of 
(1) Crowder, (1968), op. cit., p. 150. 
(2) Lewin, op. cit., p. 175. 
(3) The remain-in-g-Southern Provinces which formed the British Protected 
territory were Accra, Adangme, Ahanta, Akuapem., Akwamu, Akyem and Aowin, 
ibid., p. 42. 
(4) TF-s is argued persuasively by Lewin, ibid., Chapter 3. Dissidents 
within Asante used Britain's presence To-gain a greater voice in decision 
making after 1874. For example, the Bekwai and Adansi in 1886 used 
British support to shore up their separate causes, ibid., p. 52. See also 
Chapter 8, especially pp-206, and the British straT-egy of dismantling 
the legitimacy of Kumase over Asante. 
(5) Ibid., p. 52. 
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Kumase (1) especially following the British decision to occupy Asante 
after Chamberlain's appointment to the Colonial Office in 1895. We 
will see shortly how the rush to become involved in the cash crop 
production of kola and rubber and the shortly to develop cocoa farming 
by individuals in Asante posed a serious threat to what had previously 
been the State Trading Company or Bata Fekuo (2). Britain's presence 
on the coast, and the concessionaires'attempts to seize more land in 
the hinterland, opened up the possibilities for cash income in Asante. 
To the concern of the Asantehene and certain elders a revolt was brewing 
withifi, the Asante against the constraints imposed by the Asante 
state to the individual accumulation of wealth. These restrictions 
included high rates of taxation, lower death duties which hitherto had 
inhibited the accumulation of capital and high rates of interest on 
loans. The nineteenth century Asante political economy had always 
been geared to making the most of Asante's indigenous resources under 
the control of the central government. Following the trauma associated 
with the sacking of Kumase, the bolstering of opposition states and 
internal conflict within Kumase, space was created for the independent 
development of the rubber asikafo in the creation of a new industry 
and in the removal of government obstacles to individual accumulation 
of wealth (3). 
A major area affected by Britain's greater'incursion into Asante 
was the increased emphasis upon and presence of the 'cash nexus' in 
Kumase. The use of money in trading transactions was not a new 
(1) See Crowder, (1968), op. cit. pp. 149-150. In 1894 Acting Governor 
Hodgson had asked for onclon: s permission to occupy Ashanti but Lord C -- 
Ripon had turned this down, "I do not desire to annex Ashanti in na-me 
or in fact and thereby greatly to increase the responsibilities of the 
Gold Coast Government" in, ibid., p. 149. 
(2) See Chapter Two and Chaoter-Fo-ur and Wilks (1975), op. 6it. 
(3) See below on the development of the rubber industry. 
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innovation to people in Asante. Before ca. 1874 there had been 
opportunities for earning cash if an Asadte had been associated with 
gold or palm oil production. There had also been limited scope for 
non state trading groups. In general however, payments made to 
chiefs for taxation or tribute had been paid in kind (1). The 
development of the rubber trade and cocoa later changed this. These 
developments signified "the use of capital as commercial capital, 
so ... production (was) no longer for use alone mediated more or 
less 
by money but for wholesale trade" (2). In part this was the result 
of indigenous activities but also in part of the result of colonial 
endeavour. The latter created the institutional framework for money 
making while also quickening the pressures for cash crop production. 
For the successful initiation of capitalist production and for the 
stabilisation of the territory colonial authorities required the 
monetisation of certain sectors of Asante's political economy. Without 
this the formal incorporation of Asante into the British sphere of 
influence with the exiling of Prempeh I and the establishment of the 
Protectorate was meaningless (3). 
The immediate response of the British in bringing Asante under 
formal colonial rule was to establish an administration based upon a 
Chief Commissioner together with Provincial and District Commissioners. 
These administrators brought with them much of the paraphenalia of 
institutional control which had already been used in the Gold Coast 
(1 ) See Chapter'l above for examples of 'communal labour' on chiefs' farms. 
(2) Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political 
Economy (Ro-ugh-Draft). Translat-R-w-TIT a forward by Martin Nico aus 
(London: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1977), 
p. 859. 
(3) The -specifics of the commoditisation and monetisation of labour is 
dealt with in Chapter 6 below. 
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colony. The British ensured that the movement of traders was not 
hampered as had previously been the case, and the traders position 
was enhanced by the added impetus that the British brought to bear 
on the development of roads and the urbanisation of Kumase (1). The 
development of infrastructure in the area not only facilitated the 
easier movement of traders and the influx of 'strangers' but also the 
easier access for the British to possible areas of conflict. 
The introduction of an uniform currency deserves our attention. 
Increasingly, wealth in the form of cash became more apparent in 
Asante which in turn further induced the earning of cash (2). More 
opportunity to earn cash increasingly eroded previous orthodoxy where 
the chiefs were meant to be the only individuals who could both 
accumulate and display wealth. The result of Britain's presence in 
the Asante Protectorate and the relaxing of sanctions against 
individual trade further weakened the position of chiefs. For one 
writer: 
Society in general was becoming more acquisitive, 
more money conscious, and more competitive (3). 
In time the overall effect was for the redirection of Asante's 
energies previously used in the expansion of the Asante Empire towards 
commercial endeavour. 
(1)"By the enq of 1918 Ashanti had 383 miles of motor roads, this number 
had increased to 500 miles by 1922 and to 1,157 by 1929". 
W. Tordoff, Ashanti Under the Prempehs 1888-1935 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 965), p. 189. 
(2) K. Arhin, The Impact of Europe: Traditional Societies and the 
Constraints of Colonial Rule: The Pressure of Cash and its 
Political Consequences in Asante in the Colonial Period 1900-1940', 
African Studies Association, UK, Liverpool, Conference September 
1974(b). 
(3) W. Tordoff, op. cit., p. 190. 
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(C) Cash Crop Production 
One such area of endeavour was in cash crop production. 
Colonial activity in the hinterland of Asante increased the demand 
for foodstuffs in the area and provided more incentive and opportunity 
for money making by Asante. In addition to the sale of foodstuffs 
for cash, sections of Asante responded to easier access to wider 
markets for cash crops of kola and rubber (ca. 1880-1920) and of 
course they were also to be involved in the initiation of cocoa which 
was to become the largest export earner of the colony (1). All these 
moves posed further t hreats to the stability of Asante traditional 
rulers and also to the stability of the newly imposed colonial rule. 
Among these threats was the increasing demand from commoners in 
Asante to be able to take part directly in the new opportunities for 
carrying cash crops rather than have their trading activities sanctioned 
by the Asantehene. The British, however, both wanted to encourage 
more commercial activities while at the same time not disrupt whatever 
peace could be achieved within Asante's pre-colonial social formation. 
The process of undermining the power of Asante chiefs was thus uneven. 
In some regards the growth of trade enhanced the power of the chiefs; 
they could take an advantageous position in. cash crop trading but 
also the direction of people's energies into economic concerns meant 
that people tended to get less involved in issues of local discontent (2). 
The migration of 'strangers' into areas where different chiefs exercised 
power also enhanced chiefly authority over an increasing number of 
people. On the whole however: 
(1) See Chapter 6 below for a discussion of cocoa. We will also look 
in more detail at the broader attempts to introduce a variety of 
cash crops. 
(2) W. Tordoff, op. cit., p. 191. 
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Asantes increasing participation in the world 
market and the development of new commercial 
activities in the metropolitan region'constituted 
a major threat to the centralised economic power 
and control of the Asantehene's government in 
Kumase (1). 
Discontent with chiefs was reflected through an increasing 
number of destoolments and concern with the accumulation of chiefly 
wealth (2). Much of this was hastened by the onset of relatively 
new economic activities and the chaos caused through concessions (3). 
One cash crop which grew in importance at this time and which served 
to again reduce the authority of chiefly power was rubber (4). This 
crop became a means of trade and also a vehicle for accumulation of 
wealth. Its importance was described by one informant: 
Asante middlemen sold rubber to the whites on the 
coast ... They were not chiefs ... All rubber from Asante and Ahafo passed through their hands. 
They traded with people all over Asante and the 
Akyem country. They lent money to other traders who 
carried rubber to the coast ... (these other traders had previously been gold dust dealers - R. B. ). They 
knew the whites needed their services. The whites 
were after the rubber to take back to their countries. 
They made much money from this knowledge. The rubber 
trade was a new thing here. Asantes with money knew 
they could make much more money ... All the rubber traders feared that quick money would be taxed by 
Nana Prempe and the elders in Kumase (5). 
The production of rubber became more important for the colony as we 
will see later. It served at this time to increase the degree of 
autonomy for independent, non state, traders in Asante. Greater 
(1 ) Lewin, op. cit., ' P. 53. 
(2) S ee earlier, and below also Tordoff, op. cit., pp. 192. 
(3) GNA (CC) 23/l/230. 
(4) Attempts at developing plantation rubber are dealt with in 
Chapter 6 below. 
(5) Interview with Kwadwo Bo 3 September 1970 quoted from Lewin, Structure 
of Political Conflict in Asante 1875-1900,2 vols, Vol. 2, Ph. D. Thesis 
North Western University 1974, quoted in Lewin op. cit., pp. 143-144. 
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interest in rubber trading also served to reinforce the pressure of 
a 'cash nexus' in Asante and through this make commodities more readily 
available in the hinterland which hitherto had been available only to 
chiefs and elders. Consumer goods like imported cloths tended more 
and more to replace those produced locally and the same began to apply 
to building materials which hastened the development of modern urbanised 
Asante (1). Obligation and payments of taxes which were extensive were 
also paid less in kind as before the advent of the British and more 
by cash (2). 
V CONCLUSION 
The overall impact of colonialism in the last part of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century on the Akan and 
Asante political economy was uneven. we have seen in this chapter a 
number of different, but interconnected processes employedby the developing 
colonial state in drawing the inhabitants of the Gold Coast more and 
more into the dominance of anEurorpean controlled international economy. 
The incorporatio*n of the Akan into this economy in the period of formal 
colonialism began with the increased presence of European commercial 
interests in direct productive activities through the purchasing of 
concessions after 1850. Always ambivalent, and often contradictory, 
the officials of the colonial state sought to maximise the success of 
the European mining companies and the development of capitalist forms 
of production through increasing the legitimation and permanency of 
its presence on the colony. The result of this 'policy' of colonial 
entrenchment was the partial erosion but also support for indigenous 
modes of production rather than their absolute dissolution. The outcome 
(1 ) See Arhi n (1 974b) o t. 
(2) For example, see 
6N Box 3, CCA-000 3/08 Case No. 113/19D8 
Death Duties payable to chiefs. 
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of a British colonial presence towards the end of the nineteenth 
century was to lend support to indigenous political and economic 
structures wherever possible through a policy of 'indirect rule', rather 
than forcing ahead in the wholesale dissolution of indigenous relations 
of production. 
The colonial impact in Asante hastened the development of a 
class of traders which did not need the sanction of the Asantehene or 
of the state trading company. Greater contact with coastal traders 
increased the demand for cash crops of the mid nineteenth century 
like palm oil and the demand for new economic activity, the development 
of rubber and the presence of concessions for gold, timber and rubber. 
A corollary to this increased economic activity which was to gain 
interest in Asante, and on the coast was the development of money in 
the hinterland. This' bustling period of commerce ane. trade reqUired 
the development of a uniform currency which was provided by the 
British. Parallel with greater opportunities for the earning of cash, 
however, went more opportunities for incurring debt. Both individual 
and stool debts rose in frequency as did the the number of legal cases 
brought to court in the period 1894-1922 (1 ). 
lie now have a clearer idea of the main processes enacted by 
the onset of a formal colonial presence on'the Gold Coast in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, and of the conflicts emanating 
from the increasing commercial isation of land through concessions in 
mining, timber and agriculture. Our attention can now focus specifically 
(1) On the dramatic rise of recorded legal offences see inter alia: 
GNA(A) ADM 27/1/14 Tarkwa Duplicate Letter Book 1909770. 
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on the colonial impact on labour. In looking at this we will draw 
out further illustrations of the imperial 'strategy' of establishing 
a colony in West Africa which could become self sufficient through 
different agricultural and mining concerns. 
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APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER FIVE 
ILLUSTRATION OF CONCESSION AGREEMENT BETWEEN EUROPEAN 
MINING COMPANY AND AKAN GROUP IN THE WESTERN REGION 
ADAPTED FROM GNA (S) 1973 Concessions, 8449 Bibiani Timber Concession 
12/6/1910 11/1916 Concession Ennuir-Y No. 1100 Secondee 
The following is an illustration of a concession agreement which 
shows the degree of carte blanche that the European companies had over 
indigenous land holders despite the 'controls' of government through 
concession ordinances. 
July 1910 The Bibiani Timber Concession was scheduled on land 
in Sefwi. A lease for 99 years was agreed for timber and surface rights 
with the payment of flOO consideration money. There was then negotiated 
rent for occupying the land, in this case ilOO per annun, which took 
effect as soon as machinery was erected for cutting timber. On commence- 
ment of regular working 1200 per annum would be paid. When this 
concession was granted by Chief Atta Quarinor of Sefwi a second stage 
had to be completed. This was the certificate of validity where a 
concession court would assess whether the terms of the concession 
were reasonable. In this particular case limitations were 
imposed on the Bibiani Mine Ltd to. make compensation to those using 
the plot for cultivation. The final process was the indenture of the 
concession where final wording of the agreement was made. In this case 
giving the company power to "erect construct and make all such building 
works erections etc ... and to clear the land by burning or otherwise 
removing the forest trees or jungle for purpose of any planting or 
agricultural operations" as long as this did not destroy native houses. 
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APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER FIVE 
Examples of colonial attempts at developing forest reserves 
in the Gold Coast in the 1920's. A summary of the reasons for their 
abandonment including indigenous protests and obstacles to their 
enactment. 
SOURCE: GNA (CC) ADM 23/l/459 
Schedule for Forest Reserves under Control of Assistant 
Conservator of Forests Cape Coast, from A. Bletsdell for 
Commissioner Central Prýpvince, 30 November 1926. 
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CHAPTERsIx 
COt, 140DITISATION OF LAND AND LABOUR: ca. 1874-1930, Il 
THE-COMMODITISATION OF LABOUR 
"The, transformation of working humanity into a 
"labour force", a "factor of production", an 
instrument of capital, is an incessant and 
unending process. The condition is repayment 
to the victims, whether their pay is high or 
low, because it violates human conditions of 
work; and since the workers are not destroyed 
as human beings but are simply utilised in 
inhuman ways, their critical intelligent, 
conceptual faculties no matter how deadened or 
diminished, always remai, n in some degree &threat 
to capital". 
Harry Braverman, Labor and ýbnopoly Capital 
I INTRODUCTION 
The early years of the twentieth century were to pose many 
problems for sections of the indigenous population in the Gold Coast 
Colony, Asante, and in the areas to become known as the Northern 
Territories. The experiences of these different groups of people 
were associated with an increasing British colonial presence: one 
which sought to maintain b, ut also extend, in a very ad hoc manner, 
its political control over the territories while at the same time 
trying to gain financial reward for its presence in this part of 
West Africa (1). On the one hand, the lack of any clear cut 'policy' 
for the exploitation of the colony, and its surrounding territory, 
often placed the colonial state and its representatives in conflict 
with the interests of 'metropolitan' European capital on the 
For the purpose of this chapter 'colony' will refer to the three 
territories; the Gold Coast Colony, Asante and Northern Territories 
unless otherwise stated. 
5C 
coast (1 ). On the other hand, the activities of the colonial state 
in seeking to consolidate certain political structures of 'indirect 
rule' and in trying half heartedly to initiate economic development 
along the lines, for example, of plantation agriculture entered 
into conflict with sections of the African population. 
We will in this chapter look at some of these conflicts 
emanating from Britain's increased presence in the colony. Again 
we do not seek to trace all the 'events' of the opening years of the 
'twentieth century. Instead, we are concerned with continuing our 
look at the nature of the social processes set in motion by the 
relationship between colonialism, European concessions and the 
indigenous people. We will do this by looking specifically at the 
growing demands of capitalist enterprise for wage labour in the gold 
mines at Tarkwa and Prestea. What was the impact of mine owners' 
attempts to secure a supply of labour upon the surrounding areas, 
and in particular upon the Northern Territories from where the bulk 
of labourers were drawn, often by force and without their families (2)? 
We examine here then the demands for wage labour of a developing 
capitalist sector of the Gold Coast economy. We need also, in under- 
(1) The nature of these conflicts is discussed in IV below. On understanding 
the relationship between the state as an institution, its representative 
operating the apparatus of the state and the representation and articu- 
lation of interests between these groups see the debate between Ralph 
Hiliband and Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Problem of the Capitalist State' 
in, R. Blackburn (editor), Ideology in the Social Sciences- Readings ý2_ 
in Critical Social Theory, TGlasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1975). See 
also the contributions in J. Holloway and S. Picciotto (editors) 
State and Capital: A Marxist Debate, (London: Edward Arnold, 1978). 
(2) For a detailed examination of the nature of a migrant labour economy 
in an institutionalised racist setting see inter alia, H. Wolpe 
'Capitalism and cheap labour-powerin South Wrýjca_-7ýrom segregation 
to apartheid', in, H. Wolpe (editor), The Articulation of Modes of 
Production, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 289-320. 
1 
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standing this period more fully to examine processes at work within 
the indigenous economy. Amongst other things we will look at the 
migration of people to establish the production of cocoa. The 
development of what might be called the 'cocoa economy' is linked to 
the impact of colonialism because many of the new cocoa farmers 
acquired their wealth from the growth of cash crops initiated by the 
British. We need to look at the nature of the migration of farmers 
to cocoa areas and the kinds of relationships between Africans that 
were initiated and transformed in this process. 
II CAPITALISM, ' LABOUR AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 
The turn of the twentieth century was the period of the Gold 
Coast's continued uneven incorporation into a growing capitalist 
world economy, a process began in the fifteenth century (1). This 
process was uneven both in its geographical spread and in the development 
of infrastructure and had an enormous impact upon the lives of Africans. 
While it can be agreed that the development of wage labour is crucial 
for the full development of capitalism (2), the pace of this process 
varies and so too does the degree to which the labour force is 'free' 
(divorced from its means of subsistance). In colonial conditions a 
continued link with pre-capitalist means of production reduced the cqsts 
involved for the capitalist employer to maintain his worker, for the 
latter can ensure the reproduction of his/her labour power by retreating 
to the relative haven of indigenous relations of production and repro- 
(1) See Chapter Two above. 
(2) See Karl Marx, Capital , Volume 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970) 
especially Chapter VI. We also recognise the possibility for capitalist 
development on the basis of unfree labour. For example, contract 
or indentured labour or on the basis of a 'controlled' peasantry. 
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duction. The persistence of pre-capitalist social relations assists 
the development of capitalist production not only in subsidising the 
costs of reproducing labour power in the rural areas, but possibly 
also with the invaluable provision of foodstuffs for the labour force 
at the capitalist enclaves (1). The persistence of pre-colonial 
social relations of production can also act as a fetter to capitalist 
development. In the Gold Coast conditions the persistence of 'unfree' 
labour in fact inhibited the free flow of labour to the mines and also 
the development of indigenous trading concerns. In an attempt to 
obviate these di'fficulties it was recognised early, by those associated 
with the mines, that if a labour force was not readily available or 
willing to work in the mines then one should be imported from elsewhere: 
Native labour will, for many years at any rate 
have to be imported, as the Ashantis are, for 
the most part farmers pure and simple, and so far 
have not taken kindly to manual labour in the 
mines - still they can fulfill a very useful part 
in the development of the country by keeping up a 
good supply of foodstuffs for the mining population (2). 
The demand for more workers in the mines followed the industry's 
increased activity after a slight downturn at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In 1901, Europe increased its demand for gold which was .0 
translated into a 'rush' on the colony and 2,825 concessions (3). This 
boom was shortlived in all but selected areas which now became the focus 
for expatriate enterprise. These were in Asante with the Ashanti Gold- 
(1 ) See Fn. 2, p. 330 above for the literature on the classical South 
African example of this. 
(2) GNA(A) ADN 45/l/l Resident Kumasi to Colonial Secretary Accra, 
23.7.1899, Letter Book for Mines 30 March 1899-23 March 1901. 
(3) Extract from The Annual Report for the Gold Coast for 1902, 
quoted in G. E. Metcalfe, (editor), Great Britain and Ghana: 
Documents of Ghana History 1807-1957, (Londo-n----Thomas N-elson and 
Sons Ltd., 1964). 
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fields Corporation at Obuasi, in Sefwi Awhiaso with Bibiani Gold Fields, 
and in the Wassaw area around Tarkwa and Prestea. 
We can now look at the ways in which some of these gold mine 
managers and the colonial authorities begar. to deal with the shortages 
of labour which they faced, and the persistence of unfree relations of 
production which inhibited colonial and capitalist development on the 
coast. 
(a) The Erosion of Slavery 
We have already discussed the nature of slavery and the slave 
trade on the Gold Coast and Asante (1). In this later period we are 
concerned with the notion of 'domestic slavery' which interested 
colonial authorities at the beginning of the twentieth century)and 
especially in 1927 following an initiative by the League of Nations 
to ensure the eradication of slavery in all colonial territories. 
Officially, slaves received their emancipation in the Gold Coast in 
1874, but vestiges of so-called 'domestic slavery' remained (2). 
Colonial attempts at ending domestic slavery were uneven. This was 
because of a seemingly contradictory stance adopted by different 
representatives of the European communities. For instance, the 
missionaries abhored the persistence of any kind of unfree condition 
while the colonial authorities proper recognised that domes-tic slavery 
formed a basis for existing relations of production and were apprehensive 
to disrupt them too quickly. in contrast, the mine owners were keen 
(I) See Chapter Three above. 
(2) GNA(A) ADM 111975, Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the 
Gold Coast. 
366 
to draw African labour swiftly from their pre-colonial setting to 
work in the developing industrial enclaves. The colonial dilemma 
was that whereas it sought to undermine any form of labour exploitation 
not based upon the inducement of cash, it sought simultaneously not 
to upset too quickly the indigenous forms of social control as these 
often helped to enhance the interests of colonial capitalism. These 
interests included first, the maintenance of relative indigenous peace 
to enhance the security of trade and second, the preservation and 
reinforcement of an alliance between the colonial authorities and 
local chiefs to maintain indirect rule. Because of these constraints 
on simply disrupting indigenous relations of production, the picture of 
domestic slavery was normally painted by colonial authorities as being 
nothing but a natural state (1). Thus: 
... domestic slaves are practically free people and have their farms (2) 
And again, the domestic slave on the Gold Coast: 
is invariably well treated and regarded rathEr as 
a member of the family than as a servant and not 
infrequently succeeds in -accumulating a considerable 
amount of personal property (3). 
This rosy picture, however, of the plight of domestic slaves 
was not shared by everyone (4). In highlighting the often appalling 
working conditions of domestic slaves and their relationship with 
their master the missionaries added weight to the colonial position 
(1) This was arguably alsotheway in which Asante officials described 
slavery. See, R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923). 
(2) GNA(A) 11/975 Domestic Slav-er-y-"Case No. 23/1927, Evidence from Minutes 
of Evidence taken before 'Committee on West African Lands 7 February 
1913, Mr F. Crowder. 
(3) GNA(A) ADM 11/975 Memorandum on the Vestiges of Slavery in the Gold 
Coast Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs October 1927. See also 
GNA(K) 234, Armitage, Commissioner South'West Ashanti, Remarkson Ramseyer. 
(4) GNA(K) 234 Extract, letter from Ramseyer to Governor 31 October 1904. 
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that slave labour played an important part in bolstering the wealth 
and position of African chiefs and elders (1). 
How much money have they (the chiefs and elders - R. B. ) 
not extorted from thEir poor subjects. We have only 
to invest into how some of their houses in European 
style have been built; for instance the house of the 
chief of Agona or the house of chiefs Yaw Wuah (2). 
It was precisely because domestic slaves continued to sustain 
thE chiefs and theirmaterial position and maintain some kind of stability 
in the region, that the colonial officials were equivocal about 
hastening the demise of domestic slavery. As late as 1905, for 
example, senior colonial officials saw the need to recognise domestic 
slavery and pawning to avert a "chaotic condition of affairs and to 
avoid a too sudden and drastic change of the national polity" (3). 
Colonial representatives preferred a less hasty end to indigenous 
forms of servitude than were beginning to be demanded by the missionaries. 
The need for 'patience' in dealing with such difficult and 
trying areas of colonial administration came out most clearly in 
colonial attitudes towards pawning. Pawning was one of two ways of 
guaranteeing payment for a debt in Asante. It was a system where 
usually a male family member of a debtor lived with the creditor of a 
loan agreement until the debt was paid (4). This arrangement was not 
seen by the colonial authorities as synonomous with domestic slavery. 
To reduce the onerous nature of the pawn creditor relationship the 
Chief Commissioner for Ashanti in 1905 suggested that the pawn should 
See Chapter 3 where it is argued that the exploitation of slave labour 
forms the main basis of chiefs' control 
(2) GNA(K) 234,1904. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) S-Fe-Chapter 3 above: the other form of guarantee was 'surety' where 
a man of standing guaranteed the loan. 
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not keep his/her status for more than seven years (1). Any suggestion 
at reducing the system of pawning or of domestic slavery was resisted 
by the chiefs. In I ine with Ramseyer, and our notion that this form 
of unfree labour was crucial for the exercise of chiefly power, the 
Kings and chiefs of Adansi petitioned the Commissioner in Obuasi 
saying: 
all our drum blowing horn and swords, elephants' 
tails, basket carrying and farming works are done 
by these (i. e. pawns and domestic slaves) as we 
have no money like Europeans to hire men to do 
necessaries for us, but if these are set free then 
no king or chief in this Ashanti have a slave ... how we Kings and chiefs can attend any calling by 
the government at Obuasi or Kumasi while we have no 
body to carry us, beat our drums blow our horns, 
carry our swords and other necessary things (2). 
Allied with the petitioners was a strange bedfellow. It was 
the Commissioner Southern District who thought that lalthough 
Commissioner Fuller's suggestion for reform was admirable, as part 
of gritain's civilising mission and of placating the increasing demand 
for free wage labour, for the sake of stability the preservation of a 
little "pomp and show - so dear to the native mind" (sic) should be 
safeguarded (3). The basis for this-softly softly approach was the 
need to take away the old means whereby the chiefs and headmen got 
their wealth without adversely disrupting indigenous power structures. 
One way to do this was to. educate the power holders in the manner of 
acquiring wealth through the production of cash crops, and new 
agricultural techniques; "industrial and commercial pursuits" which 
would eventually make the chiefs and headmen wealthy enough to 
(1) GNA(K) 234,1904. 
(2) Ibid., petition-from Kings and, Chiefs and Headmen of Adansi Fomina 
ýýNovember 1906, to Commissioner Southern District Ashanti, Obuasi. 
(3) 1" bid., Letter Commissioner Southern District, Ashanti 11 December 1906, 
t67hief Commissioner Ashanti. 
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substitute paid servants and labourers for the domestic slaves and 
pawns. For Armitage, the Commissioner for Southern District, this 
process might take up to twenty years, but the pace at which Asante 
was already assimilating new forms of civilisation gave him hope of 
successful transition to a political economy which would resemble one 
more closely associated with practices of capitalism in Europe rather 
than of pre-colonial Asante (1 ). 
Asante's transition to capitalist wage labour and other ways 
of the capitalist economy were seen by sections of colonial officials 
on the ground to be a necessarily gradual process. The colonial tactic 
suggested by Armitage, for example, at the turn of the 
twentieth century, was for the increasing non-recognition by the 
British of pawns for debts in English courts and the need to encourage 
wealthier groups in Asante not to lend money with pawns as guarantees. 
Legislation should also be passed to improve Native Courts and 
diSCOUrage large debts occurring at local disputes (Palavers) which 
were seen to be accountable for 99% of pawns (2). 
In discouraging chiefs from persisting with the system of 
domestic slaves and of pawning, the coloni4l authorities refused to 
help indigenous power holders regain runaway slaves. The issue 
of reducing domestic slavery, however, was subordinated to that of 
ending pawning. In trying to achieve the latter the colonial authorities 
were intent on persevering with the necessary monetisation of the Asante 
(1) Ibid. On the transition to capitalism in Europe and the processes 
ýT_disposSession of labourers from their pre-capitalist means of 
production, see, The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, 
Introduced by Rodney Hilton, (Londo ZTTT7q 
(2) GA(K) 234,1904. 
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economy,. and. its increased incorporation within an economy dominated 
by the machinations of the colonial state and fluctuations in the 
international economy. It was hoped that by putting a ceiling on the 
rate of interest, which could be claimed on any debt, to less than 20%, 
the system of putting people in to pledge would diminish. 
In 1892 the "placing or receiving of a person in pawn became 
a felony" (1), and in 1907 new rules regulating the conditions of pawns 
and slaves were issued by the Chief Commissioner of Kumase to all 
Ashanti provinces (2). The threat that these new regulations imposed 
upon indigenous power holders was that the "undesirable custom" of 
domestic slavery and pawning should be abolished "with as little 
disruption of the social identity of the Ashanti's and disturbance of 
the public peace as possible" (3). Masters of pawns could not now 
refuse the latter's wishes to redeem themselvesond the progeny of 
female pawns had to be redeemed by a monetary payment. Moreover, from 
the first of January 1903 all pawning was to be a criminal offence. 
The official outlawing of pawning and of domestic slavery did 
not mean that both practices disappeared overnight. In some areas 
the proclamations to end slavery made no immediate difference as the 
colonial authorities refused to enforce the law, and people that were 
'emancipated' seldom had other occupations with different employers to 
turn to. Although in some areas, there were changes towards a more 
orderly transformation of unfree to free wage labour (4), the more 
(1 ) See GNA(K) 234 M(-. morandum and Memorandum from Acting Attorney General 
to Colonial Secretary Accra, 14.5.1907. 
(2) Ibid., Chief Commissioner Kumase to All Ashanti Provinces, l November1907. 
(F 3) 1 iru. 
(4) TFe-rman Rottman to Basel, Accra, 30 June 1875, in Paul Jenkins (editor). 
Abstracts frcm the Gold Coast Correspondence of the Basel Mission, 
Himeo., University of Ghana, Legon, 1970, p. 585c. 
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common experience was for the legal status of slaves to be altered 
but their relations of production to remain unchanged. As was 
explained by a Basel Missionary in 1875; 
Slave owners with large tracts of land would 
almost certainly rather see their ex-slaves remain 
on the land and pay them rent in kind than draw 
them off it (1). 
A gradual transition occurred in areas where the eniancipation 
laws were enforced towards the payment of work for wages, rather than 
solely in kind through the relationship of domestic slavery. This 
meant that the basis of power shifted very slowly from the ideology 
of a rightful traditional position atop a 'communal' societyjto one 
based increasingly upon the possession of land. This in fact had been 
the reality of the position of the power holders since early in the 
sixteenth century, but the formalised colonial presence made the reality 
of the relative positions between people clearer. 
The desired impact of emancipation for the colonial authorities 
was twofold. First, it was to release from pre-capitalist relations 
of production a labour force which could work in productive activities 
0 rganised by encroaching European concessions. Second, it was to 
enhance earlier moves at establishing the cash nexus in Asante and 
elsewhere which was a basis upon which to build capitalism. Both these 
processes were made explicit by the colonial officials in Kumase who 
saw the objective of the reforms to pavining and domestic slavery as to: 
transform labour hitherto classified under the 
name of 'Pawns' into the 'hired labour' known 
(1) See ibid., Asante, Hohr and Werner To the Slave Emancipation 
Commissioner of the Basel Mission on the Gold Coast 26 January 1875 and 
discussion about more than 100 slaves leaving their masters in Kibi and 
the Okyehene' attempts at retrieving slaves by force. 
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to all modern civilised communities (1). 
The need to transform the nature of exploitation within Asante and 
the colony from that based upon unfree coerced relations between 
master and slave to one based upon a wage payment, particularly in 
cash, was the thrust of the colonial regimes attack upon certain 
indigenous relations of production. The impersonal nature of the 
cash nexus and payment for work was seen by the colonial authorities, 
in the context of the Gold Coastto be the least disruptive and most 
efficient way of developing a colonial capitalist economy (2). 
Although gold had been used in Asante as a medium of exchange it was 
not practicable for everyday use on a large scale, and neither was it 
readily accessible to all social classes in the colony. To obviate 
these difficulties and to facilitate the easier demise of the 
institutions of pawning Armitage sought, amongst other thinos, to: 
Introduce licensed Native Letter writers in 
Ashanti and the growing use of promissory notes 
(as the - R. B. ) best guarantees for the ultimate 
disappearance of the pawn (3). ' 
The use of promissory notes were seen as the forerunner to the 
development of hired labour. Instructing the Acting Commissioner of 
the Southern Province in Obuasi to explain this to the Chiefs of 
Mansu and NKwanta the Chief Commissioner of Kumase said that: 
(1) GNA(K)234 Chief Commissioner Kumase to all Ashanti Provinces, 
1 November 1907. 
(2) This is not to say that the colonial regime was unanimous about this 
direction of the pace of the spread of capitalist relations of 
production. This lack of certainty is best drawn out by the conflicts 
between and within the colonial authorities and European capitalist 
interests relating to 'migrant labour'. See IIb(i) below. 
(3) Ibid., Armitage, Kunase to Acting Governor Bryan, 
'5-January 1908. .0 
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by the payment of a very small monthly or yearly 
fee by the creditor to the debtor, the 'pawn' 
becomes a 'hired labourer' and as such the creditor 
will have a greater hold over the person so 'hired' 
than if such a person had been 'pawned'. The fee 
is a minor consideration for if a person agrees to 
hire himself out at a nominal wage it is no-one's 
concern but his own (1). 
The use of hired wage labour took time before it became the 
basis for the relations of production between indigenous producers, 
owners and controllers of land. It took time also to become 
established in the European industrial enclaves. We will examine 
difficulties still facing the mine owners in a mowent. On a 
different scale organisations like the Basel Mission also continued 
to experience difficulties from its work force. Persistent obstacles 
remained associated with maintaining sufficient discipline in the 
work place and even in the congregations (sic) (2). The process was, 
however, set in motion for the different European employing groups 
to hz. ve access to a free wage labour force. In the words of one 
mission worker they were no longer dependent upon the whims of 
individuals because increasingly, by 1875 a free labour force was 
developing and it should be possible to keep wages down (3). The 
emergence of a wage labour force nevertheless continued to be uneven 
with many examples remaining of the persistence of unfree labour (4). 
(1) Ibid., Chief Commissioner to Assistant Commissioner Southern Province, 
N-uase 9 Harch 1908. It should be noted that this development of a hired 
labourer was based on the assumption bythecolonial officials that the 
pawn was thE: debtor. See the mention of 'panyarring' above in Chapter 4 
(Z)See Jenkins , op. cit., A Report from Obrecht, 11 October 1899 (No. 1899 
il 
199) "It's not"only'factory workers .. in Europe who know how to go on strike and cause their superiors sad and difficult hours, but also the 
Africans of this dark continent .. more than among the working masses of Europe, on the Gold Coast (and probably in the whole of Africa) there is 
everywhere the desire for more wages and less work; and this often exem- 1'fies itself in insolent and careless behaviour", pp60403-404. (3)Ybild ., As ante, Mohr and Werner to the Slave -Emancipation mmissioner of Ea-sel Mission 26 June 1875, p. 585a. ' (4)See. ibid., and GNA(K)249, Respecting Slave Dealing recently occurred at Sefh'wi, and GNA(K)562 Pawning, and for the treatment of slave children i-I 
the care of the colonial authorities GNA(CC) ADM 23/l/126 Slave Chil&en 
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Our examination of colonial attitudes towards the presence of 
'unfree' indigenous relations of production is important because it 
highlights one of several trends in the development of capitalism in 
the territory. Karl Marx's model of primitive accumulation derived 
from the development of capitalism in Europe and included the premise 
of the 'freeing' of labour from its pre-capitalist means of production (1). 
This process ensured the necessity for the labourer to meet with an 
employer of labour (capitalist) in the market place, where the labourer 
had nothing to sell but his/her labour power and which thereby facilitated 
the development of capitalist relations of production based upon wage 
labour. As Marx put it: 
For the conversion of his money (i. e. the capitalist - R. B. ) 
into capital ... the owner of money must meet in the market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, 
that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as 
his own commodity, and that on the other hand he had no 
other commodity for sale, is short of everything 
necessary for the realisation of his labour-power (2). 
AlthOUgh an integral part of Marx's model for the development 
of capitalism in Europe, there is no a priori reason why labour in a 
pre-capitalist social formation automatically and rapidly becomes 
freed from unfree - in our case slave - relations of production in 
the development of capitalism. Indeed a major feature of the 
development of capitalism throughout the world has been the. uneven 
detachment of indigenous labour from their means of production and 
reproduction. This process has been uneven because although capitalism 
as it developed in Europe, sought the development after time of a free 
wage labour force whose labour power could be bOL: ght and. sold on a 
market place, and thereby commoditised, this was not an automatic 
(1) Karl Marx, (1970), op. cit. 
(2) Ibid., p. 166. 
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process. The separation of the labourer from his/her pre-capitalist 
means of production was subject inter alia to thc nature of class 
conflict wiýin the pre-capitalist social formation, to class struggles 
within the colonising power and the resolution of these struggles at 
the local and international level. We have shown that pre-colonial 
forms of labour remained on the Gold Coast throughout the period of 
formal colonialism and at times this was desired by differEnt European 
commercial ventures and the colonial state when cheap migrant labour 
was I recrui ted' to work in the mi nes (1 ). Wage 1 abour, mo reover, was 
resisted by African peasants because of their reluctance to be incor- 
porated into a developing capitalist mode of production. 
In brief, pre-colonial relations of production persisted in one 
form or another into the twentieth century in the colony because of the 
nature of class struggles between the encroaching colonial power and 
indigenous Akan groups. We have already mentioned that the British did 
not want to disrupt too quickly indigenous relations of production for 
fear of disintegrating local authority structures which the British 
were themselves trying to cultivate. The institution of chiefdomship 
was a means of maintaining indirect rule on the coast. Similarly we 
have shown above the protest from chiefs at losing a means of their own 
political and economic power base in different areas. A dilemma never- 
theless remained for the colonial authorities in that they recognised 
the importance of the impersonal, 'free' relationship based upon the 
(1) Similarly we will show in a moment that hired labour for indigenous 
owners of land during the development of cocoa was for a time discouraged 
by the colonial state because it added to the cost of producing cocoa. 
At different moments, however, both mining and the state system 
questioned the expense involved in operating a migrant labour system 
and argued for a permanent, urbanised work force. 
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spread of cash nexus and wage labour but were constrained in extending 
this among the Akan because of the uncertainty which might follow in 
terms of the absence of a class with which it might successfully 
align. 
(b) Labour, the Mines and the Incorporation of the Northern 
Territories 
Nowhere was the colonial dilemma of increasing the capitalist 
direction of the colony's economy, through the greater development of 
wage labour, while simultaneously trying to maintain indigenous pre- 
colonial power relations, more apparent than in the Northern Territories. 
The struggle for control of the area north of Asante had been brought to 
the fore by colonial rivalries between the French, Germans and British 
at the end of the nineteenth century (1). The Northern Territories 
became a separate administrative region in 1898 and a Protectorate in 
1902. The colonial regime had mixed feelings about the potential for 
the new area brought within British control. The Governor in 1899 
remarked that the Northern Territories: 
possess no natural resources to develop. The country 
as far as is known is destitute of mineral wealth, 
it is destitute of valuable timbers, and does not 
produce either rubber or kola nuts indeed any 
product of trade value .. For the present I there- fore cannot too strongly urge the employment of all 
available resources of the government upon the 
development of the country to the south of Kintampo 
leaving the Northern Territories to'be dealt with in 
future years .. I would not at present spend upon the Northern Territories ... a single penny more than is absolutely necessary for their suitable administration 
and the encouragement of the transit trade (2). 
(1) See, M. Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, (London: Hutchinson, 
1968), G. E. Metcalfe op. ci ., and R. B. Beni-n-g-, rColonial Development 't Policy in Northern ýhaýa 1898-1950', Bulletin of the Ghana Geographical 
Association, 17,1975 and map showing the Gol-d-C-o-ast and Northern 
Territories. See below for- discussion of the developing rail, network 
and liar6our facilities. (2), PRO CO 96/346, Gold Coast Conference 20 December 1999; pp. 1-4 Governor 
Hodgson talking about the potential of the Northern Territories, quoted 
in Bening, op. cit., p. 72. 
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This feeling was not shared by all parties concerned with the spread 
of European 'civilisation' in the area. In 1901, for example, a 
mining company, the Wa Syndicate Limited of London wanted to purchase 
land in the North for the exploitation of gold deposits. in Western 
Gonia (1). Companies looking for concessions laid the inhabitants 
of the area open to the difficulties faced by Africans in the south 
and once more highlighted the British lack of understanding for 
indigenous titles to land. For example: 
I find that the Dagarti people inhabiting that 
country dre a-wild naked tribe not using money and 
having no kings or central power of government. 
The mining rights in this country would not 
interfere with their lands or villages but would 
be a benefit to them if worked by a company (2). 
Increased colonial presence and European mining companies 
in the North were to pose problems for the colonial strategy of 
indirect rule. As more and more interest was shown in the potential 
supply of labour from the Northern Territories, the indigenous groups 
recognised increasingly that. their chiefs were being seduced by 
colonial promises of financial reward for departing from previous 
land practices (3). Prior to European contact, social organisation 
of the Northern peoples was far more decentralised than that of the 
Akan groups which we have examined in Asante and on the coast: chiefs 
existed but in a less hierarchical and rigid structure than say among 
the Asante. In the process of establishing Indirect Rule in the North 
(1) B. G. Der, 'Colonial Land Policy in the Northern Territories of the Gold 
Coast 1900-1957', Universitas, 4,2,1975 An inter Faculty Journal 
published at the University of Ghe. na. See also, Nii K Plange, 'Under- 
development in Northern Ghana: Natural Causes or Colonial Capitalism? ' 
ROAPE, No. 15/16 M%December 1979,1981. 
(2 ) Lhief Commissioner jor A. H. Morris, to Nathan, 18 May 1901 quoted in Del 
op-cit., p. 130. 
(3) ý_ee_Tor example, Der op. cit., and Roger G. Thomas, 'The 1916 Bongo Riots 
and Their Background: --A-spects of the Early Colonial Administration of i 
Eastern Upper Ghana', Mimeo, Institute of African Studies, University 
of Ghana, Legon, 1975. - 
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the British extended and modified thC powers of the chiefs. One 
such extension of chiefly power facilitated by the British, which we 
examine below, was the provision of the coercive mears whereby tile 
village headmen and chiefs in the North supplied labour to European 
employers. These measures were not always successful. 
- The colonial authorities' major concern with the North was 
with the number of labourers that it could provide for mining 
developments in the South, and later in cocoa production. The 
importance of the labour power in the territory was summed up in 1922: 
The principal asset of the Dependency is the amount 
of manpower it sends down to relieve the labour 
shortage in the colony and Asante, and also in the 
recruits it supplies to the Northern Territories 
constabulary, the West African Front. ier Force and 
the Police (1). 
In 1921 alone the Commissioner of the Northern Territories reported 
that 3,800 organised labourers were supplied to the mines, ra. ilways 
and sisal plantations in the south. 
We can now examine more carefullY the nature of the migration 
south. Was it a voluntary movement of people to find work or did it 
occur only under duress? We can also examine here some of the affects 
upon indigenous relations in the North as the European employers of 
labour sought to acquire a more permanent wage labour force. This 
process was similar to earlier colonial incursions in that it was to 
be a violent process. 
(1) GNA(A) ADM 57/1/496 Annual Report on Northern Territories for 
1921: Northern Territories Report for first quarter, 
1922. 
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(i) Labour Recruitment 
There were early demands by mining companies for labour. The 
colonial government at different times recruited labour from the 
villages for road clearing and road maintenance, and. the mine owners 
asked if government recruitment practices would be applied to them. 
Careful not to upset the workers too much who were brought down from 
the north, under the protection of the colonial officials, the Chief 
Commissioner in the Northern Territories asked the mine owners to try 
and ensure that workers from thC same village worked together (1). 
The need to encourage rather than to simply use coercion with the work 
force when it arrived at its new place of work was briefly and 
tentatively acknowledged by some of the mine owners. In 1906, for 
example, it was reported by the Mines Department that the visit of 
thirty labourers sent down by the government from the North, to see 
what the work was like "was a decided success, the people showing an 
interest in all that they saw" (2). At the same time it was recognised 
that: 
In the event of any persons coming down to work 
from the Northern Territories, they would at first 
require very careful handling as they would probably 
go away if they received any severe treatment, and 
it must be remembered that when the labour supplies 
of the colony are exhausted the Northern Territories 
is the only place in the Gold Coast where large 
numbers of labourers could be obtained (3). 
With this in mind the Chief Commissioner Northern Territories began a 
recruitment programme in the North by encouraging the chief to send 
(1) See, Roger G. Thomas, 'Forced Labour in British West Africa; The Case 
of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 1906-1927', JAH, 1,14,1973. 
(2) Governmnt of the Gold Coast Report on the Gold Mining I6-d-ustry for 
1906, (London: Waterlow and Sons Ltd., 1907), p. 5. 
(3) TU71., p. 5. 
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his fit villagers South. Attempts at imposing new alien work routines 
on the Northern labourers, however, were not successful. This was 
especially the case with regard to recruiting workers to toil under- 
ground (1). As an incentive to chiefs to recruit labour for the 
colonial regime and the mines, 5/- a head for headmen was suggested. 
For this payment the chief had to supply a labourer for a twelve month 
period and if the worker did not last that long the chief became 
eligible for the cost of the workers' subsistence while the latter 
had worked at the mine (2). 
The degree of force which accompanied the encouragement given 
to the chiefs and labour by the colonial authorities has recently 
been documented (3). In one instance the District Commissioner of 
Tumu in August 1907, threatened to fine all Tumu headmen 30/- and the 
chief 40/- if 150 men did not come forward to work in the South for 
the mines (4). Shortages of labour in the mines became more apparent 
in the middle of 1908. In September 1907, there had been a serious 
outbreak of cerebo-spinal meningitis in the North West ending in a 
final death toll of eight thousand. Added to the specific problem facing 
the mine was an increase in infrastructural activity in the colony. 
The development of rail links from Tarkwa to Prestea and the construction 
of the Accra-Kumase link all demanded labour from the North, so too did 
the mushrooming cocoa industry. 
(1) See for example, Reýort of Mining Department April 1923-March 1924, 
Accra Government Printer. The point is made here that there was a 
shortage of underground workers and that labourers preferred longer 
hours and lower wages as long as they worked on the surface, p. 5. 
Labour shortages were also being experienced in the North for road 
maintenance GNA(A) ADM 56/l/433, Annual Report Tamale District 1909. 
(2) GNA(A) ADM 56/1/84 Native Labour Northern Territories 1909-1920. 
(3) Thomas, (1973), op-. cit. 
(4) Quoted in ibid., pp. 81-82., 
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Dissatisfaction with their new work routines and conditions 
that greeted the Northern labourers was reflected by unrest in the 
North, and desertions en route to their new place of employment. Two 
hundred, for example, deserted from Mamprusi and Navrongo Districts out 
of a total of five hundred and forty before they reached Tamale. and the 
total number which finally reached the mine was only two hundred and 
fifty eight. A further two hundred and thirty one left the mine after 
a short while (1). In 1917 it was also recorded that labourers en route 
to the mines in Wassaw had tried to escape by jumping from the train at 
Obuasi having originally been told that they were going to work in 
Bekviai (2). 
Although limited success had been achieved in the recruitment 
of labour and the development of a disciplined wage labour force 
problems in recruitment persisted. Difficulties continued in maintaining 
a permanent labour force which did not retreat back to the North after 
earning small sums of money. For example, the report of the Mines 
Department, 1923-24 repeated the sentiments and worries about labour 
which had been made by a Commission in Tarkwa in 1882: 
Another disadvantage to progress is the necessity 
of getting fresh Kroomen; they will only engage 
for a year at a time, and nothing will induce them 
to remain longer, and the consequence is that about 
the time they are really becoming skilled and useful 
labourers, this period of service is up, and they 
take themselves off to their homes (3). 
On another level the colonial authorities viere not happy with the 
amount of unrest and. resistence to labour recruitment that was apparent 
(1) Ibid., p. 83. See map on page 346. 
(2) ýWK) 395 N25/1917,7 March 1917-19 March 1917 Native labourers for the 
Mines, ill Treatment of. Compare, C. Van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine 
Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933, (London: Pluto Pres-s-, -1976). 
(3) Report on Mining Industry 1 -, _, 
1923-24, p. 5. 
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in the North. Having said this however, it is possible to argue that 
labour was looked for in the Northern Territories increasingly because 
of labour disputes in the South among a growing militant work force 
there (1). 
In seeking to remedy the difficulties still faced by the mines, 
a nd increasingly so after 1909, a Barrister representing twelve mining 
companies suggested that a fillip could be given to labOUr recruitment 
if a system similar to tha. t used in South Africa, of Pass laws and 
compounding native labour, was adopted (2). The establishment of a 
Native Labour Bureau was suggested which would be the sole supplier of 
labour to the mines and would be under the control of the companies, 
rather than directly that of the colonial government. In opposition 
to this, Governor Rodger saw the possibility of being able to placate 
more adequately the dissatisfaction of the migrant labourers, if they 
were controlled by the colonial authorities. Moreover, it was thought 
by the colonial authorities that the labour from the North would be 
more disciplined and remain longer in the jobs if they were accompanied 
by their wives; if they were not required to work underground as soon 
as they arrived at the mine and if they got food to which they were 
accustomed (3). These suggestions were not greeted with much enthusiasm 
(1 ) This is argued by Jeff Crisp-, 'Labour Resistence and Labour Control 
in the Ghanaian Gold Mining Industry, 1870-1980', Ph. D., University of 
Birmingham, 1980, Chapter 3. 
(2) Thomas, (1973) op. cit., p. 85. 
(3) Letter to Giles Bunt from Colonial Secretary 5.11.1909, GNA(A) ADM 
56/1184 Native Labour, Northern Territories, 1909-1920. It should also 
be noted that there was a degree of exploitation within the mine labour 
force, Southern workers' wives played a large part in providing 
both cooked and uncooked food for the single men from the North 
and took great advantage from their monopoly position. 
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by the mine authorities. To bring the wives of the workers down 
would cause greater expense not only 
-in 
paying the men an increased 
family wage but also in the building of mixed family accommodation (1). 
Furthermore, thE- suggestion not to put the workers underground 
immediately defeated the whole object of recruiting workers from the 
North. The point was to satisfy the demand for work underground 
following the increased demand for gold which simultaneously would 
discipline the work force in the rigours of their new occupation. 
After much discussion as to the possible legal and institutional 
changes which the colonial regime could enforce to facilitate the 
further recruitment of NorthErn Labour there was an amendment, in 
1912, to the 11aster and Servants Ordinance. This legislation gave 
the courts greater power to penalise breaches of ccntract and thE 
government power to inspect labour conditions. Rules on the provision 
of medical inspection were also included. 
Mine owners continued labour recruitment without the governments 
direct assistance until the discovery of manganese in the colony in 1926. 
Manganese was an important ingredient for the war effort in Europe and 
so the colonial personnel were encouraged to entice the chiefs of the 
North to send labour south. It was advised, however, that this labour 
should not work underground and the reward for supporting the war 
Regulations and instructions issued by the colonial authorities with 
regard to labobr recruitment from thE. North were equivocal as to who 
should bear the cost of womens'presence in the mines. For example, 
"Every encouragement will be given to men to bring their wives, who 
shall be provided with subsistence for the journey from their homes. 
This may be subsequently charged against their husbands' pay". Compare 
"If a mining company requires labourers to come by rail the company 
shall pay their railway fares and those of their wives". GNA(A) ADM 
56/1/84 Na 
* 
tive Labour N. T. Regulations and Instructions as to the Supply 
of Labourers from the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast to the Mine 
See Thomas, (1973), op. cit. This followed the government having been pre 
vailed upon to accept, inter alia, coloured labourers Ordinance which 
would have imposed sentences ý-fsix months' hE. rd labour for desertion et 
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effort shoul d be 1/3 to 1 /8 a day (1 ). 
Developmentsin the colony especially following Guggisberg's Ten 
Year Development Plan in November 1919, continued to attract labour 
which could have worked in the mines. These developments together 
with the cocoa industry once more pressurised the West African Chamber 
of Mines, and the individual mine ccmpanies, to complain bitterly about 
the lack of sufficient workers. An influenza epidemic in 1918 added 
to the shortages and calls began again for labour recruitment from 
oUtside the colony: 
The shortage resulting from thE: influenza epidemic 
in 1918 has not been made good, and with labour 
required for so many purposes in the colony it is 
difficult to see how a sufficient supply of labour 
to meet all requirements can*be obtained unless a 
source of supply from outside the colony can be 
. 
discovered (2). 
As the labour requirements of the colony increased the Governor 
called a meeting to discuss possible schemes in the North. The mine 
owners were excluded from this meting. The government decided upon a 
voluntary recruiting scheme without coercion but supervised by political 
officers who could encourage chiefs to enlist gangs of workers of about 
25 who would become registered for specific tasks in the south. The mine 
(1) Ibid., p. 89. What Thomas sees as this 'patriotism' was not always 
Tort-hcoming. While recruiting for the Gold Coast Regiment in 1917 
the Chief Commissioner of Gambaga informed the Provincial Commissioner 
North Western Province of the "lack of patriotism" of some of the 
chiefs for "selecting the half lame and blind" to be soldiers when 
there were growing able bodies to choose from. At news of this 
Armitage replied, with typical aggression, that the chiefs "should 
be warned that they will be reported ... if they repeat the offence, then I shall seriously consider whether they are qualified to return 
to their positions after having them deliberately insulted the governmen 
GNA(A) 56/1/219 Gold Coast Regiment Recruiting in Northern Territoriesl 
(2) Mines Department Report, 1919, p. 3. A numbEx of workers already migrated 
for work at the mines from Liberia but it ha, d become increasingly more 
difficult for thEA to pass through French West Africa. As late as 1921 
however the' Commissioner Northern Territories had been able to report 
"large numbers of French labourers passed through to obtain work in the 
South" GNA(A) ADM 56/1/496 Annual Report on Northern Territories 1921 . 
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representatives were again unhappy about a scheme which did not 
involve them directly and they requested that a minimum of one third 
of the recruited labour should be directed to the mines. Guggisberg 
defended the government's form of labour recruitment by stressing 
that it must be on a voluntary basis. This was because to force 
labour to the mines would result in increased antagonism between workers 
and employers and already work in the mines was detested. To bear this 
out, mine recruiters could only get 400 men in July 1920 compared with 
the recruitment of 8,000 by the government (1). After little success 
in direct competition with government recruitment, the mines established 
recruitment depots in the North and, used African ex Non Commissioned 
Officers to help the chiefs to provide mine labour. An added inducement 
was to be the payment of head money to the chiefs for the! labour 
recruitment. Labourers were to receive 2/- a day for working under- 
ground but this money was not to be paid at the end of each day. 
Instead, to ensure that the labourer did not retreat home when he hz. d 
earned enough to satisfy his own requirements, payment was staggered. 
A shilling paid immediately, half of the balance on completion of the 
contract and half when the labourer returned home (2). Added inducements 
were offered to the labourers to remain at work after the companies 
had trained them. These included improved living conditions: 
To attract labour, the mining companies have 
contracted good houses for the labourers, 
installed water supplies, provided food at cost 
price, and raised the wages as high as they 
could afford (3). 
(1) Ibid., p. 93. Although possibly an exaggerated figure, this does 
suggest that the proposal of workinq in the mines was not well received 
by Northern labourers. For more on the conflict between mine recruiters 
and government recruiters see, ibid., p. 96. 
(2) Ibid., p. 94. 
(3) Wiýnes Department Report 1920, (Accra: Government Printer, 1922), pp. 3-4. 
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Despite these inducements the Mines Department still reported 
a decline in the numbers of African workers employed. An average of 
ten thousand four hundred and thirty nine Africans were employed by 
the mining industry in 1920 which was a decline of one thousand three 
hundred and three in the year (1). Moreover, the establishment of 
recruiting bureaux in the North were not seen to have been viable: 
The cost 
' 
of recruiting was out of all proportion 
to the number of recruits, and of those recruited 
many deserted before reaching the mines (2). 
The mine owners still had some hope, however, that despite the 
continuous shortfall of labour, something experienced in Nigeria and, 
the French Territories and even the South African mines, the anticipated 
colla'pse in the cocoa industry due to methods of cultivation and 
diseased trees would ensure more supplies to the mine. Once again 
the competition. not simply from government programmes but also 
indigenous production activities, provided too strong an incentive to 
African labour - not least because the cocoa industry could pay higher 
wages (3). In 1920-21 the government more overtly assisted the 
the recruitment of labour to the mines. Between 1922-23 two thousand 
two hundred men were recruited for the mines while only nine hundred 
and thirty one went to the railways (4). This was appreciated by the 
mines' owners and was reflected in the I-lines Department Annual Report, 
1922-March 1923, which recognised the continuing serious nature of the 
Ibid. To get an idea of the relative labour requirements at a particular 
mine; Abontiakoon mines at Tarkwa in Wassaw employed 52 Europeans and 
1,608 Africans in 1920. This was a decline in numbers of 19 whites and 
260 Africans compared with 1919. Ibid. 
(2) Ibid., p. 7. 
(3) 7eFe-ibid., and for the hope of the collapse of cocoa to release labour 
to tFe-mines see C. C. Tamale to S. H. Ford Esq, Supt Engineer Fanti 
Consolidated Mines Ltd Tarquah, 7 November 1916 in GNA(A) 56/1/84 Native: 
Labour Northern Territories 1909-1920. 
(4) Thomas, (1973), on. cit., p. 97. 
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labour shortage but also that it was: 
very much easier owing to the vigorous recruiting 
of labour to increase the period of indenture 
from six to nine and in some cases to twelve 
months (1). 
Rather than rely, as previously, upon simply the availability 
of labour the recruiting programme in the North now took the form of 
fixed quotas which had to be met by the chiefs, and which inevitably 
led to more forms of coercion. 
The mines still did not receive the desired amount of labour. 
Labour did not stay long enough to make it profitable for the mines 
to train it in anything but the most alienating of routine jobs. 
Arguably alsolthe uncertain financial. footing of the mines meant that 
their unpredictable future militated against the prospect of any durable 
long term presence on the Gold Coast. The treatment of workers, despite 
the mine owners' boast of improved conditions, remained appalling and 
there was amongst other things, an increase in 'social diseases' like 
venereal disease and drunkenness which permeated back to the Northern 
Territories and added to mounting lawlessness there (2). Such was the 
treatment of some'workers by the mines that one government official 
commented: 
I feel certain that there are very few races 
if any in this world who would have stood the 
treatment that the African has received from the 
hands of the old company (3). 
The treatment of the workers did not go unnoticed by the chiefs 
Mines Department January 1922-flarch 1923 Report, Gold Coast Government 
Press, Accra, 19N, p. 3. 
(2) GNA(S) District Administration Office Tarkwa, 561 Mining Complaints 
1924-1931. 
(3) GNA(S) District Administration Office Tarkwa 3 Quarterly Reports 31/3/23- 
31/12/30 Quarter ending September 1925, Talking about Prestea Block W, 
Ltd. 
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who showed both increasing reluctance to let labour go South and an 
inability to recruit increased numbers of workers. Deaths occurred 
through illness like tuberculosis and also through accident (1). 
Following a government enquiry into the death rates of African 
employers the mine managers insisted that the main cause of mortality 
was not the condition of the mines but of the workers themselves. 
Despite these protestations the Secretary of State ordered thE super- 
vision of recruiting until sanitary conditions in the mines improved (2). 
An inquiry found that the majority of the workers recruited to the mines 
were not in good heal'th. This was. because although the chiefs had been 
told to supply fixed numbers of employees to the mines, the most healthy 
and young showed a preference to work elsewhere (3). Many of the 
fittest workers did. indeed migrate South for waged employment but their 
preference had not been for the traumas of the mines but for work in 
the railways, i, n harbour development and in cocoa. Forced recruitment 
of labour failed therefore to satisfy the demand for quality labour. 
Even using coercive measures the chiefs of the North could not round 
up the fit young men; only the infirm and unfit were available. This 
hindered the progress of the mines: 
The labour question ... involves quality as well as quantity. It of necessity takes time for the 
recruit to accustom himself to the unwanted conditions 
he meets underground, and to absorb the training 
necessary to render him an efficient worker. At the 
beginning of the year, the labOL: rer was indentured for 
six months only, with the result that very shortly 
For a breakdown of deaths through disease, April-September 1923 see 
Thomas, (l 973, ) op. ci t. 100. See also Mines Report 1923-1924, (Accra 
Government Printers, j92P4*, )p. 25. 
(2) Ibid., p. 101. The outcome of a government enquiry into the health of 
'fFe-mine workers was a mining areas Health Ordinance. (3) Ibid., p. 101 . The colonial authorities, hoaever, saw the lack of fit younC men in gangs recruited by the chiefs as the fault of the latter because 
they were told to. supply, "Thei'r best people and find men who would go 
down to work and not to seize rabbits and wasters. Deserters are worse 
than useless and a nuisance to everyone. " GNA(A) 56/1/319, Diary 
Commissioner Northern Province, 18/l/22-18/2/24. 
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after he had graduated from the learners' class 
the recruit was due to be repatriated. The 
labourers are now indentured with their own consent 
for nine months, and some gangs have agreed to sign 
on for twelve (1). 
The other major reason why the mines did not get the desired 
amount of labour was that labour was needed in the Northern Territories 
by the chiefs in the maintenance of agricultural production. The 
maintenance of food production in the North was as vital to the 
colonial regime and the mine managers as it was to the indigenous 
inhabitants. Without adequate food production the colony would have 
to bear the cost of the reproduction of labour power. By keeping food 
production in the North at a sufficient level to feed the population 
there, the mining companies did not have to burden themselves with 
providing wages large enough to maintain the labourers when they 
returned to the iMrth (2). Too much food production in the North 
would inhibit the flow of labour in the South. For these reasons 
the colonial authorities were concerned about the levels of food 
production in the North. As we will see below the colonial authorities 
did not approve of the migration of northerners to different 
agricultural, namely cocoa growing areas. These moves were seen as 
attempts to avoid recruitment to European initiated enterprise in the 
south and to blatantly challenge the authority of the chiefs. In the 
process the authority of the colonial regime was also challenged (3). 
(1) Mines Department Report January 1922-March 1923, (Accra: Gold Coast 
Government Press, 1924), p. 10. 
(2) The other side of this is that the mine i,,, orkers should have a m-inimum 
amount of money in their pockets to return to the North with, so as to 
continue the development of a cash economy. This would show other 
potential recruits that the whole exercise of going south to work in 
the mines was worthwhile. See, GNA(A)ADM 56/l/84, Chief Commissioner 
Tamale, comments on this to the engineer of Fanti Consolidated. 
(3) This was especially the case as the chiefs were seen to have their 
authority vested in them by the colonial government. See GNA(A) 56/l/278, 
Migration of Natives from One District to Another, 1921-1930. 
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In November 1927 the mines ended their recruiting campaign 
in the north. The reason given was because of the expense involved 
for such a limited return. The process of forced labour which had 
existed off and on since the turn of the century, and which continued 
in different forms, was a forerunner to the formalisation of indirect 
rule in the north (1). The north, due partly to its remoteness and 
distance from the coast, (and thus the difficulty in the transportation 
of cash crops) together with its ecological, mainly savanna area, had 
become in twenty years a labour reserve for the colony and in-particular 
for European commercial interests in the mining industry. 
We have touched briefly some of the difficulties faced by the 
mines in satisfying their demand for. labour. Significant among these 
was the failure to dispossess the indigenous labourers from their 
means of production, mainly land, in the North. In part we have seen 
that this helped the mines keep a low cost of reproducing their labour 
power. They only had to pay subsistance for the labourer while he was 
at the mine. At the same time, becaLlse the colonial regime did not 
give full backing to the open coercion of labour and its containment 
in compounds, the mines could not keep their costs sufficiently low to 
maintain a migrant labour system. In this case, as in many examples 
of a colonial regime trying to establish a system of wage labour, it 
became increasingly apparent at the turn of the twentieth century that 
the colonial regime would have to act to facilitate the separation of 
the labourer from his means of production. Such a separation would 
hasten the monetisation of northern society and thereby integrate it 
(1) See (ii) below on the continued presence of forced labour and the 
distinction, often nebulous, with communal labour. 
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more fully into the capitalist commodity market already becoming 
entrenched in the south. Monetisation would hasten the emergence of 
a permanent wage labour force to satisfy the increased demand for 
labour in the south which was needed for rail and harbour development 
projects - as well as for the mines. The colonial desire for thE: 
emergence of a more permanent wage labour force, was as we have just 
seen subject to a number of checks and balances. Some of these were 
imposed by the mine owners who wanted the coercive 'recruitment' of 
labour. Other constraints on the speedy separation of northern labour 
from the means of production carrie from the reaction of indigenous 
groups in the north itself, and their refusal to be incorporated into 
new work patterns and a capitali-st mode of production. The colonial 
regime was also_on a tight rope concerning its attitudes towards the 
development of a wage labour force. This was because while it had a 
policy of increasingly introducing money and commercial relations into 
the Northern Territories, it sought to maintain political control in 
the region by supporting and often creating local chiefdoms. The 
commercialisation of social relations, however, tended to undermine 
the already fragmentary powers of northernchiefs. It is in the light 
of these pressures on the colonial authorities in the north, that we 
can now examine more closely how the colonial presence in the Northern 
Territories sought to further incorporate the region into the developing 
capitalist economy in the Gold Coast Colonywhile not completely 
dissolving all pre-capitalist relations of production. 
(ii) Indirect Rule and the Subjugation of the North 
ThEt development of the infrastructural potential of the Northern 
Territories, like elsewhere in the colony, was subordinated to the 
likelihood of colonial reward in the form of greater economic profitability 
8 'A 
and political subjugation of the indigenous inhabitants. Little was 
done to change this situation even when, following years of northern 
labour working in European industries in thc SOUth and fighting for 
the British in the Gold Coast Regiment in World War One, Guggisberg 
announced that: 
... The Career df the Northern Territories as the Cinderella of the Gold Coast is nearing its end; ' 
as Cinderella she has done good and unobtrusive 
work; her reward for that and the gallantry of her 
soldiers is in sight (1). 
The geographic. distance of the Northern Territories from the 
longer established Gold Coast Colony, and the resulting lack of an 
Europeam oriented, commodity producing economy there gave the colonial 
regime little incentive to control the north. Indeed, initial 
control of the Northern Territories came only as a result of inter- 
colonial rivalry between Britain, France and Germany for territories 
bordering the North. Once a British tolonial presence was estabTished 
in the North, however, with a small number of staff, the potential 
labour resource of the region became increasingly apparent. 
For a short while at the turn of the twentieth century the 
British thought that the north could be made economically viable with 
the minimum of colonial expense. ThE: answer lay in the land of the 
North and the potential mineral resources there but also prospects for 
cotton and shea nut production. The British thought, that land could be 
appropriated by the colonial government, and then sold to mining 
companies and thereby realise payment for the trouble that the British 
went to in establishing an administration in the area. Coupled with 
Quoted in Der, op. cit., p. 135. See also Guggisberg's, 'Report on 
Northern Territories 919', CO/96/614. 
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this was the desired impact that the commerical companies could bring 
to the area. In addition to the effects of the labour returning, with 
money (in reality, more often than not without it) the northerners 
could be forced into compliance with the work practices of twentieth 
century Europe right on their own doorstep. The political corollary 
for this was the imposition of 'indirect rule', where the colonial 
administration could help sustain chiefly controls in the area. If 
ever there was a breakdown of such control another chief could quite 
easily, with colonial help, be foisted upon the people. In this vein 
one colonial administrator used the simile of a ladder when talking 
about indigenous power holders and British administration in Yendi: 
all headmen, village chiefs, district chiefs, 
District Commissioners, etc. -being compared with 
rungs in it, hence all being trusted by the 
government each to do his duty, faulty execution 
thereof not jeopardising the ladder but only the 
rung in it; 
He added: 
The chiefs are calling a meeting'to discuss their 
ability and divide up the responsibility for the 
collecting of labour (1). 
Unfortunately for the British the execution of this policy was not 
as eqsy or as peaceful as they had hoped (2). 
(iii) Dispossession of Land in the North and Colonial Violence 
As we have already suggested the British colonial regime at the 
turn of the century recognised increasingly that the best way to satisfy 
(1) GNA(A). ADM 56/l/259, Yendi Informal Diary, July 30,1920. 
(2) It should be noted that the 'pacification' of the north was an 
uneven process with regional differences of reaction between, 
for example, the North West and North East in terms of the 
willingness of labourers to work in the mines. 
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labour shortages in the south were to separate northE. rn labourers 
from their mans of production through the increased commercial isation 
and monetisation of the north. Frcm an early date thE colonial 
authorities rejected the mine owners' demands that the flow of labour 
to the industrial enclaves should be prompted largely by ccercion and 
a system of migrant labour. Instead, because of the colonial authorities' 
desire not to disrupt too quickly indigenous relations of production, and 
I 
local power structures, and because of African resistance to the incor- 
poration into the capitalist mining industry (and agriculture) the 
British sought a slower and initially more partial dissolution of 
indigenous relations of production. The pace of the erosion of indigenous 
relations of production was crucial to the colonial administration and 
to the success of capitalist mining enterprises. The speed and also 
the degree of the dissolution of indigenous modes of production, 
remained an issue of discussion within the colonial regime over its 
policies towards the Northern Territories just as it was to come to the 
fore in the colonial states' handling of the developing cocoa industry 
at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Legislation was the first method used by the colonial regime to 
separate people in the north from their means of production. The 
Mineral Rights Ordinance in 1904, denied the rights of northern power 
holders to allocate land in the granting of concessions. It will be 
remembered that in the south, following the furore against the proposed 
Lands Bill in 1898, and the Forest Bill in 1911, the colonial authorities 
conceded that granting of concessions should remain with the chiefs. 
In contrast, in the north this was to be carried out by the Governor. 
Moreover, the Governor was given the right in law to seize land for 
publ ic uti 1i ty' wi thout compensation except where crops would be 
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damaged and improvements to the land had been carried out. The fee 
for concessions was set at very high rates. For example, the 
government sought at different stages of the concession being developed; 
162 for issuing a prospecting license, f1250 per annum for the rights 
of option and 15000 per annum for a mining lease. These fees were 
reduced in 1904 but they still had the intensiod' of raising revenue 
for the administration of the territory, and of limiting the sizes of 
the concessions (1). Again, unlike thE Gold Coast Colony the need for 
a concession's court was disposed of by the Governor granting concessions 
direct. 
The colonial administration rode roughshod over indigenous 
forms of land allocation like the role of'the Tendana or Earth God 
in Northern society who, in collusion with the elders, allocated land 
an d rights of occupation (2). Despite the seizure of land and the 
impression given in the Northern Territories that all rights in land 
were now held by the Crown, mining syndicates failed to be interested. 
The expense of establishing mines in the north for the mining of gold 
deposits weighted heavily upon the finances of the companies. This 
was especially the case following thE. imposition of high charges for 
the concessions by the British administration. In 1905, for example, 
thE: Wa syndicate was forced to close operations and for similar reasons 
the area taken up by Felicia Syndicate was never worked (3). 
This side of colonial policy in the North and of seeking its 
easier incorporation into the colonial capitalist economy of the colony 
(1) For more detail, see Der, op. cit., pp. 130-131. 
(2) See M. Fortes, The Dynamic-s of Clanship among the Tallensi, (London: 
1943), and Der, 2P. cit. 
(3) Der, dp. cit. 
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was a failure. Insufficient encouragement was offered to get European 
companies to take up concessions in the area. In attempting to erode 
indigenous fcrms of land allocation the Governor was prevailed upon 
not to impose a land tax. The experienced Commissioner Armitage saw 
the prospect of too many problems if the pover of indigenous authority 
holders was reduced too quickly (1). In fact, the tightrope involved 
in maintaining a system of indirect rule was already posing difficulties 
for the colonial administration. 
Although the dispossessed in the north did not have the benefit 
of support from an organisation like the Aborigines Rights Protection 
Society, which had proved so effective in the south in the fight against 
colonial land policy, the northern people did not surrender meekly to 
the presence of colonial administration. In extending control in the 
north the British SOUght to minimise the expense of administration by 
using the already established powers of local chiefs. Indeed, in many 
areas chiefs' powers were extended. This process of bolstering chiefs' 
powers was not uncommon (2). It did, however, create much tension and 
unrest in the north. 
It was recognised very early in the North East that chiefs were 
acting as pawns for the British (3). This became especially apparent 
when the chiefs were used for the recruitment of labour for World War 
One. People in Zwarangu and Navrongo, for example, refused to fight 
for the Gold Coast Regiment in Togo and the Chief of Sekofi in August 
1915 complained to Chief Commissioner Armitage that prospective recruits 
were leaving the village (4). This incident gave the colonial administrator 
(1) Compare his comments in Chapter 5 concerning the need for gradual change 
in Ashanti being more desirable than sudden change in the power structures 
(2) See Chapter 5. 
(3) Thomas, (1975), op. cit. 
(4) Ibid. 
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in thE north a motive for once again destroying a Tanzuga shrine in 
the Tong hills which for many years had been the hideout of resisters 
to the British. 
Indigenous conflicts mounted following British attempts to 
increase recruitment for World War One and also in the imposed changes 
in the allocation of land. A land dispute of another kind, but 
hastened by colonial presence, provided the colonial authorities once 
again with the rmtive for violent incursions into the villages of the 
north. 
The Bongo Riots in 1916 followed a land dispute between two 
groups (1). An trying to settle the incident a police officer was hurt 
and the British promptly demoted a chief who was seen to have little 
control over his villagers. This move by the British had little effect 
upon the dispute and so the colonial regime used more force. In a 
typical statement about how to quell unrest a Commissioner in the North 
East said: 
.,. hostile parties ... should be fired on while the 
u ual compound destroying and driving in of cattle 
belongirr. to *the insurgents should follow (2). 
This belligerent response by the colonial authorities to ending unrest 
was quite common. For instance, following the theft of a horse from a 
police constable in Boku the Chief Commissioner of the Northern 
Territories reported that as promised a headman's compound had been 
burnt down and that: 
(1 ) ! bid. 
(2) TE-ting Commissioner gorth East Province to Chief Commissioner 
Northern Territories 12 August 1916, in Governor Clifford to 
A. Bonar Law, 18 September 1966, PRO C096/750 quoted in 
ibid. 
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on my way back from Boku, I told the chief of 
Namogu to try and. get word to the Boku people to 
return the horse and. saddle in two days time or 
I might possibly burn down all the compounds in 
the section (1). 
Fifty nine villagers were killed in Bongo by grcups of government 
Non Commissioned Officers and their stock, including twenty four 
cattle, seventy seven sheep and goats and twelve donkeys were seized. 
Following this expedition an official commented: 
A few more expeditions like this and I think the 
native will once more realise that'thE: white man 
still lives (2). 
The colonial regime was seemingly unperturbed by the chaos 
which it was imposing upon the. people of the North; thE: effect of 
seeking a transformation in the way in which land was allocated and 
in attempting to monetise the economy and separate a free labour 
force frcm the land. This overtly aggressive smashing of indigenous 
structures was seen by one official as the only way forward in the 
area: 
I recommend ... nothing but a strong line of policy. In their present development it is too early to rule 
them successfully otherwise than by fear and the 
confident belief that punishment inevitably and 
swiftly follows insubordination. The "please" and 
warm pressure of the hand, frcm the local representation 
of the dominant race which might do duty in places 
below the eighth parallel say, would merely excite 
derision among these engagingly primitive, but 
sufficiently truculent children of an earlier age (3). 
This policy of controlling the north by force and scme of the 
associated attEmpts at separating northerners from their means of 
(1) GNA(A)ADM 56/1/177, Informal Diary Chief Commissioner Northern Terri- 
tories Navarro District 15 April 1916. 
(2) Castellan to Commissioner North Eastern Province 9 July 1916 Quoted in 
Thomas, (1975), or). cit., p. 10. 
(3) Acting Commissioner North Eastern Province to Chief Commissioner 
Northern Territories 12 June 1916, quoted by Thomas (1975), op. ci ., P. 10. 
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production did not go without criticism from within the ranks of the 
colonial administration itself. Governor Clifford, for example, 
threatened resignation if Armitage was not removed and some of the 
unrest caused by the Bongo riots was calmed down (1). 
The reaction of indigenous groups in the Northern Territories 
to the activities of the colonial authorities and concessionaires, 
recruiting agencies led to an increased instabiTity in the region. 
This was reflected by disputes over land allocation and unrest within 
and between Northern ethnic grOL; ps especially following the increase 
in the marketable value of land. British support for some chiefs and 
elders rather than for others, and the intervention into Northern 
political practice created more disqyiet. 
Unrest was marked by rebellions against the British and increased 
instances of lawlessness and attacks on chiefs who were identified 
as puppets of the British. The latter were especially identified as 
such following financial inducement offered to chiefs to round up gangs 
of workers to migrate South to work in the mines: 
With the support of the British or the 
manipulation of the fear of such support these 
chiefs were able to supply the labour and other 
demands of the British while diverting scme of 
these resources to their own use (2). 
Work for which this labour was recruited was not popular and caused 
much hardship and disruption to the relations of production in the 
north, with the often forced withdrawal of the male member of the 
household southwards. Disruption to agricultural production followed 
(1 ) Ibid. 
. (2) TEM., p. 16. 
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which made the colonial desire for a cheap migrant labour force 
difficult to realise. It was a desire based upon the calculation 
that a migrant labourer could rely upon his place of origin for 
subsistence at different times of the year. Further major changes 
occurred following the ending of forced labour and the imposition of 
direct taxation in the north in the 1930's with the colonial policy 
of Native Administration. With the advent of this phase of colonialism 
the chief, hitherto a prop for colonial contact in the region, lost 
the responsibility fcr gathering labour for the south and with it the 
opportunity to financial gain and the abuse of his subjects. 
III CONCESSIONS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LAND 
Now that we have looked at attempts by the colonial administration 
and European mining companies to develop a wage labour force in the 
colony and protected areas-we can extend our earlier analysis of the 
impact of concessions and agricultural development (1). 
The period around the turn of the twentieth century in the Gold 
Coast colony and Protected areas was one where the colonial authorities 
sought to build a unified economy geared towards the increased production 
of cash crops for the international market (2). The change in the 
economies of the area featured the substitution of produced_goods for 
the 'naturally' occurring commodities of the forest belt as the main 
content of export flows (3). Rather than the colonial authority take 
(1) See Chapter 5. 
(2) For developments in the economy see R. Szereszewski, Structural 
Changes in the History of Ghana, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol n, 
1965) and S. Hymer, 'The poTitical economy of the Gold Coast and 
Ghana', in, Gustav Ranis, (editor) Government and Economic 
Development, (New York: Yale University Press, 1971). 
(3) See Szere wski, op. cit-, Chapter 7. 
396 
the responsibility for this, the colonial regime wanted European firms 
and companies to get involved in cash crop production or plantation 
agriculture. As with'British 'policy' throughout the years of 
contact, the greatest achievement in economic development and 
financial reward were sought through the minimum amount of expense. 
The major task of the colonial regime was to secure the political 
control of the area they occupied hoping that this would facilitate 
economic growth (1). 
The period 1898 to 1920 in the colony was one of immense 
colonial activity. Essentially, it was a time when thE! colonial state 
sought to consolidate its hold over the colony (2). A minimum amount 
of infrastructural development was carried out most notably with the 
development of a number of rail links. These lines, which by 1920 
totalled two hundred and fifty miles, were to facilitate the transporta- 
tion of the colonies'mineral resources from Asante to the coast at 
Sekondi and Accra (3). The railways and the development of administration 
on the coast accounted for by far the largest aMOL: nt of Government 
expenditure until the 1920's. The Guggisberg Ten Year Development Plan 
then sought to diversify the areas open for exploitation in the colony 
and to consolidate the areas alreadyseen as most economically viable, 
until, that is, the international depression took its toll on the Gold 
Coast (4). The development of a, transport network was not, however, 
without its problems. The colonial debate over transport and specifically 
the development of a railways network once more highlights the conflicts 
(1 ) Hymer, in Ranis, op. cit. 
(2) See below. 
(3) G. B. Kay, (editor), The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana, 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972). -E-x-penditure a-t-t-TTTI-Stime on 
railways represented 24% of total government expenditure. Compare 2.4% of 
the total being spent on Health and Education. See, ibid. and Map on 
p. 346. 
(4) See below. 
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and contradictions inthe. colonial regimes' actions during formal 
colonialism. The first railway line linked the gold bearing areas 
in the west of the Gold Coast with the nearest port at Sekondi. The 
role of the line was clear. To carry extracted gold as quickly and 
safely to the sea for transport to Europe. It was not until 1912 that 
the Accra-Koforidua line passed through the. major cocoa producing areas. 
This last route facilitated the increased tonnage of cocoa exports; 
seventy seven per cent of which were carried by rail (1). Despite the 
increased importance of a transportation network to the developing 
cocoa industry the colonial state failed to meet the needs of the new 
flourishing indigenous farming activity. Instead, the colonial state 
clearly favoured expatriate mining interests. In 1920 it was agreed 
by the colonial regime that a deep water harbour be built at Takoradi in 
the west, rather than in Accra. Had the decision been for locating it 
in Accra it would have benefitted the export of cocoa and given greater 
incentive to Gold Coast farmers seeking an outlet for their production. 
Instead, expatriate capital favoured assisting the transport of gold 
and manganese to the nearest coastal area (2). 
The decision to build the harbour in Takoradi clearly shows 
the dilemma of colonial investment on the Gold Coast. On the one hand 
it was crucial that the dues for using the harbour were paid in full 
by the users of the new facility, namely expatriate business. This 
would enable the loans for building the harbour to be paid off quickly. 
(1 ) Kay(1972) or). cit., p. 20. Exports rose from 23,000 tons in 1910 to 
52,000 in 1ý14. 
(2) No detailed reason was given for the choice of Takoradi rather than 
Accra except that the former had 'natural' advantarles with the 
Takoradi reef and rocky sea bed which reduced the expense of dredging. 
It was not reported that the Accra-Kumase line would have been cheaper 
to develop rather than the Sekondi-Kumase link because of the need to 
realign the latter. See ibid., p. 21. 
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On the other hand the pressure for building the harbour had been 
from expatriate business for a subsidised transport network to 
export the mined minerals. The only immediate solution to this 
dilemma was seen to be the efficient use of the harbour by using all 
its facilities, thereby keeping costs down by reducing handling costs 
per uni t. The difficulty with this solution was that the expatriate 
mining interests could not provide enough minerals to ensure the 
harbours full capacity (1). The result was for the colonial state 
to encourage cocoa production by building the Central Province Railway 
which just reached the cocoa belt at Kade. As one observer has 
suggested: 
once again the colonial dilemma was fully represented: 
although built in British interests the harbour was 
dependent upon Ghanaian capital to discharge its aims 
fully (2). 
However the colonial state had still not resolved the dilemma of the, 
conflict of interest between satisfying the demands of financial 
orthodoxy or mining capital. Because the railway networks did not 
fully enter the cocoa growing areas and link them directly with the 
port at Takoradi a system of feeder roads became essential. Even 
before the Central Province Railway was finished in 1927 a system of 
road haulage had been established which effectively undercut the 
benefit of the railway extension. The ability of the Gold Coast 
farmers to get their cocoa crops to ports other than Takoradi, which 
became possible with the development of road haulaqe, ensured that 
Takoradi operated at a deficit (3). 
(1) This argument is detailed by Kay in ibid., pp. 21-22. 
(2) Ibid., p. 22. 
(3) To-rts in the Central Province at Cape Coast and Saltpond continued 
to be used. 
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In addition to the clamour of mining interests and the continued 
exploitation of the gold bearing areas of the colony, there was an 
increased European concern with the development of an export timber 
industry and the development of cash crop production of rubber, cotton 
and palm oil. In 1925, for example, there were fifty one Agricultural 
concessions accounted for by the Provincial Commissioners Office in 
Sekondi of which twenty one were for the cutting of timber, fourteen 
for palm oil And eight for timber and rubber exploitation (1). The 
increased importance to the colony of the forest region in providing 
cover and shade for cocoa plantations and as producer of valuable 
export crop (2) was recognised by the colonial regime - hence the 
attempts at developing forest reserves (3). The urgency to develop 
forest reserves was impressed upon the Forestry Department which was 
reorganised in 1919 following the effects of a free hand by many 
foreign timber concessions, and extensive denudation of forests by 
mining companies using timber for fuel (4). 
(1) GNA(S) Disposal. of Records Western Region, Records, Transferred 
District Sekondi, 333 Concessions 26/5/14-24/11/47: Provincial 
Commissioners Office, Sekondi 18.3.25 to D. C. Sekondi. For the 
attitude of foreign companies to timber concessions and the amounts 
paid for the exploitation of the land see inter alia: GNA(S) 1973 
8570 Kumasi Timber Concession 19/12/1912-14/l/18; th . is last instance 
refers to the suing of C. C. Mengels and Brothers Company for default 
in complying with Concession Ordinance No. 14 of 1900, for 17,600/0/0 
for non payment of rent. For more on this last incident see Chapter 
5 above. 
(2) Forestry exports 1925 for example amounted to 2,200,000 cubic feet 
valued at 1286,000. This provided for invaluable revenue at 2d per 
cubic feet. See Report by Honorary W. G. A. Orsmby-Gore on his visit to 
West Africa during the year of 1926 Cmd 2744 1926, quoted in Kay, 
op. cit., p. 211. 
(3) See- Chapter 5 above for some of the difficulties associated with 
developing the reserves. 
(4) This latter activity forced the Acting Colonial Secretary Finley to 
suggest to the Commissioner Western Province that coal should be imported 
from Nigeria for fuel for the mines and that the, more enlightened chiefs 
will consult the Commissioner Western Province before the granting of 
timber concessions so as to ensure new clauses to prevent further 
deforestation. See GNA(S) 333 Disposal of Records Western Region Records 
transferred District Sekondi. 
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One of the difficulties which faced the colonial regime linked 
with the -increased deforestation, was the non-compliance of 
European 
firms with government Ordinances to lodge their concession with the 
government. Concessions would be taken up, timber cut and payment made 
for each tree. The operator would then leave the area within a season 
or two without the concession being certified (1). Alternatively, the 
European timber company would not work a concession directly but would 
purchase timber from indigenous concession holders (2). The government 
response to this was to increase the development of forest reserves. 
In 1923 there were two reserves covering one hundred and eleven square 
miles and by 1926 twelve reserves had been set up by the colonial regime 
covering four hundred and fifty miles - still less than half the desired 
number (3). 
In addition to securing a common procedure for the development 
of timber and agricultural rights on the land within the colonythe 
system of reserves provided the government with the opportunity to 
impress upon the indigenous population the need not to cut trees until 
they had reached a size of maiturity. rn talking about the concession 
reserves in the Ankobra-Sehwi District, for example, the Conservator of 
Forests suggested the need in 1924 to reserve at least sixty to one 
hundred square miles of forest to enable the working in twenty years time 
of mature mahogany of more than 9 feet in girth. It was continually 
(1) GNA(S) 285 Transferred District Sekondi, Timber Concession Reserves 
Ankobra and Sehwi District; Provincial Commissioner Sekondi to Acting 
Conservator Forests 20 June 1924. See also GNA(S)379 (as above) 
Conservator of Forests Office 5.7.20. "Concession Ordinance is evaded 
by a very large proportion of timber exporters and it is these people 
we are trying to deal with" 
(2) See the lift of concession 
ýolders GNA(S) 379 Records Transferred 
District Sekondi Timber Industry 30/4/13-29/11/30. 
(3) See Ormsby Gore; quoted in Kay' (1972), op. cit. - 
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impressed upon the chiefs of the different divisions in the area 
that it was in their interest to maintain the reserve. This was 
especially the case following the Timber Protection Amendment Ordinance 
in 1930 where the organisation and export of mahogany was applied more 
generally to timber. Accepting reluctantly the need to control the 
exploitation of timberthe indigenous power holders had difficulty 
convincingtheir villagers of the need to reduce the availability of 
land for agricultural production and farming. Moreover, many chiefs 
continued to be cautious of government intentions to reserve areas 
of land. As a colonial official remarked: 
I found him (the Omanhene in Wassaw Amanfi Division 
- R.. B) to be suspicious of government intentions 
and indifferent to the progress and welfare of his 
Division (1). 
The colonial argument was simple. Reserves and measures of forest 
conservation were seen as crucial: 
... one of great importance to this Colony, to you 
and to the people who come after you. To them 
belong just as much as to you the natural resources 
of this country and it is your duty to look after 
the interests of those who come after you just as 
much as it is your duty to look after the interests 
of those alive at the present day. Land is yours and 
the timber is yours. The timber is there for your 
use. All we say is that you shall not waste this 
timber and that you shall provide timber for the 
future. If you will do this you will build up a 
flourishing timber industry in this country and those 
to come will bless the forethought of those who made 
that possible (2). 
A year later it was suggested that the cost for developing the 
resources of the colony should be born by the indigenous people, and 
not by the colonial regime. The cost of the experimentation with 
(1) GNA(S)285 Transferred District Sekondi Concessions Res erves Ankobra and 
Sehwi Deputy Provinces Commissioner Officer Wioso 24.12.1924 to Commiss- 
ioner Western Province. 
(2) GNA(CC) ADM ? 3/1/801 Timber 6/l/31-25/10/1947, Commissioner Central 
Province Address to Provincial /Council of Chiefs, 26 February 1934. 
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reserves could be born by the colonial administration: 
but beyond that, since the states own the land 
and stand to benefit by the establishment of 
valuable forest crops it seems that the states 
should foot the bill (1). 
We. have re-examined the development of the forest reserves 
here because it helps us again focus our attention on the encroachments 
made into indigenous land holdings by European concessionaires and the 
colonial regime. The effect of this further European encroachment was 
to increase the market value of land. There was an increase in inter- 
state rivalry for land and an increase in the disputes between 
indigenous groups over which land belonged to whom. Land disputes 
now took on a previously unknown intensity. This was because the 
incursion of European capitalist copc erns in the development of mining, 
and later the encouragement of cash crop production, raised the value 
of land. A two pronged attack on indigenous social realtionships was 
occurring. The first was that chiefs in the Northern Territories and 
elsewhere were encouraged to recruit labour for European employers or 
to work with increased intensity for indigenous power holders to produce 
greater quantities of marketable produce in exchange for European 
merchandi'se (2). The second was that simultaneously indigenous insti- 
tutions, like chieftancy, came. under threat as attitudes towards land 
and its use were transformed. Land increasingly had a commercial value. 
Before the commercial revolution largely initiated by colonialism, 
rights over land were seen to lay with the stool, this now changed. 
(I ) -GNA(CC)ADM 23/1/1038, Provincial Commissioner Cape Coast to 
Commissioner Central Province 26/10/4370. 
(2) See, Document 441 in G. E. Metcalfe (editor) Great Britain and Ghana, 
Documents of Ghana History 1BO 
- 
7-1957, (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons 
Ltd, 1964), State of Trade in 1904 Governors Statement to Legislative 
Council, 16 October 1905 "the natives are prospicious and have more 
money to spend on clothing, spirits p. 531. 
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Hitherto the stool allocated land and it was meant to be returned to 
the stool after a user died. Even though in effect there operated a 
form of hereditary user right the increased value put on land 
following European concession hunting, "made land an immediate economic 
asset and the determinent of the now floating living standard of the 
owner and cultivator" (1). The effect of European concessions was 
recognised by the colonial authorities: 
A strong demand exists for forest land and the 
native authorities. appear either unable or uhWilling 
to prevent alienation and subsequent deforestation. 
The rise in land values brings about interminable 
boundary disputes which further complicate matters 
... (2). 
The increasein land disputes, following the European presence 
has already been' referred to (3). Unless a-particular dispute could be 
used to colonial advantage the increase in unrest among, and between, 
indigenous power holders was something the colonial administration 
tried always to avoid. Wherever possible the colonial regime was 
intent upon preserving the powers of indigenous rulers but the regime 
was also faced increasingly with a conflict which emanated from its 
agricultural 'policies'. This was because the attempt to extend the 
number of forest reserves and to prevent access to these areas by 
indigenous people placed the chiefs in daily conflict with the villagers. 
The-chiefs were, as in the recruitment drives inthe Northern Territories, linked 
with the colonial regime and now with the increased shortage of land. 
(1) Bjorn Edsman, Lawyers in Gold Coast Politics ca. 1900-1945, From Mensah 
Sarbah to J. B. Danquah, (Neden: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, S-t-u7ia 
Historica-U-psaliensis, Uppsala, 1979) p. 104. 
(2) GNA(CC)ADM 23/1/452 District Administrative Officer, Forest Reserves 
and Forestry 19/7/29-23/4/46 quoted from Report on Forestry Department 
1930-31. 
(3) Chapter 5 above. In connection with the later attempts to develop cash 
crop production see inter alia, GNA(K) 755, Land Dispute Between 
Nkoranza Tekiman. 
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Following the experience of border guards on the forest reserves 
preventing local inhabitants in the Central Province from having 
access to the reserved area, for innocent acts of collecting snails 
and felling dead trees, a colonial official echoed the feeling that 
colonial land and forestry policy was increasing the potential for 
indigenous unrest: 
... the fear exists that if these people (the 
chiefs of Central'Province - R. B. ) are to be so 
deliberately depriev'ed of such innocent uses of 
their lands set apart for agricultural development 
purposes, for some years to come the Ruling chiefs 
found that they seriously incur the displeasure of 
their peoples by leaving Forest restrictions in the 
hands of government to the eýxtent of such restrictions 
being used to unnecessarily interfere even with 
their very livelihood (1). 
Indigenous disputes arising from commercial isation of land 
varied in extent and across different lines. The kind of dispute 
within indigenous groups alluded to above, occurred when the chief 
was associated with the colonial authority. Another form of chiefly 
dispute occurred where the chief claimed ownership of the land held 
by a lesser power holder (2. ).. Our argument throughout has been that 
what was seen as the traditional rights of the stoolholder to allocate 
land created in effect the basis for power, exercised by the chiefs 
and elders in a hierarchy above commoners and women. The commercial- 
isation of land brought into focus the nature of power relationships 
blurred by the traditional ideology of the stool. With raising land 
values the head chiefs now overtly claimed the control (ownership) 
of land held by lesser power holders. 14oreover, as land more clearly 
(1) GNA(CC) AM 23/l/80 Timber 6/l/31-25/10/1947 Commissioner Central 
Province September 1935. 
(2) This vertical line of conflict is suggested by Edsman, op. cit., 
p. 104. 
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reflected wealth, because of its increased exchange value, individuals 
were keen not only to secure their positions over land worked by them 
for years but also to extend access and control over larger areas of 
land. There were also land disputes with 'westernised Africans' who 
often demanded greater access to land in repayment for duties performed. 
Here, land disputes were tried by the Supreme Court, unlike the disputes 
between Africans in the 'traditional setting', which were heard in 
Native Tribunals with revising powers exercised by the District and 
Provincial Commissioners. 
The outcome' of the whole range of disputes between and within 
indigenous groups and Europeans was that conflict over access and 
ownership to land became a major factor in the destooling of chiefs 
The overall process at work in the Gold, Coast Colony and Asante 
resulting from this aspect of the colonial presence has recently been 
summarised and is worth quoting at length: 
According to old custom, the chief was entitled to 
one-third of what the land in his state yielded. 
Originally, this tribute was fairly small, paid in 
kind, and spent on communal rituals, celebrations and 
festivities. Now however the'tribute became quite 
substantial and obtainable in cash. The chief grew 
rich, and chiefship became'attractive. From being 
a kind of honorary president, the chief became (or 
could become) a wealthy landlord. Chiefship turned 
into a rewarding business attracted an increasing 
number of people, and became the centre of fierce 
conflicts and disputes. As any successful claimant 
could most likely generously reward his supporters, 
factionalism inspired by bidding flourished (2). 
(a) Cash Crop Production 
In addition to the general discussion above concerning the 
(1 ) See Chapter 5. i: 
(2) Edsman, op. cit., p. 105. Our point of course is that even in the 
earlier -pe-r-io-d-chiefs and elders were able to accumulate, wealth 
as well as spend on communal rights. 
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impact of the commercial isation of land and the demand for African 
labour at European industrial enclaves, we can now look briefly at 
the specific colonial attempts at developing an agricultural export 
industry and the impact that this had upon the people of the Gold 
Coast and Protected areas. 
Apart from palm oil production which reached a peak in the 
mid nineteenth century, colonial policies with regard to expanding 
cash crop production had been ne'gligible. Indeed, it was not until 
the years following 1922 that the government accepted the "responsibility 
for a policy of development of local agricultural resources" (1). Even 
after this commitment however, the government's attitude to developing 
agricultural resources of the territories for internal consumption, 
especially concerning indigenous food production, were poor and uneven. 
The attention of government interests continued to be with bolstering 
the development of products for export. 
(i) Palm Oil 
One of the products which the government encouraged was the 
growth of oil pdlmsý. In the nineteenth century the export of this 
crop had helped lubricate the wheels of the European industrial 
revolution. Exports of both palm oil and palm kernels had fallen 
since 1910. (2. ). An Ordinance of 1913 sought to revitalise the 
industry (3). The Colonial Administration encouraged the presence'of 
The Commission on Agricultural policy and Organisation 1928, quoted 
in Kay (1972, ) o cit , p. 199. This commission identified 4 phases 
in cýpartment 
of Agriculture: (i) 1889-1905: work the history ofl*Vu 
limited to import of plants and examination of their behaviour under 
local conditions: (ii) 1905-1915, development of instructional, and demon- 
strational work, (iii) 1915-1922, instruction organisation on provincial 
basis, (iv) 1922: see ibid. 
(2) H. J. Bevin, 'Some Notes-6-nGold Coast Exports 1886-1912', The Economic 
Bulletin of Ghana, 14,1,1961. 
(3) Metcalfe, .5p. 540. 
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European firms in the areas where palm oil was grown so the pulping 
of the kernels could be done more efficiently and greater amounts of 
oil could be acquired for export. This was the crux of the Ordinance 
of 1913 which sought also to establish reserves where palm oil could 
be grown (1). The colonial authorities insisted that indigenous 
activities would not be interfered with, only that specifically 
demarcated areas for the growing of palm nuts could be established 
and European machinery imported to express the oil. The Colonial 
authorities in effect sought to encourage the concentration of palm 
nut production while trying to ensure a reduced price being paid to the 
producers because of the European control of purchasing. In short, 
European firms in the palm oil industry were given an oligopoly 
following government attempts to increase the mechanisation of the 
industry (2). European firms needed an incentive to establish them- 
selves overseas and the Palm Oil Ordinance provided just this: 
to grant to any person, with such area not exceeding 
a mile with a 10 mile radius and for such period not 
exceeding 21 years ... the exclusive right to 
construct and work mills, to be operated by mechanical 
power for expressing or extracting oils from the 
pericarp of palm oil (3). 
Apart from increasing the amount of palm oil exported the 
colonial regime hoped that the use of European machinery, and a different 
labour process in getting the oil, would rel. ease labour in the colony 
to work elsewhere (4). The indigenous method of expressing oil from 
(1 ) See also government attempts to subsidise the development of an European 
oil palm industry with the United Africa Company, 1929. Kay (1972), 
op. cit., p. 216. 
(2) To-r a detailed examination of the oligopolisation of the Gold Coast 
economy, see Howard op. cit:, Chapter 4. 
(3) Governor to Gold Coas-t-Legislative Committee 20.2.31 quoted in ibid., p. 7? 
(4) The Colonial Secretary moving the second reading of tM ardinanc-e 61-f the 
Legislative Council, 28 January 1913, document 445 quoted in Metcalfe, 
o p. ci t. , pp. 540-541 . 
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the kernel was extremely labour intensive. It involved the pulping 
of the palm nuts in small shallow pits lined with stones. Water was 
then poured onto the pulped mass to increase the flow of oil (I). 
Another concern of the colonial regime was that the indigenous labour 
process used for getting oil from the oil palms tended to dilute the 
quality of the palm oil. 
Despite the measures imposed by the government, attempts at 
revitalising palm oil production on a plantation basis failed. Ideally, 
the development of plantation agriculture was not only meant to raise 
the productivity of an export crop, but it also sought to discipline 
an indigenous work force not yet accustomed to the routines and 
rigours established by capitalist forms of production. The Agricultural 
Department could not impress uponthe producers of palm nuts, that a 
plantation system, ofworking would greatly benefit all concerned because 
of the concentrated nature of production and the easier cultivation and 
processing of the crop. Indigenous petty commodity palm nut producers 
resisted colonial attempts at being incorporated as wage labourers 
into colonial plantation experiments. African preference - given 
prevailing wage rates and working conditions in -the ýcolonial sector' - 
was for the pre-capitalist relations of production. As such Africans 
once again raised the question as to the viability and prudence of the 
colonial regime'sattempt to completely break down indigenous relations 
of production, or whether they should be allowed to persist - at least 
in the short term - while the colonial authorities sought other ways 
of breaking down local barriers to capitalist forms of agriculture. 
(1) GNA(A) ADM ll/l/24 Oil Palm Trees Cultivation of, Letter, M. Sarbah, 
1 January, 1909 to Secretary Native Affairs C. C. C. 
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Difficulties were similarly encountered by the Department of Agriculture 
in trying to generalise a specific seed type which produced a thin 
shelled nut and thus greater oil (1). 
Added together these factors led to the decline of the palm 
oil export industry. The decline occurred despite Ormsby Gore's 
comments in his report of 1928 that there were concessions totalling 
one hundred and ninety three square miles in respect of oil palms of 
which one hundred and forty three square miles were being effectively 
worked. The reasons given by the colonial authorities for the decline 
of the industry related to the increase in cocoa production. The 
latter was encouraged partly by the seemingly less arduous labour 
process involved. This observation,. howeverdid not recognise that 
palm trees were more often than not still used for shade by the cocoa 
farmers (2). 
Part of the difficulty 'which the government encountered in 
trying to initiate and sustain an agricultural export economy was 
the, shortage of'funds. The development of state plantations needed 
valuable funds which were being spent on developing other activities. 
Even with the Guggisberg Ten Year Plan, where agriculture got a belated 
mention, it was only allocated 1% of total expenditure (3). The 
government programmes still concentrated more on areas of infrastructural 
development which facilitated the evacuation of mineral deposits and 
(I ) GNA(S) District Administratfon Tarkwa 62, Palm Products 1926-1931. 
(2) Another reason offered by the government for the decline of the 
industry and which-prompted the Palm Wine Ordinance in 1930, was the 
use of the crop by Africans as an alcoholic drink which "like other 
alcoholic beverages is a luxury and is as such a proper subject 
for taxation". J. de Hunt, Acting Attorney General, 28 August 1930 
GNA(S)62. 
(3) Kay (1972), op. cit., p-199- 
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lumber to Europe. Hence earlier, when the idea was floated to encourage 
the development of cotton on a larger scale, little money or enthusiasm 
was forthcoming from the Department of Agriculture to establish the 
required demonstration centres which were used to initiate new forms 
of crop production (1). 
(ii) Rubber 
Another cash crop which the colonial administration tried to 
develop was rubber. Like palm oil this product was indigenous to much 
of the colonial area and was transported into the hinterland in pre- 
colonial times (2). Indigenous production, however, did not meet the 
demands of the government and European companies for regular and constant 
supplies of good quality rubber. The high point for rubber exports from 
the Gold Coast was the period 1890-1904 when the area became the largest 
rubber producer in the British Empire and the fourth in the world (3). 
Throughout the late 1880's greater interest in rubber had been 
expressed by European merchants trying to hedge their bets against 
fluctuating palm oil pripes. The export market was dominated by the 
companies Alexander Miller Brothers and F. & H. Swanzy. These companies 
would invariably employ middlemen and agents on the coast who promoted 
the tapping of rubber inland. The links between the company on the 
coast and the brokers inland were strengthened by the increased pre- 
dominance of cash in indigenous economies and facilities for credit. 
The former gav. e incentive to producers inland to develop rubber to 
(1) GNA(A) ADM 11/1/415 Cotton Cultivation Gold Coast and its Dependencies 
1912: see petition of the department by British Cotton Growing 
Association and plantations. 
(2) R. E. Dumett, 'The Rubber Trade of the Gold Coast and Asante in the 
Nineteenth Century: African Innovation and Responsiveness"JAH 12,1,1971. 
(3) In the year, 4,104 units of rubber: i. e xlOOOlbs with a val7e of 
1360,644 were exported, see Bevin op. cit., p. 19. 
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brokers and receive cash in exchange to facilitate the purchase of 
greater quantities of imported merchandise. The development of credit 
sustained this process by ensuring that producers were obliged to supply 
rubber to brokers at different times or remain in debt (1). 
This was one result of the impact of the Gold Coasts increased 
incorporation into the demands of an international economy for rubber. 
This product was much needed in Europe and elsewhere as an input into 
many new production cycles. There were, however, many problems 
associated with the rubber trade which ýecame particularly apparent 
at the turn of the twentieth century when better quality rubber was 
demanded by European firms (2). Indigenous rubber was of the wild 
Funtamie variety and was frequently diluted by African producers much 
to the annoyance of their European clients on the coast. In response, 
the colonial administration imported*quantities of para rubber seeds 
from Ceylon (3), thereby seeking to take advantage of the climatic 
conditions of West Africa in the hope of furthering-interests in 
indigenous rubber production. Reason for the demise of the rubber 
industry was given as the dilution of the latex. It became more 
profitable for British firms to use South East Asia where plantations 
proved more successful (4) for the production of rubber than to use 
West Africa. 
This brief look at the rubber industry on the Gold Coast 
(I ) Dumett, op. cit. 
(2) Rubber of poorest quality tended to be exported for a time to the United 
States of America a, nd Russia where 'inferior' rubber goods were made. 
See GNA(A)ADM 11/1/189 Rubber Preparation of for European Markets. 
(3) GNA(A)ADM ll/l/233. 
(4) See Dumett op. cit. This does not mean plantations were not developed on 
the Gold Coa-st-. Tee, GNA(S) 1973 8494 Dunkwa Rubber Concession 19/9/10- 
15/3/11, and GNA(S) 1973 8574 Wassaw Timber and Rubber Concession. ' 
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serves as a further illustration of the way in which the territory 
was drawn into an international economy dominated by the interests of 
European manufacturing concerns, which sought to develop the Gold 
Coast political economy insofar as it supplied invaluable products 
for developments in the capitalist world. It also illustrates that 
the process of incorporation was not smooth and that when the constraints 
imposed-by indigenous relations of production, or of the African labour 
process, became too inhibitive for the shipments of rubber to Europe 
to be profitable British firms switched their demand for rubber to 
the Far East (1). Fortunately for the Africans involved in 
rubber production this fall in demand by Europe was not too problematic, 
many of them switched to cocoa production. 
The spread of the cash economy, was hastened by rubber producers 
and the greater contact that this engendered for inland traders with 
the coast. Rubber attracted greater numbers of people into a system of 
cash nexus than hitherto associated with kola, gold dust or ivory 
trading (2). The result of this increased involvement in trading 
and commodity production was to further break down the barriers to 
'commoner' trading in Asante and to also facilitate more-opportunities 
for the accumulation of capital (3). This last process often provided 
the funds for the indigenous development of a cocoa industry on the 
colony which was so dependent upon the purchase of extra land outside 
that used solely by the family; and in the employment of labour. Before 
we look at this development several points need clarifying. 
(1) For a detailed analysis of 'successful' plantation agriculture 
particularly linked with rubber production in the Far East, see 
S. B. D. de Silva, op. cit. 
(2) Dumett, op. cit 
(3) On the changed 
; ttitudes to trade in Asante in the nineteenth 
century, see Chapter 4. 
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First, this review of developments in cash crop production 
in rubber and palm oil is not intended to be anything other than 
piecemeal. Our point is not to write the history of these two areas 
of colonial and indigenous trading concerns (1). Rather, we have 
sought to build on the earlier analysis in this and the preceding 
chapter, concerning the processes underpinning the consolidation of 
formal colonialism on the Gold Coast. We looked earlier at the 
monetisation of the indigenous economy, the changes in social structure 
and the problems which this bought in its wake for African production 
activities. These continued in rubber and palm oil production and 
added the further dynamic of a developing European oligopolisation of 
trade. 
The government sought to encourage the presence of European' 
firms on the coas t as exporters of the colonial resources and attempted 
to make this easier wherever possible: to hasten the export of palm 
oil and rubber with the development of plantations. Attempts were 
also made at developing other plantations for producing sisal , bananas 
and copra (2).. All failed. Colonial fu6ds for these were limited. 
Moreover, the colonial regime faced resistence in imposing alien work 
practices and labour processes which for the African amounted to 
unacceptable forms of appropriating crops. This is not to say that 
the African did not respond to inducements of the market, they clearly 
(1) It might be noted in passing however that to my knowledge these 
areas have not been dealt with in this manner before. 
(2) At one time it was suggested that'the development of a copra 
industry should be promoted by children: they should be encouraged 
"to plant coconuts as a kind of organised useful, instructive and 
lucrative play" (sic) GNA(S) 368 Disposal of Records Western Region 
Records Transferred from District Administration Office, Tarkwa, 
368 Agri, culture Misc. 18/l/26-4/7/33. 
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did and this is born out by developments in the petty commodity 
production of palm oil and rubber. Rather, our point is that the 
moment colonial incursions occurred in trying to organise the capitalist 
production of forest produce, as opposed to being merely involved in 
its marketing, alien work processes acted to inhibit increases in 
productivity. More fundamentally, we can argue that African peasants 
resisted the transformation of their pre-capitalist social formation: 
in addition to rejecting an alien. work discipline peasants rebelled 
against the proýess of incorporation into a developing capitalist 
form of plantation agriculture where they were to become agricultural 
labourers. 
Colonial attempts to develop plantations and reserved areas 
solely for the production of produce for the needs of Europe represented 
a concerted European attempt to initiate capitalist agriculture. 
Although these practices were never successful on a wide scale, they 
nevertheless aided the disruption occurring among indigenous groups over 
the access to land which was rising steadi-ly in value. These disruptions 
curiously had two different effects on the fortunes of colonialism. 
The first was that the indigenous groups were increasingly getting 
access to a cash economy and commodity production which aided colonial 
capitalist expansion by breaking down indigenous barriers to trade. The 
second effect was that this process hastened the demise of the authority 
of the chiefs upon which the colonial regime was so dependent for the 
extension of its authority. 
Added to problems of labour recruitment and the organisation of 
export agriculture was the impending international financial crisis of 
1930. This denied at a stroke, any pbssibility for plans of diversifying 
the colonial economy. Before we examine this last point in detail we 
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can now assess briefly the impact of cocoa production and the 
migration of cocoa producers upon indigenous relations of production. 
(b) Cocoa 
The extraordinary development of cocoa as an export cash crop 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is heralded as an 
illustration of indigenous productive practices and ingenuity. The 
cocoa industry for one writer is seen to have grown "in spite of, 
rather than because of government policy" (1). In large part this 
was true. Colonial attitudes to cocoa production were at best 
equivocal and at worst antagonistic. The explanation for this is 
that the movement of labour into the cocoa industry reduced the supply 
of labour to colonial projects and those which the government thought 
were more beneficial to the colony as a whole: that is gold production, 
railways and harbour expansion and also palm and rubber production (2). 
On two important counts, however, the development of a cocoa 
industry did not wholly depend upon indigenous practices. The first 
of these is the trend towards the hinher value of land and the importance 
vested in control over land rather than i, n 'rights in people' following 
the development of rubber and palm oil for cash crop production. 
Accompanying this process was the increased monetisation of the 
economies of Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony following the introduction 
of the British silver coin in the 1890's and the demotisation of gold 
dust and nuggets in 1889. The sellers of produce increasingly demanded 
(1) Hymer, in Ranis(1971), op. cit., p. 134. 
(2) The development of cocoa also reduced in colonial eyes the production 
of food for workers at the mines. Thus in 1935; "Advantage is, not taken 
of the potential market arising out of the mining industry. There is 
a shortage of food for the mines and it is estimated that it costs a 
mine labourer between 8d and 1/6 per day to live"GNA(A) ADM 27/5/3, 
Tarkwa District Record Book, 1900-1939 DC, Tarkwa. 
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cash in payment for products grown in the forest which provided an 
opportunity for the accumulation of capital and facilitated the 
development of cocoa. The second process underpinning the development 
of cocoa production for export was the demand for cocoa by the 
economies of Europe, which had merchants willing to purchase the 
product in the colony. Thus the economies of the area were further 
incorporated into the dominant capitalist economies of the world. 
For one observer it was a matter where: 
What internal growth occurred in Ghana was a 
function of its position in the world capitalist 
market as a primary producer (1). 
However, while locating the colony's positon in the world economy we 
must not eclipse the existence of conflicts between international 
capital -and developing embryonic cocoa producers on the Gold Coast and 
the nature of the transformation of indigenous relations of production: 
it is to some of these that we have already alluded and can here see 
more clearly. ' 
There is no need to detail the events of the development of. 
cocoa (2). Instead, we shall merely first: assess one of the issues 
involved in -this specific process of Gold Coast history, namely the 
nature of the migration by people involved in the production of cocoa 
and second, we will enquire into the particular kind of social 
differentfatton that the production of cocoa engendered. Finally, 
while looking at both these issues we will stress how they fit within 
I (1) Howard, cit p. 85. 
(2) This has een one elsewhere but still with shortcomings: see inter 
alia: Polly Hill, 'Social Factors in Cocoa Farming', in, J. Brian Wi ls 
T-eFtor) Agriculture and Land Use (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) 
Studies in Rural Capita 11 s-q-, -7(U-ondon: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
Migrant Cocoa Farmers of ýouthern Ghana, (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1963), W. H. Beckett, Akokoaso)-, -T-Survey of a Gold Coast Villagel' 
Monographs on Social Anth'rop-F-0-9-y-TF-. 10 Published for L. S. E. by Perry Land, 
(London, Humphries and Company Limited, 1944) B. Beckman, Or anising the 
Farmers, (Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies-, Uppsala, 
I 9/b) . 
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the broader nature of colonial transformation and in particular how 
cocoa production was facilitated by general conditions of colonialism. 
Colonial authorities did not immediately welcome the development 
of an industry based on cocoa production. The colonial regime was much 
more concerned with the development of alternative cash crops at the 
time that cocoa production increased in popularity at the end of the 
nineteenth century. It was not until the 1920's that the colonial 
regime, through the Department of Agriculture, actively sought to 
'develop' the industry on their department's terms with Eurocentric 
ideas of farming. In 1910, when cocoa production had established 
itself on a large scale, the Departmeent*of Agriculture began a campaign 
against the industry spelling out an impending disaster for the colony 
if cocoa production continued to expand, and if other agricultural 
initiatives were neglected. The precise criticism of the Department 
was that unsuitable farming techniques were being used by African 
farmers. In particular Europeans insisted on the need for techniques 
of production associated with land scarce temperate climates. 
Conditions on the Gold Coast were the opposite of this: there were 
plentiful supplies. of land but shortages of labour (1). The latter 
condition led to the movement of farmers from one area to another if 
crops were attacked by pests or diseased and thus led the Director of 
Agriculture to fear the spread of diseases elsewhere (2). 
(1) The antagonistic attitude to. qards the -cocoa i9dustrywas not shared by all 
colonialists, see GNA(A) ADM 27/l/8 Duplicate Letter Book 1902-1903, 
and acceptance by the District Commissioner of the conditions for cocoa 
production. 
(2) Director of Agriculture concerned about the future of the cocoa 
industry: measures of control proposed 1918; extract from W. S. D. Tudhope, 
(Director of Agriculture) Enquiry into G. C. Cocoa industry- 1918-1919 
document 29 in Kay (1972) op. cit., p. 243. For the attitudes of colonial 
officials to developing cocoa see R. H. Green & S. H. Hymer, 'Cocoa in the 
Gold Coast: A Study in the Relations between African Farmers and 
Agricultural Experts', Journal of Economic HistorZ, 26,1, March 1966. 
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As the cocoa industry developed from its initial eighty pounds 
of production in 1891 to more than one hundred thousand tonnes in 1918, 
the Department of Agriculture saw the need to intervene in the industry 
to control and direct its development. The way to do this lay in the 
control of production and marketing but this would have to occur without 
creating too many conflicts with the indigenous producers. As one 
observer has commented on the period: 
The Governor was aiming to placate the Department of 
Agriculture by permitting legislation, but at the saw 
time was preventing the Department from obtaining the 
blanket measures it sought and which, he feared, would 
lead to a serious political confrontation between the 
administration and the cocoa farmers (1). 
For Governor Clifford the way to capitalise on cocoa production was to 
increase the facilities available for transporting the crop to European 
manufacturers on the coast. Unfortunately, however, all rail links in 
the colony had been developed solely for the transportation of gold from 
the gold bearing areas. These links were not, therefore, useful in 
transporting cocoa. This crop had to wait the development of road 
networks (2). 
Migration and Class Formation 
Unlike the forced migration of labourers from the North, to 
work in the mines of Western Gold Coast, the massive migration of 
farmers from the Akwapim Hills to what is now the Eastern Region, 
and of the farmers from central Ashanti west to the forests in Ahafo 
occurred without coercion (3). It has been established that 
(1) Ka it p. 239. Yý op. ci 
(2) Per aps-tfFe biggest impact made by the government was in the development 
of marketing boards: For discussion of this see, Beckman, op. cit. This 
latter development in many ways provides the backdrop to t'Fe per od up 
to independence and is outside the scope of this thesis. 
(3) See Map Ten. Although Akwapims initiated the migration other farmers in the 
south of the forest zone "where there was little orno land fit for cocoa grow-: 
ing soon joined the racetoacquire suitable land". These people included the 
Krobo, Shai and varieties of Adangme. See, Hill (1962), op. cit., p. 281. 
421 
the migration involving the residents of central to northern and 
western Akwapim began ca. 1892 when the farmers there began to plant 
cocoa and coffee on land over which they already had control, or newly 
acquired control, perhaps through a sharecropping arrangement (1). 
The notion of migration was not new to these people. They had already 
been involved in the production of oil palms on land over which they 
had secured control from the Akwapims (2). In fact, as one of the 
earliest writers on cocoa has commented: 
oil palm not only provided most of the finance 
required for the cocoa migration, but was also 
a forerunner as a planted perennial tree crop (3). 
The other-cash crop which provided the financial basis upon 
which Akwapim and Ashanti farmers could migrate to new land to establish 
cocoa farms was rubber (4). In 1890 the -high price of rubber meant 
that values of- rubber exports exceeded the value of exports of palm 
oil and kernels (5). In addition to these overtly colonial oriented 
export productive activities, informants in Akwapim told one writer 
that gen eral trading in items like salt, parrots, skins and blankets 
from the north also faciliated'the capital for the purchase of new 
land (6). * These improved opportunities for cash earnings increased the 
(1) More on sharecropping or the ! abusa' below. See A. F. Robertson, 'Abusa: 
The Structural History of an Economic Contract', Journal of Development 
Studies, 18,4,1982. 
(2) Hill (1 62), op. cit., p. 281. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) TMi, (1963), op. cit., pp. 164-165, see also Green and Hymer, op. cit. 
(5) Hill, (1963) _opý. cit., p. 164. 
(6) Ibid., p. 1,6L THe p! jrchase of land in new areas was not unproblematic 
for-migrants. We will assess this briefly below in regard to processes 
of class formation and changes in ýelationsof production initiated by 
migration. The promise of concessions in the newly poýulated areas made 
0 
genous 1n owners not always willing to part wit the land because inai ad 
fte ossibility of alternative financial renuneration. In one instancC 
coloniaT officials in Tarkwa commented late in 1929, where miýrants had 
come to start cocoa cultivation, "Akwapim farmers have bough land right!, 
through the district butthe local, peoples prefer to hope for fat conces- 
sion rents than to make extensive cacao farms. " GNA(A) ADM 27/5/3 
Tarkwa District Record Book 1900-1939. 
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numbers of people who could get involved in new productive activities 
and added to the long term demise of the power of the chiefs. For 
instance, people involved in cocoa production and marketing, like 
money lenders and brokers, all added to the numbers of people which 
hitherto had not been involved in the appropriation of cash. 
Of course the chiefs and power holders also gained in some 
ways from the development of cocoa. Thi's was the case when those 
involved in growing the crop were 'stranger farmers' (1). These 
migrants made a tribute payment to the chief of the areas into which 
they moved which usually was one third of the cocoa grown or sold 
thus bolstering the wealth of the chief (2). 
This system of payment for. the right to use land has been 
called an abusa contract (3). Earlier in the thesis we stressed that 
chiefly control over the allocation of land was a source of chiefly 
(1) According to Hill, (1962), op. cit., p. 279, this category was the 
norm and not the native or -se! Te-nTary farmer. See also A. F. Robertson, 
o it p. 458. p*cl " (2) Tn some areas this payment of tribute acted to deter new farmers. 
Because of this the tribute payment also incurred the wrath of 
colonial authorities sections of which thought that a system of 
rent should be developed for cocoa farms per acre. 
"While ancient custom may govern the proportion of such 
demands on account of uncultivated or native products 
no. -such custom can exist in the case , 
of cocoa; a new 
form of cultivation only 'introduced into the Gold Coast 
within the last few years" 
and 
"should these excessive rates of tribute continue, His 
Excellency will be compelled to consider the adoption 
of legislative measures very considerably to reduce, 
if not abolish, all payments by tribal landholders in 
respect of their cultivated land" 
See, GNA(A) ADIM 11/j/184, Coý: oa Farming Tribute Payable by Farmers 
to Chiefs, Laws As To-No scheme of rent was imposed because the 
colonial regime accepted that it had no power of compulsion or 
interference in rivate contractual agreements. Ibid. (3) Robertson, op. 
M. 
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authority. While land remained plentiful, relative to the numbers 
of people wanting to work it, chiefs were willing to grant the use 
of land to newly arriving farmers for a single lump sum. As land 
became more scarce with the growth of the cocoa economywhat had 
began as the-'alienation' of land for a lump sum payment was 
transformed into the right of migrant farmers to work land for 
regular payments of tribute to chiefs (1). The outcome of this 
latter development was the transformation of "stranger tenure into 
something resembling fixed rent, tenancies" (2). However, despite 
the increasing heritable nature of the'land lease it remained difficult 
for the stranger to sub-lease the land. Instead we tend to agree 
with the statement that: 
a stranger's tenancy ... is(was) really an indefinite license assuring rights of beneficial 
user in consideration for periodic payments (3). 
These payments began in kind but were commuted into money as the 
spread of cash nexus increased. 
In contrast to labour recruited to the mines, the 'Stranger 
famer' was the person who in years leading up to the development of 
the cocoa economy had access to money making opportunities, linked 
usually with cash crop production of oil palms and rubber. Again in 
stark contrast to the Northern labourqrs, the stranger farmer migrant 
was able largely to establish the conditions of work for himself and 
was also to become the employer of labourrather than be subject to 
(1) Ibid., p. 457. 
(2) TS-M., p. 458. 
(3) T. -F. K. Asante, Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana, 
1844-1966, quoted in Robertson,. op. cit., p. 458. 
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routines imposed by somebody else. There were two kinds of migrants 
both of which usually moved in groups rather than as individuals (1). 
The first was the family group "which was the typical means of 
migration of the matrilineal Akwapim" (2). The second was the 
'company'. This last category consisted of a group of people, not 
necessaril. y relatives, and which became the "usual means of migration 
of certain patrilineal Akwapim" (3). In. this last system of migration 
land was divided among the members in strips each getting the amount 
correspo. nding- to his contribution. Under the family system the 
largest piece of land was usually kept by the leader. The remaining 
land was then worked by other family members. 
Polly Hill has identified, four forms of labour hire in the 
Ghanaian cocoa economy. We have been concerned thus far with the 
abusa, crop sharing category where migrant farmers paid chiefs for the 
right to use land to grow cocoa, although increasingly the right of 
use was transformed into an inh. eritable right for the cocoa producers' 
family (4). The development of cocoa also accelerated the development 
of a rural wage labour force, which were often migrants from the North, 
who found. increasingly that they could earn more cash by selling 
labour powerpor by making abusa payments in the Gold Coast Colony and 
Ashanti, than if they cultivated their own land or went to the mines. 
This situation was enhanced as regional inequalities in the climate 
and soil fertility added to the dimension of social 'differentiation 
and class formation. Cocoa could be grown only in the natural conditions 
of the tropical forest. This resulted in the increase in the value of 
(1) These categories are given by Hill, (1963), op. cit. 
(2) Hill, (1962), op. cit., p. 282. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) (1962), (1963), op. cit. 
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forest land compared with that of the savannah and the emergence of 
a labour hiring economy based around the production of cocoa. 
Migrants from the North often became 'daily or casual' labourers on 
farms worked by abusa men but especially on newly developing farms. 
Polly Hill'also identified a third category of labour (i. e. in 
addition to the abusa) which was the 'seasonal worker' who would be 
employed for weeding or picking the cocoa pods. Finally, there 
developed a system of 'annual contract' workers who were normally 
employed by farmers who had well established farms and who, therefore, 
had sufficient funds to employ labour for a full year. This category 
of labour had the most restrIctions placed upon it and generally felt 
that it was at the beck and call of the farm owner (1). 
The system of migration to cocoa grtwing areas became self 
perpetuating, again in contrast with the migration of mine workers 
from the North. Increasingly, farmers would invest parts of their 
surplus from one piece of land to purchase new land. Land increasingly 
had a commercial. value and the working of land was seen as a useful 
area of investment. The production of cocoa also became a pre- 
occupation for people who did not migrate but who incorporated 
this new -crop among older farming practices, This production of cocoa 
within the family unit at home led to a process of unrest initiated 
earlier within different areas by rubber and oil palm production. In 
short, the changing organisation of production and the higher esteem 
in which land was perceived following i ncreases in cash crop production, 
*but accelerated and enhanced by cocoa production, added to indilgenous 
conflict. 
(1) Robertson, op. cit., p. 46. 
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The production of cocoa was creating a number of tensions. 
The first was between the indigenous producers of cocoa and the 
encroaching European companies involved in sustaining the interna- 
tional capitalist economies. The European companies which purchased 
cocoa for manufacture in Europe were soon to realise that the primary 
producers'could not be as easily subjugated to the capitalist market 
as at first was thought (1). A second tension associated with the 
commercial isation of land which in part initiated, but more clearly 
accelerated, processes set in train earlier by cash crop production 
had a number of effects. As we have already suggested above: 
New relations were ... created'over land and labour replacing a system dominated by family 
production for the iridividual household within 
a framework of communal land tenure. Private or 
semi private property rights in land were 
extended throughout the cocoa areas. Land was 
bought and sold. Farms were mortgaged, auctioned (2). 
A further effect of the development of cocoa were the processes 
of class formation emanating from the developmentof a rural wage labour 
force. Pressures brought to the fore by these developments were 
exacerbated by difficulties of obtaining credit and the need to be 
in an area where transport was available to move the crop to the coast. 
Hence there developed a 'sub strata' of farmers, traders, money lenders 
(1) This later period is not covered here. On the nature of conflict at 
the international level and on the local level through hold-ups the 
first of'which occurred in 1903, see, John Miles, 'Rural Protest in 
the Cold Coast: The Cocoa Hold-ups, 1908-1938', in Clive Dewey and 
A. G. Hopkins (editors), The Imperial Impact, Studies in the Economic 
History of Africa and India, (London: Athlone Press for the Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies UnTiversity of London, 1978), J. F. Milburn, 
British Business and Ghanaian Independence, (London: C. Hurst & Co. 
Ltd., 1977). T. J. Johnson, 'Protest: Tradition and Change: An 
Analysis of Southern Gold Coast Riots 1890-1920', Economy and 
Society, 1,1972. 
(2) Beckman, op. cit., p. 37. 
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and transport owners within the farming community itself (1). 
Perhaps the most important development associated with the emergence 
of cocoa production which we have traced in here was the rural wage 
labour force and the transformation of people's relationship with 
the land. 
Cocoa is a tree crop which yields continuously but with 
diminishing productivity for about fifty years. A young farm starts 
bearing after 3-5 years. The perennial nature of the cocoa crop and 
the fact that it is a long term investment and asset helped revise 
rights of land inheritance in Asante. Hitherto, with the growth of 
subsistence crops, communal land rights to control or use the same 
piece of land were less important. This changed with the growth of 
, tree crop production 
(2). Land was now occupied by individuals for 
an indefinite period ensuring that rights of inheritance were 
transformed. Moreover, the semi-capitalist mode of production of 
cocoa where abusa men in particular had resources to employ labour, 
contrasted to previous cash crop production based upon petty coýmodity 
production. In addition, the labour process involved in producing 
cocoa required the farm owner to draw on a pool of migrant, non- 
family labour to complete a number of work tasks. These included 
pruning, weeding and the provison of temporary shade. It was in 
carrying out t4ese ta. sks that the farmers hired -labour. It is this 
process that has been called capitalist farming (3). The owner of 
the farm ensured a regular minimal income while employing labour to 
keep the farm producing. This went on while'the. owners visited 
(1) Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
(2) -S-eeibid., p. 38 and Robertson *Cit (3) This-7-orm of production has pe2apps mor*e accurately been called 'peasan' 
capitalism'- capitalist farming with. a strong peasant element for the 
role of "family labour and distinct from cash investment in capital 
formation, and in the landlord tenant aspect of share crop labour", Beckman., on-. cit., p. 36. 
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their other farms. 
In looking briefly at some of the issues associated with the 
development of the cocoa industry in the Gold Coast we have highlighted 
the transformatory affects of the interaction between colonial contact 
and indtqenous African activities. The demand in Europe for cash 
crops, that had not hitherto been qrown in the Gold Coast, 
hastened the process in the colony towards the more overt alienation 
of land. for money payments and a system of wealth which lay less in 
the possession of people as slaves or pawns, and more in the ownership 
of land and payment for labour services with cash. But the forms of 
commodity production induced by European demand did not take on an 
overt form of the capitalist mode of production classically conceived 
with the premise of free wage labour. , The trend towards this had 
began, however, and we have. traced this development in the burgeoning 
cocoa economy and i, n the demand for mine labour. The particular form 
of capitalism which developed on the Gold Coast was, as we have seen, 
subject to a number of social forces, pressures and conflicts: these 
were both" within the colonising power, over the type of administration 
to be developed on the coast and with the European mine owners for 
labour and developing companies in Europe which demanded cash crops for 
home consumption. In addition there were conflicts within the Akan 
and northern social formations over the assimilation into an increasing 
commerical economy where old values and traditions were being eroded. 
Arguably many of these processes were in motion, in an embryonic 
form, during the incursion of colonial interests into the hinterland 
in the 1860's and 1870's. The Asante had for years used a form of 
gold currency and the power holders in Kumase and elsewhere in the 
Gold Coast colony had the basis of their power in the allocation of 
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land, (de facto ownership), and appropriation of crops. Ostensibly 
these chiefly functions were for use as stool regalia. In 'reality' 
they served to increase personal accumulation. As colonialism extended 
into the hinte-rland and the presence of a cash nexus became all impor- 
tant, this form of accumulation of wealth was transformed. 
We have seen how the colonial authorities sought at times to 
hasten. and at others to slow downthe development of wage labour and 
reduce the instances of slavery to facilitate the development of a 
capitalist mode of production in the colony more closely attuned to 
that in Europe. This was attempted by reducing constraints against 
indigenous economic development of the colony. We can now look 
briefly as to how such measures interacted with other compelling needs 
of state; that is, at the way in which the colonial state sought to 
enhance the position of its authority on the colony, and the measuýes 
it set under wayto increase the incorporation of the Colony within 
an increasing dominant international capitalist economy. How did the 
colonial state seek to maintain legitimacy in the colony? By what 
means did it seek to redress the marked unrest occurring within 
indigenous au. thorities caused through mounting colonial and commercial 
incursions? What ýtructures did the regime establish, linked to the 
need to advance its policy of indirect rule, to placate the desires of 
the chiefs to be more actively involved in the running of the colony; 
and how did the colonial state manage to appease the chiefs, while 
having simultaneously to placate the interests of the educated elite 
and other social strata on the colony? 
IV INDIRECT RULE AND THE COLONIAL STATE 
We 'shall argue that the role of the colonial state on the Gold 
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Coast in the twentieth century was essentially to placate the 
financial interests of European trading companies on the coast and 
mining and timber concerns, while simultaneously securing a stable 
political climate in the relations between the states' representatives 
and colonised people. In general, it could be said that, the 
colonial state acted: 
on behalf of the metropolitan bourgeoisie insofar 
as the interests of that bourgeoisie did not 
conflict with the interests of the state itself (1). 
The character of the colonial state cannot therefore be "reduced 
simply to that of a loyal minister to capital's needs" (2). We 
have traced above for instance a series of. conflicts between political 
interests of the colonial state and-the economic concerns of mining 
and finance capital. 
Although an arbiter of capitalist interests, the colonial 
state, at times of dissension and conflicts between European 
capitalists, which we have examined, often acted directly as an 
instrument of the dominant class or some of its fractions. In other 
words, the degree of relativeautonomy was temporarily eroded (3). 
(1) Howard, op. cit., p. 46. The classical debate on relative autonomy and thE 
inadequa-Fifesof an infrastructural analysis of the state are found in 
the exchanges between R. Miliband and N. Poulantzas, op. cit. For a dis- 
cussion of this debate and the explanations for rel autonomy see 
also E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (London: N. L. B. 
1977). See also R. -MilAband, Marxism ant Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
(2) J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, 'Coping with the Contradictions: The 
Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914, JAH 20,1979, 
pp. 489 and also 487. This point applies equally to ouF-general under- 
standing of the state in capitalist societies. This is to say the state 
is relatively autonomous from acting at the direct behest of capitalist 
interests. Individual capitalists, left to their own devices would fail 
to guarantee the conditions for securing capital accumulation. The resul 
historically has been that the maintenance of "the hierarchy of class 
domination (has) been abstracted from the economic to the political leve 
within each national social order". See also the Miliband and Poulantzas 
debate, op. cit. 
(3) Lon s dal e-an-T-Berman, op. cit., p. 490. 
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This occurred when representatives of the colonial state were busy 
fulfilling their role of securing social order on the Gold Coast 
which was often required after the "dislocative consequences of the 
expansion of the capitalist mode"(1). These theoretical points 
support the bulk of our analysis of the way in which the Gold Coast 
colonial state sought at times to brake, but at other times to 
hasten, the spread of proletarianisation in the colony. As two 
writers have recently commented: 
The colonial state straddled not one but two levels 
of articulation between the metropole and the colony 
as a whole as well as wi. thin the colony itself. It 
therefore bore a dual character: it was at once a 
subordinate agent in its restructuring of local 
production to meet metropolitan demand, yet also the 
local factor of cohesion over the heterogenious . fragmented and contradictory-social forces jostling 
within (2). 
The major role of the colonial state on the Gold Coast, and 
arguably elsewhere in Africa, was to legitimate a presence which began 
as largely naked force. For this process to be completed the state 
required the acceptance of the African population which was secured 
through the use of 'indirect rule' - the creation and use by the 
colonial regime of so-called indigenous traditional power structures. 
The second major role of the colonial state was one which largely drew 
it in conflict with satisfying its first activity. This was to ensure 
that "imported capital (was) converted from a lifeless factor of. 
production into an active social relation" (3). The contradiction of 
this latter process manifested itself in the requirements of a 
developing colonial capitalist economy which began to slowly erode 
(1 ) Ibid. 
(2) 211Z. , p. 490. (3) Ibid., p. 491. 
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the very traditional forms of social structure on which the colonial 
state vested so much hope for maintaining its control. In other 
words, the processes of indigenous class formation, often began 
prior to colonial contact, but accelerated during the development of 
European gold mining and the purchasing of concessions, eventually 
undermined the control and authority of the colonial state. 
We do not want hem to engage in the theoretical debates about 
the role of the-state on the periphery of international capitalism. 
These debates are legion (1). Nevertheless, we can and have raised 
some of the questions associated with the relationship of the state 
to society and of the, relationships between the state and the interests 
represenied on the Gold Coast among Europeans and Africans. 
The significance of the colonial state was in the establishment 
of colonial rule through an apparatus capable of suppressing all 
indigenous'classes in fhe colony. ' 
It might be said that the 'superstructure' in the 
colony is therefore 'overdeveloped' in relation to 
the structure of the colony; for its basis lies in 
the metropolitan structure itself, from which it 
is later separated at the time of independence (2). 
Superstructure here refers to the areas of state activity 
which facilitated control and acceptance of the alien regime (3). 
(1) Inter alia: W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendorfer, 'The State in Peripheral 
Societie7, in R. Miliband and J. Saville, (editors) The SocialistRe ist 
1977. (London: Merlin Press, 1977). Most discussion-F-owever 
w1tF post colonial rather than colonial society. 
(2) Hamza, Alavi, 'The State in Post Colonial Societies, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, ' NLR, 74 1972, p. 61. 
(3) In itself h6-w-ever, the reificiation of the superstructure of the develop- 
ing colonial state. must not eclipse the need to analyse more fully the 
precise relationship between the state and society. Neither must it take 
our focus aýay from recognising the conflicts within the colonial regime 
as to policies which should be adopted for the colonial administrati)on. 
-These criticisms are taken from Zieman and Lanzendorfer, op. clt*, for further criticisms of Alavi's positioh see C. Leys The 'Overdeveloped' 
Post Colonial State: a Re-evaluation' R. O. A. P. E. No. 5,1976, and John 
Saul. 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies - Tanzania', in R. Miliband 
ana J. Saville (editors), The Socialist Register 1974, (London: Merlin 
Press 1974). 
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We may now summarise some of the attempts employed by the colonial 
S4 ; ate in hoping to offset the disintegrative aspects of the colonial 
presence on the coast before concluding with the eventual demise, 
partly caused by economic depression, of colonial plans for economic 
re fo rm. 
(a) Indirect Rule 
The years between 1900 and 1930 saw various attempts by the 
colonial regime to consolidate its political control over the Gold 
Coast. We have already seen that the British 'tactic' for controlling 
the colony in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was for 
political control to be exercised wherever possible through indigenous 
power holders (1). The position of the Aborigines Rights Protection 
Society (ARPS) had been that the educated Africans' role was to be the 
representatives of the Government and spokesmen for the people. This 
position was adopted because the traditional authority holders were 
seen to have the position of rulers vested in them only through the 
"wishes"and consent of the people. The colonial administration, however, 
rejected this position (2). - Indeed the extent to which this position 
could be extended was to cause a split within the ARPS itself. 
In 1920 a section of the ARPS forrhed the National Congress of 
British West Africa (NCBWA). The NCBWA stressed the need for a greater 
rapport between the colonial state and African communities but that it 
was the role of the ncitural rulers, that is, the chiefs, and not the 
educated young men to initiate this. 
(1 ) See Chapter 5 above. 
(2) In 1924. Guggis-berg was to su(-Igest that the elite "are lacking 
conspicuously in qualities of leadershiD and responsibility", 
quoted in Edsman, op. cit., p. 84. 
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The introduction in 1916 of a new constitution helped 
initiate the NCBWA. Governor Clifford introduced measures to increase 
the size of the Legislative Council which was now to include six 
Africans - three chiefs and three educated Africans. The ARPS saw 
the move to have chiefs on the Council as unconstitutional. This 
was because the chiefs were seen not to be able to make any decisions 
without consulting their councillors and elders (1). The position of 
the ARPS had always been that the educated elite should be in 
government as the intermediary between the chiefs and colonial 
government. Increasingly, however, sections of the ARPS, notably 
Casely Hayford and the NCBWA, moved from the earlier position of. 
bolstering-the status of the chiefs to one of substituting the 
chiefs by the educated elite as leaders of the people (2). This 
position was seen as both an attack against the colonial state and 
the chiefs; it also increased the wrath of sections of the educated 
elite. The representatives of the colonial state recognised that the 
Congress section of the educated elite sought to undo previous 
colonial policy. of working through traditional institutions. We 
have already made the point that processes accompanying the Gold 
Coast's increased incorporation into the international economy served 
to erode traditional authority structures. In large part these 
processes had facilitated the development of an active educated elite 
of Africans, a section of which now sought to increase their representa- 
tion in the procedures of government but also to usurp the-authority 
(1) Edsman, 0 p. cit., p. 61. 
(2) Ibid. ' p. 65. -Fo'r more detail on the split within the ARPS see ibid., TFa-pters 2-4. One result of this change of line by the Congress was 
the narrowing of its own poli'tical base: it lay itself open to attack 
from traditionalists within the ARPS and from the chiefs. The result 
was the demise of Congress especially following the wrath of Ofori 
Atta. 
of the chiefs. This was counter to colonial state Dolicýy of bolstering 
the powers of the chief and to use them increasinqly as the vehicle for 
colonial control (1). 
The eventual outcome of the split within the ranks of the ARPS 
was to be the strengthening of the role of the chiefs and the elimina- 
tion of the position that the educated elite had managed to achieve 
over the years. In brief, the 'traditional authority' of the chiefs 
was bolstered by the government's recognition of the Head Chiefs' 
Council which Governor Guggisberg saw as an opportunity of "preservinq 
and strengthening traditional authority" and of helping "the chiefs to 
adjust their rule to changing circumstances" (2). In addition chiefly 
authority was supported by the Native Affairs Ordinance of 1927 which 
followed the development of a new constitution in 1925. In preparation 
for the new constitution the establishment of three Provincial Councils 
of head chiefs was provided for. From these provincial members would 
be drawn thanew Legislative Council (3). 
The reaction to this improved provision for chiefly representa- 
tion varied (4). - Many chiefs responded posttively to reducing the 
power of the educated elite. The Congress group within the ARPS saw 
the new constitution as a retrograde step and protested that the 
educated elite become the leaders of the African community. The ARPS 
(1) This vieW'reinforces the lack. of support of the Congress proposals 
for Municipal Corporation Ordinance 1924, see Edsman, op. cit., 
pp. 67-81. 
(2) Ibid., p. 83. 
(3) XT-m-Fle op. ci ., pp. 446-448 and Edsman cit., p. 83. ': op. cit., p. 83. The order consii"ied a legislative* (4) Edsman tU 
council or-7-members, 16 official and 14 unofficial including 9 
Africans and 6 chiefs elected by 3 Provincial Councils of Head 
chiefs and 3 Municipal members. Provincial eligibility was 
restricted to head chiefs. 
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protested also that the Provincial Councils should be able to elect 
commoners as well as head chiefs. There was much opposition to the 
new constitution. The ARPS-Congress petitioned the government and 
tried to encourage the cýiefs not to implement or be involved with 
it. Unfortunately for the ARPS discussion within its ranks as to 
which critical perspective should be adopted: one of ARPS traditionalism 
the ARPS as arbiters between the government and chiefs, or Congress 
modern, ism the westernisation of government and direct African repre- 
sentation through the educated elite, obscuredan overt assault on the 
lack of 'educated' African participation. in government (1). Unable 
to develop support for the position of direct African representation 
Casely Hayford recognised increasingly the need to try and work from 
within the Constitution. This disquiet continued until, as with the 
rest of the ARPS, the need to mobilise against the colonial state once 
more came to a head. This later occasion was the Native Affairs 
Ordinance 1927 which along with previous attempts at imposing colonial 
rule received a stormy passage. 
Since 1922 attempts had been made at imposing a Native Affairs 
Bill which could regularise and codify the powers and jurisdiction of 
indigenous power holders (2). There now began another attempt to 
speficy the nature of native jurisdiction in the desire to minimise 
the amount of unrest-among' Africans. Part of this unrest was trans- 
lated into dissatisfaction with head chiefs who were destooled (3). 
The position of traditional authorities had come increasingly under 
attack. We have seen, for example, the effects of increasing 
(1) For the specific differences, Edsman op. cit., pp. 85-90. 
(2) Chapter 5. 
(3) The recorded number of chiefs destooled rose from 7 in 1904-8 to 
41 in 1919-24. 
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monetisation and the colonial demand for permanent wage labour and 
the disruption that thistogether with changes in indigenous relations 
of production emanating from the development of cocoa, caused for 
traditional power holders. On the more overtly political frontýas 
the. processes of incorporation into the international economy 
progressed, chiefs saw their authority threatened daily and the successor 
to them was the educated elite. The ARPS had become particularly 
threatening in their campaign against the chiefs' presence at Provincial 
Councils. Governor Guggisberg now decided not to initiate a Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance. Instead, the viewwas adopted that because of 
previous constant opposttion the chiefs must introduce ideas themselves 
for codifying the position of traditional power holders (1). Such a 
Bill was initiated by Ofori Atta in 1927 following consultation with 
other. chiefs. The proposed Native Affairs Ordinance (N. A. 0. ) has been 
seen as a way of trying to reconcile traditional authority structures 
with changing economic conditions through safeguarding the institution 
of chieftaincy. In short, the Bill was to. provide for the strengthening 
of the institution of chieftainship and consequently Was seen by the 
educated elite as an attack on the rights of 'ordinary Africans' 
especially themsblves (2). Although the chiefs now accepted the 
doctrine of 'derived jurisdiction', that is, in the last analysis chiefly 
power was vested in the Crown, the institutions. of government facilitated 
greater representation in the administration of the country, particularly 
on the local level. The colonial state had managed to extend the policy 
of. indirect rule by getting the chiefs to initiate legislation themselves 
(1 ) Kimble, op. cit p. 491 . (2) For details of*ihe provisions see Metcalfe, op. cit., Document 472, 
p. 629; Kimble, op. cit., pp. 106-123. 
436 
and thereby let the latter take the brunt of whatever criticism might 
devel op. 
Briefly, the main conditions of the Bill were for the State 
Council to become the senior authority within each state for deciding 
disputes between stools and for the Provincial Councils to receive 
formal administrative and judicial powers. The important point in 
connection with the State Council is that although its powers were 
specifically increased, appeals and a number of specific cases lay 
with the new colonial state. In this way the"Native Affairs Ordinance 
was the final outcome of a long series of attempts to regulate the 
chiefs' jurisdiction and its relationship to British executive and 
judicial authority"(1). For example, the State Council now had the 
authority to examine disputes arising from elections and the deposition 
of chiefs. If the issue was not resolved the case would go to the 
Provincial Council where the Governor had the final word. The situation 
led to a Gold Coast leader writer to comment that: 
The time is coming when a chief once installed 
will sit firmly on the neck of the people like the 
old man of the sea, and rule in his own way without 
any lawful means of getting rid of him (2). 
Whatever power lay in the hands of commoners and the educated elite in lidtin 
the authority of the chiefs was now being eroded. The colonial state 
was ensuring the 'stability' of the society by supporting chiefs 
against the newly emerging groups of educated Africans and embryonic 
wage workers. Another example of the Administration's authority to 
ý1) Edsman,. op. cit , p. 12. 2) Gold Coast Times, 19.3.1927 quoted in Kimble, op. cit., p. 94. 
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sanction or be involved in matters of hitherto traditional business 
was the right of formal appeal to the Governor by parties involved 
in disputes of a political or constitutional nature between chiefs 
of similar rank in the same state (1). 
The passing of the NAO marked another defeat for the educated 
elite which-sought greater representation and control over what were 
seen to be increasingly undemocratic institutions; the colonial and 
the 'traditional'. Although the ARPS petitioned against the Bill on 
the grounds that only twenty four'Paramount chiefs out of sixty one 
had accepted the Provincial Council the Bill was passed and marked 
the further demise of the ARPS.. The Act reflected the consolidation 
of the authority of the colonial state. This was facilitated 
importantly by a clause giving the chiefs the right to assemble and 
codify traditional law. As we have already mentioned (2) the reifica- 
tion of 'traditional law' was initiated by the colonial authorities 
in their attempt to sanction the development of a legal structure 
with which to control indigenous activity. This process now came to 
the fore. It was an aspect of the Bill which the ARPS rightly argued 
against as it was seen that-first: "a head chief has no power to make, 
or join in the making of laws for his people" and second; that any 
such codification gave to the "said Paramount chief the bulk of the 
rights for which he was contending". As another writer has said, 
"the chief could easily frame as 'customary law' the measures necessary 
to make himself an autocrat" (3j. 
This further move at indirect rule by the colonial state 
(1) For further examples. of colonial state-control see Edsman, op. cit., p. 109 
(2) Chapter 5. 
(3) ARPS petition 13/2/1928 section 13, quoted in Edsman, op. cit., p. 118. 
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withdrew British political activities from local African politics 
and administration, but left the British administrators with the right 
to interfere with indigenous disputes when so requested by the chiefs. 
The authority of the chiefs was vested in the Crown but the opportunity 
was given for the traditional office holders to help mediate the effects 
of increasing European. commercial presence. Instead of allowing the 
traditional positions to be usurped by the educated elite the colonial 
administration provided for the establishment of 'indigenous' institutions 
to cope with increasing disputes emanating from the British presence (1). 
The British colonial administrations support for the chiefs 
against a developing educated elite was in keeping with the practice of 
indirect rule. With an impending international financial crisis and 
the perennial shortage of funds on the Gold Coast the British felt that 
it was financiallYand politically more stable to support the chiefs. The 
British were wary of the dislocative effects of the emerging class of 
educated Africans and the impact of an increasing wage labour force. 
In short, the imperatives of depression and political control, together 
with the fear of an emerging new class and the underlying racism upon 
which these' positions were based led the British to support ailing and 
struggling chiefly authority. 
(b) The Colonial State: Economic Expansion and Decline 
A corollary to the political consolidation of the British 
states'pre sence on the Gold Coast was itsý direct expanded involvement 
in developing the infrastructure of the colony. We have already made 
The increased separation of chi-efs from colonial administration 
at least on paper resulting from these measures of indirect rule 
also had the effect of putting the onus of good government on the 
chiefs and not the colonial regime, thereby laying the chiefs open 
for attacks on any level of abuse. 
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the point that the intention of the colonial state was to facilitate 
the increased presence of European capital on the coast when this 
did not conflict with maintaining order there. We have also seen 
that this position was not without inevitable conflicts. We can now 
look briefly at the biggest colonial plan for developments of certain 
areas of the colony and the reason behind this. 
The Guggisberg administration, 1920-30ý introduced measures 
which were conceived to try and tie the Gold Coast economies more 
closely to the economy of Britain and in a new way: one linked to 
increased fixed capital expenditures in the colony. Praised as the 
most integrated plan of development ever imposed by the British on 
the Gold Coast, Guggisberg, sought to capitalise on the economic growth 
of the colony since the turn of the century and to develop ways in 
which it could be extended. In particular this meant raising 
expenditure on infrastructural developmentnotably transport, to 
facilitate the easier evacuation of cash crops and minerals produced, 
in the hinterland of the colony (1). Out of a total expenditure of 
twenty five million pounds for example, 12 million was set aside. for 
the construction of Takoradi harbour, fourteen. and a half million 
pounds for railways and il million for roads. There was also a 
concerted attempt to try and diversify the Gold Coast agricultural 
industry. The development of the cocoa industry had been encouraged, 
albeit tentativelythrough the provision of better transport 
facilities especially railways but now feeder roads were built to 
(1) For discussion of Guggisberg's Ten Year Plan, see, Hymer, in 
Ranis op. cit. We have already discussed in some detail the 
confli-ct-s- 67 interest which presented themselves to the colonial 
state especially with regard to investment in transport. 
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get the cocoa to the coast. Plans were also set in motion to revive 
the palm oil industry and sisal plantations near Takoradi. Accompanying 
these initiatives was also the Forestry Ordinance Act of 1927. 
The implementation of these measures was not easy. There were 
difficulties due to a lack of skilled manpower, mainly because colonial 
authorities had neglected the training of personnel. There was also 
fierce competition for labour between the colonial regime and commercial 
interests in mining and agriculture. In addition to these constraints 
in initiating a change in the direction of government spending there 
was a shortage of funds available to raise the infrastructure of the 
colony. Since 1891 and the gold rush in the western part of the 
colony, mining concerns had called for the easier access to gold 
bearing areas so greater amounts of machinery cauld be imported and 
greater amounts-of gold exported. A similar argument was made for 
a deep water harbour at Takoradi (1). It was thought that the 
development of rail links would simultaneously satisfy private European 
commerical interests exploiting the resources of the Gold Coast forest 
and the colonial regime which sought to raise revenue wherever possible. 
Monies received for the use of government developed rail routes, for 
example, between 1904-1925 averaged twenty six per cent of total 
government revenue (2). European interests were well represented in 
the administration of the colony. In 1926 the Gold Coast Legislative 
Council included 5 European unofficial members together with a member 
We- have seen that this does not mean it was built without some 
difficulties and indeed opposition. The latter came especially 
from a selection of colonial officials who doubted the prudence of 
financing* the exercise from a E4 million loan at 6% raised in London. 
(2) Howard, op. cit., p. 170. This did not last for long as competition 
from Afr-ican-Torry drivers reduced revenue in 1927 to 31%. and 1928-38 
the government received no revenue from railways at all. 
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elected by a mercantile electorate nominated by firms working on the 
colony recognised by the Chamber of Commerce. This mercantile 
representation in the administration was supported by similar 
representatives in England where Royal Commissions were ensured 
business participation (1). This merchant support among the ranks 
of colonial officials in the colony and at home in England did not 
preclude conflict within the colonial state as to the correct 
direction for colonial policy. Mining interests, for example, were 
opposed to government assistance in the cocoa industry as it drew 
labour away from work underground to more profitable and healthy 
agricultural pursuits above ground (2). 
Guggisberg's Ten Year Plan allowed for the greater diversifi- 
cation of agricultural activities as well as the placating of European 
industrial commercial interests through improved transport links and 
harbour facilities. Unfortunately for Guggisberg, and for the people 
of the colony, the attempts made to increase the colonies! links with 
the international capitalist economy were themselves subject to the 
vagaries of the international capitalist economy. As financial 
disaster in Europe and North America approached with the crash of 
1929-30 so too did the opportunites for securing a more profitable 
economy on the coast. Exports failed to improve because of diminishing 
prices in real value of the country's commodities. The 1940's were 
to bring little change with increases in prices of imports. In fact, 
the financial crash in Europe hit the colonial regime so hard that 
(1) See ibid., for example, Commission of Trade and Taxation (1921)'. 
(2) This-Fas been pursued further by Green and Hymer op. cit., see 
also Miles, cit., for the development of oligopo-1-1sation in 
agriculture an te conflict between big and small expatriate 
agricultural concerns. 
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Guggisberg's plans had to be curtailed because of lack of revenue. 
The contradiction of being linked to the increasingly more powerful 
world economy came to the -fore as Gold Coast producers were helpless 
to obviate falling international demand for cocoa, rubber and other 
cash crops. The col. onial state had sought to turn the Gold Coast 
economy ever more outward towards Europe, to satisfy the demands of 
capitalist development there, but at the time when this was done with 
greater vigour the world economy disintegrated and took the Gold 
Coast economy with it. 
V CONCLUSION 
This chapter has concluded our examination of the processes 
involved in the British colonial incursion of the Gold Coast. We 
have traced in sow detail the ways in which the British attempted 
to legitimise formal colonial rule on the coast. Coercive, ideological 
and administrative measures were adopted by the colonial regime to 
ensure the entrenchment of the colonial-state. We have examined the 
development of 'indirect rule' through which the British sought to 
build upon and often create the power of 'traditional' authority 
holders so that the colonial authorities might work througb indigenous 
power structures. On the surface this colonial strategy was prompted 
by a lack of funds. It was cheaper and required less manpower for the 
colonial regime to work through indigenous power holders, rather than 
establish a whole new complex of administration and then have the 
6-dditional job of encouraging the Gold Coast inhabitants into accepting 
al. ien legal praqtices. The reality of indirect rule of course as we 
showed earlier (1), was that the colonial regime actually established 
(1) Chapter 5. 
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not only a colonial form of judicial and political administration 
on the coast but also imposed new forms of 'native', legal paraphenalia 
on the local people. In stressing the need to work through local 
structures the colonial state often crea. ted their own chiefs and 
frequently imposed alien 'indigenous' forms of native customary law. 
Underlying the discussion of colonial attempts to legitimise 
its rule we have examined in detail processes set in motion by the 
colonial presence linked with the proletarianisation of an indigenous 
work force. In addition to the process of class formation relatihg 
to the forced migration of northern labourers, to work in the gold 
mines in. Tarkwa and Prestea, we have traced briefly the emergence of 
an indigenous cocoa economy. The latter was based largely upon the 
'voluntary' migration of northern peopleto work on the cocoa farms 
in Ashanti and elsewhereand the workers formed the basis for a 
developing rural wage labour force. The employers of labour were 
themselves usually migrants who entered the forest belt of central 
Gold Coast to purchase the right to farm land by giving chiefs a lump 
sum payment. After a short while and a mounting shortage of land, 
this once only payment for the right to cultivate land was transformed 
into a regular abusa tribute payment. 
A feature of the colonial presence in the colony had been the 
degree of conflict and Tack of unaminity of 'policy' in relation to 
the pace and nature of European commercial incursions inland. We 
saw in Chapter Five, with the development of mining concessions and 
operations in the western part of the Gold Coast Colony, that there 
was, no clear cut colonial policy relating to the desired impact of 
drawing Afri. can labour away from its pre-colonial modes of production. 
The same degree of ambivalence was shown by the colonial authorities 
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in relation to European incursion into the Northern Territories and 
to the development of an indigenous cocoa industry. Unsure of the 
economic benefit of allowing the persistence of pre-colonial modes 
of productionthe colonial state was wary of facilitating the 
wholesale and permanent migration of labourers from the Northern 
Territories to the mines in the western part of the colony. This, 
as we have seen, led to conflicts between the colonial administration 
and the European mine owners who lacked sufficient SUPDlies of labour 
to mine gold. In time the British administration in the Northern 
Territories became more brutal. Local chiefs were encouraged, often 
forcefully, to recruit labour for the mines and later for the railways 
and the military. This form of indirect rule led to increased local 
insurrection against the British and indigenous chiefs who were 
identified as working with the colonial power. 
Our examination of British activities in the north, together 
with the assessment of the development of cash crops like rubber, 
palm oil and later cocoa, has reinforced ouý earlier suggestion that 
colonialism on the Gold Coast did not have the effect of immediately 
dissolving local modes of production. Instead our point throughout 
has been that colonial actions were beset by both internal conflicts 
of interest and conflicts with indigenous Akan and Northern groups. 
On the one handimmediate economic gain was sought from the colony 
and this would best be achieved by allowing the European capitalist 
firms carte blanche. with the subsequent tendency to erode indigenous 
forms of production. On the other hand, the reality of colonial rule 
was that law and order had also to be maintained for economic plunder 
to be facilitated. Indirect rule became the instrument for ensuring 
different degrees of law-and order although invariably the coercive 
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arm of the colonial state was always ready and frequently used, as a 
means to ensure British legitimacy. Indirect rule meant the propping 
up of indigenous power relations and modes of production. The contra- 
diction for the colonial state was that acts of ensuring the continued 
viability of indigenous modes of production, coincided with the latter 
suffering from the disintegrating impact of capitalist incursion like 
the cash nexus, and proletarianisation of peasant producers. 
A culmination of the difficulties for the colonial authorities 
in this regard became evident in the 1930's and was confirmed by the 
Nowell Commission (1). This Commission recognised the development of 
a 'capitalist' class of cocoa farmers and all that this meant for the 
colonial authorities. This was namely that the achievement of the 
hitherto small petty commodity producerswas eroded. This class had 
previously grown some cash crops together with subsistence crops. 
The success of this was now minimised by the development of a distinct 
class involved mainly with cash crop production and also involved in 
utilising the labouriof others. We have tracedbriefly the development 
of a labour hiring economy in the cocoa growing areas. The emerging 
class of cocoa farmers now also challenged the authority of large 
European trading firms which had previously managed to manipul'ate the 
smaller class of peasant producers (2). In addition to the threat 
posed to the European trading. companies, by the development of an 
indigenous class of cocoa growers who possessed the means of production 
in their own right, such a development also challenged the authority of 
local power holders. An additional threat to the dominance of. chiefly 
(1) Nowell Commission Report, 1938, quoted in Grier op. cit., p. 39. 
(2) Grier, op. cit., p. 39. 
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authority came from the increasingly more powerful educated elite 
of Africans who used the ARPS and the NCBWA as a vehicle for 
expressing their desire for greater Africa participation in Government. 
This section of lawyers and professional men were to become a running 
sore in the-side of the colonial administration for years to come. 
On many occasions the chiefs themselves entered into cash crop 
production and in so doing strengthened their position of power and 
authority over the Oman. Where this did not occur, however, individual 
wealth and authority began to outweigh that of the chiefs. This 
development, similar in effect to the development of an educated elite 
in the nineteenth century, also hastened the demise of chiefly - 
authority and now posed a threat to the way in which the colonial 
regime channelled its authority through indigenous structures. 
Throughout the nineteenth century indirect rule had been based on 
supporting the most powerful traditional indigenous groups against 
likely contenders for local power. The twentieth century now saw the 
culmination of the processes set in train by colonial transformation 
and provided the conditions for chiefly authority to be challenged. 
The scene was now set for conflicts to emerge within a nationalist 
movement eager to take power and authority from the British. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have traced the interplay between indigenous development 
within the Gold Coast and the incorporation of the territory from 
ca. 1471 into the growing capitalist international economy of the 
twentieth century. Early European interest with plundering the 
economies of the inhabitants on the Gold Coast was twofold: first, 
with the exploitation of gold dust, a substance that had been produced 
by the Akan for centuries, for which there was an increasing demand 
in Europe, and second, the appropriation and seizure of African 
slaves to work plantations in the Caribbean which produced crops 
demanded by newly industrialising Britain. We have traced the impact 
of the Atlantic slave trade upon the'Akan and distinguished this 
externally initiated trade from indigenous slave trading and categories 
of local unfree labour. 
In the last part of the nineteenth century, four hundred years 
after the first Portuguese-visit to the Guinea Coast, Europeans on the 
littoral still sought to appropriate gold from western Gold Coast but 
the techniques used for so doing, (and thus the labour process and 
impact upon Gold Coast society), were quite different. The early 
informal colonialism of the Portuguese, Dutch and English had been 
based upon merchant capital; the buying cheap and selling dear of 
commodities (for the most part) already produced. Only infrequently 
had Europeans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries sought to 
intervene directly in the appropriation of the commodities of the Gold 
Coast by establishing their own productive enclaves. As European 
demand for gold rose so too did the European desire to become actively 
involved in its extraction. This, together with nineteenth and later 
5C 
twentieth century attempts at encouraging indigenous cash crop 
production partly destroyed, but also acted to maintain, certain 
indigenous relations of production. 
Our view of understanding colonial transformation on the 
Gold Coast has not located the dynamic for change simply upon 'external' 
or 'internal' pressures. Indeed it has been our contention throughout 
this thesis, that such a dualistic formulation for understanding the 
processes for social change on the Gold Coast, between ca. 1400-1930, 
is both unhelpful and obfuscaiory. Instead, we have stressed the 
need to recognise the dialectical interaction between the Akan, (and 
the whole complex of their relations of production) and the colonial 
incursions on the coast and the dynamic for colonial expansion from 
Europe to West Africa. 
Power in pre-colonial Akan areas was dependent upon the 
allocation of land and the control over slaves. We have stressed that 
chiefs and headmen were atop a hierarchy within each pre-colonial 
state because of inter alia: the rights invested in them to allocate 
land to the landless, and because of their ability to appropriate 
greater numbers of unfree labourers to work on their own disproportion- 
ately large tracts of land. In addition to slaves, chiefs also had 
the power to call on the labour of 'free' men and women to work their 
land. Commoner men in the hierarchy of power appropriated the labour 
of their wives and their children. The sexual division of labour in 
the Akan social formation ensured that women worked both in the fields 
and in the home of the domestic productive unit. 
As the colonial institutional presence on the coast increased 
so too did European commercial merchants' demands for greater security 
in their trading activities. Conflicts existed throughout the eighteenth 
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and nineteenth centuries between European merchants and the British 
administration on the coast and the state in Europe. These conflicts 
centred around the most appropriate form or pace of commercial links 
between Europeans and indigenous traders. We have seen in chapters 
3-4, how British traders, and then government, entrenched their position 
on the coast only after numerous conflicts between themselves and with 
the local inhabitants. The impact of developing a form of 'legitimate' 
commerce with the Akan, following the end of the international slave 
trade, was to disrupt indigenous relations of production. European 
contact had not, and was never up to, completely eroding indigenous 
relations of production. Early attempts at formalising 'colonial' 
rule, however, of regularising commercial trading practices, led to 
armed conflicts and certainly imposed strains on the indigenous social 
formation. In the early nineteenth century, the British administration 
on the coast sought to end some local African relations of production 
which were seen to inhibit the free development of a capitalism known 
in Europe; a capitalism which existed on the basis of free wage labour 
and the sanctity of private property. But these early measures were 
largely equivocal and fragmentary. It was not until the establishment 
of formal colonial rule in 1874, that the British attempted to impose 
a structure upon Gold Coast inhabitants which was intended-to ensure 
the smoother incursion of colonial capitalism in the colony. 
The particular political framework for ensuring the establishment 
of a political economy in tandem with the wishes of the colonial 
authorities was 'indirect rule'. Indirect rule provided the political 
and administrative umbrella, under which the developing colonial state 
sought to create the pre-conditions for the particular form of capitalist 
development on the coast, but also to control the pace and nature of 
$5 
capitalist development on the colony. This is not to say that the 
colonial state, in the late nineteenth century was even then a 
monolithic unit. The degree of class and fractional conflict and 
confusion emanating from Whitehall, Cape Coast and Accra, concerning 
amongst other things, the best form that colonialism should take suggests 
that at no time was such a cohesion state organisation present on the 
Gold Coast. All that existed, towards the end of the nineteenth century 
were a set of emerging institutional apparatuses which were used by 
colonial administrators in a period of colonial state formation and 
which were the outcome of a compromise between different competing 
factions of a British bourqeoisie. 
The British 'policy' of indirect rule sought to ensure government 
by local inhabitants with the minimum of expenditure and the maximum of 
effective control. We have seen that the colonial administration however, 
was not always able to impose its will on the local populace, indeed, 
much of the colonial states' actions can be seen to come as a reaction 
to indigenous conflicts. Indirect rule was in one sense a policy to 
lessen some of the destabilising effects of increasing capitalist 
incursions on the coast and inland. We have argued that instead of 
colonial capitalist development dissolving indigenous modes of 
production their erosion was partial and piecemeal. This resulted in 
part from (or was reflected in) the ambivalent attitude of the colonial 
authorities towards indigenous relations of production. On the one 
hand, indirect rule propped up local power holders, and thereby maintained 
indigenous relations of power which we discussed in Chapter 1. On the 
other hand, the increased presen'ce of European colonial commercial 
practices, the proletarianisation of the local work force, the increase 
in the 'cash nexus' and opportunity for private trading acted to undermine 
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the very indigenous power structures upon which the colonial regime 
laid so much store for maintaining law and order. It was this contra- 
diction which persisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in varying degrees of intensity which beset the colonial 
state. In safeguarding colonial capitalism the colonial authorities 
were never wholeheartedly committed to the complete erosion of local 
modes of production. Instead, colonial 'policy' with regard to 
transforming indigenous forms of production was ad hoc and confused. 
Foremost in the colonial administratorsminds was the need to provide 
the conditions for making the colony pay for itselfbut the cost 
involved in facilitating this was too high if it meant a constant 
military solution to subjugate the local inhabitants. 
We have traced in some detail the particular vacillation of 
colonial policy in 'pacifying' the people of the Gold Coast, Asante 
and the Northern Territories. We have located the reasons for these 
vacillations in three and closely dialectically interrelated areas. 
First, we examined the conflicts between and within European class and 
national interests for establishing a colony on the West African 
littoral, (Chapters 2-3). Second, we have looked at internal conflicts 
between the Akan which affected the nature of colonial transformation 
in theiterritory, (Chapters 3-4). Finally, we have tried throughout 
the thesis to show that it is only in examining the interrelationship 
of local and international social forces that a fuller, and more complete, 
picture of colonial transformation on the Gold Coast can be obtained, 
(Chapters 4-6). In other words, colonial transformation may not have 
been a one way process and certainly not the acting out of the colonial 
'Will', (it was vacillating as we have stressed), but there was a 
process - whose dynamic it has been the task of this thesis to uncover. 
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The focus of analysis for this thesis has therefore contrasted 
with previous work on the Gold Coast, and indeed with much writing on 
colonialism. We have integrated an examination of the social processes 
for European expansion to the Gold Coast with an understanding of pre- 
colonial relations of production in the incorporated territory and the 
way they shaped changed. Having established the latter, we have been 
able to see more clearly the kind of impact that colonialism had upon 
the way in which the Akan produced their means of subsistence and of 
trade. 
We await a similar analysis of the later period of formal 
colonialism on the Gold Coast and the transition to politicalindependence. 
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GLOSSARY 
OF MAIN IFSAITT- T14I TERMS 
This glossary presents the principal Asante Twi terms that 
appear in the text. It is constructed on the basis of preferred 
Asante orthography although for reasons of simplicity this practice 
has not been followed in the text. The Asante Twi ". -All therefore 
appears as "o" and the "f-" as Ile" in personal and place names in the 
text. Moreover, this glossary has been alphabetized by omitting the 
initial vowel or initial nasal I'm" and 'In". )man therefore appears 
under I'm" and Asantehene under 'Is" below. 
See Lewin (1978) and Wilks (1975) for a fuller listing of 
Asante Twi terms. 
N 
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B 
abusua . ..... matriclan or matrilineage; the head of an abusua is 
pl. mmusua abusua-panin, pl. abusua-mpanifm . 
D 
odekuro ..... a lesser ranked chief; usually the head of a town or 
pl. adekurofo7 village. 
dommum . ..... a captive taken in times of war 
pl. nnommum 
ýdýnk) ..... a person who is bought; usually a slave; 
pl. nmnk: ýfo) unfree plantation labourer 
Odwira ..... The most significant annual Asante festival; held both 
in Kumase and the outlying districts; has political and 
religious importance. 
E 
fekuo literally, a "grouping" of persons with something in 
common; used to refer to the main divisions or departments 
of government of officeholders in Kumase. 
G 
Gyaase refers to the fekuo responsible for the maintenance of 
Asantehene's royal household; led by the Gyaasehene 
H 
')hene, ruler, head or leader of a polity, district, or 
pl. ahene organization 
5 "o 
K 
akoa literally, "a subject" of the Asantehene and thus 
pl. nkoa a citizen of the Asante Nation. 
kontihene The military ti'tle of the Bantomahene of Kumase. 
Akwamuhene Second-in-command of an army after the Kontihene; 
title held by the Asafohene of Kumase, 
)kyeame ..... linguist, secretary, spokesman, or adviser 
to the 
pl. akyeame Asantehene and his councillors; participated in 
decision-making, and member of Council of Kumase. 
M 
. iman a situational and functional 
term referring to 
pl. aman district, territorial division, state, or nation, 
depending upon the context used; hence Asanteman. 
Amansie literally, "origin of nation", refers to the southern 
region of metropolitan Asante, including the districts 
of Amoafo, Bekwae, Dadiase, Danyase and Kokofu. 
amanto: 1 ..... the five largest and oldest territorial districts 
of the metropolitan region: Bekwae, Dwaben, Kokofu, 
Mampon and Nsuta. 
p 
panin literally, "the older". 
apeato) ..... A special purpose tax, levied to cover the costs 
of military operations. 
S 
asafo. a unit or company organized for communal or military 
purposes; hence, asafohene or asahene, a military 
leader or commander 
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Asantehene 
Asanteman 
si ka 
sika futuro 
sikani 
pl. askiafo 
or asikafo-) 
w 
awowa 
the head of the Asante Nation and a male member 
of the royal Oyoko dynasty. 
literally, "the Asante Nation"; refers to the 
Asante Union in contrast to the Asante Nkabom, 
or Asante Confederacy. 
gold, money. 
gold dust 
a person of wealth in the community; a"rich man" 
a pawn; person sold for a debt; unfree status. 
a 
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